The likely meeting between Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden on the sidelines of the APEC summit in San Francisco in November supports hopes of a “thaw” in US-China relations this year. Biden predicted such a thaw earlier this year and some observers believe they see an upturn.
The outlook is less optimistic, however, if we assess the current state of the relationship from a longer historical perspective. For several decades, US relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) followed long cycles featuring high climbs and deep descents.
During the Korean War in the 1950s, the relationship reached a nadir with Chinese and American soldiers killing each other in battle. For years afterward, Washington remained deeply hostile toward China, viewing Mao’s regime as aggressive and irrational.
The 1970s, however, saw US President Richard Nixon’s visit to China, PRC paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s visit to the US and the establishment of normal diplomatic relations.
Another serious downturn followed in 1989 with the Tiananmen Massacre. But in 1994 the relationship had recovered to the point where US President Bill Clinton de-linked the renewal of China’s Most Favored Nation trade status from the PRC government’s human rights record.
Relations weathered the shocks of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-96 and the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade by US aircraft in 1999. Clinton’s government granted China Permanent Normal Trade status in 1999, and China joined the World Trade Organization in 2000 with Washington’s support.
A bilateral crisis intervened in 2001, resulting from a collision over the ocean near the Chinese coast between a US surveillance aircraft and a recklessly maneuvering PRC fighter aircraft. The Chinese pilot died, and the PRC government imprisoned the US aircrew for 12 days while demanding an apology from Washington. Some members of Congress said the Chinese were taking “hostages” and deserved no apology.
Yet three years later, US-China relations had improved to the point where US Secretary of State Colin Powell called the relationship “the best we’ve had in 30 years.” Shortly thereafter, US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick articulated the American vision of China as a “responsible stakeholder.” A US official making such a statement today seems unimaginable.
That was the last multi-year high point before the Xi Jinping era began in 2012. Xi has presided over an era of steady decline in the bilateral relationship, marked by irritants such as China’s construction of military bases in the South China Sea, Chinese “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy, the Covid-19 pandemic, tensions over Taiwan, Chinese economic coercion against trade partners that are US friends and allies, PRC government-sponsored cybertheft, the Chinese spy balloon furor, US attempts to stop China from getting advanced technologies and Beijing’s pro-Russia position on the Ukraine war.
Importantly, the Xi era simultaneously saw China attain a level of military capability that forced Americans to begin to see the PRC as a peer competitor.
Before Xi, the relationship was volatile in the sense of high mobility between cordial and hostile. The positive aspect of this volatility was the expectation that when relations were poor, eventually they would recover.
If US-China relations were a stock bought at US$50 per share, sometimes the value would go down to $30, but you could depend on it eventually bouncing back to $75.
Now, however, as a consequence of large, irreconcilable conflicts in the two governments’ vital interests, the scope for dramatic improvement in China-US relations is far more limited than prior to the Xi era.
The relationship is stable rather than volatile, but it has stabilized at a low level of quality, locking in poor bilateral relations for an extended period. The $50 stock may be stuck at $25 indefinitely. And it may drag down the rest of the stock market.
To be sure, the two countries have taken some steps this year to improve their relations. They’ve established working groups on economic and financial issues. In September, the PRC government assisted in the return of fugitive US soldier Travis King from North Korea to the US, earning thanks from the White House.
Several recent Chinese moves might be signals of goodwill with broader implications: the release of Australian journalist Cheng Lei after three years of imprisonment on questionable grounds, an agreement to cooperate with Western institutions in restructuring Zambia’s debt and an invitation to the US to send delegates to the Xiangshan defense forum in Beijing, China’s knock-off of Singapore’s annual Shangri-La Dialogue.
These mostly procedural and atmospheric steps are pathetically minor, however, compared to the substantive and intractable problems that still divide the PRC and the US.
On October 17, for instance, the US Department of Defense accused China of “a centralized and concerted campaign” of harassing US and allied aircraft in international airspace near China, also releasing a collection of photos and videos apparently showing Chinese fighter aircraft flying dangerously close to US aircraft.
Harassment missions by PRC aircraft and ships reflect both China’s disregard for some aspects of international law and Beijing’s insistence that other countries accord China a sphere of influence. Fundamentally, Beijing wants to replace US “hegemony” in the western Pacific with PRC pre-eminence. PRC public diplomacy daily condemns US global leadership, US regional influence, and US alliances.
Thus far, Washington shows no interest in re-trenching. Even four years of Donald Trump, who openly disparaged US alliance relationships and seemed inclined to follow a Jacksonian foreign policy, made hardly a dent in the well-established US posture of forward deployment in the Asia-Pacific.
Washington continues to challenge China’s claim of ownership over most of the South China Sea through diplomatic protests, “freedom of navigation” operations by US ships and aircraft, and support for pushback against Chinese claims by countries in the region.
Taiwan, as well, remains a flashpoint over which neither side will yield. Absent an agreement on their respective policies toward Taiwan, Washington and Beijing are trudging, zombie-like, toward an eventual cross-Strait war, as each tries unsuccessfully to warn off the other by making military preparations.
China demands that America return to the pre-Xi posture of heavy economic engagement and technological collaboration with minimal restrictions. That is no longer possible given US disillusionment with the Xi regime.
The pandemic subsequently supercharged this sentiment, as Americans learned how concretely vulnerable they were to Chinese-produced goods that might suddenly become unavailable either because of economic disruption in China or because of intentional Chinese economic coercion.
The clincher is a bipartisan commitment in the US to curtail cooperation, whether technology transfer or investment, that might enable PRC foreign policies that undercut US interests.
Any possible US-China thaw can be extremely fragile, as we saw in June of this year. Days after the successful talks in China by his secretary of state, Biden remarked off-handedly that Beijing overreacted to the US shooting down the Chinese spy balloon because it caught Xi by surprise, and “That’s what’s a great embarrassment for dictators, when they didn’t know what happened.”
Biden was seemingly defending China against the hardline US view that Xi dispatched the balloon as an intentional humiliation of the US. Nevertheless, the PRC government responded angrily, saying Biden’s remarks were “ridiculous and irresponsible” and “seriously violate[d] basic facts, diplomatic protocol and China’s political dignity.”
Biden’s take reflected a highly plausible interpretation of the incident, but Beijing objects to Xi being called a “dictator” even though this description is factually correct.
Those who expect that a Xi-Biden meeting in San Francisco will cause a breakthrough should recall that Biden and Xi had a similar face-to-face meeting a year ago in Bali. That meeting paved the way for several US cabinet members to visit China, but otherwise did nothing to solve the big issues causing bilateral friction.
Although the two leaders agreed in principle that a zero-sum relationship and a new cold war are undesirable, each government subsequently continued to blame the other’s policies for causing problems.
In this new stability, thaws will be more modest and less frequent. US-China relations are becoming more like US-North Korea relations, where a poor bilateral relationship is so ossified that hopeful observers get over-excited about a meeting between officials.
Denny Roy is Senior Fellow at the Honolulu-based East-West Center.