Albanese to China with trade war in quiet retreat

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When Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese visits China this week, he will be able to celebrate a figure that previous Australian leaders could only dream of. Over the past year, China has imported more than AU$200 billion (US$127 billion) worth of Australian goods and services.

In August 2023, the Australian Bureau of Statistics put the annual value of goods exports at AU$194 billion and services at AU$9.5 billion. In 2016, the last time an Australian prime minister visited China, the combined figure was less than half the current level at AU$95.6 billion.

Besides buoyant commodity prices and the emergence of new areas of trade such as lithium, exports have reached a record high because the disruptive measures imposed by Beijing in 2020, affecting barley, coal, lobsters and more, have been steadily removed. 

Australian Trade Minister Don Farrell says that under the Albanese government’s watch, by September 2023 AU$20 billion of “trade impediments” had been reduced to just AU$2.5 billion.

There is one narrative in Australia, particularly popular among those who championed former prime minister Scott Morrison’s government’s abrasive approach to China relations, that this positive outcome resulted from firm Australian resistance. It suggests that eventually, Beijing had no choice but to “capitulate” under Australian pressure. This narrative is both misleading and self-serving.

It is true that by the end of 2021 Beijing had recognized that its campaign of trade disruption was causing more harm to itself than it was shifting Canberra’s foreign policy positions.

Upon his arrival in January 2022, the new Chinese ambassador to Australia, Xiao Qian, said he was on a “noble mission” to work with “the Australian government and friends in all sectors … to jointly push the China–Australia relations back to the right track.” 

But Australian resolve provides only a partial explanation of the removal of the disruptive trade measures. What triggered Beijing’s actions in 2020 was not a particular policy by the Morrison government, but rather its diplomatic posturing. 

After the early Australian moves that disadvantaged China, such as Australia leading the world in banning Chinese technology companies from participating in its 5G rollout in August 2018, and accusations then that Beijing was threatening Australian trade, there was little sign of it. 

It was only in early 2020 when the Morrison government began aping the political attacks launched by former US President Donald Trump against Beijing over the Covid-19 pandemic that Beijing took steps against Australian trade.

Then-Australian prime minister Scott Morrison often aped US president Donald Trump. Photo: Facebook

Beijing wasn’t alone in being taken aback by Australia’s political assault. On Morrison’s call for international health inspectors to be given powers akin to “weapons inspectors.” 

Martin Parkinson, the usually reserved and then recently retired secretary of the Australian Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, remarked, “what whizz kid … dreamed up those talking points, what did they think they were going to achieve with that?”

When the Albanese government restored “calm and consistent” diplomacy, little wonder that ministerial visits resumed and trade disruptions began to ease.

A critical ingredient in the restoration of trade ties has been the multilateral trading system, overseen by the World Trade Organization (WTO). 

This system, which supports open and competitive global markets, blunted the effects of Beijing’s bans on Australia by facilitating the redirection of exports of Australian coal, barley and other commodities, previously destined for China, elsewhere.

The WTO also provided a neutral forum in which Canberra and Beijing could engage in their disputes relating to barley and wine.

After Washington drove the WTO’s regular appeals body into dysfunction in December 2019, Australia and China both stuck to a rules-based process by joining the workaround to the WTO dispute settlement process, the Multi-Party Interim Arrangement. This meant that neither would appeal an unfavorable WTO panel finding “into the void.”

In the case of barley, the timeline is telling. The WTO panel circulated its final report on Australian barley exports to both parties on March 15 – reportedly in Australia’s favor.

On April 10, Canberra and Beijing announced a deal had been struck in which Beijing would undertake an “expedited review” of the tariffs it had imposed. This led to Chinese tariffs being lifted on August 4.

Chinese tariffs on Australian commodities hit agricultural producers hard. Image: Twitter/NDR

Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong calculates that Australia “would not have been able to get this outcome without working through the WTO.” Later that month, Trade Minister Farrell farewelled the first shipment of 55,000 tonnes of Australian barley, at a healthy price premium, destined for China.

October brought the news that the same process was in train for wine. On the informal measures still affecting lobsters and beef, Farrell says that warming relations and the experience of the barley episode mean that Australians can “be very confident … that we can resolve all of those outstanding issues.”

Australia’s resistance to Beijing’s attempts at economic coercion was undoubtedly right. But in celebrating the latest trade numbers, when in Beijing Albanese might propose a toast to professional diplomacy and a shared commitment to the multilateral trading system, including an independent, rules-based resolution of disputes. Recommitment to both is the right way forward.

James Laurenceson is Professor and Director at the Australia-China Relations Institute at the University of Technology Sydney.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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Splitting the atom’s supply chain

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Uranium enrichment and the nuclear fuel industry make up a globally integrated complex concentrated in the hands of a few key players. A geopolitically-driven divorce is on the horizon, however.

At the outset of the invasion of Ukraine last year, US Senator John Barrasso, a Republican of Wyoming, led an effort to ban Russian-origin uranium and nuclear products following the West’s break with the fossil fuel industries that had been filling the Kremlin’s war chest.

The bill stalled, but it highlighted America’s reliance on Russian nuclear imports and the need for a comprehensive supply chain rework. When countries are already scrambling to secure supply for nationally critical materials like rare earths or semiconductors, doing so for nuclear fuel – which powers one-fifth of US electricity generation– is not a bold proposition. 

Rosatom, Russia’s sprawling state-owned champion, dominates chokepoints in the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle – 38% of global uranium conversion and 46% of enrichment. This not only gives Moscow leverage over downstream “critical infrastructure” abroad but supports its wider energy statecraft agenda.

Since 2007, nuclear reactor exports have become a key channel in Russia’s foreign influence strategy, accounting for about half of the 53 units under construction worldwide.

Additionally, leading US small-modular reactor companies like TerraPower and X-energy require high-assay, low-enriched uranium (HALEU) for their designs, and that is only commercially available from Russia.

The National Nuclear Security Administration has the ability to downblend weapons-grade material into HALEU for civil use but conflicting national security directives necessitate that it be considered a temporary solution at best.

This year, Barrasso is making more headway. The “Nuclear Fuel Security Initiative” (NFSI) breezed through the Senate as an amendment to the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act rather than as a stand-alone bill.

This would allow Congress more discretionary authority to ensure that disruptions in the nuclear fuel supply chain neither (1) impact existing commercial reactor operations, nor (2) impede the development of advanced nuclear reactors.

A companion bill banning Russian uranium (with allowances through 2027) is working its way through the House.

HALEU in the form of 30–40 kg ingots (photo 1) are recast in a multi-tier crucible system. Image: American Nuclear Society website

Opening the HALEU bottleneck is an acute priority, but the imperative should also address the broader, energy security implications of growing Russian and Chinese influence over Kazakhstan and its industry behemoth, Kazatomprom – the world’s largest uranium miner.

A disruption to the West would equate to a crisis. Nearly all producers are fully booked for years, and soaring uranium spot prices hint that warehoused sources may be depleted.

To avoid sleepwalking into a larger dilemma brought on by a captive Kazakh uranium industry, policymakers not only should empower the Department of Energy to reshore enrichment but also should firm up the broader nuclear fuel supply chain with trusted partners.

A Sino-Russo-Kazakh nuclear industrial complex?

Once known as the steady “floor” for global supply, Kazatomprom has been beset by geopolitical risks, and is on its fourth CEO in two years.

First, its primary transport route through Russia was impacted by international sanctions. Now, the bubbling Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict threatens to complicate the Trans-Caspian Route it had promoted as an alternate solution.

With access to Europe constricted and US influence in Central Asia waning, Kazakhstan has little choice but to be more accommodating towards its two assertive neighbors, who are already (by far) its most important partners in trade.

In May, Rosatom took a bite out of Kazatomprom, acquiring a 49% stake in its prized Budenovskoye-6 and -7 uranium deposits. Several executives quit as a result, fueling speculation that it was a “backdoor deal” imposed by Astana in cooperation with Moscow.

Once developed, this uranium mine complex is expected to become the world’s largest, capable of supporting Rosatom’s downstream dominance in conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication for many years to come.

When Russia invaded Ukraine, there were signs of Kazakhstani president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev distancing himself from Vladimir Putin, but the opposite has instead played out. The two have met in person at least a dozen times since, with energy cooperation a frequent focus.

Beijing has also factored Kazatomprom into its energy strategy. China is undergoing a massive buildout of new nuclear power plants, on track to become the world’s top producer by 2030. In his first post-Covid trip abroad, Xi Jinping visited Tokayev to lay the groundwork for deeper bilateral collaboration – with energy, again, a priority area.

Xi Jinping’s first post-Covid trip abroad was to Kazakhstan to see Tokayev. Photo: Xinhuanet

Since then, the China National Nuclear Corporation has secured a major long-term uranium supply contract in excess of 50% of Kazatomprom’s total book value.

Additionally, the China General Nuclear Power Corporation has started receiving nuclear fuel assemblies from the Ulba Metallurgical Plant on the Kazakh-Chinese border – a joint venture slated to provide 200 tons of nuclear fuel each year until 2041.

Signs of deepening Russia-China cooperation over nuclear fuel may further fan this hotspot of security concerns. In March, the US House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces was briefed on reports of Rosatom supplying highly enriched uranium to fast breeder reactors in China, a well-established pathway for weapons of mass destruction.

While there is no indication that Kazakhstan collaborates with Russia or China toward nuclear arms, evidence of an increasingly captive uranium industry presents a glaring liability for energy security in the US and Europe.

Reshoring, friend-shoring and the fuel cycle’s end

All this is coming to a head as demand for uranium is returning in force. With grids around the globe struggling to replace coal reliably with the variable generation of wind and solar, nuclear power is gaining recognition as a necessary component in the clean energy transition at large.

Nuclear plant developers from China, France, South Korea and the US are presently vying for business across Africa, Asia and the Middle East – eager to catch up with Rosatom’s lead.

And the most ominous driver of supply chain bifurcation may be the resuming buildup of nuclear weapons between great powers. China has been expanding its arsenal for years, and with Russia’s recent suspension of the “New START” arms control treaty, the US is pressured to modernize its own capabilities.

America should restore long-term nuclear fuel security before a crisis puts critical infrastructure at risk. The Nuclear Fuel Security Initiative can be maximized by (1) stockpiling uranium as disruption insurance, (2) reshoring critical bottlenecks like HALEU manufacturing and enrichment and (3) proactively friend-shoring the upstream stages of the supply chain among trusted allies.

The first two are already off the ground, with a strategic uranium reserve recently established and Ohio-based Centrus Energy beginning enrichment operations just this month.

But they require greater urgency. The reserve’s current inventory would cover only nine days of US commercial demand, and Centrus has a long way to go in scaling up to create a meaningful shift away from Rosatom.

The process building at the American Centrifuge Plant in Piketon, Ohio. Photo: Centrus Energy / American Nuclear Society website

The United States is fortunate that Canada and Australia are the number 2 and number 4 suppliers of uranium after Kazakhstan. However, the problem is that ramping up enough production to quit Kazatomprom would take many years, given the mining sector’s challenging workforce as well as lending and regulatory conditions.

Friend-shoring through policy incentives or consortium-building can accelerate this process by signaling a commitment to decoupling from the Russian nuclear industry – thereby boosting investor confidence and diverting capital otherwise flowing to marginally cheaper producers, like Namibia or Uzbekistan.

The surprising coup in Niger and its impact on France’s nuclear firm, Orano, should be lesson enough regarding dependence on states with elevated political risk for uranium supply.

Since the dual-use nature of uranium and the oligopolistic conditions of the space will never allow it to become a true commodity market, scruples over government intervention should be saved. The United States allowed Russia to maneuver into its commanding position by privatizing, then outsourcing, this critical supply chain.

Expeditiously rebuilding supply security at home and industrial capacity among allies is the first step to making a comeback in an industry that will undoubtedly remain vital within energy, technology and national security arenas for decades to come.

Brandt Kekoa Mabuni ([email protected]) is a resident WSD-Handa fellow at Pacific Forum in Honolulu.

This article was first published by Pacific Forum and is republished with permission. The article is a primer to a longer forthcoming report by the author titled “Splitting the Atom’s Supply Chain: Analysis & 3S Implications for a Disintegrating Nuclear Fuel Industry.”

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Clearer skies ahead for resilient Thai AirAsia

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Clearer skies ahead for resilient Thai AirAsia
Santisuk Klongchaiya, CEO of Thai AirAsia, said ‘our biggest lesson learned’ from the pandemic was to make the company healthy, with strong internal management, financial status and stakeholders.

Aviation was among the industries hit the hardest during the pandemic.

  • Best CEO in Resilient Leadership
  • Santisuk Klongchaiya, Chief Executive Officer of Thai AirAsia

Driven by pent-up travel demand after Thailand reopened its borders in 2022, the carriers that rebounded quickly were able to do so by maintaining sufficient resources, including pilots and crew, as well as their fleets, as was the case with Thai AirAsia.

Santisuk Klongchaiya has been chief executive of Thai AirAsia and SET-listed Asia Aviation (AAV) since 2018, leading the airline through the toughest time in aviation history by using “resilient leadership”.

His journey with Thai AirAsia began when he met Tony Fernandes and Tassapon Bijleveld at Warner Music. Mr Fernandes and Mr Bijleveld would later resign from Warner Music, with Mr Fernandes going on to establish Air Asia and Mr Bijleveld later becoming chief executive of Thai AirAsia.

Mr Santisuk was later persuaded to join Thai AirAsia as its head of commercial operations as the airline began a new chapter in aviation history by introducing the successful low-cost model to the Thai market.

By overcoming all kinds of challenges over the past 20 years, such as the 2003 Sars epidemic, the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, and various periods of political unrest in Thailand, Mr Santisuk said he always believed those experiences would help the airline quickly rebound from the impact of Covid-19.

Unlike many other airlines during the pandemic, Thai AirAsia made a bold move by retaining its entire workforce and fleet, opting only to return aircraft when their contracts expired.

“We adopted a ‘pause and play’ strategy to continue from the same place where we stopped once we wanted to resume again, instead of starting from the beginning of the whole track that would have made us progress slower during the recovery period,” said Mr Santisuk.

He said he wanted to give credit to the chairman of Thai AirAsia’s board — Vichate Tantiwanich — who allowed the company to maintain this plan, and also give credit to his 5,000 staff, who had received a reduction in pay and participated in the company’s furlough programme.

The airline also received good cooperation from stakeholders, such as the aircraft leasing company, airports, and the provider of aeronautical radio services, for temporarily pausing service expenses and repayment.

Salaries were slashed based on the position of the employee. For example, Mr Santisuk’s salary was cut by 50%, whereas the salaries of employees earning the least would receive the smallest reduction in salary.

“Our greatest ‘lesson learned’ is to make ourselves healthy, with strong internal management, financial status and stakeholders,” he said.

Starting with two aircraft in 2004, the company is now operating a fleet of 54 aircraft. Mr Santisuk said he believes that a strong organisational mindset ensured the airline survived and it still maintains the biggest market share on domestic routes following the pandemic.

In terms of costs, he said the airline learned to streamline its operational plan with feasible and well-prepared plans, particularly in terms of fleet expansion, which is the biggest investment for airline businesses.

The key point in terms of sales and marketing is to step away from a price war as experienced in the past, he added.

Looking ahead, he said the aviation industry still has to maintain a balance between supply growth and demand over the next few years.

On the demand side, airlines must closely monitor pent-up demand and assess how long it will continue. They must monitor the progress of big markets such as China, as well as how the Russia-Ukraine war will affect the world economy and tourism.

With supply chain disruption persisting, carriers still have to wait when it comes to aircraft maintenance and face delayed aircraft deliveries.

“In the long run, I believe in sustainability for all aspects,” he said.

BANGKOK POST CEO OF THE YEAR 2023

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Germany to seize Japan’s third-biggest economy crown

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TOKYO – Thirteen years on, the Japanese still haven’t quite gotten over China surpassing their economy in gross domestic product (GDP) terms. Now here comes Germany with a fresh blow to the national psyche.

This week, the International Monetary Fund calculated that Germany’s nominal GDP is on track to surpass Japan’s this year. That would push Japan from No 3 to No 4 globally.

If you think Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s approval ratings are low now – a mere 29% – just wait until this changing of the economy guard makes banner headlines. It will remind 126 million people that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party continues to dither as Japan’s global footprint shrinks.

Economists are skilled at finding creative ways to explain away such inflection points. We’re only talking about GDP in US dollar terms, some argue. Others say vagaries surrounding changes in prices of goods and services muddy the picture.

And to this day, Tokyo stresses per capita income levels — which are markedly higher in Japan — are the most important metric vis-a-vis China’s economy.

But there’s no masking that the fall from No 3 to No 4 speaks to the weakness of the Japanese economy and the collateral damage from a now backfiring 25-year-old weak yen policy.

It’s worth noting, too, that German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s economy isn’t exactly thriving in the homestretch to 2024. The IMF thinks growth in the US, UK, France and Spain will top Germany over the next five years.

In mid-August, The Economist argued Berlin had gone “from European leader to laggard” and asked, “is Germany once again the sick man of Asia?” Ten days later, a Wall Street Journal headline proclaimed “Germany Is Losing Its Mojo. Finding It Again Won’t Be Easy.”

Economists can debate where Germany is, circa late 2023. But it’s hard to refute that from the mid-2000s to the late 2010s, Berlin showed Tokyo how it’s done in terms of thriving economically despite strong exchange rates.

German executives and policymakers “didn’t complain about exchange rates – they figured it out and restructured accordingly,” explains economist Stephen Jen, managing partner at SLJ Macro Partners. What’s more, as the global economy grew increasingly chaotic after the mid-2000s, Germany “didn’t fight it,” Jen notes. Berlin “went with it” and raised its economic game accordingly.

Over time, Germany – then under the leadership of Gerhard Schroder followed by Angela Merkel – found ways to innovate and adapt to the fast-changing forces of globalization despite high labor costs and financial crises.

Better than most peers, Germany balanced tensions between increasing competitiveness and maintaining maximum employment, even amongst the “Mittelstand,” the medium-sized enterprises that long formed the backbone of German industry.

Germany’s SMEs are highly competitive; Japan’s, less so. Image: Twitter Screengrab

In 2014, economist Sebastian Paust probably didn’t know how right he was when arguing in an Asian Development Bank report that the Mittelstand was a “model” not just for Japan but emerging Asian economies, too.

If a “full” German Mittelstand-like “success story is the goal,” Paust explains, “reform steps must be taken to create a high-standard legal and institutional system that is complemented by a stable and sufficiently decentralized and participative political system combined with a strong entrepreneurial spirit toward social responsibility.”

Though it boosted exports in the late 1900s, Japan’s weak yen policy deadened the nation’s entrepreneurial animal spirits. Since then, a revolving door of leaders leaned on a weak yen to juice growth. That rid the last 13 governments of the urgency to boost competitiveness, recalibrate growth engines and welcome disruption.

Year after year, the Bank of Japan came under increasing pressure to ease further — to push a quantitative easing (QE) experiment that began between 2000 and 2001 into new monetary frontiers.

Things got supercharged in 2013 when Haruhiko Kuroda was named BOJ governor. The central bank went on a multi-year buying binge, cornering the government bond market. Stocks, too, through epic buying of exchange-traded funds. By 2018, the BOJ’s balance sheet topped the size of Japan’s entire economy — then roughly US$4.9 trillion.

Yet the last decade of hyper-easing merely exacerbated Tokyo’s all-liquidity-no-reform problem. It generated record corporate profits, but it failed to incentivize CEOs to boost wages, invest big in innovation, increase productivity or take risks on promising new industries.

A weak exchange rate provided 25 years of modern capitalism’s most generous corporate welfare, which ended up holding Japan back. Why would CEOs exert themselves restructuring, recalibrating or reimagining industries that once showed Apple, Samsung and Tesla how it’s done when the BOJ has your back 24/7?

Prioritizing exchange rates over disruption made dominating Asia’s future industries much easier for China. And now Germany, whose officials are about to walk into Group of Seven meetings with even greater swagger.

The IMF reckons Germany’s nominal GDP will end 2024 at $4.43 trillion, topping Japan’s $4.23 trillion for Japan. This shift comes as the yen sits around 150 to the dollar — near a 33-year low — and around 160 to the euro. The yen-euro rate was last in this neighborhood in 2008 amid the global financial crisis.

What’s more, the yen is likely to slide even further. Tight labor markets and surging oil prices are upping the odds of more US Federal Reserve rate hikes, perhaps as early as next week. European Central Bank rate hikes also widened the yield gap with Japan.

The yen is falling while there is no end to QE in sight. Image: Facebook

“The greenback continues to draw smaller benefits from strong US data and high rate advantage than it should, likely due to its overbought status, but upside risks remain predominant,” says economist Francesco Pesole at ING Bank.

The BOJ remains in stimulus mode amid flatlining wages and slowing growth. Few observers expect much from next week’s BOJ policy meeting. At most, the BOJ might announce a modest tweak in its “yield curve control” policy. An outright tightening step, though, is becoming even less likely given Prime Minister Kishida’s fiscal policy plans.

In December, Kishida unveiled a more than 50% boost in defense spending over five years to $315 billion. Last week, he pledged to cut income taxes and corporate levies, in addition to greater assistance for childcare. This latter push comes as his government’s approval falls to record lows.

As Tokyo adds to a national debt that’s already approaching 260% of GDP, the BOJ might have to boost liquidity as opposed to withdrawing it. Kishida’s U-turn on spending will put newish BOJ Governor Kazuo Ueda in a difficult spot.

When he took the helm in April, traders everywhere expected an early pivot away from QE. Perhaps even a rate hike or two. Ueda has demurred, fearing Japan Inc isn’t ready to lose the easy money training wheels.

In the meantime, the global scene has taken a turn for the worse. The 2022 surge in energy prices related to Russia’s Ukraine invasion is now accelerating thanks to the Hamas-Israel crisis. As the gap widens between Japanese yields and those in the West, the yen may experience increased downward pressure, compounding Japan’s troubles.

As Willem Thorbecke, a senior fellow at Japan’s Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, puts it: “Although a weak yen has been profitable for many Japanese firms and their trading partners, a further depreciation would be harmful. It will not increase exports of goods or key services such as tourism. It would also limit any potential increase in employment at a time when Japan needs more high-quality jobs.”

In Thorbecke’s view, further depreciation “would reduce the purchasing power of firms and consumers, and hinder their ability to import key products. For pharmaceutical goods and oil, whose imports do not decline when the exchange rate weakens, depreciation would still increase their yen costs.”

The problem is that “when the dollar costs of oil and primary commodities are already high, any further increase could swell Japan’s [current] account deficit,” Thorbecke says. “While the current value of the yen offers advantages, a further downward spiral would impose costs that exceed the benefits.”

A weak yen also can negatively affect consumer confidence. “Due to an increase in the weight of imported consumer goods, the purchasing power of households became prone to decline when the yen depreciated,” notes Wakaba Kobayashi, economist at Daiwa Research Institute.

Rather than currency management, “structural reforms that encourage innovation and productivity should be continued,” says analyst Takeshi Tashiro at the Peterson Institute of International Economics.

“Japan,” Tashiro says, “must rethink its agenda to address excess private savings and consider alternative ways to manage its savings when the private sector cannot meet demand on its own.”

Given the high level of government debt, Tashiro says, “Tokyo should also seek out the most promising investment opportunities while prioritizing alternatives to budget deficits in order to sustain demand. Low inflation in a period of yen depreciation shows that managing the economy in the face of huge private savings continues to be Japan’s major challenge.”

Asked about the IMF projections earlier this week, Japan’s Economy Minister Yasutoshi Nishimura said: “It’s true that Japan’s growth potential has fallen behind and remains sluggish. We’d like to regain the ground lost over the past 20 or 30 years. We want to achieve that through measures such as our upcoming package.”

Yet Kishida’s package would do nothing of the sort by merely treating the symptoms of Japan’s malaise, not its underlying causes.

Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s fiscal package won’t stem Japan’s slide down the global economic rankings. Photo: Asia Times Files / Agencies

Already, IMF data suggest Germans have reason to feel better off than their Japanese counterparts. Average German GDP per capita is roughly $52,824 versus $33,950 for Japanese households. At this point, continued yen weakness will do zero to boost Japanese living standards.

To be sure, German leader Scholz has more than his fair share of economic headaches. Last month, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) warned that Germany may suffer the heaviest blows from a global slowdown.

“Germany, perhaps more than other EU economies, is affected by the slowdown in China,” says Clare Lombardelli, chief OECD economist. “It exports a lot to China, as well as imports, so it’s a combination of factors.”

While “you’re seeing weaker growth across all of Europe,” Lombardelli adds, “Germany is probably the largest example. You’re seeing the impact of inflation on real incomes. That’s been suppressing consumer demand. And you’re seeing the impact of monetary policy tightening.”

Still, Japan’s woes are enabling Germany to rise in global rankings at the worst possible moment for a Tokyo government that’s very much on the ropes. The costs of 25 years of a yen-only growth strategy have never been higher, with the slip from No 3 to No 4 perhaps just the first drop in a deeper economic fall to come.

Follow William Pesek on X, formerly Twitter, at @WilliamPesek

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Ukraine’s ‘IT army’ fighting world’s first real cyberwar

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The recently established” That army” of Ukraine is crucial to the conflict with Russia, launching destructive cyberattacks and information thefts against the Russian government and other high-profile targets like energy tycoon Gazprom.

Thousands of voluntary IT military members communicate, coordinate, and report on activities via Twitter and Telegram stations. Its people have already participated in numerous problems.

These include safely disrupting Russian connections and other crucial sites in order to obstruct the Russian war efforts, as well as stealing and exposing crucial information.

The Russian government created the IT troops as a response to worries about the potential impact of Russian cyberattacks on the conflict. Mykhailo Fedorov, the sin prime minister of Ukraine, issued a call to arms on February 26, 2022, inviting all hackers to enlist in his IT force to defend Ukraine from Russian cyberattacks and destroy Russian networks.

The development of Ukraine’s This army is regarded as a global primary in cyber-warfare operations. It is thought to be the first time a state official has publicly urged hackers from all over the world to take part in cross military operations and add an organization’s military defense work against an invading army.

Hacktivist organizations that are not affiliated with Ukraine but want to help the nation against Russia even support Ukraine’s This army.

Its Chestny Znak identification system, which gives every product in the nation a unique ID and barcode, was the target of one of its most destructive attacks in 2022.

Hackers were asked to assist in the creation of an IT troops by Russian Vice Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov( right ). & nbsp, Photo: Alamy, Ukrainian Presidential Press Office, and Ukraine Presidency

Chestny Znak’s servers were inundated with information as a result of this cyberattack, which caused it to stop functioning, caused widespread disruption with significant financial costs, and also prompted the Russian state to revoke some labeling regulations.

Additionally, the IT infantry and another hacktivist organizations have been successful in targeting Russian radio and TV stations, where they have broadcast false air raid notifications and added snippets of videos about the Ukrainian war to programs.

For instance, in June 2023, a video purportedly produced by the Russian Ministry of Defense was hacked and broadcast on Belarusian state TV and various channels. The video included footage of Ukraine’s military operations, and it was then followed by an English message that read” the hour of reckoning has come.”

This gathering of attackers for Ukraine has prompted Russian organizations like Killnet, Sandworm, and XaKnet to start their own cyber-attacks on American and Russian targets.

But, Belarusian cyberattacks began long before the war and got worse in February 2022. In order to stop Russian troop movements from being tracked during the war, these included a number of smaller attacks on Russian state and private networks as well as an important cyberattack on the Viasat dish communications system.

Foreign repercussions

The Viasat cyberattack on February 23 had significant repercussions outside of Ukraine, shutting down the remote control networks of thousands of European wind turbines. This incident demonstrated that all wars then have a very real internet dimension that may have effects on the rest of the world.

The formation of the IT army has sparked significant discussions about the function of cyberwarfare in actual military operations in addition to the international security concerns that this turmoil has caused.

It may be possible for Russian government to officially target groups like the IT army, losing some of the protections provided by international law, if they are viewed as combatants rather than civilians.

However, some nations, including Estonia, have now fully set up comparable cyberforce resources. The Russian government is currently thinking about this for its This army.

The unpredictable nature of thief organizations acting as decentralized” cyberguerillas” is another factor to take into account. Beyond the conflict zone, this could have major repercussions, possibly leading to increase in more nations.

The international community and educational experts have made efforts to use the law of war and international humanitarian law in cyber procedures, which have resulted in the publishing of the Tallinn manuals.

Vladimir Putin, the chairman of Russia, is the target of a cyberattack in Ukraine. Facebook photo

These books make an effort to address issues with international law relating to computer incidents. But despite the fact that these files are not legally binding, many of the worries that the IT military has brought to light are still up for debate.

In the upcoming years, as AI equipment are increasingly used in cyber-attacks and eventually integrate into modern information warfare, conflicts may become even more difficult.

This is why, before the new era of cyberattacks begins, we need more coordinated efforts to address the functional and legal issues.

At the University of Portsmouth, Vasileios Karagiannopoulos holds the positions of Associate Professor in Cybercrime and Cybersecurity and Co-Director of the Centre for Cybercrimine and Economic Crime.

Under a Creative Commons license, this article is republished from The Conversation. read the article in its entirety.

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New train fleets, track circuit, power supply systems: North-South, East-West MRT lines complete renewal works

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SINGAPORE: On Wednesday, October 25, the multi-year program to maintain and improve the six key techniques of the North-South and East-West MRT lines( NSEWL ) was finished. & nbsp,

The sleepers, second bridge, signaling system, monitor circuits, power supply, and train fleet are the six main systems. & nbsp,

The road system development program has carried out extensive system renewal and upgrading work in phases since 2012.

Since then, renewal efforts have been concentrated on finishing the remaining components after three of its core systems— sleepers, the third rail, and the signaling system— were finished before 2020.

A” condition monitoring feature to allow faults to be pre-emptively addressed” is a common feature of the new train fleets, power supply systems, and track circuit, according to the Land Transport Authority( LTA ).

This makes it possible to stop service disruptions before they lead to a larger program breakdown or dislocation.

TRACK CIRCUIT SYSTEM RENEWAL

The new record loop system may improve rail reliability, according to LTA on Wednesday. Additionally, it can assist in identifying” broken rail in need of repair ,” lowering the possibility of disruption and enabling more effective preventive maintenance. & nbsp,

The Communications – Based Train Control signaling method, which was finished in 2018 to show the location of all trains on record, collaborates with the new track circuits. This reduces the effect on travellers by allowing the operator to concentrate its response attempts and speed up train treatment in the event of a problem. & nbsp,

More than 1,100 record circuits have been replaced since 2018 as part of the NSEWL system’s replacement work. In December, some slight track circuit construction projects that are still ongoing are expected to be finished.

RENEWAL OF POWER SUPPLY

However, according to LTA, the NSEWL’s fresh power supply system has improved real-time checking features, which enhances fault detection and prediction.

For instance, it will continuously keep an eye on the detachment of grip cables, allowing the operator to determine their situation and make” appropriate pre-emptive interventions” as necessary.

Acting Minister Chee Hong Tat stated at the conclusion meeting on Wednesday that the power supply replacement works, which started in 2018,” encompassed the successor of 1, 300 km of power cables, 250km of fiber-optic cables and hundreds, power inverters and switchboards.”

” Nearly six times the length of Singapore’s peninsula is covered by all power cords ,” according to nbsp.

To” isolate power faults and prevent line-wide disruptions ,” according to LTA, all NSEWL stations have also switched out their 64P touch voltage protection systems for new Voltage Limiting Devices.

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‘This is not supposed to happen’: Experts on DBS, Citi outage caused by data centre failure

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NEEDED Files, Healing Programs

Due to the significance of the data center, banks generally have a storage facility. Additionally, some businesses have two information centers that simultaneously share the load. If one fails in like circumstances, the different can make up the difference.

There are typically several levels of redundancy for mission-critical applications like banks, according to Dr. Dennis Khoo, managing partner at online firm allDigitalFuture. & nbsp,

According to Dr. Khoo,” In the majority of advanced banks, using the most recent technologies, the database may be quickly replicated, which means they will have a main site and an alternate site, and the data is duplicated suddenly on both sites.” & nbsp,

According to the Singapore Computer Society, the majority of data centers are built with real-time repair capabilities and some degree of reliability. They are also particularly constructed, according to the company, to match the precise duplication requirements of the business.

To reduce potential customer disruption, the world added that a files center’s typical uptime guarantee would typically be 99.982 %. & nbsp,

But, there is still 0.018 percent of outage that could occur. In order for their crucial IT systems and data information to quickly failure to the supplementary data center in the shortest amount of time if such an incident happen, the client may establish an effective Business Continuity Management System and IT Disaster Recovery Plan.

WHAT CAN Businesses DO IF THE Information Areas ARE DOWN?

However, if all data centers fail, there isn’t much — if any — service a bank can offer. & nbsp,

Banks activate what they refer to as” offline mode ,” according to Dr. Thng, which means they provide some services at branch offices using what is available. When the information center is restarted, these purchases are finally updated with the server. & nbsp,

These services may include money deposits, transaction instructions, and credit card transactions, as banks have extra cash on hand. DBS reopened departments to assist customers with some companies. & nbsp,

Dr. Thng claims that everyday This incidents like processing delays happen. Some of these go unrecognized by clients. However, company outages will harm the company’s reputation and possibly have economic repercussions. For instance, if a client receives late fees because they were able to pay their bill on time due to an outage, they may also cause financial losses. & nbsp,

Dr. Khoo claimed that banks would own” broken” their support commitments to offer customers around-the-clock service in terms of social impact.

Therefore, it is certain that your reputation will suffer as a result of your inability to provide excellent customer service. And this is not supposed to happen with suitable style. “& nbsp,

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China-Philippines testing the waters of a short sharp war

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After their canoes collided on October 22 close to the contentious Second Thomas Shoal in the roiling South China Sea, the Philippines and China are literally on incident program at water. As political tensions flared in a maritime region with significant political stakes, both edges blamed the other for the event.

A BRP Sierra Madre grounded vehicle island on the Second Thomas Shoal was about 25 kilometers east-northeast of the collision of a China Coast Guard vessel at approximately 6:00 am on Sunday. A Spanish task force reported the incident. It asserted that the Filipino team was in danger due to China’s” controversial, careless, and illegal action.”

The two Spanish provide boats and two beach guard ships entered disputed waters and were allegedly transporting” illegal creating materials” to warships, according to a statement from China’s international ministry.

According to China’s declaration andnbsp, the collisions happened after the Spanish boats disregarded warnings and approached Chinese vessels in an uncomfortable way. It stated that” the responsibility lies entirely with the Philippine side ,” which gravely broke the international maritime collision – avoidance rules.

Beijing claimed that” our operations were professional, standardized, legitimate, and legal ,” and that its coast guard ship” intercepted the trespassing Philippine ship in accordance with the law despite numerous ineffective warnings.” The rules to which the speech was referring was not specified.

vehement and serious charges

Military officials from the Philippines have from entered the rhetorical altercation.

Soon after a collision at sea between Philippine and Chinese coast guard forces at the hotly contested Second Thomas Shoal, Philippine National Security Adviser Secretary Eduardo Ano declared,” We will not be deterred and we will continue to resupply our troops in BRP Sierra Madre ] grounded vessel ] despite provocations. & nbsp,

Near the contentious feature, Vice Admiral Alberto Carlos, commander of the AFP’s Western Command( WESCOM ), directly blamed China for the conflict while stating that” our resupply sorties have always been regular and routinary.”

He claimed that his soldiers handled” Chinese vessels” harmful maneuvers with the utmost professionalism, ability, and patience to prevent any mishaps or unfavorable incidents.

A Philippine flag flutters from BRP Sierra Madre, a dilapidated navy ship that has been aground since 1999 and is now a Philippine military detachment on the disputed Second Thomas Shoal, part of the Spratly Islands, in the South China Sea. Photo: Reuters/Erik De Castro
BRP Sierra Madre, a decrepit navy ship that has been grounded since 1999 and is now the Spanish government detachment on the contentious Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, is fluttering with the symbol of the Philippines. Erik De Castro, Reuters, and Asia Times Files

Meanwhile, newly appointed PCG Commandant Admiral Ronnie Gil Gavan criticized China for acting” provocatively, irresponsibly, and recklessly ,” while highlighting the Philippines’ resolve to prevent” escalating tensions.”

The Philippine Navy ( PN ) and the Philippine Coast Guard ( PCG) collaborated on a resupply mission to the grounded BRP Sierra Madre, which serves as the country’s official base on the Second Thomas Shoal.

According to an arbitral tribunal’s decision at the Hague in 2016, the Second Thomas Shoal cannot legally be claimed as a territory by China, whose expansive nine – dash line claim was nullified on the legal basis of the United Nations Convention on l’Ocean Sea ( UNCLOS ). This is due to its low tide elevation within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone ( EEZ ).

China is obviously testing the waters in the South China Sea as the US appears to be mired in numerous problems in Ukraine and then Israel.

The Eastern power wants to terrify the Ferdinand Marcos Jr. administration, which has turned up to American allies in rebellion of Beijing’s earlier objectives, in addition to reiterating its broad claims.

As a result, there are growing concerns that China might use quick, decisive dynamic operations to restore control, impose its will over the disputed waters, and suppress the Philippines’ escalating issue contested lands.

Important allies, including the US, are coming to Manila’s linguistic security in response to growing worries about an armed conflict.

According to US Ambassador to Manila MaryKay Carlson on X, formerly known as Twitter,” the United States condemns China’s latest disruption of a legal Philippine resupply mission to Ayungin Shoal [ Second Thomas Shoals ] putting the lives of Filipino service members at risk.” She continued,” We stand with our # FriendsPartnersAllies in defending [ Philippine flag ] sovereignty and in support of a # FreeAndOpenIndoPacific.”

In a separate speech, the US State Department reiterated that the” 1951 US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty extends to military attacks on Spanish military personnel, people vessels, and plane– including those of its Coast Guard — anywhere in the South China Sea.”

Under the Philippine-US Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement( EDCA ), there are growing concerns in Asia about America’s wherewithal and ability to restrain Chinese assertiveness in nearby waters. This is true even in the face of strong assurances from Washington and an expanding military presence on Philippine soil by the Pentagon.

President Joe Biden insisted last week that the US does wage war in numerous conflict zones to support allies all over the world in a significant conversation. In the midst of the continuous military activities in Gaza, he requested further security assistance of US$ 61.4 billion to help Ukraine against Russia and$ 14.3 billion for Israel, maintaining that” American administration is what keeps the world up.”

Israel has benefited from more than$ 300 billion since its founding, while Ukraine received nearly$ 47 billion in defense aid from Washington alone last year.

A Brief, Sharp War

Regarding the Indo-Pacific, Biden requested only$ 2 billion in additional revenue, underscoring the Pentagon’s difficult return to conventional theaters of worry, especially the Middle East and Europe.

Since the Pentagon has repeatedly cited China as the greatest threat to US global leadership, many analysts were perplexed by America’s apparent new defense priorities & nbsp. According to a recent Pew Research Center survey, up to 50 % of Americans believe China to be the US’s biggest physical threat.

Due to their extremely minimal defence capabilities against China, US allies like the Philippines are now in a specially precarious position. The total defense assistance provided by the US to the Philippines since 2015 has been around$ 1 billion, the highest amount in the area but a pitiful sum in comparison to that provided to allies in other theaters.

Marcos Jr. has gradually embraced increased defence cooperation with the Pentagon since taking office last year in an effort to thwart Beijing’s aggressive actions. The Filipino president has increased his hope in an American security umbrella under an expanded EDCA after failing to secure any significant compromises on the marine issues during his journey to Beijing earlier this year.

Marcos Jr. properly injected the Philippines into the Taiwan issue by allowing the US government exposure to prized bases in the northern provinces of the East Asian country, much to China’s dismay and shock.

Beijing properly soon push the envelope further in the South China Sea, having been frustrated by Manila’s more confrontational stance but presently probably encouraged by the potential strategic overstretch of Washington.

The possibility that China will strategically engage in targeted battles, as it did with India in the Himalayas in recent years, to reinstate its will over the Philippines is causing growing concern in Asian security lines.

The Asian superpower has long relied on a” salami slicing” or” cabbage” strategy to increase its influence in the South China Sea, always avoiding direct military conflict or inciting the US-Philippinese mutual defense agreement.

Smaller competitors of China have had trouble responding to its” black zone” threats, particularly its increasing reliance on militia-driven swarming strategies. However, they now appear to need to get ready for possible small-scale but terrible conflicts.

Taiwanese ships can be seen anchored at the Whitsun Reef on March 23, 2021, about 320 kilometers north of Bataraza on the South China Sea area of Palawan in the Philippines. Asia Times Files, Handout, and Satellite Image, 2021 Maxar Technologies, AFP

According to some analysts, China may now be tempted to wage a” little sharp war” against some of America’s Eastern friends due to the extraordinary circumstances.

There are two isolates in Chinese corporate culture, according to eminent naval planner James Holmes. One favors a long conflict, while the other values an immediate, resounding victory. Mao Zedong’s experience can be placed on the past, and Sun Tzu is placed upon the former.

The Philippines’ resolve to renovate its place in the Second Thomas Shoal and its growing presence in supporting America’s deterrent strategy over Taiwan have possibly increased Chinas’ appetite for risk.

China has made it clear that it will use force if necessary if the Philippines remain with its ostensibly” provocative” activities, starting with ongoing work to renovate the BRP Sierra Madre and possibly allowing US military access to the country’s northern bases near Taiwan. & nbsp,

The Philippines and China may soon transition from maritime collisions to a short-term, strong war, with significant repercussions for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, absent any significant political find or stronger US sign of assistance.

Follow Richard Javad Heydarian at @ RicheyDarian on X, formerly Twitter.

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US-China relations have stabilized, but in permafrost

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The likely meeting between Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden on the sidelines of the APEC summit in San Francisco in November supports hopes of a “thaw” in US-China relations this year. Biden predicted such a thaw earlier this year and some observers believe they see an upturn.

The outlook is less optimistic, however, if we assess the current state of the relationship from a longer historical perspective. For several decades, US relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) followed long cycles featuring high climbs and deep descents.

During the Korean War in the 1950s, the relationship reached a nadir with Chinese and American soldiers killing each other in battle. For years afterward, Washington remained deeply hostile toward China, viewing Mao’s regime as aggressive and irrational.

The 1970s, however, saw US President Richard Nixon’s visit to China, PRC paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s visit to the US and the establishment of normal diplomatic relations. 

Another serious downturn followed in 1989 with the Tiananmen Massacre. But in 1994 the relationship had recovered to the point where US President Bill Clinton de-linked the renewal of China’s Most Favored Nation trade status from the PRC government’s human rights record. 

Relations weathered the shocks of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-96 and the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade by US aircraft in 1999. Clinton’s government granted China Permanent Normal Trade status in 1999, and China joined the World Trade Organization in 2000 with Washington’s support. 

A bilateral crisis intervened in 2001, resulting from a collision over the ocean near the Chinese coast between a US surveillance aircraft and a recklessly maneuvering PRC fighter aircraft. The Chinese pilot died, and the PRC government imprisoned the US aircrew for 12 days while demanding an apology from Washington. Some members of Congress said the Chinese were taking “hostages” and deserved no apology.

Yet three years later, US-China relations had improved to the point where US Secretary of State Colin Powell called the relationship “the best we’ve had in 30 years.” Shortly thereafter, US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick articulated the American vision of China as a “responsible stakeholder.” A US official making such a statement today seems unimaginable.

That was the last multi-year high point before the Xi Jinping era began in 2012. Xi has presided over an era of steady decline in the bilateral relationship, marked by irritants such as China’s construction of military bases in the South China Sea, Chinese “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy, the Covid-19 pandemic, tensions over Taiwan, Chinese economic coercion against trade partners that are US friends and allies, PRC government-sponsored cybertheft, the Chinese spy balloon furor, US attempts to stop China from getting advanced technologies and Beijing’s pro-Russia position on the Ukraine war. 

Importantly, the Xi era simultaneously saw China attain a level of military capability that forced Americans to begin to see the PRC as a peer competitor.

Chinese President Xi Jinping reviews a military display of Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy in the South China Sea on April 12, 2018. Photo: Reuters/Li Gang/Xinhua
Chinese President Xi Jinping reviews a military display by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy in the South China Sea on April 12, 2018. Photo: Xinhua

Before Xi, the relationship was volatile in the sense of high mobility between cordial and hostile. The positive aspect of this volatility was the expectation that when relations were poor, eventually they would recover.

If US-China relations were a stock bought at US$50 per share, sometimes the value would go down to $30, but you could depend on it eventually bouncing back to $75. 

Now, however, as a consequence of large, irreconcilable conflicts in the two governments’ vital interests, the scope for dramatic improvement in China-US relations is far more limited than prior to the Xi era. 

The relationship is stable rather than volatile, but it has stabilized at a low level of quality, locking in poor bilateral relations for an extended period. The $50 stock may be stuck at $25 indefinitely. And it may drag down the rest of the stock market.  

To be sure, the two countries have taken some steps this year to improve their relations. They’ve established working groups on economic and financial issues. In September, the PRC government assisted in the return of fugitive US soldier Travis King from North Korea to the US, earning thanks from the White House. 

Several recent Chinese moves might be signals of goodwill with broader implications: the release of Australian journalist Cheng Lei after three years of imprisonment on questionable grounds, an agreement to cooperate with Western institutions in restructuring Zambia’s debt and an invitation to the US to send delegates to the Xiangshan defense forum in Beijing, China’s knock-off of Singapore’s annual Shangri-La Dialogue. 

These mostly procedural and atmospheric steps are pathetically minor, however, compared to the substantive and intractable problems that still divide the PRC and the US.

On October 17, for instance, the US Department of Defense accused China of “a centralized and concerted campaign” of harassing US and allied aircraft in international airspace near China, also releasing a collection of photos and videos apparently showing Chinese fighter aircraft flying dangerously close to US aircraft. 

Harassment missions by PRC aircraft and ships reflect both China’s disregard for some aspects of international law and Beijing’s insistence that other countries accord China a sphere of influence. Fundamentally, Beijing wants to replace US “hegemony” in the western Pacific with PRC pre-eminence. PRC public diplomacy daily condemns US global leadership, US regional influence, and US alliances.

Thus far, Washington shows no interest in re-trenching. Even four years of Donald Trump, who openly disparaged US alliance relationships and seemed inclined to follow a Jacksonian foreign policy, made hardly a dent in the well-established US posture of forward deployment in the Asia-Pacific.

Washington continues to challenge China’s claim of ownership over most of the South China Sea through diplomatic protests, “freedom of navigation” operations by US ships and aircraft, and support for pushback against Chinese claims by countries in the region. 

Taiwan, as well, remains a flashpoint over which neither side will yield. Absent an agreement on their respective policies toward Taiwan, Washington and Beijing are trudging, zombie-like, toward an eventual cross-Strait war, as each tries unsuccessfully to warn off the other by making military preparations.

China demands that America return to the pre-Xi posture of heavy economic engagement and technological collaboration with minimal restrictions. That is no longer possible given US disillusionment with the Xi regime.

The pandemic subsequently supercharged this sentiment, as Americans learned how concretely vulnerable they were to Chinese-produced goods that might suddenly become unavailable either because of economic disruption in China or because of intentional Chinese economic coercion. 

The clincher is a bipartisan commitment in the US to curtail cooperation, whether technology transfer or investment, that might enable PRC foreign policies that undercut US interests.  

Any possible US-China thaw can be extremely fragile, as we saw in June of this year. Days after the successful talks in China by his secretary of state, Biden remarked off-handedly that Beijing overreacted to the US shooting down the Chinese spy balloon because it caught Xi by surprise, and “That’s what’s a great embarrassment for dictators, when they didn’t know what happened.” 

US sailors fish the collapsed Chinese spy balloon out of the Atlantic off South Carolina. Photo: US Navy

Biden was seemingly defending China against the hardline US view that Xi dispatched the balloon as an intentional humiliation of the US. Nevertheless, the PRC government responded angrily, saying Biden’s remarks were “ridiculous and irresponsible” and “seriously violate[d] basic facts, diplomatic protocol and China’s political dignity.” 

Biden’s take reflected a highly plausible interpretation of the incident, but Beijing objects to Xi being called a “dictator” even though this description is factually correct.

Those who expect that a Xi-Biden meeting in San Francisco will cause a breakthrough should recall that Biden and Xi had a similar face-to-face meeting a year ago in Bali. That meeting paved the way for several US cabinet members to visit China, but otherwise did nothing to solve the big issues causing bilateral friction. 

Although the two leaders agreed in principle that a zero-sum relationship and a new cold war are undesirable, each government subsequently continued to blame the other’s policies for causing problems.

In this new stability, thaws will be more modest and less frequent. US-China relations are becoming more like US-North Korea relations, where a poor bilateral relationship is so ossified that hopeful observers get over-excited about a meeting between officials. 

Denny Roy is Senior Fellow at the Honolulu-based East-West Center.

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Commentary: When it comes to bank outages, convenience favours the prepared

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If history is any indication, the response to the most recent disruption will follow a three-track pattern: Customers will gripe about the inconvenience and question whether Singapore could go digital, banks may be forced to review their administrative procedures and system resilience, and the authorities may slap the violators with additional requirements and demand that they perform better.

Everything you’ve said is entirely reasonable and comprehensible.

Without a doubt, the banks — all of them, not just the two parties — will benefit from this. They should double down on duplication systems, increase their situation planning, and develop in better public relations and client recovery.

It is impossible to predict when another interruption may occur. No technological method is perfect, upon both.

A BETTER Digital Culture IS MISSING A LINK?

This will be viewed as a significant learning opportunity from sage social strategy to being digital. However, I wonder if society, including you and I, sees ourselves as a part of the entire digitalization process rather than just consumers. This would be the missing piece of information that would make the digital system function better. & nbsp,

Singapore has made great strides toward becoming a digital society. The nationwide campaign to reduce cash transactions began in 1985, even though the popularity of digital banking and digital transactions has only definitely increased recently.

In a statement delivered on March 14, 1985, Lee Yock Suan, the acting secretary for Labour, stated that the widespread adoption of electronic fund transfer systems and the popularity of digital transactions may show in’ a new period of comfort and convenience’ in banking and cash management services. ” We can anticipate the day when we can shop, pay our bills, check our bank accounts, and transfer money between accounts all from the comfort of our homes ,” said & nbsp.

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