The danger of the Pyongyang-Moscow axis is becoming clearer – Asia Times

In recent days, Kyiv to Seoul has been alarmed by the growing defense shaft between North Korea and Russia. In the latest development, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service ( NIS ) &nbsp, reported&nbsp, on Friday that some 1, 500 North Korean special forces had been sent already to the Russian Far East in preparation for deployment to the Ukrainian war front.

Yoon Suk Yeol, the president of South Korea, convened a security emergency meeting, stating that this poses” a major security threat” to both the international community and our nation.

Following its large shipments of weapons and ammunition, Pyongyang’s decision to send armed forces to Russia’s war effort comes from the security alliance that was sealed next June during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attend to North Korea.

What Moscow has agreed to give Pyongyang in return is revealed in more enticing ways. That, the evidence is less reliable, but it is possible to draw a conclusion that Russia has abandoned its long-standing commitments to avoid atomic use and non-proliferation.

Even more disturbing, these innovations take area amidst growing conflicts along the inter-Korean border, fueled by North Korea’s decision to officially reject the goal of peaceful unification. Otherwise, in a visit to an army headquarters on October 17, Kim Jong-un&nbsp, told&nbsp, forces that any use of pressure against the South had form an action against a “hostile country”, no against “fellow countrymen”.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visits the North Vietnamese Women’s Army 2nd Corps office on Oct. 17, 2024. Photo: Asian Central News Agency

North Korean army and arms implementation

The NIS accounts of North Korean army implementation follow many reports from Ukraine of their existence, prompting&nbsp, statements&nbsp, from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy about their appearance. One&nbsp, report&nbsp, claimed that a Russian missile strike killed some North Korean military officers. More lately, Ukraine’s Center for Strategic Communication and Information Security&nbsp, released&nbsp, a picture that appears to show North Korean soldiers lining up at a Russian center in the Far East to collect clothing and other products.

So far, however, neither US nor NATO officials have independently confirmed these reports. Yoon spoke with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte about the potential deployment of North Korean forces. Rutte argued that North Korea’s deployment of troops to Ukraine would represent a significant escalation.

As&nbsp, reports&nbsp, have pointed out, it is hardly unprecedented for North Korea to dispatch military advisors, or even combatants, to conflicts. The North Koreans fought for the Bashar al-Assad regime during the Syrian civil war, in support of the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, in Egypt during the Yom Kippur War, and recently.

There is some skepticism, however, about&nbsp, reports&nbsp, that the North Koreans are preparing to dispatch large numbers of forces – 10, 000 or more – to join the Ukrainian front. According to long-time Russian military analyst Aleksandr Golts, who is currently based at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, that would only occur if Putin were looking for an “immediate and decisive victory on the battlefield.”

The logistical challenge of training, arming, and moving that many forces is daunting. In an email interview, the veteran military analyst stated,” I believe Russia cannot support such a deployment.”

Russian combativeness has already depended heavily on the support of North Korea. Although the supply of artillery shells and short-range ballistic missiles is estimated to vary, even at the lower end ( roughly 1 million shells ), it would make up a quarter of all the ammunition used, according to Golts. Russia’s ability to halt a Ukrainian offensive in the last year and achieve clear gains on the battlefield was viewed as crucial to the North Korean supplies.

Officials from the US and South Korea have noted recent supplies ‘ significant volumes. Robert Koepcke, US deputy assistant secretary of state for Japan, Korea, and Mongolia, &nbsp, told&nbsp, a conference in Washington last month that more than 16, 500 containers of munitions had been sent from North Korea since September of last year and that Russia had launched more than 65 North Korean ballistic missiles into Ukraine.

Alliance, or marriage of convenience?

Some analysts believe that this military axis has reached a point where North Korean stockpiles may soon be run out, and that this axis has a limit on its reach. RAND analyst Bruce Bennett&nbsp, argues&nbsp, that, rather than an alliance, this is a marriage of convenience – one that may not outlive the supply of munitions. He points to evidence of China’s unease with the relationship and, in particular, with Kim’s efforts to reprise the Cold War games that his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, employed to play off Moscow against Beijing.

Whatever may occur, the Russians are indicating a commitment to this axis since the Korean War. During his June visit, Putin signed a&nbsp, Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership&nbsp, between the two countries, which included a mutual defense clause under which each country agreed to help the other repel external aggression. The Russian State Duma received the treaty in writing on October 14 to formally ratify it. When asked if Russia would get involved in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, Kremlin&nbsp, spokesman&nbsp, Dmitry Peskov told reporters that the two countries would engage in” strategic deep cooperation in all areas, including ensuring security”. As to the treaty’s implications,” the wording in the agreement does not need clarification, it is quite unambiguous”, he said.

Putin’s visit and the signing of the treaty sparked a lot of discussion about the potential financial support Russia might offer North Korea, particularly the technological and military support it might provide to bolster its nuclear and long-range ballistic missile programs. Observers have examined Russian aircraft’s travels to and from North Korea and meetings with senior government officials in search of evidence that Russian assistance may have helped the North Koreans solve their missile testing problems.

Any Russian assistance that effectively helps North Korea perfect its nuclear delivery systems would represent a significant change from Russian policy, which was actively trying to stop any potential technology leakage and opposed to nuclear proliferation in principle.

I was among the first Western correspondents to&nbsp, report&nbsp, on this during my time as the Moscow Bureau Chief for&nbsp, The Christian Science Monitor. The North Koreans made an effort to entice a sizable group of Russian missile developers from the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau to work there after the Soviet Union was overthrown. Although some design data may have been transferred, the KGB eventually stopped the group at the airport as they were about to leave Pyongyang.

Nuclear implications

The war in Ukraine, among other things, seems to have led to a clear shift in Russian nuclear policy. Most prominently, there is increasing high-level discussion of lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield. On September 25, Putin&nbsp, presided&nbsp, over a meeting of a previously unknown organization, the Security Council Standing Conference on Nuclear Deterrence, where he talked about the need to revise the country’s doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons in response to aggression even from non-nuclear states.

This shift mirrors the&nbsp, doctrinal declarations&nbsp, of the North Korean regime, envisioning the use of tactical and other nuclear weapons, even in a conflict with South Korea. However, it also suggests that Russia would no longer perceive a barrier to aiding North Korea in that area.

” Russia supported non-proliferation for many years”, Golts told this writer. ” But now the situation has changed dramatically. The main objective has become the West’s intimidation.

Golts makes reference to statements Putin made when he traveled to North Korea that warned Russia might offer” sensitive” military assistance to US allies in response to the West’s supply of long-range weapons to Ukraine.

Putin&nbsp, who spoke to international reporters ahead of his trip to North Korea, said,” We are thinking that if someone thinks it is possible to supply such weapons to a war zone in order to strike at our territory and cause problems for us, then why do we not have the right to distribute our weapons of the same class to those regions of the world where there will be strikes on sensitive facilities of those countries that are doing this to Russia?”

After signing the treaty with Kim, Putin&nbsp, repeated&nbsp, that he does” not rule out” arming North Korea with such weapons. ” From this point of view, Kim is the best possible recipient”, observes Golts. He draws attention to the instance of Russia leasing nuclear submarines to India, which could also include funding for the development of long-range missiles under the guise of aiding North Korea’s satellite launch capabilities.

Already, the level of Russian military interaction goes beyond anything seen in decades. The recent&nbsp, visit&nbsp, of a Russian naval vessel to Chongjin, reportedly to ferry North Korean troops to Russia, was the first such entry since 1990.

There are still many unanswered questions about the nature of the growing military axis between Russia and North Korea. However, it is clear that both these developments are escalating and that the growing threat they pose for both the Korean Peninsula’s future security and stability as well.

Daniel Sneider is a Non-Resident Distinguished Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI ) and a Lecturer in International Policy and East Asian Studies at Stanford University. The views expressed here are the author’s alone.

This article was first published by KEI’s The Peninsula. It is republished with permission.

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Govt appoints Azman Ismail as new DNB CEO, it took 20 months

  • Ralph Marshall, who left in March 2023 because his contract was no extended, is in his place.
  • DNB continues to push 5G implementation across consumers, businesses and public service

Govt appoints Azman Ismail as new DNB CEO, it took 20 months

Govt appoints Azman Ismail as new DNB CEO, it took 20 monthsThe Board of Digital Nasional Bhd ( DNB) announced the appointment of Azman Ismail ( pic ) as the company’s new CEO, effective tomorrow, 23 Oct 2024. Ralph Marshall, a no-nonsense business middleweight in Malaysia, served as its first CEO from March 2021 to February 2023 when the Indonesian government institution was established in March 2021 to lead the development of Malaysia’s 5G company system.

Azman had earlier been appointed, by the internet, as DNB’s CEO with several accounts in Oct 2023 claiming that he had been appointed DNB CEO, pending formal notification from the state. That not came, until now.

Azman has worked for 36 years, most recently as the managing director of PLUS Malaysia Bhd, an motorways technician. DNB claims that he oversaw significant modern change and change management initiatives throughout his career, which were well-known both in Malaysia and the Asia-Pacific area.

Prior to joining the burden bridge operator, he was Managing Director of Shell Malaysia Trading Sdn Bhd and, continuously, the general director of its financial firm, overseeing Shell’s gas shopping in Malaysia and Brunei. In his 30-year job at Shell, Azman held corporate functions in the operations, wholesale, and finance sections.

DNB expressed confidence that Azman’s considerable experience and command will generate DNB’s efforts in its second phase of development as the business continues to advance Malaysia’s 5G implementation across consumers, enterprises and public services, and help the world’s digital transformation.

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Singapore’s Max Maeder nominated for young sailor of the year at 2024 World Sailing Awards

SINGAPORE: &nbsp, Singapore kitefoiler Max Maeder is among the contenders for the inaugural&nbsp, Young World Sailor of the Year award&nbsp, at the 2024 World Sailing Awards. The 18-year-old is in a brilliant artery of form, &nbsp, clinching&nbsp, copper at the Paris Olympics, when properly as&nbsp, winning the&nbsp, 2024 IKA KiteFoilContinue Reading

Lisa ‘in talks’ for New Year Countdown

Lalisa "Lisa" Manoban, 27. (Photo: lalalalisa_m Instagram Account)
Lalisa” Lisa” Manoban, 27. ( Photo: lalalalisa_m Instagram Account )

According to Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, the private sector is in talks with Lalisa Manoban, a known member of the internationally acclaimed (K-pop ) musician from the Korean popular (K-pop ) band Blackpink, to see if she will play at the New Year’s Countdown event in Bangkok.

Following a government meeting, Ms. Paetongtarn explained to the media that the program is being handled completely by the private market. She expressed concern about whether Lisa may accept to participate, but no specific details of the celebration are known.

The prime minister said that she is excited about having Lisa do at the year-end occasion, as Lisa is Thai and admired by people all over the world, despite the fact that the news is not directly related to the authorities.

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Pariah to president, Prabowo may bring new dark days to Indonesia – Asia Times

On October 20, past public Jokowi Subianto sworn in as Indonesia’s seventh leader. Twenty-five centuries ago he was a leper, and for good reason.

In 1998, special forces soldiers under his command abducted democracy activists in Jakarta, 13 of whom have never been seen once, and he was accused of human rights violations in Papua and East Timor. Those who did gain had been tortured.

The kids had been calling for the departure of President Suharto, Prabowo’s father-in-law, who eventually stepped down in May 1998 after widespread violence that some believe Prabowo helped expert. Therefore, backed by forces under his command, Prabowo tried to storm the presidential palace, gun in hand, to intimidate the new leader, BJ Habibie.

Jokowi was prohibited from visiting the United States for 20 years, but he never went on trial for the campaigners ‘ disappearances.

And his beloved defense career came to an end fast: he was fired from the military for “misinterpreting orders.” Disgraced, and seen as embodying the violence and repression of Suharto’s plan, Prabowo went into voluntary banishment in Jordan. He appeared to have no hope for the democratic Reformasi ( reformation ) system that had come out of the ashes of the oppressive New Order.

But Prabowo was far from finished. His recovery and extraordinary ascendance to the president may presently signal the end of Indonesia’s delicate, ambitious liberal democracy and a profit to the New Order design.

The conclusion of Reformasi?

Prabowo lacks passion for democracy, it is obvious enough. He has said, for instance, that it “very, quite relaxing” and “very, very noisy and expensive”.

Gerindra, the political party he founded and prospects, yet has, as its number one mission statement, a transfer to the Constitution” as stated on August 18, 1945″. This is the conservative original Constitution that Soeharto relyed on to act. It gave the president enormous power, who was not elected and had no word limits, but it did not guarantee individual freedom or a separation of powers.

Following Soeharto’s fall, the Constitution was changed to adopt a progressive, democratic design. Thus, a return to the original 1945 Constitution may in itself possible finish Indonesia’s hard-won, if troubled, democracy.

But Prabowo may not need to go this far to love the sweeping authority his former father-in-law exercised. Numerous New Order components are already in position. Much of the work of dismantling Indonesia’s liberal democracy has already been done by the outgoing president, Joko Widodo ( Jokowi ), whose son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, is now Prabowo’s vice president.

For instance, a key foundation of the New Order was “dual work”, a theory that allowed serving military members to get human content, allowing them to occupy the government. Following Suharto’s fall, this was ended.

However, new amendments to the civil support law that were passed in October last year re-authorize active members of the police and army to hold human positions. The proposed changes to the Indonesian National Army ( TNI ) Law currently being debated could expand this. When questioned about the military’s return to human life, the military forces chief welcomed the alterations, saying the troops would not be exercising a “dual work” but a “multi-function”.

Also, under Soeharto, restrictive laws tightly restricted media freedom. A contentious new criminal script that goes into effect in 2026 may presently restore the bans on criticizing the government that the Constitutional Court had formerly outlawed. Additionally, “broadcasting investigative journalism information” may be prohibited under a proposed fresh television law.

Under the New Order, legal community engagement was likewise cruelly restricted. There has been a constant increase in libel and threats against state critics over the past ten years under Jokowi. Additionally, a law passed in 2017 allows the state to break non-governmental businesses without the use of a court system. Now, three NGOs have been banned.

Some activists now openly admit their dread of being targeted and intimidated by state trolls or even intelligence organizations. Some fear Prabowo will use his connections to Sunni civil society organizations to&nbsp, force or vilify another groups&nbsp, he sees as reviewers.

Keeping the leaders content

Jokowi is also forming a sizable alliance in the DPR, the federal government, by in the footsteps of Soeharto and Jokowi. Only one group is remaining, with over 80 % of the members already voting for the other.

Jokowi will also increase his government, allowing him to honor areas to supporters and co-opt others, including members of civil society. This will further weaken the opposition.

This kind of government of elite “unity” makes politics opaque. Before measures are put to a vote, political fights occur in secret and are resolved through power plays and agreements. As it was under Soeharto, it would render the national legislature as little more than a rubber stamp.

This assumes Prabowo is capable of handling Indonesia’s powerful political leaders, particularly the rivalry between Megawati Soekarnoputri and Jokowi. Together, they now control the two biggest parties in the legislature ( PDI-P and Golkar, respectively ).

In the February elections, Jokowi, a still incredibly popular man, backed his ex-liar Prabowo because he believed that this would help him maintain his influence after he left office. Prabowo will, however, be reluctanced for very long to give someone real power. One of his biggest obstacles to rule is likely to be his relationship with Jokowi.

Having to deal with a obstructive court

The Constitutional Court, which has the authority to impose laws, is one of the few remaining obstacles to Prabowo acquiring the kind of dictatorial powers Soeharto had. Prabowo will not want a non-compliant and obstructive ( that is, independent ) Constitutional Court. Politicians are already openly discussing the need to “assess its performance.”

The court could simply withdraw from the court, as it has done in the past, if the legislature passes laws that weaken the court.

But the court was established by the amendments to the original 1945 Constitution. This implies that a return to the 1945 Constitution could be used to replace it if the government is unable to pass laws that would weaken, stack, or intimidate independent judges.

Before doing this, Prabowo would need to feel confident that his rule is secure and that he has the backing of the elites, but it is undoubtedly possible. Returning to the original Constitution would simply require a two-thirds vote in the MPR, Indonesia’s highest representative assembly.

Bold promises on the economy

In exchange for high economic growth and development that freed millions of people from poverty, Soeharto’s system was based on a Faustian agreement that allowed him to rule corruptly and oppressively.

Prabowo is likely to adopt the same approach. He campaigned on an annual GDP growth target of 8 %, a rate reached under Suharto, but never by subsequent governments. Jokowi put a lot of emphasis on development, especially in infrastructure, but he never saw much growth above 5 % annually.

Many people are optimistic about the state of the economy under the new president. Prabowo’s father was a prominent economist and finance minister. Prabowo has also&nbsp, asked&nbsp, Jokowi’s highly regarded finance minister, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, to stay in her role.

However, Prabowo comes to office with some enormously expensive commitments that would make Sri Mulyani’s job extremely difficult. These include his free school lunches program (upwards of US$ 30 billion ), which Sri Mulyani has publicly questioned, and Jokowi’s signature new capital city, Nusantara, currently under construction. ( The initial phase alone will cost at least US$ 35 billion ).

Moreover, Prabowo’s main priority will be to keep the elites happy and maintain his enormous coalition. His supporters and allies will demand access to concessions and lucrative appointments for their cronies to make up the large sums spent on the February elections, including his brother, tycoon Hashim Djojohadikusumo, who has funded his political career. Rational economic policy-making will therefore be highly constrained.

Indonesia’s high growth rate has always been attained through foreign investment, but Prabowo’s protectionist rhetoric has not stopped there. In reality, Indonesia will continue to be open for business. That will likely make the 8 % GDP annual growth target impossible.

More active foreign relations

Prabowo, who was educated overseas and speaks English fluently, feels comfortable on the global stage. Given its enormous size and new status as a middle-income nation, he will want a more prominent place in international affairs for his nation.

As Jokowi’s defense minister, he was active internationally, even attempting to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine. And to his great surprise, countries like the US, which had previously denied him entry, have congratulated him on his victory.

Prabowo’s main foreign affairs challenge will be the same as his predecessor’s: managing the difficult relationship with China.

Indonesians harbor a strong sense of suspicion for China, which is fueled by a potent combination of deeply ingrained racist beliefs, a fear of communism, and an underlying hegemonic concern. The elite rely heavily on Chinese trade and investment, and Indonesia is one of the largest recipients of Belt and Road investments.

Like Jokowi, Prabowo will have to manage this difficult balance.

Indonesian civil society leaders are already referring to the new administration as” New Order Volume II” or “neo-New Order,” and it is obvious why. All the evidence suggests that the process begun under Jokowi will continue under Prabowo, moving much more toward a liberal democracy reform movement that was attempted 25 years ago.

There is nothing in Prabowo’s past or his campaign promises to suggest otherwise. The only thing that remains to be seen is probably how quickly it occurs and how far he will travel.

Tim Lindsey is the director of The University of Melbourne’s Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam, and Society, Malcolm Smith professor of Asian law.

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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House to vote Thursday whether to accept commitee’s report on amnesty bill

MPs attend a parliament meeting in August. (File photo: Nutthawat Wichieanbut)
Lawmakers are present at a legislative session in August. ( File photo: Nutthawat Wichieanbut )

On Thursday, the House of Representatives is expected to vote on whether to take a review from a special committee that will create an amnesty costs for democratic criminals.

Wisut Chainarun, a Pheu Thai MP and general state punch, said on Tuesday that the report is up for assessment on Thursday. He said if the MPs endorse the document, it will be forwarded to the state, which is not legally obliged to follow its advice. &nbsp,

He said that if the document is rejected, it will be considered dropped, and there will be no need for further motion.

Before the vote, the ruling party MPs will meet to discuss the findings of the report and been asked to vote on whether the party does support it, according to Mr. Wisut.

The Move Forward Party’s four asylum bills were all proposed to Parliament by the Pheu Thai MP before it was disbanded, according to the Pheu Thai MP.

The document does not specify whether amnesty should be extended to lese-majeste offenders, but rather the results of the unique agency’s study into the various amnesty options that could be pursued.

Because the research is the product of all parties involved,” Pheu Thai does not regard it a loss of experience if the situation is rejected,” Mr. Wisut said.

He added that the outcome of the vote wo n’t affect the amnesty bill’s fate.

The committee outlines three possible choices: complete asylum, contingent asylum, or no asylum, which has drawn mixed responses from legislators in both government and opposition tents.

The main opposition People’s Party ( PP ) wants the lese-majeste offence to be included in the amnesty bill. The coalition government events, however, oppose granting asylum to those found guilty of lese majoreste.

The legislature will go into corner next year, according to the general government whip, because it is unlikely the House will deliberate any asylum bills in the current session because these bills are no scrutinized by the parliament whips.

During an casual conversation on Monday, Deputy Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai said that Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra confirmed to all coalition parties that the Pheu Thai Party is opposed to changing the lese-majeste laws or extending the amnesty bill to handle lese-majeste crimes.

The ruling group’s deputy leader, Thanakorn Wangboonkongchana, expressed hope that the government’s MPs will take the same action when the statement is up for a ballot.

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14,000 homes to be built in new housing areas at Sembawang North and Woodlands North Coast

SINGAPORE: Two innovative cover areas in Sembawang and Woodlands may be developed to provide about 14, 000 new houses, including 12, 000 people cover cottages.

At the Housing and Development Board ( HDB) awards ceremony on Tuesday ( October 22 ), Minister for National Development Desmond Lee revealed the plans for Sembawang North and Woodlands North Coast.

The first Build-to-Order ( BTO ) projects in these two housing areas will be launched in 2025, with the rest to follow progressively, HDB said in its press release on Tuesday. &nbsp,

This will provide a sizable supply of affordable housing for Singaporeans looking to live in the north, mainly for families who want to stay close to their parents for assistance and joint care, it added.

According to HDB, the two new housing regions will expand the great geographical distribution of public housing in order to meet Singaporeans ‘ diverse needs.

SEMBAWANG NORTH

Sembawang North will be a 53ha page within the city of Sembawang. It will offer about 10, 000 cover units- 8, 000 BTO flats and 2, 000 secret housing units when thoroughly developed, said HDB.

Given its role as the British Naval Center in the 1920s and subsequent Sembawang Shipyard, the housing development may reflect the city’s maritime heritage and colonial architecture.

The BTO initiatives will incorporate design elements like courtyard designs, pitched roofs, and striking geometric designs, taking inspiration from imperial bungalows.

Nautical factors will also be incorporated into Sembawang North” to build community areas that reflect the unique history of the area,” according to HDB.

” The houses in Sembawang North will be well-served by a complete range of features, ensuring a superior living environment for both current and upcoming inhabitants of Sembawang. &nbsp,

” To provide greater ease and convenience for people, there are plans to develop fresh commercial services, care providers, schools, and places of worship,” HDB said.

Additionally, there will be additional clean and outdoor areas that will provide residents with leisure opportunities.

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Suriya justifies revisions to high-speed rail project contract

An artist's rendering of the planned rail link to three main airports in Thailand. (Photo: Jakkrit Weawkraihong)
An artist’s rendering of the planned rail connection to three major airports in Thailand. ( Photo: Jakkrit Weawkraihong )

Suriya Jungrungreangkit, the secretary of transportation, has defended the president’s changes to the agreement for the high-speed road project connecting three airports, saying they are necessary to advance the project and ensure justice for both the concessionaire and the government.

Adjustments are necessary according to both parties failing to honour the initial deal, Mr Suriya, even a deputy prime minister, said on Tuesday.

He claimed that the concessionaire was unable to start building as planned during the Covid-19 epidemic because the government did not give the concessionaire the land for construction in a timely manner.

The Eastern Economic Corridor ( EEC ) Policy Committee has approved the revisions, but the minister claims that they were n’t actually presented to the cabinet for approval on Tuesday.

The State Railway of Thailand ( SRT ) and Asia Era One, a division of Thai conglomerate Charoen Pokphand ( CP ) Group, signed the original contract in 2019. The shared investment plan included a agreement agreement to run the Airport Rail Link.

The high-speed road program, a flagship initiative of the EEC, aims to reference Don Mueang, Suvarnabhumi and U-Tapao flights.

Mr Suriya was responding to complaints made by the major opposition People’s Party during next week’s representation, which claimed that these commitment revisions favour the concessionaire, potentially compromising the president’s place.

According to him, the case is awaiting the release of the revised deal, which has already been reviewed by the trial to ensure justice for both parties.

Finance Minister Pichai Chunhavajira, who chairs the EEC commission, responded to the charges at a House meeting next month.

Since the drafting of the 2019 deal, he acknowledged that the government’s land expropriation process has taken longer than anticipated. This pause, coupled with the financial effects of Covid-19 and political issues affecting inflation and interest rates, hindered the concessionaire’s ability to secure financing for the site’s application.

According to Mr. Pichai, Mr. Pichai explained that this approach may reduce the total expense to around 120 billion baht, given recent interest rates, and that the concessionaire should pay the agreed 149-billion-baht expense in in instalments rather than a lump sum after construction.

The total 149 billion ringgit could rise substantially if paid afterward, he said.

A bank guarantee equivalent to the promised investment may be required to assure the contractor fulfills its duty, he added, and each installment will be paid only after the contracted company has finished its job.

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Bukit Panjang LRT services affected due to train fault; ‘rescue’ train also stalled

Due to a train fault, trains along the Bukit Panjang Light Rail Transit ( LRT ) line were halted on Tuesday evening ( October 22 ). &nbsp,

Travel operator SMRT said&nbsp, a station was “immobilised” near Teck Whye place at about 5.20pm. &nbsp,

In a Facebook post, it stated that” all commuters in the defective train were safely disembarked at Teck Whye station platform.” &nbsp,

A recovery coach had to be deployed to shift the faulty station to the station in order to move it. While on its way back to the depot, the evacuation train even stalled”.

The disturbance affects companies between&nbsp, Choa Chu Kang and Bukit Panjang facilities.

Teach services on the ring via&nbsp, Service A and Service B are no affected.

Between Choa Chu Kang and Bukit Panjang channels, according to SMRT,” Damaged train service is still offered on a single station flight company,” adding that regular completely buses between the two stations are available.

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