Awards (Page 12)

On June 8, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the leader of Myanmar, inaugurated the Thanlyin Bridge 3, which connects Yangon’s business hub with the Thilawa Special Economic Zone.

The bridge, which was inaugurated in 2019 with a 31 billion yen ( US$ 97 million ) loan from the Japan International Cooperation Agency ( JICA ), represents economic growth under the State Administration Council ( SAC ) junta, which is largely at odds with the widespread armed conflict and economic decline its coup has caused.

However, only days later, military-controlled media reported that security forces had foiled a story to strike the bridge opening ceremony. In a personnel ‘ cover area close to the bridge, several people were detained along with two 107mm rockets and launch gear. The following morning, two more were detained with another spacecraft.

SAC- aligned media claimed that” (o ) n the morning of June 8, 2024, in an old wooden cabin in the shipyard workers ‘ housing area in Ward 61 of Dagon Myothit ( Seikkan ) Township… several UG (underground ) members were apprehended … ( a ) ccording to a report from a concerned resident opposed to terrorism”.

The defense media, which can never endure displaying a “perp- map” of mug shots and reported connections between the conspirators, designated some of them as “rocket shooter”,” shooter assistant”, and” position check”.

According to the report,” Arkar Min (yet to be apprehended ) of the Brigade Drone Force PDF ( People’s Defense Force )” posted instructions on Instagram for using rockets in the third week of April 2024. Phyu Hnin Aye, another alleged leader, was given the title” Rocket shooting director ( at large from Mae Sot )”

The SAC denied alleging that the exiled National Unity Government ( NUG) was responsible for the alleged plot, instead referring to it as a murder attempt on Min Aung Hlaing’s life. If that was the objective, it raises doubts about the skill of the opposition forces to launch an operation that might have decapitated the SAC’s most powerful members.

In a conversation released in the state media two days after the incident, Min Aung Hlaing” stoned the need to eradicate terrorists in Yangon Region.” He also emphasized that people must monitor terrorist moves with security awareness and knowledge to maintain peace and stability.

A unique admission of instability or the anxieties of a war criminal who has only endured a probable assassination story? How many other attempts have been made to get at the most despised gentleman in Myanmar?

Some Burmese resistance makes expressed initial enthusiasm that Vice Senior General Soe Win, the SAC second in command, had been killed in a drone strike at the defense Southeast Command in Mawlamyine in mid-April.

After not seeing him for some days, rumors began that he had been seriously injured, that he was receiving extensive treatment in Yangon, or that he had been moved to an Indian doctor, but he soon surfaced in remarkably good health.

Unmanned aerial vehicles ( UAVs ) have been becoming more popular among those opposed to SAC, as evidenced by the largely symbolic drone attack on Naypyidaw, the military’s fortress capital, in early April, which did little harm but did have a certain repercussions on the military leadership.

However, the gate story reveals a number of more significant styles in the SAC conflict. On the one hand, it illustrates that industrial operations, which have been mostly low- level, irregular and in decline over the past year, are also practical if an urban cell can form, operate, plan and surveil a target, and smuggle into Yangon ordnance to carry out an attack. An exact rocket launch would have been more dramatic.

Another view would be that the security services ‘ intelligence is sufficient to prevent such resistance operations, as they have done in numerous large metropolitan areas like Yangon and Mandalay.

Many predictions made up for a flurry of industrial uprisings to following the successful Operation 1027 in northern Shan condition in October, which saw insurgents capture scores of towns and over 200 military posts. However, this was a failure, partly because it was challenging to organize urban operations in Myanmar’s skilled and brutal police state.

The incident also highlights the air of twisted normalcy that echoes through Yangon, where the regime’s top leader, Japanese engineers from the Nippon Koei Company, and rebellious SAC members like former Karen leader Mahn Nyein Maung construct new infrastructure as if the situation were to remain stable.

The embattled regime has largely lost control over areas like that crucial section of the Asia Highway, including that crucial section of the Asia Highway, where the regime blatantly claimed the bridge” will help use the East-West Economic Corridor, which will benefit the Hpa-an/Myawady area, as well as the development of Mon and Kayin states, as well as the improvement connection with regional countries.”

However, the bridge operation also raises important concerns about choosing resistance targeting tactics. 107mm rockets have been used in numerous battlefronts in Myanmar and are notoriously inaccurate and prone to malfunction.

The Chinese military developed a Type 63 multiple launch system in the 1960s, which is typically used in very low-tech mode, propped on a stand or sandbag, and ignited with a simple battery in a “fire and forget” manner. They were well-known among the Mujahideen in Afghanistan as a result of their resistance against the Soviets and have a range of several kilometers.

Before and after the coup, 107mm rockets were popular with many Myanmar resistance groups and were used in numerous attacks on built-up or airfields. Resistance forces deployed 12 against Mandalay’s Tada U airport in January, with only five actually igniting.

It’s unknown how much damage was done to the military airfield at Nam Paung, which is close to Myitkyina, the state capital of Kachin. The rockets are plentiful, easy to use and indicative of the asymmetric nature of Myanmar’s scattered armed conflicts.

However, two recent incidents warrant greater scrutiny of the anti-military resistance forces’ decision-making processes. The SAC claims that a large number of 107mm rockets were taken in Bago in the first few days of February, and that the” Dark Side Revolution Burma” ( DSRB ) PDF was planning attacks on tea shops and restaurants where large crowds gathered to watch the annual Myanmar Academy Awards ceremony on television.

There is no proof that the group was planning a similar attack against civilians. This could potentially be a false flag claim against the SAC because the DSRB is not a widely active organization.

The Mandalay PDF, however, fired nearly a dozen rockets into Pyin U Lwin in April during the annual Thingyan water festival, hitting a military academy, killing two Buddhist monks, and seriously injuring a number of civilians, including children.

Although it was n’t widely known at the time, resistance forces might be responsible for this war crime. The use of indiscriminate weapons, especially in developed areas, could also be against international humanitarian law.

If Min Aung Hlaing had n’t been targeted by such misguided munitions in a sizable crowd of civilians, it might have been a war crime. But the “bridge plot” should also serve as a moment of clarity for the resistance.

The SAC uses indiscriminate weapons against large crowds every day, killing civilians across the nation with airstrikes and artillery. Extreme or desperate measures may have a counter-productive effect on anti-SAC forces, even those that are planning the assassination of senior regime figures. Innocent civilians may become collateral damage.

Independent analyst David Scott Mathieson studies Myanmar’s conflict, humanitarian, and human rights issues.

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