Disruption (Page 3)

As China’s subtle maneuvers, Russia’s hunter-killer satellites, and the US’s press for efficient orbital fight capabilities converge toward future space battles, the conflict is escalating.

According to Air & Space Forces Magazine, US Space Force leaders have been looking for more maneuvering abilities as a result of China’s extreme orbital maneuvers in geostationary orbit.

Air &amp, Space Forces Magazine mentions that since 2010, China has launched roughly 1, 000 satellites, with new activities involving large activity rates, planetary war techniques and evasion tactics.

The document highlights the dangers posed by China’s powerful telescope tactics, which include inspecting, moving or damaging another observatories. According to the record, these tactics are uncommon for a geostationary circle and aim to avoid detection and disruption.

According to the statement, US Space Force Commander General Stephen Whiting cited China’s use of novel orbit and on-orbit fuel as evidence that the need for sustained place movement abilities.

Additionally, it mentions Brigadier General Anthony Mastalir’s warning about a paradigm change that required the US to adjust. Additionally, the report mentions Lieutenant General Douglas Scheiss ‘ suggestion that because both countries have maneuvering skills, there might be a “dogfight in space.”

According to Air &amp, Space Forces Magazine, the US aims to create systems similar to the X-37B spaceplane to lessen operating surprises and bridge planetary governments.

Defense Scoop reported in October 2024 that the US Space Force gave California-based business Impulse Space a$ 34.5 million commitment to show on-orbit flexibility for its strategically flexible storage system in addition to the X-37B spaceplane.

The contract includes the delivery of two orbital maneuver vehicles ( OMV) for the Victus Salo and Surgo missions, according to Defense Scoop. The report notes that these missions are intended to evaluate the ability of pre-positioned space assets to respond to on-orbit threats quickly.

Defense Scoop mentions that the US Space Force is working to improve its response to space threats and aims to have operational, tactical space capability by 2026. It also says the upcoming Victus Haze mission, slated for 2025, aims to test maneuverable space vehicles.

In February 2022, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ( DARPA ) announced that General Atomics, Lockheed Martin, and Blue Origin had been awarded contracts to develop nuclear propulsion systems for Low Earth Orbit ( LEO ) demonstrations by 2025.

This technology, which uses nuclear fission to accelerate propellants, offers significant advantages over traditional chemical propulsion, including longer endurance, heavier payload capacity and double fuel efficiency.

These advancements may shift space combat from passive “detection and response” to active “positioning and maneuver” strategies. They enable the application of traditional war principles—flexibility, concentration, and maneuverability—to space operations.

Maneuverability may also address satellites ‘ inherent vulnerability. Most of them follow predetermined paths, making them susceptible to tracking and targeting by anti-satellite weapons. With greater precision, adversaries can plan and execute attacks with greater predictability.

Adversary satellites employing” chase and disable” tactics —actively seeking, inspecting, or damaging critical space assets—pose significant threats to space security.

These tactics involve satellites moving to close proximity to and possibly involving other satellites, raising concerns about unintentional interruptions or hostile behavior.

For instance, NPR reported in May 2024 that the US had accused Russia of launching a satellite, Cosmos 2576, that is likely a counter-space weapon. NPR says the satellite, launched from the Plesetsk site in northern Russia, is in the same orbital plane as a US spy satellite, USA 314, which is part of the Keyhole 11 series.

According to NPR, the US claims that Cosmos 2576’s proximity to USA 314, approximately 48 kilometers at its closest point, suggests it could be used to inspect, move or damage other satellites.

The report notes that this maneuver has raised international tensions, with the US looking out for any threatening behavior on the satellite. NPR says Russia has denied the allegations, calling them “fake news” and asserting its opposition to placing weapons in space.

Previously, Asia Times reported in August 2022 that Russia’s Kosmos-2558 satellite is suspected to be an “inspector satellite” with potential hunter-killer capabilities. Analysts believe it has the ability to track and possibly destroy US spy satellites, which raises questions about the use of space as a weapon.

That month, Kosmos-2558 approached within 75 kilometers of the USA-326 satellite, which carries a classified payload for space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ( ISR ) missions.

Concerns about the satellite’s location and potential threat have been raised by the US National Reconnaissance Office ( NRO ). Russia has a history of deploying satellites with similar capabilities, including Kosmos-2491, Kosmos-2499, and Kosmos-2504, which have conducted proximity maneuvers since 2013.

The US Space Force should look into plans to deploy “hunter-killer” satellites, using SmallSats ‘ flexibility and affordability, in a July 2024 article for the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, to increase space superiority.

Galbreath says these hunter-killer satellites are designed to operate as co-orbital weapons capable of disabling adversary satellites through kinetic strikes, electronic warfare, laser targeting, spoofing and jamming.

He points out that the US Space Force is more apt to carry out offensive counter-space operations on short notice by patrolling close to adversary assets, hiding in less-monitored orbits, or remaining dormant aboard larger spacecraft until they are activated.

Additionally, Galbreath says these satellites can be “bodyguards” for high-value space assets, similar to fighter escorts for aircraft, thereby shielding critical systems like missile warning satellites from attack.

He notes that the adoption of SmallSats for this role is driven by their low cost, rapid development cycles, and potential for mass deployment, which enables the US to counter China’s and Russia’s growing space warfare capabilities.

Galbreath claims that SmallSats have the potential to transform US military space operations because of their combination of precise targeting, operational agility, and the ability to achieve effects without creating orbital debris.

However, the rules of war regarding attacks against satellites aren’t crystal clear. Michael Byers and Aaron Boley discuss the legality of an attack on a satellite as a result of their book” Who Owns Outer Space” in 2023, which deals with the interpretations of the jus ad bellum ( right to war ) and jus in bello ( conduct in war ) principles.

According to Byers and Boley, opponents of satellite attacks may argue that they fall under the UN Charter’s Article 2( 4 ), primarily if they cause significant damage to state assets or interfere with essential services like navigation or communications.

They argue that using satellites for military, economic, and civilian purposes may be justification for using them in self-defense under Article 51.

Conversely, they mention that opponents note that not all satellite attacks meet the threshold of an “armed attack”, especially if effects are non-destructive, like signal jamming or hacking.

Moreover, Byers and Boley point out that satellites ‘ dual-use nature complicates attribution and intent assessment, making classifying such actions as acts of war challenging.

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As tensions rise over a possible Taiwan war, the US only demonstrated its ability to shoot down nuclear missiles from Guam. This sends a strong message to China.

The US Missile Defense Agency ( MDA ) conducted its first live intercept of a ballistic missile from Guam on Tuesday ( December 10 ), according to The War Zone, marking a significant milestone in the development of the Aegis Guam System.

The War Zone mentions that the test, known as Flight Experiment Mission-02 ( FEM-02 ), successfully saw a Standard Missile-3 Block IIA intercept a mock medium-range ballistic missile over 200 nautical miles northeast of the island. It notes that the test is an important step in ensuring Guam, a geopolitical island in the Indo-Pacific region, receives 360-degree protection.

According to the report, Aegis Guam’s method, which has a leaning Mk 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS), offers more freedom for missile launch points than another Aegis Ashore systems. It makes note of the AN/TPY-6 sensor, which demonstrates the Guam’s incorporated air and missile defence capabilities.

The program is a part of a wider effort to strengthen Guam’s threats against potential risks from China, which has been swiftly expanding its nuclear weapon army. In the event of a discord, it makes note of the MDA’s continuous expansion of the Guam Defense System, which aims to establish a strong, multi-layered defense network involving regional allies and members of the US military.

Aegis Ashore, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense ( THAAD), Typhon, and Patriot systems are integrated into Guam’s wider Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense ( EIAMD) system for 360-degree protection, according to Asia Times.

Guam will also make use of the Integrated Battle Command System ( IBCS) to unite various radar and missile assets into a single network, addressing flaws in US missile defense kill chains.

Yet, significant barriers remain. The complexity of integrating various systems and the limited land area of Guam cause risks of clumsy responses when combined with nuclear, cruise, and hypersonic missiles, while the country’s limited land space and hilly terrain complicate the development of infrastructure.

Additionally, over-reliance on set sensor-to-shooter links does limit adaptability against next-generation risks. China’s possible use of multi-domain attacks—combining cyber, electrical, and dynamic strikes—threatens the dignity of US destroy chains.

Apart from these challenges, a finite number of interceptors per system ( Aegis, THAAD and Patriot ) means that if a large-scale, multi-axis attack occurs, the inventory of available interceptors could be depleted quickly.

In line with that, Megan Eckstein mentions in a February 2024 Defense News content that the US Navy faces significant challenges as a result of supply chain bottlenecks and antiquated manufacturing capabilities.

Eckstein claims that despite dramatically increasing weapons costs, the US Navy struggles with insufficient stockpiles of crucial weapons, including the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile ( LRASM), MK 48 torpedoes and Standard Missile varieties.

She mentions that vital suppliers of elements like jet motors and electronics are unable to meet the growing demand while big defense contractors have expanded their facilities and modified processes. She notes that while the US Navy’s FY24 funds includes US$ 380 million to address these obstacles, business professionals warn that it will take time to discover changes.

Eckstein points out that efforts to increase productivity are further hampered by the US Navy’s reliance on a select few eligible rocket engine manufacturers.

Further, Mackenzie Eaglen mentions in a July 2024 article for The National Interest ( TNI ) that the US Department of Defense’s ( DOD ) decision to terminate SM-3 Block IB production in favor of the newer SM-3 Block IIA has not been matched with adequate increases in the latter’s procurement, leading to a shortfall in interceptor stockpiles.

Eaglen notes the FY 2025 defence budget reduces planned purchasing of SM-3 Block IB from 153 to zero over the next five years, saving US$ 1.9 billion but no reinvesting these benefits into SM-3 Block IIA output, which remains stagnated at 12 weapons annually.

He points out that despite a projected increase in SM-6 purchasing, total missile production is still insufficient to meet the US Navy’s requirements.

Eaglen says that efforts to increase output are further hampered by the persistent preference for smaller purchasing quantities and the reliance on a small number of skilled rocket motor manufacturers.

To address those challenges, the US Navy released an industry Request for Information ( RFI ) in July 2024 to assess the production capabilities for SM-6 rocket motors, specifically the MK72 booster and MK104 dual thrust rocket motor, to enhance fleet defense.

In its July 2024 RFI, the US Navy seeks details on these creation efforts ‘ value and professional preparation, aiming for merger in the FY26-FY27 timeframe or faster.

Additionally, the supplies of missiles, energy and extra parts for interceptors, sensor systems and communications technology is logistically difficult. Guam may experience resupply delays as a result of a protracted conflict due to the disruption of seafaring supply lines.

China has been constantly expanding its appearance in the South Pacific in an effort to do so. Some experts suggest that threatens to minimize entry between Guam, Australia, New Zealand and the US.

In Asia Times, Grant Newsham mentions how China is encroaching on the South Pacific through a comprehensive plan of social, economic, and military invasion.

According to Newsham, China is using political conflict to undermine US presence while the US is focused on reestablishing airfields and dispersing forces under the Agile Combat Employment (ACE ) strategy.

He mentions that China is funding Kiribati aircraft repairs and has built dual-use infrastructure, including games and ships, in US states like the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.

He says that in the Federated States of Micronesia, China is constructing airports that mirror US work, while China aims to influence Palau’s political authority in its pursuit through purchases.

Newsham points out that Huawei’s buildings and harbor restoration in the Solomon Islands support the latter’s China-friendly program. He claims that an East Timor airport constructed with US cash might ultimately be a “gift” for China.

Newsham says China’s approach to these South Pacific says includes corruption, political offers and misinformation, usually outmatching US attempts.

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