Russia plays it cool on Estonia’s ‘shadow fleet’ ship seizure – Asia Times

On Friday ( April 11 ), Estonia seized one of Russia’s” shadow fleet” vessels and, just two days later, approved a new law allowing it to use force to sink such ships if they pose a threat to national security.

The first was labeled as” state-sponsored piracy,” according to RT editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan, while Nikolai Patrushev, the senior adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin, speculated that Britain might be behind the second.

At the time of writing, Russia has not yet taken a significant stance against this most recent offense. The seizure occurred as part of Trump’s next meeting with Putin, which follows Soviet envoy Kirill Dmitriev’s efforts to break the impasse over Ukraine during his previous week in Washington, DC.

The political approach of the Russian-US discussions on correcting relationships and, consequently, ending their substitute war in Ukraine is back on a positive note, which upsets German warhawks like the UK. Therefore, it can be concluded that Patrushev is definitely correct because London does indeed have a desire to sabotage this.

In order to inspire Russia into a military response by seizing one of its alleged” dark ship,” mischievously timed as it was during Witkoff’s most recent trip to Russia, it makes perfect sense for the UK to encourage its German partner, in whose country it has little less than 1, 000 troops.

Russia’s reaction will likely remain physically restrained despite that fact, even if it quickly launches a political attack against Estonia and the UK. Moscow does this because it doesn’t want to slide into London’s pit.

Putin might hope that Trump can put pressure on the UK and Estonia to stop making any more provocative remarks, apparently by telling them (either informally or secretly ) that they won’t be able to defend NATO’s Article 5 security guarantees in the event of future seizure that lead to armed conflict of any kind with Russia.

The foundation for this plan is in what US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated in an early February statement about how the US won’t grant these same offers to NATO forces in Ukraine.

The US might even say that it will withdraw its troops from Estonia if this happens repeatedly, whether in parallel with or in its place, but that would have the opposite effect, causing the UK to lose its everlasting appearance there.

The result would be that, in the wake of Germany’s recent establishment of a continuous base in Lithuania, no profit to the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act could be made as Putin wants.

If France replicates its circular presence in Romania with similar results, Western Europe’s three standard Great Powers may basically be moving eastward to stop Trump from possible reaching a deal with Putin to restore the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

This is consistent with what was previously said in this evaluation: The US is unlikely to withdraw its troops from Central and Eastern Europe, making these improvements a part of their struggle for leadership in post-conflict Europe.

Russia and the US may not be able to stop this because the earliest didn’t use force in response to such low-level intra-NATO deployments, no matter how intimidating it may be, while the next has lost command over its rebel German, British, and European allies.

In any case, the relevance of this scenario to Estonia, which is supported by the British, is that a strong political reaction from Moscow could be used to justifiably justify the UK doing this.

Even if this most recent action doesn’t sabotage the Russian-US talks ‘ positive trajectory, the decision may have already been made to complicate the Russian-US rapprochement and put it in opposition to its traditional Western European Great Power counterparts.

Despite its extreme political bent, a militarily restrained response from Russia could make the UK’s potential establishment of a permanent military presence in Estonia appear provocative by removing the primary pretext.

Russia could at least be able to present it as a destabilizing move to the world public despite the fact that the outcome would remain unchanged, that is, that it could happen regardless of what.

That’s better than Moscow falling for London’s trap by issuing credible military threats against Tallinn that could lead to the reversal of recent advances in ties with Washington and even provoking a rally against NATO against Russia. If Putin doesn’t want to go to war over this, then it’s the best course of action right now, assuming there are other unfortunate events.

In that case, the US stance toward Article 5 in this regard would be crucial, as he might eventually overcome his innate reluctance to escalate&nbsp, just as he did when he did&nbsp in late November when authorizing the use of his nation’s top-secret medium-range hypersonic Oreshnik missiles.

Repeat incidents would only occur if the US were unable or unwilling to exert any influence over Estonia, which was supported by the United States. Therefore, it may either withhold or explicitly reaffirm these defense guarantees.

Trump’s choice will ultimately depend on whether he will eventually grow resentful toward Putin because he has been unwilling to significantly compromise andnbsp, on andnbsp, his highest goals.

He already, right before Dmitriev’s most recent trip, and once more posted about them during Witkoff’s visit on Friday in an effort to possibly support upcoming seizures as a form of pressure on Russia. That would be a very dangerous way to “escalate to de-escalate” on better terms for Ukraine.

Since Putin couldn’t step down and Russia reportedly lost the significant budgetary revenue it reportedly receives from its” shadow fleet’s” Baltic activities, as well as face-loss, it could very well escalate.

However, as of right now, everything is still manageable, but that could change. Even though Putin’s patience has its limits, Russia’s restrained response to Estonia’s provocative naval seizure is pragmatic.

This article was originally published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind permission. Subscribe to the Andrew Korybko Newsletter here.

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Estonia cribbing Ukraine’s script for provoking Russia – Asia Times

Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his family Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg, were shot and killed by Gavrilo Princeps, a Bosnian-Serb extreme, on June 28, 1914. Legate did not act by himself.

He was one of the group’s six principals known as Young Bosnia, and he and others were attempting to secede from the Austro-Hungarian kingdom. Additionally, he was helped by the Black Hand, a covert organization that provided arms like guns and bombs.

The murder of the Austrian Archduke, who was the immediate following king Franz Joseph I, was a offense that led to the so-called July crisis, which culminated in a Serbian ultimatum on July 23. By that point, Germany had pledged to support Austria, and Russia and France would organize to support Bosnian nationalism.

World War I might have been avoided, but it was not. Some of the crime’s perpetrators in Bosnia were tried, others were imprisoned ( including Princeps ), and others were put to death. The Austrians significantly overestimated their defense prowess. The Austro-Hungarian kingdom do vanish at the conclusion of the conflict for them.

Isabel and Franc Ferdinand in the murderous vehicle. In the back of the car, the king and his partner are seated. IWM picture

Are we currently in a similar position? Ukraine and some of its followers, including Joe Biden, who authorized long-range ATACMS hits deeply inside Russia, some of which targeted Russia’s early warning scanners and nuclear bomb foundations, have carried out numerous actions.

The Ukrainians launched aircraft attacks on the Kremlin on May 3, 2023, aiming specifically at Russian President Vladimir Putin’s business.

Without NATO’s professional assistance, such attacks are incomprehensible, particularly since long-range robots require spacecraft for tracking and communication. The White House has refuted claims that it just carried out attacks.

Ukraine and its supporters have also waged and waged a social conflict with Russia. Estonia is one of the best propagandists.

The most north of the European state is Estonia. It faces the Baltic Sea, where Tallinn, its country’s funds, is abut. Narva, the village in Estonia, is directly bordering Russia. About half of Narva’s people is Russian.

According to statistics from 2023, Estonia has a population of 1.37 million. Depending on how the matter is calculated, between 20 and 25 % of Estonia’s inhabitants are Russians.

Estonia has been fighting Russia for its culture for a while completely dependent on NATO for its stability for a while. Just 7, 700 active duty members of the German army are conscripts, of which 3, 500 are troops.

Its reserve force is considerably larger, but it lacks the necessary tools to support its reserves, making it mostly a paper force. Estonia only has two Czech-made ( Aero Vodochody ) L-39 trainers and two small M-28 Polish transports, with none of them active.

one of two L-39s from Estonia. Photo provided by artist

Estonia did appear to not want to cause trouble for itself, but it seems the opposite is true, in large part due to the German belief that NATO has the backing to support it and that Russia would not attack a NATO state.

Threats are not something new for Estonians, whose hatred for Russians is intense. Estonia has made it abundantly clear that it will do whatever it can to humiliate both Russia and Russia itself by nearly denying citizenship to its Russian citizens and through legislation to attack the Russian Orthodox Church in Estonia.

Tallinn’s iron soldier relocated following the 2024 Victory Day Celebrations. Photo provided by the publisher.

The Albanians made the decision to relocate the statue known as the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn that in April 2007. Additionally, that statue served as the location of a number of graves of Russian Russian troops who had died fighting the Nazis.

The graves were dug up, and their Russian people were informed that they could either relocate them along with the monument to the Estonian military cemetery or that they could be buried there.

We have yet another round of monument-busting in 2025 as the Estonians re-demolish Russian war shrines. This includes damaging and destroying battle memorials, as well as dishonoring Belarusian graves in the Estonian military cemetery.

Statues dedicated to Russian sailors, soldiers, and officials who liberated the nation from Nazi invasions have been destroyed by employees of the Estonian Military Museum in Tallinn Military Cemetery. Photo provided by the artist.

The tremendous significance given to Russia’s crucial role in the beat of Nazi forces in World War II is if there is one unifying principle in Russia today. Russia holds its quarterly Victory Day celebration on May 9 that emphasizes a display of military might.

The Immortal Regiment, a more melancholy but obviously significant individual’s protest, follows it. People will happily bring World War II-era banners and pictures of their loved ones during this march ( Russian terminology for World War II ).

Estonia’s contempt for Russia’s victory in World War II, along with its poor, some might say, compromised actions supporting the Nazis, is becoming more irksome to the Russians.

Additionally, efforts are being made to prevent Russians from becoming citizens of Estonia or even from casting ballots in votes. Estonia has increased that by  by passing new legislation to make it even harder for Russian citizens to receive equal treatment.

Estonia is even attempting to block any connection between the Russian Orthodox Churches in Estonia and the Moscow Patriarchate. Estonia’s steps may have been inspired by Ukraine, which is also taking the exact course, but it’s not surprising that they are similar.

The Immortal Regiment holds a protest in Moscow. Author provided with the image.

If, for instance, European or American Catholics were not permitted to connect with the Pope in Rome, the German actions against the Moscow-led church had stoke resentment and horror abroad.

Estonia is at the vanguard of the pro-war movement in Europe. Kaja Kallas, the country’s former prime minister, is now the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

She is presently a significant advocate for sending troops to Ukraine and expanding Europe’s defenses. Estonia is in the top of the list of the six countries that have allegedly pledged to send soldiers to Ukraine, despite the fact that it does not have anyone to take forces.

Provokes may cause war, which is the issue with actions. The growing apprehension about how Ukraine will survive the Russian siege is now apparent in official channels in some of Europe ( for example, France, UK, Germany, and Estonia ).

The French and British, in particular, have tried their hardest to undermine US President Donald Trump’s efforts by finding a quiet solution to the conflict.

Although some of this can be explained as a rescue for Europe’s financial problems by substituting military output for human production, gap spending of this kind will never be sufficient to solve Europe’s economic and industrial problems.

In the meantime, little nations like Estonia can result in significant issues and a conflict-producing nation.

Stephen Bryen is a former US assistant secretary of defense for plan and a specific editor for Asia Times. Weapons and Strategy, his Substack newsletter, previously appeared in this article, and it has since been republished with permission.

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Cable wars: what to do about deepening conflict beneath the seas – Asia Times

A Russian shadow-fleet oil ship dragged its outlet a hundred yards across the Baltic seabed the day before Christmas, causing damage to world cords and the Estonian Estlink-2 power line.

The Chinese large aircraft Yi Peng 3 nearly the same thing the fortnight before, rupturing Baltic Sea online cables.

The Trans-PacificExpress Cable, which connects South Korea, Japan, and the United States, was damaged by a Cameroon-registered Chinese vessel ( Shunxing-39 ), which broke up in January 2025. &nbsp,

Injuries at sea do occur. For years, ocean communications cables have been hacked by sharks, porpoises, and ostensibly thoughtless sailors. Yet in recent years, basically “accidental” undersea cable disruptions have suddenly increased, not only around Taiwan, but also in the Baltic, the Red Sea, and abroad while well.

What is causing this string of oceanic conflicts, and what does it mean for foreign affairs in general?

According to most experts, the Information Revolution is the greatest force behind cord wars. The internet is extremely in charge of almost every aspect of our lives as that terrible juggernaut progresses. And 95 percent of web traffic travels beneath the sea, largely outside of nation-state boundaries, which contributes to a rash of wire construction and the above-mentioned geopolitical tensions.

For a variety of reasons, web traffic travels beneath the sea. The most important aspect is that maritime transmission is dramatically less expensive and more effective than the main alternative, since satellite hardware costs more to produce than fiber-optic cable.

Cable transportation is also subject to a small amount of regulation across international waters, which gives operators more flexibility to adapt to changing demand patterns as technology develops. So, Seaborne traffic is best suited to the rapidly expanding multinational service trade.

Around 400 significant undersea wires, stretching for a million miles in total, mostly across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans from the United States to Europe and Northeast Asia, lie mainly in global waters, making up the vast majority of the internet connections that travel across the globe at the speed of light.

With less powerful connectors connecting Latin America, Africa, and other parts of the world, lower capacity extensions connect Europe and Asia via the Indian Ocean. Nearly all of this complex network is located beneath the sea, with some of the most rapidly expanding portions being constructed in areas of severe US-China geopolitical conflict.

Thus, undersea cable traffic is both extremely important economically and economically for advanced societies, and also highly susceptible to disruption. The top international players, particularly the United States and China, are becoming more and more competitive as a result of their economic ( and geopolitical ) importance. And there are spoilers out there intent on asymmetrically challenging the main players, particularly Russia and a plethora of international terrorists.

For five fundamental reasons,” cable wars” have significantly accelerated over the past ten years as geopolitics has entered the picture. China’s rapidly expanding cable network, which is focused on developing countries stretching westward across the Indian Ocean to Europe and Africa, has been its main driver.

Development projects in China have received significant funding and have focused on establishing direct links between developing countries and underdeveloped information societies with strategic interests in China.

A similarly geostrategic American response to Chinese expansion across the Indo-Pacific has been a second driver of cable wars, using both legal and physical tools. The US’s objection to a trans-Pacific cable in the US to Hong Kong, which American regulators rejected in 2024, was the first one.

An alternate trans-Pacific cable connecting the US to Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Singapore via Palau was created in collaboration with Japan.

In competition with China’s Peace cable from Gwadar in Pakistan through the Red Sea and the Mediterranean to Marseilles, the US also initiated the Sea-We-6 Indian Ocean cable from Singapore westward.

Thus, the US re-entered the cable-laying game, which was inspired by geopolitical competition, as it used diplomatic means to stop the construction of Chinese cables. The US and China engaged in fierce combat in these and related projects to establish a binding relationship between East Asia and Arica in self-contained configurations.

Geopolitical conflict in crucial areas of the world has contributed to the deepening Eurasian cable wars, which has had three additional drivers.

The Ukraine war, which was sparked by Russia’s February 2022 attack on Ukraine, was of course the most dramatic. The Russians have reportedly found asymmetric undersea warfare, which involves frequent covert, deniable attacks on undersea cables, to be a low-cost yet high-impact form of response as the conflict has steadily grown and with Russian bombardment intensifying even as the West has provided more advanced weaponry to the Ukrainians.

The Russians have had special geopolitical incentives to target Baltic infrastructure as a result of the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO in 2023 and the fragile yet deteriorating Nordic infrastructure ties to the former Soviet Baltic republics.

The Middle East’s growing regional conflict has also been sparked by the Hamas attack in October 2023 and followed by Israel’s unwavering support of the Iranian” Axis of Resistance” ( Axis of Resistance ).

With over 10 % of global internet traffic passing through Egypt, the Red Sea has been a particularly vulnerable arena and proximate target. The Shiite Houthis of Yemen, who rule the Bab al-Mandab’s Arabian coast, have threatened undersea cable lines, particularly those that are connected to the US and Europe, as well as maritime commerce from the Indian Ocean to Europe.

Cables that are near Yemen. Submarine Cable Map is in the image.

The Taiwan Strait is the third Eurasian flashpoint, where cable disputes have already broken out and seem to be getting worse. Hybrid warfare serves a short-term Chinese geopolitical goal, similar to what happened with the Russians in the Baltic: to put pressure on the Taiwanese regime without provoking a kinetic response from the United States.

Two subsea internet cables that connect Matsu and Taiwan were damaged by Chinese ships in 2023, causing Matsu to experience internet blackouts. A similar incident occurred in January 2025, just the latest in a series of roughly thirty gray-zone undersea-cable incidents against Taiwan since 2017.

Image of the jacket: Brookings

As I mentioned in my recently published book, Eurasian Maritime Geopolitics, the sea lanes of the Indo-Pacific and those of the Arctic seem likely candidates for a further escalation of cable wars.

The main conflict point is between the cable war leaders, the United States and China, and there are numerous flashpoints that could stoke a rift.

The sea lanes between Suez and Shanghai offer a number of flashpoints that are particularly attractive to disruptors because they involve less-developed infrastructure than those in the G-7, and because they cause high geopolitical tensions and littoral regions are less equipped to deal with disruptions.

In addition to Taiwan, chokepoints like the Strait of Malacca, where piracy has always been a problem, and Diego Garcia’s area offer the possibility of cable conflict over a cable building, surveillance, and cable interdiction.

The status of potential landing sites and information centers in nations like Sri Lanka will likely be a source of contention, especially since a lack of bases nearby makes it difficult for the US to respond to cable disruption.

The Arctic is turning into a region of deepening information infrastructure construction that could lead to cable conflict as well, and even natural factors like global warming are likely to accelerate the ongoing cable war.

Fortunately, the White House and the US Congress are beginning to understand the risks associated with cable conflict given the rising likelihood of it affecting national security. The Undersea Cable Security and Protection Act ( H. R. 9766 ), which was proposed in September 2024, is a significant first step.

America needs to collaborate with NATO and other allies to combat Chinese, Iranian, and Russian overt and gray-zone efforts in addition to improving the protection of undersea telecommunications cables and associated landing points in the United States.

Kent Calder is the director of Johns Hopkins University’s Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, a former US Ambassador to Japan, and the author of Eurasian Maritime Geopolitics ( Brookings, 2025 ).

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Why many 2nd-generation Asian Canadians plan to vote Conservative – Asia Times

The Liberal Party of Canada is beginning to recover after months of social deterioration, which some claim is driven by a wave of national pride in response to Donald Trump’s price battle and threats to American sovereignty.

The Conservative Party of Canada’s ( CPC )’s ) growing appeal among immigrants and their children is obscured by this apparent rebound, which is more surprising.

The centrist Liberal Party has usually been supported by immigrants and members of apparent minority groups. Chinese and South Asian Canadians have long been a significant part of the Liberal base in the Greater Toronto Area ( GTA ), where over half of all residents identify as “visible minority” ( the category used by StatCan ).

However, recent polling reveal a unique perspective. According to a survey conducted in October 2024, 44 % of immigrants have changed their political affiliations since immigrating to Canada, with several then leaning Conservative.

In addition, another national survey from January 2025 found that the majority of East Asian ( 55 % ) and South Asian ( 56 % ) respondents voted in favor of the Conservative Party, far outpacing the Liberals or the NDP.

The two largest populations in Canada are South Asians and Chinese Canadians, accounting for more than 26 % of the country’s population.

The couple available data points suggest a significant shift, despite the rarity of detailed cultural breakdowns in American voting. This style also reflects a wider pattern: South Asian and Chinese Indians in the GTA are becoming more socially active, with a rise in voter participation and a broader political split.

Increasing awareness

For its part, the Conservative Party has taken see. Under Pierre Poilievre’s leadership, the CPC has constantly recruited racial candidates and increased awareness to residential swing ridings, specially through ethnic media ads and messages centered on family values and financial self-reliance.

This racial voter’s shift to the right perhaps seem counterintuitive. Under Stephen Harper’s leadership from 2006 to 2015, the Conservative Party has previously represented white, wealthy voters, and has implemented policies that have overwhelmingly harmed racial communities.

Why, then, do racialized Canadians extremely turn to the right?

In a study I just published, I spoke with 50 white, South Asian, and black children who were born in the Greater Toronto Area ( GTA ) through a study I recently conducted. This change, in my opinion, is not in contradiction with the previous one but provides a glass into how racial groups deal with inequality, isolation, and the research for belonging.

Although there are many reasons why second-generation racist Canadians may back the Conservative Party, this study provides one unexplored explanation. Second-generation South Asian and Chinese Canadians may seek approval when power is related to white by voting for a right-wing party that represents the interests of light, wealthy citizens.

the added costs associated with appropriate in

In other words, many of these racist Canadians don’t voting Traditional because they are ignorant of inequality. They choose to be Traditional because they are navigating it.

The younger people I interviewed watched their immigrant families face deskilling and upward mobility despite having professional certifications and growing up in dangerously middle-class families.

They were pressured by their families to” Canadianize” their titles and accents, only to be let down by companies who also supported white.

And they were raised in a society that frequently ignores structural racism while celebrating historical symbols.

In this environment, supporting the Conservatives reflects a way to overcome exclusion rather than ignorance of it. Having a proper alignment is a sign of belonging.

One younger South Asian American gentleman put it this way:

You’ve arrived, I tell you. You are a French. Thus, begin casting your ballot like a fool.”

This apprehension to relate doesn’t manifest in a pump. It is shaped by cultural scripts that compensation compliance and punish dissention, most notably the design minority stereotype.

Acceptance comes at a price.

Eastern Canadians are portrayed as diligent and silently effective by the model minority stereotype. It appears to be acclaim at first. In reality, it conceals inequality and needs silence in exchange for contingent belonging.

That tolerance is delicate. Some South Asians, especially those who were perceived as Muslims, were immediately recast as dangerous outsiders after Sept. 11, 2001.

Similar themes surfaced again during the Covid-19 pandemic, when racial harassment in Eastern People dramatically increased. In both instances, those who were once hailed as “model” residents were abruptly threatened.

Social caution, such as keeping silent or avoiding protest, can serve as a survival tactic in some situations. However, that’s not what I observed in this review.

The second-generation Canadians I spoke with were not socially calm. They vehemently backed the Conservative Party. Voting Conservative was a way for them to show they were already there, not by requesting incorporation, but by demonstrating they did not need to. Conservative conservatism became a sign of success, independence, and connection to the people who were at the heart of American life.

This idea is reinforced by Canada’s established embrace of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is unclear how racism actually operates, despite being frequently praised as a regional strength. Behind feel-good stories of addition, architectural restrictions are hidden.

Reconsidering belonging

Race, school, and dignity are frequently the factors that influence who belongs in Canada. Racially divided folks must not only show that they are diligent and upholding the law, but also that they have “fit in.” Voting Conservative is a way for some to demonstrate that they have done the same, as saying,” I’m not like them. One of you is me.

However, this approach has a price. Racialized voters perhaps gain personal recognition while promoting the very structures that marginalize them while furthering social exclusion. And they might avoid the procedures that would contribute to the development of a more just community by rejecting equity-based platforms.

This fluid is not limited to the next generation. Four in five newcomers, according to a recent CBC study, think Canada has accepted to many immigrants and foreign students without appropriate planning.

Some newcomers are becoming more and more expressing their anti-social opinions, frequently toward those who have arrived more just. This also embodies ambitious politicians. And it demonstrates how vehemently intertwined are culture, precarity, and belonging today in Canada.

None of this imply that conservatives who are racialized are nave. Their choices frequently reflect a thorough knowledge of how electricity functions.

But if we want a fairer political future, we must consider how race, class, and nationalism affect belonging, not just at the polls but also in the narratives we tell about who qualifies as” Canadian.”

Inclusion shouldn’t be seen as an act of generosity, as sociology Ruha Benjamin reminds us. It’s not about “helping” the underprivileged; rather, it’s about acknowledging that we are all interconnected. Everyone suffers when fear is removed from public policy and commodities.

Emine Fidan Elcioglu is a University of Toronto associate professor of sociology.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Learn the article’s introduction.

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Pikachu, Studio Ghibli memes and the subversive power of cuteness – Asia Times

Pikachu was spotted fleeing the authorities in Antalya, Turkey, as quickly as his quick, bright arms had wiggle.

The person who donned the well-known Pokémon figure had been protesting the imprisonment of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, whose social group afterward wrote on X:” Pepper spray, which also affects Pikachu, didn’t do anything to you or me! # ResistPikachu.

The web was having a field day at the same time as another renowned Japanese anime film, using conceptual AI to recast popular memes, family photos, and movie scenes in a manner appropriate for the Japanese animation company Studio Ghibli.

Never mind that Hayao Miyazaki, a chairman and founder of Studio Ghibli, reportedly criticized AI-generated arts as” an affront to life itself.” The charm of beauty is demonstrated by both the popular Pikachu activist and the popular Studio Ghibli-style animations.

There’s more to charming than that, in my opinion.

Use political language to describe beauty. It may draw attention to injustices committed to the underprivileged. And it can increase the underdog’s assistance.

In the truest sense of the word, it’s a form of sweet energy.

Asia embraces the adorable

As a Chinese American, I’ve always been a longtime fan of East Asian culture’s cuteness, including adorable cartoon characters, adorable stationery, and even cute-looking food.

Now that I’ve studied cuteness, I’m interested in understanding what constitutes a” cute” and how it functions in politics and culture.

Japan is a well-known, endearing country with a lot of common, well-known, and adorable pop culture figures and products, especially after World War II, when Japanese animation, or anime, and a Japanese comics style called manga gained popularity.

Their narratives and aesthetics reached out to a nation that is still reeling from the disgrace of US job and the destruction caused by the nuclear bombs.

Using stories that were cheerful, upsetting, or a combination of both, Anime and manga used both futuristic and idealistic futures to process shared trauma.

Through grief, shame, and loss, pretty characters frequently guided audiences and readers. For instance, the six-year-old Gen’s activities are described in the comic” Barefoot Gen,” which details his survival from the Hiroshima attack.

Similar to” Tomb of the Fireflies,” a film from Studio Ghibli tells the tale of Seita and Setsuko, two younger siblings who are starving following the bombing of Kobe in World War II’s waning years. They are drawn because of their expressive faces and large eyes, which symbolize ignorance and impotence.

In the latter half of the 20th century, Studio Ghibli and the Pokémon company, along with other titan of beauty like Hello Kitty, who merely celebrated her 50th birthday, Doraemon, and well-known Nintendo figures Kirby and Yoshi, emerged.

South Asian cultures are now predominate due to charm.

Popular cartoon characters adorn the sides of Chinese trains, as well as green bunnies and small rice cookers, which are cute mascots for the city of Taipei.

The word “kawaii” refers to the lovely and lovable in Japan. This includes clothing and even talk, such as talking in a pout or speaking in a childish voice, as well as cartoon characters and velvet dolls.

You can learn beauty in the way celebrities often speak with a baby voice, breath out their cheeks, or bird their eyelashes in Asia when they flash heart symbols with their fingers, a gesture that originated in South Korea.

YouTube video

[embedded articles]

softer the snags

American culture is rooted in charm. However, it lacks Asia’s equivalent historical clout.

But to me, the Studio Ghibli memes that dominated British social media platforms revealed a common desire for affection at a time when the world seems particularly harsh, aggressive, and uncertain.

According to Sianne Ngai, a theoreticalist, cuteness is typically determined by the power gap between the observer and the cute object: A small kitten, a stuffed animal, or a crying baby are all cute in part because they’re so vulnerable.

I believe that’s why the White House’s attempts to get involved in the Ghibli memes failed. A Dominican woman was handcuffed by an ICE agent while her Instagram account posted a Ghibli-like image:

The portrayal sparked outrage. The cartoon assumes that the audience would enjoy punching down. Celebrating the powerful – the ICE agent and the U.S. government, rather than the powerless, is a perversion of how cuteness works. Compare the White House’s appearance to the” Grave of the Fireflies,” which highlighted the vulnerability of children during war.

Rallying in circles of cuteness

But paradoxically, cute characters can have powerful effects: Most people can’t help but cheer for a furry, yellow cartoon animal fleeing from riot police. A cute character can appear helpless, but it can show up in the crowd to support the brave.

Pikachu may have been present at two other protests, one of which was an anti-Trump rally in Washington, DC, on April 5, 2025, and another that was held the same day.

Cuteness has been used in Asia as a political tool, which is surprising. The Milk Tea Alliance, which was established in 2020, is a pro-democracy, pan-Asian movement that brings together people in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, Myanmar, and other countries.

YouTube video

[embedded articles]

The effectiveness of cuteness and humor as a tool to condemn violence and denounce authoritarianism is pointedly highlighted by organizers. The movement’s online images feature cartoons of holding hands while holding Taiwan bubble tea, Thai cha, and Hong Kong milk tea in anime-style drawings of young student protestors.

Comedy can be obscene. Political cartoons and comedic performers, of course, have long tapped into this dynamic.

However, cuteness further defangs the power hungry by adding a whimsical absurdity. Is it any wonder that Chinese authorities forbade the release of a Winnie-the-Pooh movie after Xi Jinping-related memes went viral?

Despite having a cuddly, quaint, and endearing exterior, cuteness has hidden superpowers: it celebrates the vulnerable while sapping the authority figures they want to project.

At Yale University, Yii-Jan Lin is an associate professor of New Testament.

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the text of the article.

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Thawing Arctic heats up US-Russia imperialist instincts – Asia Times

You can’t seize another nation, it says. At a recent press conference with the Greenland’s approaching and approaching prime ministers, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen delivered this information. It appeared to be directed at Russian President Vladimir Putin, rather than Donald Trump, the leader of one of her government’s closest friends, who has threatened to overthrow Greenland.

Frederiksen was speaking in Nuuk, the money of Greenland, stating something that is clear under international law but cannot now be taken for granted. Under Trump, US foreign policy has played into Russian and possibly Chinese regional ambitions and has become a major driver of this doubt.

Jens-Frederik Nielsen, the approaching Greenlandic prime minister, made it abundantly clear that Greenlanders should decide their coming, no the United States. Denmark is in charge of Greenland’s home scheme, but it makes its own choices. Surveys indicate that the majority of locals want to leave Denmark in the future but don’t want to live in the US.

Trump’s attention in Greenland is frequently linked to the island’s great, but generally untapped, mineral resources. But its advantageous position is unquestionably an even greater plus. Due to melting sea ice, shifting roads through the Arctic have become more predictable and reliable throughout the year.

The Northern Passage  and the Northern Passage  ( along the US and Canadian shorelines ) are frequently ice-free during the summer.

A map of the Arctic showing the Northwest Passage.
Arctic Development and Maritime Transportation: website. Arcticportal. com

This opens up more opportunities for business transport. For instance, the east section can make a pot send travel from Asia to Europe up to three times shorter than traditional roads through the Suez Canal or around Africa.

The northwest section, on the other hand, offers the shortest path between Alaska and the east coast of the United States. Add to that the Arctic’s good significant assets, which range from oil and gas to nutrients, and the area is starting to appear like a huge real estate deal in the works.

goods in the Arctic

The Arctic’s financial potential and, in particular, its greater availability have also raised military and security concerns.

Vladimir Putin addressed the fifth global Arctic community in Murmansk in Russia’s high north the day before JD Vance’s planned trip to Greenland on March 28 and warned of growing geopolitical conflict.

He quickly pointed out that Moscow was “upgrading the combat skills of the Armed Forces, and modernising military equipment services” in the Arctic, even while saying that” Russia has previously threatened anyone in the Arctic.”

Russia’s increased marine assistance with China and Beijing’s access to the Arctic, which is equally alarming, have both increased. The two nations ‘ warships signed a cooperation agreement on search and rescue operations on the great lakes in April 2024.

A map showing possible shipping routes through the Arctic.
Ice Data Center, National Snow &, and Arcticportal. nonprofit

China participated in Russia’s largest marine tactics in the post-Cold War period, Ocean-2024, which were carried out in the northern Pacific and Arctic waters in September 2024. Russian and Chinese beach watch ships conducted their second joint Arctic guard the following month. Thus, Vance makes a point when he urges Greenland and Denmark to break up a bargain with the US because the “island isn’t safe.”

Westwards have noticed that the Russia-China relationship has led to an extremely militarized presence in the Arctic. Canada recently announced a$ 6 billion ( US$ 4.2 billion ) upgrade to facilities in its joint North American Aerospace Defense Command, which it oversees with the United States, in protest of the security of its Arctic territories.

To strengthen its Arctic defenses, it will also engage another$ 420 million in boosting the presence of its military forces, as well as purchase more boats, icebreakers, and fighter jets.

What part will Svalbard play in the future?

Norway has increased its military presence in the Arctic, particularly in relation to the Svalbard archipelago, which is strategically located between the Scandinavian mainland and the Arctic Circle.

Russia has reacted infuriated to this, falsely alleging that Oslo violated the 1920 Svalbard Treaty, which gave Norway the mainland with the condition that it must certainly host Scandinavian military installations.

According to the agreement, Russia has a straight to a place of worship there. Yury Trutnev, the Russian deputy prime minister’s minister to the far eastern federal area, is the head of the” commission on ensuring Russia’s existence on the coast Spitzbergen,” which is the Russian government’s adopted name for Svalbard. Trumpnev has filed numerous complaints about excessive Scandinavian restrictions on Russia’s appearance in Svalbard.

From the Kremlin’s point of view, this is more about Norway’s and NATO’s appearance in a proper place at the intersection of the Greenland, Barents, and Norway seas.

From there, it is possible to monitor sea prospects along Russia’s northeastern passage. The strategic significance of the island would grow even more if and when a key Arctic shipping route, which may link Greenland and Svalbard, becomes practicable.

Greenland is more significant from the standpoint of Washington because it is more close to the US. However, Svalbard is essential to NATO for tracking and halting marine pursuits from Russia and China.

Trump’s White House cares less about local security administration and is more concerned with its own immediate area.

In consequence, there hasn’t been any advice so far that the US needs Svalbard in the same way that Trump claims he needs Greenland to provide US security. Russia has not threatened Svalbard in any particular way.

However, it was obvious that Putin discussed traditional regional issues in his  speech at the Arctic Forum, including a mysterious 1910 proposal for a property switch between the US, Denmark, and Germany involving Greenland.

Putin also noted that” the NATO countries are exceedingly frequently designating the Far North as a catalyst for potential problems.” Moscow’s logic is understandable, and it is easy to see why Russia may claim Svalbard if the US is claim Greenland for safety reasons.

The conclusion to draw from this is not that Trump may aim to seize a royal Norwegian area as well. The importance of maintaining and strengthening long-standing relationships is highlighted by the North Atlantic’s sea geography.

As a result of expanding NATO security cooperation with Denmark and Norway, US interests may be protected and Russia would receive a powerful concept. It would also send a strong message to the rest of the world that the US is not planning to start a regional reorganization of international politics in order to serve only Moscow, Beijing, and Washington.

University of Birmingham professor of global surveillance Stefan Wolff

The Conversation has republished this post under a Creative Commons license. Study the article’s introduction.

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Germany’s Lithuanian base complicates grand US-Russia deal – Asia Times

Germany &nbsp, just opened&nbsp, its first permanent military base abroad since World War II&nbsp, amidst the competition &nbsp, for leadership of&nbsp, post-conflict Europe&nbsp, between itself, France and Poland.

Located in southern Lithuania near the Belarusian borders and in contact to Russia’s Kaliningrad Region, it’s strategically positioned to provide Germany enormous effect in shaping Europe’s potential security architecture. That’s because Germany is now a direct stakeholder in Central &amp, Eastern Europe’s ( CEE ) security.

This development improvements many related strategic objectives. For instance, it poses a problem to Poland’s work to present as the Baltic States ‘ most dependable European alliance, given that Germany now has a bottom in one of those countries, exactly the one that connects Poland to the other two.

On that subject, Germany and Poland agreed to create a “military Schengen” in early 2024 to facilitate the movements of soldiers and products, which makes it easier for Germany to supply its Ukrainian center.

This alliance may consequently be expanded to encompass Latvia and Estonia, especially after the German Parliament&nbsp, confirmed the centrality&nbsp, of the” Baltic Defense Line” to the republic’s eastern protection plan.

Germany’s Lithuanian base could, therefore, pair with its&nbsp, envisaged military buildup&nbsp, and an expanded “military Schengen” to compete more robustly with Poland for influence in the Baltics. That might, in turn, result in Germany subordinating Poland to become the dominant military player in CEE.

Germany’s new base in Lithuania doesn’t just pose a challenge to Polish interests, even if Warsaw won’t openly admit as much. Some Polish officials might even support a more important regional security role for Berlin.

Any hypothetical Russian military action against Lithuania, including if Moscow tries to carve out a so-called” Suwalki Corridor” from Belarus to Kaliningrad, could serve as a tripwire for the EU’s de facto leader to become militarily involved in the crisis.

To be sure, Russia hasn’t signaled any intent to blitzkrieg through Poland or much weaker Lithuania en route to its Baltic exclave. Nor has anyone cogently suggested why it would do so, considering this scenario would almost certainly lead to a continental conflict and perhaps even World War III if the US becomes involved.

Nevertheless, it still worries many Europeans and thus influences how they formulate policy, with Germany now poised to play a greater role in such discussions, given its direct stakes in deterring or responding to this scenario.

And, finally, the two preceding objectives of Germany competing more robustly with Poland for influence in the Baltics and having a greater say in” Suwalki Corridor” contingency planning are meant to ensure that it’s included in any Russian-US deal over Europe’s future security architecture.

Putin’s late 2021 request for the US to return to the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act by withdrawing Western troops and military infrastructure from the former Warsaw Pact countries can’t now be achieved without Germany’s participation.

Every other NATO member’s eastern deployments&nbsp, are rotational, &nbsp, even though they function as permanent. Yet the US and Germany’s are officially permanent, which is a different legal status that’s considered more serious by Russia.

This doesn’t automatically mean that Germany will be included in the Russian-US talks, not even in the capacity of representing the EU, but just that Berlin can now serve as more of an obstacle than anyone else to them possibly clinching a grand deal over European security without any European nations ‘ input.

This&nbsp, article was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber&nbsp, here.

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Trump’s step back abroad has triggered an atomic race in East Asia – Asia Times

US friends in Asia fear losing their radioactive umbrella because US President Donald Trump suggested some international withdrawal. Without the awning, as seen with Ukraine, a government’s liberation is in danger. It starts a new spread.

Washington is tempted to retreat from some foreign pledges and is willing to do its plan without much discussion or consensus with the allies. There are different objectives in the partnerships.

Facing the Northern Korean nuclear danger, the majority of South Koreans apparently want the weapon. Japan, threatened by North Korea and scared by China, may quickly acquire a nuclear security. At that point, actually Vietnam or Indonesia may comprehend plutonium features. And why not the Philippines or Thailand? India and Pakistan now possess a magnificent stockpile.

The big question is Taiwan: did the area produce to Beijing or create its weapons?

China would be in a minefield. It’d be the goal of this army and in a violent circle – the more weapons it companies, the more explosives its neighbors will store. It’d be extraordinary with unimaginable consequences.

The atmosphere in Asia is more difficult than in Europe, where two powerful US-backed systems, NATO and the Union, have held the peninsula along for years. Asia has thinner international organizations and intergovernmental agreements with the US.

Countries in the region usually don’t believe China or each other. If America steps up, everything will fall apart. China is not willing to offer free safety offers to anyone, replacing American people, and its assures could not be welcomed.

Eastern options

A plan could be for Korea and Japan to question France and the UK to expand their radioactive umbrella to Asia. A similar arrangement is under concern in Europe, where France and the UK may extend their national safety across the peninsula. This may enhance the transatlantic split, as the UK plus EU may produce greater room for maneuvering out of Wahington’s programs.

Besides, a Franco-British reach over Eurasia’s east side could spark fresh, not necessarily positive, global political and military dynamics. Alternatively, there could be greater political and military coordination among America’s allies, even with the US taking a step back.

The UK ( with Keir Starmer ), France ( with Emmanuel Macron ), Germany ( with Friedrich Merz ), and Japan ( with Fumio Kishida ), are possibly weaving the fabric of something new that other countries could join. In World War II, the US wanted to stay out of the fight, but then Churchill, with words and actions, helped to convince Roosevelt to change his mind.

China, America’s primary concern and preoccupation, could turn the situation by tackling it head-on. Beijing should force Pyongyang to forfeit its nuclear arsenal. It should press Russia to disarm partially, and it should shelve its rearmament plans. It would defuse the arms race.

It’d be challenging, but it’d be essential to start working on it.

It could also dissuade the US from leaving the region and persuade it to engage in a genuine negotiation on the RMB’s full convertibility, the complete opening of China’s internal market, and Beijing’s territorial claims.

US world

Underpinning this scenario is perhaps a reality that’s perceived vaguely in Beijing and taken for granted ( thus similarly unclear ) in Washington. America is not a country but a world order, just as Rome ceased to be a city when it cemented its empire around the Mediterranean.

This empire is not based solely on military might as was that of the Mongols. It has a sophisticated architecture comprising many elements besides strength: culture, rule of law, history, economic and financial prestige. If the US tries to withdraw, not only will the world order collapse but the United States will crumble, too. There’s no way back from “imperial America” other than suicide.

Naturally, the US feels immense strain after decades of vast responsibilities. Thus, many political and economic aspects must be renegotiated, but invading Greenland destroys the world order and the American nation.

It might superficially look like an opportunity for China to take up the US slack. However, Beijing could have far more problems than it currently faces, or it could face negotiating a broad deal with the US.

In all this, too many elements are up in the air, and the role of the Vatican as a disarmed yet knowledgeable and disenchanted mediator could be invaluable.

Many players would need to leave their present trajectory and comfort zone to turn the present undercurrents around. The US should rethink its direction and renegotiate its commitments. It’d be safer and less expensive than to gamble a global security overhaul. Perhaps Trump is pursuing this, but the public hears a different message.

Therefore, Asian and, thus, global nuclear proliferation is the likely scenario. The old Cold War set the terms of the previous arms race– it was run between two blocs. Now, alliances are unraveling, and every country could be basically on its own. This race would be different, more challenging, and full of unexpected incidents.

Everyone needs to step back and keep a cool head to avert a military tsunami.

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Turkey holds the key to solving multiple global crises – Asia Times

Turkey’s state is struggling to deal with widespread protests at home ( after Istanbul’s president Ekrem Imamoglu was imprisoned ), but it is extremely successful as a major power broker in negotiations with Russia, the US, and Europe.

Turkey, which is effectively significant to almost everyone and is emerging as a smart communicator, is strategically important to almost everyone at the intersection between Asia and Europe.

Turkey has relied on a international policy that placed a premium on cooperation rather than competitors since the early 2000s. Turkey continuously improved its associations with Russia, Iran, and Syria because financial relationships were a top priority.

Turkey maintains its membership in NATO and is a big trading mate with the European Union, but it also holds important ties to Russia, Ukraine, China, and Middle Eastern nations. Turkey has demonstrated that it will function with any state that serves its interests, and it has used local conflicts to act as a quick ally when necessary.

Recep Tayyip Erdoan, the president of Turkey, has no reservations about confronting both friends and foes similarly, giving it proper flexibility at the same time.

Russian-Russian marriage is rough

Russia’s second-largest buying lover is Turkey. With over US$ 60 billion in annual deal with Moscow, Armenia continues to concentrate on Soviet banking and gas networks. When Turkey stopped supporting Chechen rebels and Russia stopped supporting the Kurdish Workers Party ( PKK), the relationship between Turkey and Russia dramatically improved in 1995.

Turkey has never been compliant with Moscow, but it has kept a working relationship with Russia ever since.

Turkey criticized Russia’s plans to establish military installations in Syria, Tartus and Khmeimim, and because it controls the airport in northern Syria, it also has the authority to obstruct Russian access. In addition, Ankara has used its military presence to thwart previous Soviet control in Idlib, in northern Syria.

Turkey’s helicopter offensive in Idlib in 2020 supported the Arab opposition and resisted Russian-backed activity in the west.

The significance of the Black Sea

Turkey has a strong advantage in the Black Sea as a result of the conflict in Ukraine. Russia aimed to have complete control over the Black Sea, yet seizing some Ukrainian ships, which would have a negative impact on global grain supply in 2022.

However, Turkey negotiated the release of millions of tonnes of corn and complied with the Montreux Convention to ensure the safety of shipping roads through the Black Sea. This arrangement from 1936 gave Turkey complete control over the delivery route between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea ( through the Bosporus Strait, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles, through which hundreds of millions of tons of cargo transit each year ) through the Bosporus Strait.

Turkey also limited Russian troops into the Black Sea, which has severely limited Russian maritime power, according to the agreement.

A map of the Black Sea region.
Map provided by Shutterstock via The Talk

Turkey does not support the Russian annexation of Crimea, even though it has certainly imposed sanctions on Russia and has kept its revenue sources available. Turkey values Crimea for both corporate and historical reasons, with more than 5 million Turks claiming to be of Crimean Tatar descent.

Turkey does, however, maintain communication with Moscow ( and Erdogan and Putin are “dear friends” ). Turkey likewise supports Ukraine, providing it with Bayraktar TB2 robots, heavy machine guns, laser-guided rockets, electronic warfare techniques, armored vehicles, and safe products, complicating this “friendship.”

In the end, Turkey wants Ukraine to keep separate to prevent Russian naval presence in the Black Sea. As a result, Turkey is likely to collaborate with NATO to ensure that Ukraine is never defeated.

In order to achieve this, Turkey is willing to send troops to a post-ceasefire arrangement, provided the necessary conditions are met.

Turkey has also reduced its dependence on Russia by diversifying its power supply routes ( relying more on manufacturers from the Caucasus region and central Asia ) in the wake of the conflict in Ukraine. Turkey is in a strong position, particularly with the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean discovering oil reserves.

Through the Trans-Anatolian natural gas pipeline, Ankara aims to become an energy gateway that facilitates the transport of oil from the Caucasus, central Asia, and Russia to Europe.

Syria and Turkey

Turkey’s connection with Syria’s neighbor has also been wise and logical. In 2005, Bashar al-Assad became the first Arab leader to visit Turkey since Syria gained its independence in 1946, allowing Turkey to seek reconciliation with Syria.

However, Erdoan continued to work with him to stop Syria from entangling with Iran when it was no more appropriate for him. He occasionally hosted anti-Assad characters in Turkey, and he established a safe haven for Syrian refugees and armed fighters along its borders. He gave separatists the ultimatum to overthrow Assad in 2024.

Just as the conflict in Syria gave Turkey prospects, so too has the fight in Ukraine. The United States has strengthened its bargaining status and pressed for more concessions from Western friends. Turkey is leveraging the US’s withdrawal from NATO to encourage closer assistance with Europe.

Turkey is likewise leveraging Donald Trump’s more diplomatic stances toward Russia to strengthen its connection with the US. This is mainly due to a desire to enhance protection cooperation. Turkey relied on the US for supplies of arms, revenue, and equipment during the Cold War, but it was unable to use them without US permission.

After 1989, Turkey carved out new areas for its exports of arms and was subject to US sanctions for purchasing S-400 surface-to-air weapons from Russia in 2020. Turkey wants to purchase F-35 sonic fighter planes from the US and is hoping that the US will stop imposing sanctions on second nations that have engaged with Russia.

Whose important ally?

Turkey has made certain that the US does not view it as a young companion in the Middle East. For instance, the US offered no military support when Turkey launched activities in north Syria in 2019 and constantly fired close to US troops.

Despite having a number of different tactical objectives, the US views Turkey as a crucial alliance. Turkey also has US and NATO military bases at several of its bases, as well as US nuclear weapons ( B61 nuclear bombs ) stationed at its Incirlik Air Force Base.

Turkey wants to make an even bigger diplomatic and military presence. It has a lot of power as a G20 part, having one of the world’s 20 largest markets and having the second-largest and most effective military power in NATO after the US.

And in terms of geopolitical spinning, Turkey is now in the elite position of wanting to support them.

Natasha Lindstaedt is a professor at the University of Essex’s Department of Government.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the text of the content.

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Great Game On: Shining light on the contest for Central Asia – Asia Times

The Founding Fathers advised Americans to steer clear of ensnaring relationships if they wished to keep their recently acquired Republic. This may be news to some of our legislators but not to President Donald Trump. No US senator has been leerier of the authoritarian foreign policy bequeathed to us by Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt than Trump. &nbsp,

Immune to the crony passion for “democracy tower” and “forever wars”, Trump lives in the realm of reality– no intellectual pseudo-reality. &nbsp, Trump has had enough of the “values-based” international plan that, in the matter of Ukraine, perhaps have brought us closer to thermonuclear war than at any moment since the Cuban missile crisis. &nbsp,

Unlike so many of his political opponents, Trump is not oblivious to the negative effects a misrepresented foreign policy could have on ordinary citizens, people, the nation at large and, for that matter, the earth. &nbsp, &nbsp,

With that in mind, and in view of the rising necessity of Asia, Geoff Raby’s fresh book –” Great Game On: The Battle for Central Asia and Global Supremacy” – is worth reading to get a better control on the history and current state of great power dynamics in Eurasia and Central Asia. Raby served as American Ambassador to China from 2007 to 2011.

He has done a company by focusing on Central Asia in view of its significant and growing value. The region encompasses Afghanistan, Inner Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Xinjiang ( China ), and is more than 300, 000 square miles larger than the continental United States. That’s a major part of real property which the US ignores at its risk. &nbsp, &nbsp,

Raby – a largely non-ideological international policy specialist – deftly describes not only the 19th centuries Anglo-Russian” Great Game” but the evolving 21st century” New Great Game”, i. e., the great power competition for influence over Central Asia between China, Russia and, to a lesser extent, the United States. As such, he delves into the respective geopolitical ambitions of China and Russia in Eurasia over the past 100 years with a spotlight on Central Asia. &nbsp,

” The Principal Theater of Contest”

Raby argues that” Core Eurasia” – in other words, Central Asia – is” the principal theater of contest” between the great powers and that” the key pivots on the chess board are Afghanistan and Xinjiang” .&nbsp,

He has a point, but it’s also the case that Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, with their massive reserves of natural resources, extensive trade routes – east-west and north-south – and welcoming attitude toward the outside world represent a stable setting in which the US can expand its economic ties. ( See: Time for a US pivot to Central Asia )

To his credit, Raby eschews the moralism of so many foreign policy gurus ( who rarely get around to considering morality ). Raby, from all indications, is a proponent of the realist school of politics.

He is concerned about national self-interest, security and power relationships rather than presumed ideological imperatives as the principal drivers of inter-state relations.

Raby’s treatment of the United States ‘ presence in Central Asia is skimpy – but that is telling in itself: Washington pays Central Asia scant attention, so there’s not much to write about. That should change under Trump.

Raby provides much-needed historical context without which it is impossible to understand the competition for influence in the region. He makes insightful, thought-provoking comments on the geostrategic thinking of the great powers in light of history– for example, Mackinder’s” Heartland” theory, i. e., “whoever controlled Central Asia would be the dominant world power”.

Helpfully, the author provides the reader with maps to navigate a vast region that could easily thwart even adepts at world geography. Thus, the reader can easily find Türkmenbaşy, Kashgar and the Wakhan Corridor as well as inner Mongolia, various mountain ranges and rivers and myriad other places unknown to most people. &nbsp,

And having traveled extensively in Central Asia, Raby provides a store of anecdotes that helps demystify the inscrutability and romance of these far-off lands and peoples. &nbsp, The book is extensively researched and footnoted – a sign of the author’s sober-mindedness.

Raby claims that China has emerged” as the primary Eurasian power” in the new age of multipolarity that is upon us, an increasingly recognized reality. &nbsp,

The US, though, should take this state of affairs in stride and deal with it not through any form or degree of belligerence or aggressiveness and ditch its usual moral preachments that historically have been the stock and trade of USAID, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and other mouthpieces and instruments of liberal internationalist and globalist orthodoxy.

What Vice President JD Vance told the Munich Security Conference ( see his speech ) is also good advice for US policymakers: a little introspection is advisable. &nbsp,

Raby believes that” Great Powers can find a strategic accommodation without going to war … Options for finding strategic stability … are still worth pursuing” .&nbsp,

Nicely put – a vision that Trump’s State Department and the various Central Asian states share ( see this author’s &nbsp, Central Asian School of Diplomacy ) i. e., diplomacy is the smartest, most cost-effective way to resolve conflicts, defend national interests and avoid armed conflict. &nbsp,

Raby has recently suggested that China, for the first time in its history, feels secure along its Eurasian land frontiers and is now free to project power globally, a matter of some concern for those in the neighborhood.

Having said that, one way to address China’s resurgence, Raby suggests, might be for the West to engineer a so-called “reverse Kissinger”, i. e., entice Russia to “look West” and distance itself from China. &nbsp,

Only time will tell whether that is a real possibility, meanwhile, the West would be well-advised to understand Beijing’s geopolitical mindset and history as it confronts its growing ambitions.

Platitudes vs reality

Raby reminds the reader that the West should stop framing the Great Game as a contest between “democracy” and “autocracy” or” good guys vs bad guys” .&nbsp, Stated differently, the use of preachy, moralistic, diplomatic lingo is a non-starter. Certainly, it is a money-loser when dealing with China, Central Asia or most anyone else. Trump understands that.

Raby correctly states that” Russia’s trade with Central Asia is dwarfed by China’s” and” China has replaced Russia as Central Asia’s major source of foreign direct investment”. He sheds light on contested matters such as the “debt trap”, “debt sustainability” and the Belt &amp, Road Initiative.

But he might have pointed out that Central Asian governments are selective in their partnerships. They will not accept one-way investment deals that are perceived to have few long-term benefits for the country or, worse, inadvertently lead to geoeconomic subjugation.

To be sure, Central Asia wants win-win deals as well as free and fair trade – a mindset more in tune with Trump’s than with that of much of the American foreign policy establishment.

In case anyone missed it, Central Asian governments – whether you like them or not – want investors – whether Chinese, Indian or American – to make sensible, non-ideological cross-border long-term economic commitments to develop smart infrastructure connectivity and integration and create jobs and decent wages for families and the region’s growing populations. &nbsp, This vision is in line with Trumpian economic policy at home.

Sinostan

Without explicitly saying so, Raby does not appear to be optimistic about the US’s long-term prospects in Central Asia since China’s aim to absorb Central Asia – transform it into a veritable” Sinostan” – &nbsp, “is an advanced work in progress. But Russia and China will continue to look to each other for support in their contests with the United States and this will remain a strong point of convergence in their relationship” .&nbsp,

If true, all the more reason for the US government and business community to get in on the action in Central Asia, namely, expand trade relations and, more importantly, set up joint ventures that give US companies skin in the game. Toward this end, Trump’s State Department should grease the wheels.

If Washington doesn’t deliver soon on substance, Central Asians will continue to get the best infrastructure, logistics and mining deals ( critical metals and oil &amp, gas ) that China, Russia and others have to offer. This would be only logical if the US were to remove itself de facto from the equation.

For those eager to understand the historical and present-day ins and outs of great power competition in Central Asia, they would be well advised to read” Great Game On: The Contest for Central Asia and Global Supremacy”. This would include policymakers. &nbsp,

If American ingenuity and creativity were to be introduced into the arena shorn of hidden political and/or woke agendas and offered Central Asia attractive win-win economic arrangements, the US would stand a good chance of not only staying in the ( great ) game but prevailing.

Javier M Piedra has 40 years of international banking and finance experience and was former acting assistant administrator, Bureau for Asia, USAID ( 2018 – 21 )

Alexander B Gray is former deputy assistant to the president and chief of staff, White House National Security Council ( 2019-21 )

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