South Korea plunging deeper into sub export markets

South Korea aims to crank up its weaponry shipments with a new type of submarine with the potential to give small and mid-sized navies in the Pacific an asymmetric edge in underwater warfare.

This month, Naval News reported that South Korea’s HD Hyundai Heavy Industries (HD HHI) is developing an indigenous mid-size submarine for export markets. South Korea’s submarine market is mainly divided between HD HHI and Hanwha Ocean (previously DSME).

The report notes that Dr Won-Ho Joo, chief operating officer of HD HHI’s Naval & Special Ship Business Unit, made the announcement. He emphasized the importance of collaboration between HD HHI and Hanwha Ocean to enhance competitiveness in international bidding and shipbuilding, the Naval News report quoted him as saying.

The report also mentions Hanwha Ocean’s commitment to working with over 200 domestic partner companies for submarine procurement and future maintenance projects.

Naval News mentions that HD HHI is planning to participate in the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) and has signed a technical cooperation agreement with Babcock Canada. It has also signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Polish National Defense company PGZ for Poland’s Orka Project, the nation’s submarine program.

South Korea has previously sold submarines to foreign nations. Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) mentions that in 2011, South Korea outbid Russia, France and Germany on a US$1.1 billion contract to supply Indonesia with three Type 209-class submarines.

NTI notes that the first two submarines, the KRI Nagapasa and KRI Ardadedali, were delivered to Indonesia in 2017 and 2018, while the third submarine, KRI Alugoro, was assembled by PT PAL in Indonesia with South Korean support as part of a technology-sharing program.

However, Asia Times noted in March 2022 that Indonesia is reportedly not satisfied with the performance of its South Korean-built submarines, citing power supply problems connected to the batteries, among other technical issues.

Reports indicate South Korea continues to improve its submarines, producing cutting-edge designs that may have already addressed the problems with its earlier models.

In a 2019 article for the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Richard Bitzinger notes that South Korea began building submarines in the 1990s with the KSS-1, which were license-produced German Type 209-class units, producing nine such vessels.

Bitzinger says the KSS-1 was followed by the KSS-2, a licensed German Type 214 class version. He notes that the KSS-2 was a significant upgrade over the KSS-1, which is larger, heavier and, most importantly, runs on air-independent propulsion (AIP) technology. Nine KSS-2s were built between 2006 and 2017.

The KSS-2 was followed up by the KSS-3, one of the biggest conventional submarines at 3,000 tons, making it capable of blue-water operations. Bitzinger notes that the class is heavily armed with traditional torpedo tubes and a six-silo vertical launch system (VLS) for anti-ship, cruise and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).

The KSS-3 is the world’s first AIP submarine capable of launching SLBMs. Bitzinger says later versions of the submarine may have a 10-silo VLS for SLBMs.

Currently, South Korea has 2 KSS-3 submarines, with plans to have nine units. South Korea’s new mid-size export submarine would likely be a variant of the KSS-3, with each unit designed according to technology export restrictions and customer specifications.

South Korea, a major emerging arms exporter, is well-poised to be a major player in emerging submarine markets, most notably in nearby Southeast Asia.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), South Korea was the world’s 9th largest arms exporter in 2022, accounting for 2.4% of global arms exports, with most of its sales going to the Philippines, India, and Thailand.

SIPRI data indicates a massive leap in South Korean arms exports between 2013 and 2017 and between 2018 and 2022, showing a 74% increase between the two five-year periods.

Submarines are high on Southeast Asian nations’ military wish lists, driven largely by fears about China’s increasing naval might in the South China Sea. Regional nations are also engaged in low-level arms races where neighbors seek to keep pace with each other’s arsenals.   

In July 2023, Defense News reported that Singapore received the first of four German-built Type 218SG submarines to replace its aging Archer and Challenger-class units. Defense News notes that the Type 218SG is specially designed for tropical waters and possesses state-of-the-art capabilities, significant payload capacity, high levels of automation, enhanced underwater endurance and optimized ergonomics.

Naval News reported in June 2023 that major shipbuilders such as France’s Naval Group, Spain’s Navantia and Hanwha Ocean have offered the Philippines various submarine deals as the latter struggles to modernize its military amidst increased Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea.

However, given its overreliance on the US and limited defense budget, it is unclear if the Philippines has the political will and resources to pursue its longstanding submarine ambitions.

Asia Times reported in May 2023 that Indonesia had selected France over South Korea as its submarine program’s leading partner. Indonesia plans to acquire two Scorpene-class submarines with a preliminary agreement between PT PAL and Naval Group to collaborate on building two units and establish a joint research and development facility.

Indonesia views submarines as an asymmetric power projection asset, as it does not have the resources to build a blue-water navy.

The New Straits Times reported in February 2023 that Malaysia plans to acquire two more submarines in addition to the two Scorpene-class units it already operates.

New Straits Times says that the first submarine will be acquired between 2031 and 2035 and the second between 2036 and 2040. The report notes that Malaysia views submarines as strategic assets as they are involved in the sensitive South China Sea disputes.

As for China, NTI notes that as of March 2023 China had 56 submarines comprised of six nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) and 44 diesel-electric attack submarines (SSK), with 17 of the 44 vessels running on AIP technology.

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The roots and depths of Israel's Hamas intel failure

After the surprise Hamas terrorist attack on Israel from the Gaza Strip on Oct. 7, 2023, many observers were puzzled about how Israel could have been caught completely off-guard.

We were among those puzzled, and proposed three possible reasons:

  1. Israeli leaders may have underestimated Hamas’ capabilities and misunderstood its intentions.
  2. Israeli intelligence may have been tricked by Hamas’ secrecy, missing signs that it was planning and training.
  3. Israeli intelligence leaders may have been so wedded to their prior conclusion that Hamas was not a major threat that they dismissed mounting evidence that it was preparing for war.

New revelations from recent media coverage have shed additional light on what happened, which mostly confirm the role of faulty threat assessments, Hamas’ improved operational security, and confirmation bias.

On October 29, The New York Times reported that since May 2021, Israel’s military intelligence leaders and National Security Council had officially assessed that “Hamas had no interest in launching an attack from Gaza that might invite a devastating response from Israel.”

As a result, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and security leaders diverted attention and resources away from Hamas and toward what they saw as more existential threats: Iran and Hezbollah.

For instance, in 2021, the Israeli military cut personnel and funding for Unit 8200, a key military surveillance unit watching Gaza. In 2022, the unit stopped listening in on Hamas militants’ radio communications, though it apparently gathered other intelligence.

The US made a similar shift, focusing on the Islamic State group and other militants, leaving intelligence gathering on Hamas to Israel.

Revealing surveillance

Within days of October 7, Egypt revealed that it had shared with Israel high-level warnings of impending Hamas violence – “something big.”

A Guardian report in early November revealed that Hamas leaders who had planned the attack took special measures to avoid being detected by Israeli intelligence, including passing orders only by word of mouth, rather than by radio or internet communication. But Hamas’ planning did not totally escape detection.

The Times of Israel reported in late October that Israeli troops of the Combat Intelligence Corps surveilling the Israel-Gaza border months before October 7 saw Hamas militants digging holes, placing explosives, training frequently and even practicing blowing up a mock fence. Their warnings were ignored.

The Financial Times reported in early November that Israeli security leaders had also ignored specific alerts of Hamas training exercises from civilian volunteers in southern Israel who eavesdropped on Hamas communications.

The Financial Times also reported that weeks before the Hamas attack, Israeli border guards sent a classified warning to the top military intelligence officer in the southern command. They had detected a high-ranking Hamas military commander overseeing rehearsals of hostage-taking and warned that Hamas was training to imminently “blow up border posts at several locations, enter Israeli territory and take over kibbutzim.”

The officer who received the message dismissed it as an “imaginary scenario.” Other leaders considered the warning unremarkable.

A detailed plan

On November 30, The New York Times reported that Israeli intelligence obtained a detailed Hamas plan of attack more than a year before October 7.

The plan ran to 40 pages and included specifics that actually were part of the attack, including an opening rocket barrage, drones knocking out security cameras and automated weapons at the border, and gunmen crossing into Israel in paragliders as well as on foot and by motorcycle.

The newspaper also reported that in July 2023, a Unit 8200 analyst observed Hamas training activities that lined up with the Hamas plan, which was code-named “Jericho Wall” by Israeli officials.

The analyst determined that Hamas was preparing an attack designed to provoke a war with Israel. Superior officers dismissed her assessment, saying the “Jericho Wall” plan was only aspirational primarily because they thought Hamas lacked the capacity to carry it out.

People walk past a fortified tower with cameras and weapons on top.
Israel’s defenses include stations like this guard tower in the West Bank, with robotic weapons that can fire tear gas, stun grenades and sponge-tipped bullets, using artificial intelligence to track targets. Photo: AP via The Conversation / Mahmoud Illean

A reflection on the Israeli intelligence community

These recent reports make clear that Israeli officials had enough intelligence to step up security. The fact that they did not suggests they may have dismissed all that evidence in favor of other information they had, which suggested Hamas was not interested in or capable of going to war with Israel.

But that may not have been the only problem. Recent studies point to increasing fissures in civil-military relations in Israel. For example, populist right-wing Israeli politicians in recent years have viewed senior intelligence officials with skepticism as potential leftist rivals, which could have led Netanyahu’s Likud government to be hostile to alternative viewpoints and various intelligence warnings on Hamas.

Although we cannot observe the extent of politicization among the senior Israeli intelligence ranks, the behavior of intelligence leaders who dismissed warnings prior to October 7 is consistent with groupthink, a phenomenon that experts say may occur when social pressure, a leader’s influential position or self-censorship leads groups to express homogeneous views and make uniform – and usually poorer – decisions.

The fact that superiors ignored warnings from the Unit 8200 analyst and the Border Defense Corps is consistent with the idea that groupthink about Hamas’ capabilities and intentions led to confirmation bias dismissing Hamas as an imminent threat.

Some of the ignored intelligence analysts were young women, who have said they believe sexism could have been a reason male superiors ignored their warnings. Another form of prejudice may also have been at play. Israel has focused intensely on its technological advantages over its enemies, assigning large numbers of personnel to electronic and cyber warfare units.

Perhaps technological optimism, faith in what the Financial Times described as “aerial drones that eavesdrop on Gaza and the sensor-equipped fence that surrounds the strip,” won out. Maybe a reliance on technology led to a false sense of security, and even the dismissal of other forms of intelligence that, it turned out, had uncovered Hamas’ real plans.

In the wake of the Hamas attacks, Israel’s security apparatus will need to investigate these weaknesses further and undertake reforms. So far, it remains unclear how many people, and at what levels of the Israeli government, received the various warnings in advance of October 7.

Therefore, it’s not yet clear what specific changes in Israel might prevent a similar failure in the future.

John Joseph Chin is Assistant Teaching Professor of Strategy and Technology, Carnegie Mellon University and Haleigh Bartos is Associate Professor of the Practice in Strategy and Technology, Carnegie Mellon University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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North Korea closing embassies in a fit of desperation

In November 2023, North Korea decided to close its foreign diplomatic missions in Angola, Hong Kong, Nepal, Spain, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Bangladesh, Senegal and Guinea. 

These closures likely come as the result of financial hardship due to international sanctions as well as the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic.

But an impending domestic food crisis may also be behind the decision. For a country that prioritizes spending on its military and luxury goods for its elites, a food shortage would stretch limited resources even further.

A North Korean foreign ministry spokesperson said in a statement on November 3, 2023, that “we are carrying out operations to withdraw and establish diplomatic missions in accordance with changing global environments and national foreign policy.” 

But the likely reality is that the regime is struggling to support not only those living in North Korea but also those in missions abroad. The Kim Jong Un regime is under pressure from sanctions that have been imposed in response to North Korea’s ongoing nuclear and ballistic missile testing and launches. 

The resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council have called for the reduction of North Korea’s diplomatic missions and consular posts and have expressed concern that North Korea has been abusing immunities granted to its diplomats.

Many of these resolutions were passed between 2006 and 2017. For years, Kim Jong Un has found creative ways to evade United Nations sanctions to import luxury items, but his reserves might be running low. 

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin in a strategic embrace. Photo: KCNA

The announcement of embassy closures could be a sign that the government is looking for ways to trim back in an effort to continue to afford the leader’s lifestyle.

These closures could also be a sign that North Korea is looking to relocate diplomats and other workers to more favored nations, such as China and Russia, to make money that can be remitted to Pyongyang. 

These redeployments could provide further opportunities to engage in cyber or other illicit activities to raise money for the regime, just as the Lazarus Group, one of North Korea’s most active cybercriminal groups, has been able to do.

Over the last two years countries such as Romania, India, Indonesia and Bulgaria have closed their embassies in Pyongyang. This is a result of both Covid-19 pandemic restrictions within North Korea and waning diplomatic relations, as North Korea prioritizes its relationships with China and Russia

In his first trip abroad since the pandemic, Kim Jong Un traveled to Russia in September 2023 where he and Vladimir Putin “openly discussed unprecedented levels of potential technical cooperation.”

Interviews with North Koreans have revealed the state of the country’s food shortage crisis. Similar to the famine in the 1990s, in which an estimated “two to three million people died of starvation and hunger-related illnesses,” signs of starvation and death are once again appearing. 

One interviewee expressed that loyalty for Kim Jong Un has been waning — “before Covid-19, people viewed Kim Jong Un positively. Now almost everyone is full of discontent.”

In areas along the Chinese border, the situation has gotten so bad that the government has resorted to draconian measures and tougher restrictions to prevent its citizens from fleeing. A second famine within a generation could have devastating social and political impacts.

In early November 2023, North Korea announced a new public holiday, known as Missile Industry Day (missailgong-eobjeol), to be celebrated on November 18. 

This day not only celebrates the launch of North Korea’s Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile in 2022, but also commemorates the first time the leader’s daughter, Kim Eun Ju, known more widely as Kim Ju Ae, appeared beside him in public.

In a nation that designates public holidays solely for propaganda purposes, this new holiday is undoubtedly an attempt to legitimize dynastic rule for the Kim family. The holiday will help to solidify Kim Eun Ju’s role and aims to display the stability and longevity of the regime. 

Pre-teen Kim Eun Ju, also known as Kim Ju Ae, is seemingly next in line in North Korea. Image: Geo TV / Screengrab

Kim Jong Un is using national pride in the country’s missile program and the Kim family cult of personality to distract from his failure to improve North Korea’s economic situation.

All these circumstances could signify that Kim Jong Un is facing adversity both abroad and at home. North Korea’s borders have not reopened since their closure in 2020 and are likely to remain closed given the looming food crisis. 

With increasing economic problems, intensifying dependency on China and Russia, and further build-ups along the country’s borders, closing its foreign missions is one of the few remaining ways to consolidate resources for the regime.

The new public holiday celebrating the country’s missile program and the showcasing of the leader’s daughter show the efforts that Kim Jong Un will go to in order to bolster legitimacy, despite the country’s economic decline and the increasing hardships faced by North Koreans.

Kim Jong Un will continue to direct resources towards the nuclear and ballistic missile programs while demanding sacrifices from the people and finding ways to cut government expenses to ensure the program’s longevity — and his own.

Emma Whitmyer is Program Officer for the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) in New York.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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Taiwan deepens squeeze on chip tech leakage to China

Taiwan, citing national security reasons, has banned exports to mainland China of know-how and raw materials that can be used to make chips smaller than 14 nanometers.

Advanced chip-making technology is now one of 22 core technologies that Taiwan does not want Beijing to obtain, according to the island’s National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). 

The list, which covers the defense, aerospace, agricultural, semiconductor and cybersecurity sectors, took effect immediately after its announcement on Wednesday (December 6). 

“If people have the knowhow to make chips below 14nm, they can make many other chips,” Chen Kwo-liang, director general of the NSTC’s Department of Foresight and Innovation Policies said, citing the opinion of an official advisory board formed by industry experts and academics. 

Chen said Taiwan, taking cues from other countries, would control the exports of a list of items including chip-making equipment, gas and chemical products used in making chips below 14nm. 

In July, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry imposed export regulations on 23 types of advanced chip-making equipment and raw materials. 

“The announcement of a core technologies list is aimed at protecting Taiwanese firms’ commercial secrets. Anyone who steals these technologies or illegally exports them should be punished under the national security law,” Chen said. 

Last year, Taiwan passed an amendment to its national security law in which those who steal national core technologies for overseas “hostile forces” will face fixed-term imprisonment of between five to 12 years and fines of between NT$5 million (US$158,973) and NT$100 million. 

Taiwan also amended its Cross-Strait Act in 2022 to require its national engineers with core technological skills to apply for permits if they want to work for mainland Chinese firms but have not left their previous positions for three years. 

Liang Mong-song’s case

The NSTC said it spent a year creating the core technologies list and it will unveil another extended list around March or April 2024.

The latest announcement came after Huawei Technologies launched its Mate60 Pro smartphone, which used a 7nm processor made by the Shanghai-based Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp (SMIC), in late August.

Technology experts said SMIC’s chief executive Liang Mong-song and his team could have made a breakthrough in the N+2 technology, which can make high-energy 7nm processors with deep ultraviolet (DUV) lithography.

The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the world’s leading chip foundry, achieved the technology seven years earlier. Liang had worked for TSMC from 1992-2009.

TSMC is the world’s leading chip producer. Image: Twitter Screengrab / Digitimes

In October 2022, the United States banned American engineers from working for Chinese chip-makers, forcing them to choose between their jobs in China and their US nationality. But that rule did not affect Liang as he is Taiwanese.

Chinese commentators said if Liang is targeted with legal action by Taiwan, he can stay on the mainland for the rest of his life and be a hero in China’s chip sector. However, younger Taiwanese chip engineers may have to rethink their career plans due to the new core technologies list.

“As the US, Japan and South Korea have in recent years strengthened their laws to protect their strategic industries and core technologies, most Taiwanese companies agree that the Taiwanese government should follow suit,” Huang Chun-chien, director of the Mainland China Affairs Division under Taiwan’s Chinese National Federation of Industries, says in an article published by the United Daily News. 

“However, some Taiwanese companies are worried that they will face problems when relocating their core technicians to mainland China,” he says.

If Taiwan keeps expanding its core technologies list, fewer and fewer Taiwanese technicians will go to work on the mainland, making it difficult for the island’s companies to operate their businesses there, Huang said. 

He adds it will be bad for Taiwan in the long run if fewer Taiwanese technicians can participate in research and development projects in mainland China. Huang’s comments were cited by Cankaoxiaoxi.com, or Reference News, and widely circulated in mainland China on Thursday and Friday. 

Wang Jin, an associate professor at China’s Northwest University, says in an article that China should not worry too much about Taiwan’s core technologies list.

China has its own defense, aerospace and semiconductor technologies and does not need to learn from Taiwan, he asserts. More technological blockages will only push China to achieve more breakthroughs, Wang said. 

Read: Raimondo calls out Nvidia for China shipments

Follow Jeff Pao on Twitter at @jeffpao3

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Historian looks at anime: Blue Eye Samurai

Warning: this article includes spoilers for Blue Eye Samurai.

Netflix’s Blue Eye Samurai is an anime series set during the opening decades of Japan’s Edo period (1603–1867), also known as the Tokugawa period. Among other subjects, the series addresses – with varying degrees of histocial accuracy – violence, the role of samurai and what life was like for women and people of mixed heritage.

Japanese society was strictly stratified at that time, as the series frequently makes clear. The hierarchy, ranked in descending order, consisted of the samurai, farmer, artisan and merchant classes.

Even in the early stages of the 17th century Edo period, the entire samurai ruling class centered around the role of the warrior. But by the time the series opens, in the 1650s, the country was unified – a political and economically stable society – and this meant that the role of the samurai was in decline.

Nevertheless, the samurai still defended the ideals of loyalty, courage and honor. It is these ideals that motivate Blue Eye Samurai’s principal characters, Mizu, Ringo and Taigen.

Real people of mixed heritage in Edo-period Japan

Mizu (Maya Erskine) is a mixed-heritage white and Japanese woman living undercover as a male swordsmaster. She undertakes a quest for vengeance against four British men (one of whom may be her father) who illegally remain hidden while the Japanese isolation policy, sakoku, remains in effect.

Under sakoku, only Dutch traders were permitted entry to Japan, and they were confined to a small man-made island off Nagasaki. The isolationist policy of the Tokugawa shogunate (Japan’s military government during the Edo period) effectively closed the country’s borders to all outside influences through a number of edicts issued between 1633 and 1639.

But it might help viewers of Blue Eye Samurai to know that during the preceding so-called Christian Century (1540 to 1630), the Japanese authorities had – with varying degrees of enthusiasm – accommodated a large number of foreign traders and pirates who were resident in Japan and active in Japanese waters. We can presume the four renegades are the remnants of these pirates – including Blue Eye Samurai’s main antagonist, the evil Abijah Fowler (voiced by Kenneth Branagh).

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In the Edo period, women were expected to be subservient – but not weak. As the series depicts, women presented themselves as characteristically beautiful, with elaborate hair styles, makeup and clothing. They were supposed to be educated and compliant.

Mizu is particularly burdened by many of the stereotypes of Japanese society. Not only is she a woman, but she is of mixed heritage, something which is repeatedly referred to as being “less than human” or “impure”. She has to conceal her difference in a masculine disguise.

This is reminiscent of the fate of the children of William Adams, a 17th-century English sailor who became an honorary samurai. They disappeared from historical record after 1635. The series captures the covert presence of any person of mixed European and Japanese heritage during this time.

The real upper classes in the Edo period

The life of the upper classes and the choices open to them are depicted in accurate detail in the portrayal of Akemi (Brenda Song) and her family.

Although called a “princess” (perhaps for clarity to western audiences unfamiliar with Japan’s royal hierarchies) her status is more that of a “lady”, as she is not of royal blood. Her father (Patrick Gallagher) is a self-made lord. Nonetheless, as the Japanese emperor’s role was essentially ceremonial in this period, power did lie with feudal lords such as her father. It is accurate to suggest, as the show does, that he would gain higher social status by marrying off Akemi to a member of the ruling shogun’s family.

The strong willed “princess” Akemi excels at many of the fine arts and courtly practices as was expected of a woman of their class. This includes tea ceremony, Renku poetry, flower arrangement, painting, dancing and the game of go.

We follow her as she deploys these skills to achieve independence in a patriarchal society, including resorting to becoming a geisha – which required skills similar to those possessed by women of the ruling classes. Although the proposition is initially repulsive to her, in the end she accepts that marriage to the new shogun’s brother, rather than to her childhood sweetheart Taigen (Darren Barnet), will permit her an active role in the shogunate’s court.

Some people in Edo-period Japan lived outside expected gender roles, including geisha. They could run their own businesses, and the life offered women a level of independence unknown to the other classes, as demonstrated by the character of Madame Kaji (Ming-Na Wen).

The reality of violence in Edo-period Japan

The vivid violence in Blue Eye Samurai suggests that life in the unified Edo Japan was a lot less peaceful than reality.

Due to the long Edo period’s economic and political stability, the role of a samurai as a warrior had become reduced to a largely ceremonial one. Sword skills were demonstrated in stylized duels and challenges over honor, rather than on the battlefield.

The hostility between Mizu and Taigen is plausibly founded on the latter’s perceived loss of honor after losing their duel. However, a storyline suggesting that Abijah Fowler will succeed in usurping the shogun because he has access to firearms, which would trump the Japanese weapons of swords and spears, is a little disingenuous.

In reality, there were gunsmiths in Japan producing guns throughout the Edo period, and for a century before this story is set. As guns required less skill to wield than the sword or the bow, they were seen by some samurai as contrary to their values. The sword was simply the more practical weapon in the average small-scale Edo-period conflicts.

Despite diverging from some of the history, overall The Blue Eye Samurai is an enjoyable, fairly accurate and visually sumptuous tale of Edo-era Japan.

Ruth Starr is a lecturer in the history of Japanese art and architecture at Trinity College Dublin.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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China train cements Widodo's infrastructure legacy

Indonesia welcomed its first high-speed railway in October 2023, the first of its kind in Southeast Asia and a significant leap for Indonesia’s infrastructural development. 

The US$7.3 billion Jakarta-Bandung line, financed by Chinese banks and built with Chinese technology, reflects President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s modernization efforts as well as Beijing’s strategy to tighten relations with Belt and Road (BRI) recipient countries.

PT Kereta Cepat Indonesia China (Indonesia-China High-Speed Railways Limited), a joint venture between four Indonesian and five Chinese state-owned enterprises, built the high-speed line that connects Jakarta to Indonesia’s third-largest city, Bandung, in just 30 minutes. 

Its opening comes after a four-year delay and a 44% increase in its initial $5.5-billion price tag due to Covid-19, military opposition and complications in land acquisition.

Indonesia is the biggest economy and the most populous country in Southeast Asia. Jakarta’s decision to apply the “China Standard” in a piece of critical infrastructure and engineering systems reflects well on the BRI. It demonstrates to others in Southeast Asia the alternative development paradigm China can offer and the sort of knowledge transfer available to the Global South.

China describes the BRI as an infrastructure investment initiative that aims to build railways, highways, airports and more to connect Asia, Europe and Africa. But scholars argue there may be more to it. The BRI likely reflects Chinese attempts to integrate neighbors into a hub-and-spoke type physical infrastructure framework. 

It also attracted criticisms due to a mix of manufactured delays, fiscal pressure, opacity and disregard for the environment. Nonetheless, the BRI offers many developing countries an alternative for development without much conditionality.

Jokowi has pragmatically capitalized on BRI investment to achieve his ambitions and win support from his electorate. The Jakarta-Bandung high-speed line is no exception and cements his legacy as a leader committed to major infrastructure projects. His job approval rating surpassed 80% in May 2023 according to a poll conducted by Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting.

Indonesian President Joko Widodo (C), accompanied by officials, switches on a tunnel boring machine for the Mass Rapid Transport system under construction in the capital city during a launch ceremony on September 21, 2015. Jakarta's first mass rapid transport system is expected to be finished in 2018. Photo: AFP/Romeo Gacad
Indonesian President Joko Widodo (C), accompanied by officials, switches on a tunnel boring machine for the Mass Rapid Transport system under construction in the capital city during a launch ceremony on September 21, 2015. Jakarta’s first mass rapid transport system is expected to be finished in 2018. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP / Romeo Gacad

The Indonesian president has shown unwavering affection towards infrastructure since first coming to power in 2014. He pushed through budgetary and bureaucratic constraints through presidential decree and by expanding the role of state-owned enterprises to make high-speed rail and other projects a reality.

But Jokowi may leave much on the table for his successor next year. It remains unclear whether Indonesia’s new president in 2024 will continue unfinished infrastructure projects such as the extended railway to Surabaya.

Indonesia awarded this project to China over Japan in 2015 even though the latter had already conducted a year-long feasibility study. There were a few reasons behind the decision. 

China did not require any Indonesian government financing or a government guarantee and a business-to-business scheme was expected to reduce the financial pressure for the state government.

China also promised a superior transfer of technology, skills and operational know-how over Japan and proposed the completion of the railway by 2019 which ostensibly helped Jokowi win re-election in 2019. Beijing even cut the interest rate from 3.4% to 2% and signaled the project’s salience by sending high-level officials to negotiate.

Jokowi was one of the 23 heads of state or government who attended the Third Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in October 2023. Chinese President Xi Jinping told Jokowi that his country is keen to expand cooperation with Indonesia. 

China wants to build more trains like the one in Indonesia in Southeast Asia. Image: Twitter

Others in the region like Laos, Thailand and Vietnam may further compete for good quality BRI investment after Indonesia’s successful application of the scheme to its railways. To many Southeast Asian leaders, the BRI remains an easy tool to build legitimacy and economic development despite security concerns.

How much welfare Indonesia’s first high-speed rail line brings to local communities and overall economic development remains to be seen. But this railway proved that the BRI remains relevant for many developing countries. Southeast Asia will continue vying for BRI investment if China offers good deals.

The project marks another win for Jokowi’s legacy and will almost certainly make Indonesia’s next leader more receptive to BRI investment during their presidency, even if they would prefer to hedge economic opportunities against China.

Menghu Xia is a PhD candidate at the University of New South Wales, Canberra.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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China train has cemented Widodo's infrastructure legacy

Indonesia welcomed its first high-speed railway in October 2023, the first of its kind in Southeast Asia and a significant leap for Indonesia’s infrastructural development. 

The US$7.3 billion Jakarta-Bandung line, financed by Chinese banks and built with Chinese technology, reflects President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s modernization efforts as well as Beijing’s strategy to tighten relations with Belt and Road (BRI) recipient countries.

PT Kereta Cepat Indonesia China (Indonesia-China High-Speed Railways Limited), a joint venture between four Indonesian and five Chinese state-owned enterprises, built the high-speed line that connects Jakarta to Indonesia’s third-largest city, Bandung, in just 30 minutes. 

Its opening comes after a four-year delay and a 44% increase in its initial $5.5-billion price tag due to Covid-19, military opposition and complications in land acquisition.

Indonesia is the biggest economy and the most populous country in Southeast Asia. Jakarta’s decision to apply the “China Standard” in a piece of critical infrastructure and engineering systems reflects well on the BRI. It demonstrates to others in Southeast Asia the alternative development paradigm China can offer and the sort of knowledge transfer available to the Global South.

China describes the BRI as an infrastructure investment initiative that aims to build railways, highways, airports and more to connect Asia, Europe and Africa. But scholars argue there may be more to it. The BRI likely reflects Chinese attempts to integrate neighbors into a hub-and-spoke type physical infrastructure framework. 

It also attracted criticisms due to a mix of manufactured delays, fiscal pressure, opacity and disregard for the environment. Nonetheless, the BRI offers many developing countries an alternative for development without much conditionality.

Jokowi has pragmatically capitalized on BRI investment to achieve his ambitions and win support from his electorate. The Jakarta-Bandung high-speed line is no exception and cements his legacy as a leader committed to major infrastructure projects. His job approval rating surpassed 80% in May 2023 according to a poll conducted by Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting.

Indonesian President Joko Widodo (C), accompanied by officials, switches on a tunnel boring machine for the Mass Rapid Transport system under construction in the capital city during a launch ceremony on September 21, 2015. Jakarta's first mass rapid transport system is expected to be finished in 2018. Photo: AFP/Romeo Gacad
Indonesian President Joko Widodo (C), accompanied by officials, switches on a tunnel boring machine for the Mass Rapid Transport system under construction in the capital city during a launch ceremony on September 21, 2015. Jakarta’s first mass rapid transport system is expected to be finished in 2018. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP / Romeo Gacad

The Indonesian president has shown unwavering affection towards infrastructure since first coming to power in 2014. He pushed through budgetary and bureaucratic constraints through presidential decree and by expanding the role of state-owned enterprises to make high-speed rail and other projects a reality.

But Jokowi may leave much on the table for his successor next year. It remains unclear whether Indonesia’s new president in 2024 will continue unfinished infrastructure projects such as the extended railway to Surabaya.

Indonesia awarded this project to China over Japan in 2015 even though the latter had already conducted a year-long feasibility study. There were a few reasons behind the decision. 

China did not require any Indonesian government financing or a government guarantee and a business-to-business scheme was expected to reduce the financial pressure for the state government.

China also promised a superior transfer of technology, skills and operational know-how over Japan and proposed the completion of the railway by 2019 which ostensibly helped Jokowi win re-election in 2019. Beijing even cut the interest rate from 3.4% to 2% and signaled the project’s salience by sending high-level officials to negotiate.

Jokowi was one of the 23 heads of state or government who attended the Third Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in October 2023. Chinese President Xi Jinping told Jokowi that his country is keen to expand cooperation with Indonesia. 

China wants to build more trains like the one in Indonesia in Southeast Asia. Image: Twitter

Others in the region like Laos, Thailand and Vietnam may further compete for good quality BRI investment after Indonesia’s successful application of the scheme to its railways. To many Southeast Asian leaders, the BRI remains an easy tool to build legitimacy and economic development despite security concerns.

How much welfare Indonesia’s first high-speed rail line brings to local communities and overall economic development remains to be seen. But this railway proved that the BRI remains relevant for many developing countries. Southeast Asia will continue vying for BRI investment if China offers good deals.

The project marks another win for Jokowi’s legacy and will almost certainly make Indonesia’s next leader more receptive to BRI investment during their presidency, even if they would prefer to hedge economic opportunities against China.

Menghu Xia is a PhD candidate at the University of New South Wales, Canberra.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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Will property implode China's economy? Not necessarily

Forty years of continuous growth has transformed China into one of the world’s two largest economies. 

This is a remarkable achievement that has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty and into the global middle class, consistently surpassing expectations and confounding those who predicted an economic bust.

That pace of growth is now slowing for several reasons. Like in many advanced economies, China’s population is getting older – a demographic transition that has been exacerbated by China’s one-child policy between 1980 and 2016. 

Globally, there is post-Covid-19 resurgence of economic nationalism. Trade growth, already suffering from market saturation, is slowing as manufacturers in Europe and North America reshore, diversify their sources of supply or their governments impose trade barriers.

But there is another brake on China’s growth. Its economy has for many years depended on outsized domestic investment in real estate and infrastructure and those investments are showing sharply diminishing returns. 

Local governments that rely on land sales for revenue need to service their debt and revenues are collapsing as the real estate boom falters.

Will China’s economy melt down as a result? Not necessarily – at least not in a financial crisis of the kind the West experienced in 2007–08. But it will not be easy to manage these problems, the remedies may be difficult, and the end result is likely to be much slower trend growth.

In joint research with International Monetary Fund economist Yuanchen Yang, we have estimated how much of China’s economy depends on real estate and associated infrastructure. 

China hasn’t intervened in the property market as aggressively as many anticipated. Image: Twitter

In 2021, the direct and indirect impact of real estate in China’s economy was 22% of GDP, or 25% when factoring in imported content. If infrastructure such as roads, mass transit and water pipes that service residential and commercial real estate is included, the total rises to 31%.

In the years immediately before the Covid-19 pandemic, the total was even higher. The only advanced economy in recent history with a similar share of real estate plus infrastructure investment in GDP was Spain during the run-up to the Global Financial Crisis, though that peaked below the 30% level that China has now sustained for a decade.

The physical transformation of China’s cities over the past three decades has been remarkable. But looking at the cumulative building that has already taken place, it is clear that the construction growth engine cannot power China’s economy as it has in the past.

Real estate is durable. As the stock increases, the economic returns to construction decline. For example, floor area per capita of housing in China is now equal to or greater than France or the United Kingdom. 

While the United States’ housing stock remained stable at 65 square meters per capita from 2011 to 2021, China’s housing stock increased from 5 square meters per capita in 1992 to almost 49 square meters per capita in 2021.

80% of that floor space is in smaller, poorer Tier 3 cities, which have not benefited nearly as much from agglomeration effects as the richer, more prosperous Tier 1 cities like Shenzhen, Beijing, Guangzhou and Shanghai, and mid-ranked Tier 2 cities. Tier 3 city populations are already in decline, prices are falling and vacancies in many regions are high.

Nationally, the ratio of real estate under construction to completed commercial real estate has been steadily increasing, suggesting a market in which developers cannot complete projects due to a lack of final buyers and funding. 

Infrastructure investment has similar challenges. Projected investment in high-speed rail vastly outpaces the growth in the number of people who are using it, and recent infrastructure investment has been concentrated in Tier 3 cities.

At the same time, local government debt has climbed relentlessly from around 5% in 2006 to 30% in 2018, even by conservative estimates, and regional private banks are also exposed. The central government can always decide to bail everyone out, but doing so while maintaining the credit growth needed to fuel the economy poses challenges.

China’s local governments are straining under debt piles. Image: Twitter Screengrab

Chinese household wealth is overwhelmingly concentrated in real estate. Even without a financial crisis, the central government will be forced to adapt to wean China’s economy off its dependence on this sector.

Beijing might use its sweeping powers to restructure and reallocate economic activity as it has done effectively in the past. There are also fiscal policies that would address this problem, such as increasing transfers to bail out local governments or allowing local officials to impose property taxes – though the latter appears off the table politically into the foreseeable future. 

The government can also attempt to redirect infrastructure investment into areas that are still underinvested in Tier 3 cities, including schools and hospitals. China’s authorities have been effective at meeting economic challenges during its four decades of growth, but addressing this set of problems will be daunting even for them.

Kenneth Rogoff is Thomas D Cabot Professor of Public Policy and Professor of Economics at Harvard University and a member of the CEPR Research Policy Network on International Lending and Sovereign Debt.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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Time for Malaysia to recognize the ‘New’ Delhi

The visit by Malaysian Foreign Affairs Minister Zambry Abdul Kadir to New Delhi from November 5-8 was a significant milestone in Malaysia-India relations. Zambry met with his counterpart, Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, for the sixth India-Malaysia Joint Commission Meeting.

The JCM reviewed the progress of the Enhanced Strategic Partnership, which covers areas of political, defense, security, economic, trade and investment, health, science and technology, culture, tourism and people-to-people ties, and also discussed regional and multilateral issues of mutual interest. 

Since the start of the year, there has been a flurry of visits by top Indian ministers to Malaysia. In early June, Minister of State for External Affairs V Muraleedharan met with his Malaysian counterparts, followed by Defense Minister Rajnath Singh in July and Minister of State for External Affairs and Education Rajkumar Ranjan Singh in December.

The visits quite clearly signaled a reset in bilateral relations following the diplomatic row in 2019 arising from then-prime minister Mahathir Mohamad’s remarks about Kashmir and India’s Citizenship Amendment Act.

Zambry also mentioned that the visit of Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim to India is imminent, signifying an upswing in ties.

On the people-to-people front, just this week, Anwar announced that Malaysia would allow citizens of India 30-day visa-free entry to the country with effect from December 1. Given how visa requirements have been one of the most potent deterrents for travel between Malaysia and India, this move signals intent for greater connectivity and desire for enhanced bilateral ties.

Trade relations

India is one of the 10 largest trading partners of Malaysia, and Malaysia is the third-largest trading partner for India among the ASEAN countries. Not only dwelling on the cultural and civilizational ties between India and Malaysia, Zambry’s visit gives promise to more sectors of cooperation in the near future, primarily renewable energy, semiconductors and space. 

India is forecast to emerge as the third-largest economy in the world by 2027. This is an opportunity for Malaysia to initiate and capitalize on partnerships with India in digital, fintech and semiconductor fields.

India has been a success story in digital payments and several best practices can be shared with and adopted by Malaysia, such as the Unified Payments Interface system and RuPay payment service, which would boost overall financial engagement between the two countries. 

India now a global player

Beyond technical cooperation, it is of utmost importance that policymakers in Putrajaya, Malaysia’s seat of government, understand that this is a very different India they are dealing with since the last JCM more than a decade ago.

New Delhi is emerging as a regional trend-setter with increasing global influence through its value and visibility in the Indo-Pacific region. For India on the Indo-Pacific multilateralism front, this year could not have been a better one. 

As Group of Twenty and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) chair, New Delhi’s Global South agenda, and pragmatic, balanced and assertive foreign-policy choices took center stage.

Being a leading proponent of Indo-Pacific cooperation and guided by core policies such as the Neighborhood First Policy, Act East Policy, Africa Outreach initiative, and Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), this past year has quite clearly demonstrated how New Delhi’s role in the emerging Indo-Pacific order is taking new forms and gaining fresh momentum.

In the grand scheme of things, what stands out for India as a significant partner for Malaysia and ASEAN member states in the Indo-Pacific is its ability to take a distinct multi-aligned and multi-pronged approach to partnerships in the region. New Delhi has gradually but intently refined its approach, reflecting an adept compartmentalisation of interests, strategic competition, and geopolitical dynamics.

India is clearly able to balance continued commitment to SCO and BRICS (which means constructive engagement with traditional “rivals” such as China and Pakistan), active collaboration within the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the I2U2 Group (India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the US), and finally, advancement of cornerstone mechanisms like the G20 and BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation).

A sincere commitment to multilateralism and regionalism despite existing deep-seated rivalries makes India by far, the most “centered” Indo-Pacific partner – a reality that has not fully dawned on policymakers in Malaysia or ASEAN. 

These recent developments make the much-documented synergies between India’s and ASEAN’s approach to the Indo-Pacific region, specifically the IPOI and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), that much more apparent – and operable.

It is noteworthy that Malaysia’s alignment to the AOIP is the only articulation of its acceptance of the Indo-Pacific concept. Whether in terms of principles or priorities in the Indo-Pacific region, it is undeniable that India is a natural partner for Malaysia and ASEAN that demands more nuanced attention.

The missing cognizance in Putrajaya that it is dealing with a “new” India is perhaps one of the biggest stumbling blocks to tapping on New Delhi for more meaningful means of cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

With Malaysia assuming the role of ASEAN chair in 2025, it must advocate for active recognition and acknowledgement of India’s ability to be a valued “multilateral connector” for Southeast Asia.

There are real opportunities for ASEAN’s enhanced cooperation with other partners in the Indo-Pacific such as Africa, the Middle East and the Pacific Islands to be brokered by India within existing frameworks and initiatives – such as the Africa Outreach initiative, the recently announced India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and through the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation.

For many states in the region, including Malaysia, the rise of “new” India has understandably not been the easiest thing to calibrate or adapt to. Recognizing change and altering perceptions of New Delhi is a necessity but will be a challenge, nonetheless.

Malaysia’s current relations with India are defined by older, outdated and “safer” narratives, so much so that they do not reflect current realities – and this is a missed opportunity on several counts. India on its current geopolitical trajectory is and will remain an important partner to Malaysia. It is time Putrajaya realizes this too.

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Myanmar’s instability deepens as the world watches silently

Myanmar’s stability has eroded significantly since the 2021 military coup. But the coordinated attack by multiple separatist and pro-democracy groups in October and November 2023 has seen military outposts, villages, border crossings, and other infrastructure overrun.

While the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military, clings to control in central and coastal regions populated by the country’s ethnic majority, much of the country’s border areas are increasingly slipping into anti-government control.

This current turbulence is not an aberration but deeply rooted in Myanmar’s history. Since gaining independence from British rule in 1948, the country has grappled with what is commonly described as the world’s longest-running civil war.

Initial experiments with democracy witnessed limited clashes between Myanmar’s central government and Ethnic Armed Organizations. After a military coup in 1962 that established the junta, more EAOs emerged to challenge government power.

Infighting and splintering among EAOs, coupled with their growing antagonism toward the Burma Communist Party (BCP), itself waging a war on the central government, allowed the junta to implement fragile ceasefires in exchange for limited autonomy. By the end of the Cold War, democratic protests in 1988, the collapse of the BCP in 1989, and free elections in 1990 all suggested Myanmar was cautiously embracing a peaceful future.

Despite losing the elections in 1990, however, the junta did not relinquish power, drawing international condemnation. EAOs and other groups like the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), which split from the BCP, then continued their struggle for two decades until the junta ceded some powers to a civilian administration in 2011.

Elections in 2015 and 2020 saw landslide victories for the National League for Democracy (NLD), as well as some progress toward reconciliation.

But in 2021, the Tatmadaw re-established the junta and plunged the country back into destabilization, culminating in the 2023 autumn offensive by anti-junta forces.

In addition to EOAs and a reorganized BCP, the junta has been forced to contend with People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), loose armed organizations backed by the National Unity Government (NUG), set up by lawmakers and politicians in the aftermath of the coup. Additionally, the role of the Burman ethnic majority and grassroots civil defense forces in opposing the junta has also complicated its response to unrest.

The junta has proved adept at managing its restive elements before, and can also rely on its Border Guard Forces (BGFs) and other pro-government militia groups. But the broad swaths of Myanmar’s society fighting against it have made the junta’s traditional policy of divide and rule far less effective.

Myanmar’s Acting President Myint Swe has said the country could “split into various parts,”prompting Myanmar military officials to retreat to the capital, Naypyidaw, a planned city completed in 2012 that in effect serves as a fortress located near the most restive regions.

Evolving role for China

China’s role in Myanmar has undergone significant shifts since the latter’s independence. Despite Chinese support for the BCP and other communist groups, Myanmar grew closer to China after its isolation from the West in the 1990s. Beijing supported the junta to stabilize Myanmar and prevent adversaries from establishing a foothold on China’s southern border.

Other interests included maintaining access to Myanmar’s raw materials and natural resources, as well as infrastructure development to turn Myanmar into a strategic gateway to the Bay of Bengal through the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

China maintained ties to the junta, democracy advocates, and ethnic groups from 2011 to 2021. However, the 2021 coup disrupted development projects and led to attacks on Chinese-run facilities by rebel groups, and the junta’s inability to protect infrastructure exacerbated historical tension between it and Beijing.

Four Chinese civilians were killed in 2015 after a Myanmar military air strike hit across the border into Yunnan, while the junta burned down a Chinese-owned factory and killed Chinese and Myanmar civilians in 2021.

China’s ongoing support to some militia groups, such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and MNDAA, provides Beijing leverage over the junta and a say in the ceasefire processes.

Chinese firms also often work with armed groups in “special economic zones” near the border, and some of the anti-junta groups regularly cross the border to China to escape the junta and its proxy forces. Beijing’s tacit approval of their activities may also be partially fueled by wariness that rebel groups were becoming closer to the US prior to the new offensive.

Beijing has nonetheless attempted to sustain a balancing act, arresting a UWSA deputy military chief in October and initially ignoring calls for assistance from the rebels after the launch of their offensive. But after the steady string of defeats suffered by the junta, China has since altered its outlook. China’s affiliates now form some of the most powerful groups operating in Myanmar, and its Foreign Ministry has called for a ceasefire.

Organized crime

Myanmar’s porous borders have not only allowed armed groups to flourish but also facilitated the expansion of organized crime networks. Increased cooperation between militant and criminal groups in recent decades, known as the terror-crime nexus, has elevated the power of these groups worldwide.

American efforts to counter communism inadvertently helped develop drug networks in Myanmar during the early Cold War, while transnational organized crime in Southeast Asia burgeoned in the 21st century. The Covid-19 pandemic further established Myanmar as a hub of criminal activity, expanding the funding networks available to the country’s armed groups.

Both local and international criminal networks operate in Myanmar’s special economic zones, engaging in human and wildlife trafficking, slavery, cybercrimes, money-laundering, communication fraud, illegal casinos, and online gambling centers.

The relationships between these entities and governments are intricate, with shifting alliances commonplace. Beijing and transnational Chinese gangs play central roles in Myanmar’s heightened criminal activity. The junta has also had close ties to criminal networks for decades, and since the 2021 coup has become increasingly reliant on criminal activity to finance itself and offset international isolation.

China, while entangled in Myanmar’s criminal underworld, has grown steadily more concerned with rising illicit activity on its border with Myanmar and the willing and unwilling participation of Chinese citizens.

China’s signals to the junta to address the forced-labor networks since May 2023 went unheeded, leading to China issuing arrest warrants for junta allies and the UWSA to raid online scam compounds and trafficked-labor centers in border regions.

However, the resilience of regional criminal groups became evident after the NLD failed to disrupt their activities during the decade of partial democratic rule from 2011 to 2021, and they have only grown financially stronger since.

And despite their interweaving with regional elites, criminal networks and their militant partners have developed newfound agency and an ability to act independently from governments since the 2021 coup.

Militarized ethnic groups

Additionally, while the junta styles its current campaign as a counterinsurgency, Myanmar’s armed groups possess significant military capabilities. Minority groups such as those belonging to the Karen ethnic group were prominent in Myanmar’s armed forces during the British colonial administration, gaining valuable experience.

As in Ethiopia, certain ethnic groups have developed and maintained well-equipped forces capable of both insurgency and conventional warfare.

Like other anti-government forces around the world, Myanmar rebel groups have also embraced new technologies and strategies in recent years. This includes crowdfunding initiatives, which have expanded significantly since 2021, to offset the junta’s control over the central bank and other national economic levers.

Large-scale application of drone warfare has also made a marked difference on the battlefield, even before the current offensive by the rebels.

Myanmar’s militant groups have also worked with European criminal groups to obtain weapons, and groups like the UWSA have proved capable of manufacturing weapons since 2008. The use of 3D-printed guns by Myanmar rebel groups, just 10 years after the first 3D-printed gun was produced, also marks a distinctive feature of the current conflict.

The NUG has meanwhile been busily setting up local civic administration and public services and People’s Administrative Teams (PATs) in PDF-controlled or contested areas, indicative of their state-building capabilities.

Shaky support for junta

Hindered by international isolation, increasingly powerful rebel groups, and a growing dependence on a Chinese leadership willing to support multiple sides, the junta’s outlook appears bleak. But it does maintain some other allies abroad.

Russia grew closer to the junta throughout the 2010s and despite being tied down in Ukraine, Moscow has offered more support for Myanmar since the coup, including the first ever Russia-Myanmar joint naval exercise last month. Bordering states Laos and Thailand also maintain friendly ties to the junta, and Laos, holding the chairmanship of ASEAN since September, has shielded Myanmar from greater institutional isolation.

Myanmar’s other neighbors, India and Bangladesh, are also wary of additional instability and the potential emergence of a failed state on their borders. India has already seen tens of thousands of refugees (as well as soldiers from the junta) cross the border since 2021, while Bangladesh has seen close to a million Rohingya refugees enter the country since 2016, and India has recently shown it is still willing to engage with the junta despite its vulnerability.

Efforts to further unite anti-government forces meanwhile face obstacles due to differences in strategies, objectives, and allegiances. Several organizations have been set up to encourage greater coordination, but infighting is still common.

Some EAOs, such as the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), are still open to adhering to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), while others consider a federal system a viable alternative to complete independence.

Perceived indifference to the Rohingya crisis in 2017 on behalf of the democratic government at the time also reveals the persistent ethnic tensions among Myanmar’s population despite alternative leadership.

Persuading criminal and militant groups to give up their lucrative illicit networks, as well as untangling their links to the junta-dominated economy, will also prove challenging. And with the US diplomatically tied down in Ukraine and Israel and ASEAN’s divided approach to the crisis, China enjoys relative freedom to manipulate the situation on its border.

Yet despite positive relations across Myanmar’s political spectrum, Beijing’s reluctance to intervene more directly only amplifies the persistent uncertainty surrounding Myanmar’s future.

This article was produced by Globetrotter, which provided it to Asia Times.

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