Sure A Not

Smedley Butler, a retired Sea public and two-time Medal of Honor recipient, released a 55-page book in 1935 that wowed the nation. The book, entitled” War is a Racket”, was reprinted in Reader’s Digest, assuring a mass airflow at the time. Butler summed up his debate in this manner:

War&nbsp, is a&nbsp, stick. It always has been. It is probably the oldest, simply the most lucrative, certainly the most vicious. It is the only one with a global context. The profits are only expressed in money and the costs are expressed in life, in the only other way. A ball is ideal described, I believe, as something that is not what it seems to the majority of the citizens. Just a small “inside” group knows what it is about. It is carried out to the detriment of the very few, at the cost of the very few. Out of battle a few people make great fortunes.

Butler’s reasoning has lingered to this day. It’s difficult to understand why so many billions of dollars and tens of thousands of modern weapons were wasted in a NATO effort to expand its frontiers as we look at the horror in Ukraine.

Due to the US’s emptiness of both its military and government, the conflict in Ukraine has weakened the country. It has undermined US interests abroad, especially in the Pacific, where a frantic China is then challenging Taiwan, the Philippines and Japan. &nbsp, &nbsp,

But even more is involved, and this includes NATO itself. The first defense alliance was established in 1949 as a means of preventing the spread of communism in eastern and western Europe. &nbsp,

With the fall of the Soviet Union, socialism vanished in Europe in 1991. Yet the somewhat popular Italian Communist Party fell, and was replaced by a few far-left communist organizations that have never gained any support.

Despite the collapse, or better still, disregarding the collapse, instead of NATO dissolving ( as did the Warsaw Pact ), NATO adopted an development plan. It engaged in war outside of the framework of a protective empire including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Libya and&nbsp, Afghanistan.

And NATO has expanded to the east and is still attempting to grow. ( It could have included Iraq, but the Turks adamantly objected, so the US organized a” Coalition of the Willing”. )

Not counting Ukraine or Georgia, both promised future NATO membership, and possibly also Moldova ( another NATO target ), now NATO is a huge global alliance of 32 countries, far larger and covering vastly more territory than the original 12 states that formed the empire.

In raw numbers, NATO has a potential military force of 3.5 million and covers 25.07 million square kilometers ( 15.58 million square miles ) of territory. Combined, NATO members are household to 966.88 million citizens and may reach 1 billion by the end of the century.

An essential NATO&nbsp, raison d’etre is to issue Russia, a much-diminished state compared to the context of the former Soviet Union. Russia has a community of 147 million and a GDP of US$ 2 trillion. Russians have an average per capita income of$ 14,391. In 2023 the Russian defence budget was$ 84 billion.

Europe, without the United States, has a population of 742 million, a GDP of$ 35.56 trillion and a per-capital income of$ 34, 230. Europe’s overall defence spending is$ 295 billion, much higher than Russia’s.

Yet Europe’s commitment to its own security falls far short of its ability. Even though the British and French are nuclear power, Europeans absolutely rely on the United States for defense assistance, including nuclear weapons. Why is this?

Europe’s military energy is divided and, in many respects, fragile because of a lack of equipment and labor. The UK, for instance, is a state with a population of 66.97 million. It has a combined military ( all services ) of 138, 120 ( not counting civilian employees ). &nbsp,

The UK surface army is tiny and growing, though. At last count there were 76, 320 in the army, but simply a portion of these are true front-line men. &nbsp,

At the time of the American Revolution, the UK Army was smaller than King George II I’s army because of the ground forces ‘ shrinkage. Despite having a slightly larger population ( 67.97 million ), France performs favorably to the UK. &nbsp,

But some of these forces are foreign soldiers ( and some of them were “permitted” to go over and visit Ukraine’s military ). The French military is comprised of 270, 000 men, but France has a lot of place it needs to shield, meaning that troops for out-of-country implementation are very limited.

Poland, with a smaller community of 36.82 million, has an army of 216, 000, one of the nation’s better-sized forces. Germany has a larger population—83.8 million —but its military figures 180, 215. &nbsp, That amount, however, is false: Germany’s surface power is simply 64, 000, smaller than the UK’s.

With a few exceptions, all Western fighting makes lack enough weapons and ordnance, and they have given much of it away to Ukraine. Equipment is generally obsolete and poorly maintained. &nbsp, &nbsp,

How does Europe devote$ 295 billion on defense without being able to deploy well-equipped fighting forces? This is difficult to comprehend. One possible explanation is that Europeans do n’t want to do much more than just deploy small forces. The responsibility of ensuring Europe’s security and defense is left to the United States.

The US has about 100, 000 support people stationed throughout Europe. This includes the US Air Force, Army, Marines, Navy, and Unique Forces. The 100, 000 includes around 20, 000 who were sent to reinforce Eastern Europe in 2022 ( some to Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and Romania ). The Europeans are undoubtedly betting on an American military force to defend them.

However, the history of British expeditionary forces ( BEF ) in Europe is not a happy one. In World War 2 the BEF ( made up of 13 divisions and 390, 000 troops ) had to be evacuated from Dunkirk ( Operation Dynamo ), Le Havre ( Operation Cycle ) and from French Atlantic and Mediterranean ports ( Operation Aerial ).

Nowhere in Europe and Russia are armies that are comparable in size and power size to those in World Wars 1 or World Wars 2. Europe is even further behind if Britain was far behind in 1940 when it was building its mechanisms.

Several European countries have emptied their armaments to support Ukraine, sending vehicles, armoured vehicles, weapons, air defenses, weaponry, ammunition and plenty of different hard-to-replace weapons. &nbsp, &nbsp,

What does all this mean? This implies that while Europe spends a lot more on defense ($ 295 billion ) than Russia, it does not get much value from its investment in either fighting forces or equipment. Where does all the wealth come, therefore, is a good question to ask. Smedley Butler might be able to offer a response.

There is proof that the US has asked Europe to spend more money on defence, and these requests have proven to have resulted in larger protection budgets. However, it has not yet been translated into more powerful or larger fighting units ( with the possible exception of Poland ). &nbsp,

In fact, a slowdown in Europe, particularly in Germany and the UK, is likely to result in lower defence spending and fewer deployed troops.

All of this leads to the strange finish that NATO members in Europe cannot defend their own country without the United States. It even puts the US at a serious political risk. &nbsp,

Empty stockpiles and international operations on Europe’s edges diminish America’s ability to defend its interests abroad, especially in the Asia-Pacific area. &nbsp,

It also raises the possibility of entrapment for US security: a Middle East war led by Iran and a Chinese push in East Asia, plus conflict erupting in Korea, could result in real disaster.

The United States, which has unwavering support for NATO expansion and its aggressive attitude toward Russia, is in great danger of expanding. Even if one discounts Smedley Butler’s argument that” War is a racket”, the time has come to reevaluate America’s support for expanding NATO.

At Asia Times, Stephen Bryen is the senior correspondent. He also served as the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s staff director and its deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. &nbsp,

This article&nbsp, was originally published on his&nbsp, Weapons and Strategy&nbsp, Substack, and is republished with permission.

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