Commentary: How will Henry Kissinger be remembered in Southeast Asia?

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HENRY KISSINGER’S WORLDVIEW

In trying to understand the enigma of the man, we have to understand his worldview. Dr Kissinger was the ultimate practitioner of realpolitik pragmatism. For him, morality had little place in the arena of world politics where power served as its prime currency.

If anything, excessive preoccupation with moral arguments were a distraction from – if not an obstacle to – the larger objective of peace, which to him was ultimately about avoiding the kind of great power conflagration that brought about World War II. To achieve this objective, difficult decisions would have to be made which, to Dr Kissinger, left little room for sentimentality.

This leads to a second point: To Dr Kissinger, the chief actors in the script of global politics were the great powers. Throughout his time in office during the terms of US presidents Richard M Nixon and Gerald R Ford, Dr Kissinger was consumed by Cold War competition with the Soviet Union and principally, the question of how to prevent a major nuclear conflict without compromising American interests and security.

It is from this prism that some of the US’ most controversial policies during those years, many attributed to him and that have tainted his legacy, should be viewed, such as the toleration of right-wing dictatorships in Latin America, complicity in violence in Bangladesh and the bombing of Cambodia.

KISSINGER’s IMPACT ON SOUTHEAST ASIA

With these aspects of Dr Kissinger’s worldview in mind, what were his contributions and connections to Southeast Asia? After all, if indeed his preoccupation was with great power politics, how did he view a region that comprised small and medium-sized states?

As national security adviser and later also secretary of state to US presidents Nixon and Ford, Henry Kissinger served during the most turbulent years of recent Southeast Asian history, when Soviet and Chinese-supported communist movements threatened to take over many governments in the region.

While communist insurgencies raged across Southeast Asia, it was in Vietnam where the threat was most urgent. Indeed, as early on as the presidency of Dwight D Eisenhower, the US was already seized by the prospect that the fall of Indochina to communism would allow the ideology to spread across Southeast Asia. This became known as the “domino theory”.

Dr Kissinger was instrumental in crafting and executing American policy at the height of the Vietnam War. He would oversee further escalation of the war, both in terms of the number of US troops deployed and also the expansion of the war to Cambodia, which he thought necessary in order to weaken the Vietcong.

Nevertheless, the ballooning cost of the war, mounting American casualties, and President Nixon’s promise to scale down US involvement, compelled Dr Kissinger to pursue secret negotiations with North Vietnam for the US’ eventual withdrawal.

Both he and his North Vietnamese counterpart, Le Duc Tho, were awarded the 1973 Nobel peace prize for their efforts. Mr Tho declined it, and Dr Kissinger never went to Oslo to collect his for fear of widespread protests given how unpopular the war had become.

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AI in Southeast Asia: As rules are drafted, workers share their worries and wishes

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The debate over copyright has been seen around the world, with some artists angered by AI copying the styles they have sacrificed years to develop, often without consent or compensation. This has sparked questions of intellectual property ownership and legal challenges in countries like the US.

But this is only one of the ground-up fears that AI has brought on. Some are worried about losing their jobs, while others say the technology could be used for nefarious purposes.

AI systems used in recruitment and judicial processes also risk perpetuating biases, as the training data they use could be encoded with socio-economic, racial, religious and gender prejudices, experts say.

At the same time, the potential of using AI to do good is also there – from driving automation to predicting illness.

Against this backdrop, a race for AI regulation is taking place to avert the risks while hopefully reaping the rewards – with action being taken at the global, regional and national levels.

An international milestone was logged just a month ago. The first-ever AI Safety Summit, held in the UK on Nov 1, saw the US and China coming together with more than 25 other countries to affirm the safe and responsible use of AI.

The landmark agreement also places “strong responsibility” on developers of frontier AI to test their systems for safety.

Frontier AI often refers to the first wave of mainstream AI applications like ChatGPT.

On a regional scale, the European Union is in the final stages of formulating its AI Act, a far-reaching law that would classify AI systems by risk and mandate various development and use requirements.

Closer to home, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is planning to draw up governance and ethics guidelines for AI, which analysts told CNA are expected to suggest “safeguards” that can mitigate identified risks.

While the guide is not expected to translate into regional legislation, it could spur individual member states to create new laws or tweak existing ones to regulate the technology, they added.

Countries behind the AI curve will also get a leg up as they can benefit from the sharing of knowledge.

“The public should care about AI regulation because the technology is more pervasive than we normally think,” said Dr Karryl Sagun-Trajano, a research fellow for future issues and technology at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), pointing out that AI is used in sectors like healthcare, education, transport and crime fighting.

IS AI COMING FOR YOUR JOB?

The potential for AI to upend the labour market and disrupt industries has been much discussed. A Goldman Sachs report predicts that as many as 300 million jobs could be impacted by AI automation.

Observers have warned that faster, smarter and cheaper AI-powered chatbots could replace outsourced call centres handling customer service for many companies.

This is especially stark for countries like India and the Philippines, where call centres provide modest-paying work and surveys have shown automation could render over a million jobs obsolete.

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China’s spurious claim to Lebensraum in the South China Sea

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As US President Joe Biden recently attempted to charm Chinese President Xi Jinping into standing down from his imperial ambitions of obtaining more Lebensraum for his country, all should question Xi’s right to claim dominion over the South China Sea.

Without legal authority or historic precedent, China has audaciously and arrogantly claimed most of the South China Sea as its “domestic” waters. By militarizing its presence in the South China Sea and harassing Philippine vessels (and also shadowing American ships and planes), China is risking war.

On November 25, near the Paracel Islands, China deployed naval and air forces to “track, monitor and warn away” the US destroyer Hopper.

China said the incident “proves that the United States is an out-and-out security risk creator in the South China Sea.”

On November 27, the US Seventh Fleet issued a statement that:

“Unlawful and sweeping maritime claims in the South China Sea pose a serious threat to the freedom of the seas, including the freedoms of navigation and overflight, free trade and unimpeded commerce, and freedom of economic opportunity for South China Sea littoral nations.

“The United States challenges excessive maritime claims around the world regardless of the identity of the claimant. Customary international law reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention protects certain rights, freedoms and lawful uses of the sea enjoyed by all nations. The international community has an enduring role in preserving the freedom of the seas, which is critical to global security, stability, and prosperity.

“The United States upholds freedom of navigation for all nations as a principle. As long as some countries continue to claim and assert limits on rights that exceed their authority under international law, the United States will continue to defend the rights and freedoms of the sea guaranteed to all. No member of the international community should be intimidated or coerced into giving up their rights and freedoms. 

“US forces operate in the South China Sea on a daily basis.… The operations demonstrate that the United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows – regardless of the location of excessive maritime claims and regardless of current events.”

Also this month, the US and China held “candid” talks on maritime issues, including the contested South China Sea, where Washington underlined its concerns about what it called “dangerous and unlawful” Chinese actions.

In late October, Chinese coast-guard and maritime-militia vessels “recklessly harassed and blocked” Philippine Coast Guard boats on their way to resupply a Manila-held outpost in the South China Sea. One Chinese ship fired a water cannon at a supply boat, Philippine forces said.

Ship-tracking data showed at least two dozen Chinese vessels, including large ships of the China Coast Guard, descending on Philippine-controlled Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands archipelago.

Map evidence

Decades ago when he was US ambassador to Thailand, my father bought an old naval map of Southeast Asia showing in great detail the entire South China Sea. In that expanse of water, not one Chinese name appears. The only places identified with Chinese names are on the coasts of Hainan Island and the Chinese mainland.

Similarly, names on the coast of Vietnam are shown in Vietnamese, while along the coasts of Malaya, Borneo, and around the Philippine Islands names are shown in Malay.

Nearly all land features in the South China Sea are identified with names in English.

This is evidence that the Chinese had no occupation or permanent presence in the South China Sea as of 1794.

(The map was published in London by Laurie and Whittle on May 12, 1974, based on the last edition of the Neptune Oriental by Monsieur D’apres de Mannervillette, and using drafts and journals of British navigators and a Dutch coastal chart.)

Second, in 1816 the king of Vietnam, Gia Long, planted his flag on the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea with no objection from China. 

French priest J L Taberd wrote in 1837:

“The Pracel or Parocels, is a labyrinth of small islands, rocks, and sand-banks, which appears to extend up to the 11th degree of north latitude, in the 107th parallel of longitude from Paris. Some navigators have traversed part of these shoals with a boldness more fortunate than prudent, but others have suffered in the attempt. 

“The Cochin Chinese call them Con uang. Although this kind of archipelago presents nothing but rocks and great depths which promises more inconveniences than advantages, the king Gia Long thought he had increased his dominions by the sorry addition. In 1816, he went with solemnity to plant his flag and take formal possession of these rocks, which it is not likely any body will dispute with him.”

Third, there is a 1905 Chinese map of China that does not show the South China Sea at all, implying that China had no claim to those waters or any islands in that sea.

Fourth, on March 30, 1933, the government of Vietnam, then a French protectorate, placed administration of the Paracel Islands under its province of Thua Thien. The government decree stated that such islands had been under the sovereign authority of Vietnamese for many generations under previous Vietnamese dynasties.

Fifth, on December 21, 1933, the French colonial administration of Cochin China decreed that the Spratly Islands, and the islets named Amboyna Cay, Itu-Aba, and Two Islands Group – Loaito and Thi-tu – would be subordinated to the administration of Baria province. 

Previously on July 26, 1933, the Official Gazette of the French Republic published an opinion of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs relating to the occupation of certain islands by French naval units. On August 24 and September 14, 1933, the governor general of Cochin China annexed the islands and islets of the Spratly or Storm Group.

The Chinese government did not protest these claims by the governments of Vietnam and the Cochin China colony nor did it assert its own rival claim to sovereignty over those islands.

So today, why is the international community in general and the United States, in particular, not formally rejecting China’s claim to “rule” the South China Sea and taking effective steps to enforce the claims of Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia to those waters and the right of free passage through international waters beyond the jurisdiction of any nation?

Should China make good on its pretense that the South China Sea is part of its Lebensraum, it will be able to impose restrictions on and even a blockade of the shipping which sustains the existence of South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore, not to mention the wealth earned by countries which trade with those Asian nations by sea.

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Singapore Art Week returns in January 2024 with art fairs, live performances and the Light To Night festival

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Art lovers will be glad to know that they can chase their post-holiday blues away this January as Singapore Art Week returns for its 12th edition. Organised by the National Arts Council and supported by the Singapore Tourism Board, the event features more than 150 art exhibitions and programmes by over 400 partners from all over the world – from art exhibitions showcasing local and global talent to live music shows.

Some of the programmes will even run till February 2024.

To whet your appetite, there are already some ongoing shows to check out, including Singaporean artist Ho Tzu Nyen’s Time And The Tiger at the Singapore Art Museum at Tanjong Pagar Distripark. The mid-career survey of his works that include paintings, films and video installations is running until Mar 3.

Over at the National Gallery Singapore, there’s Tropical: Stories From Southeast Asia And Latin America. The blockbuster show, which runs until Mar 24, features 200 artworks from more than 70 artists, including the works of famous Mexican artists Frida Kahlo and Diego Rivera.

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Commentary: Malaysia opposition leader Muhyiddin pulls off shrewd political move with '24-hour resignation’

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More Bersatu MPs may jump ship now that it is clear the anti-hopping does not work in practice. There are rumours that another three or four opposition MPs may switch their support to Mr Anwar before the end of this year, with the incentive simply the ability to access government funding for their constituency.

This would have increased political pressure on Muhyiddin to take political responsibility for losing the MPs. But after the Bersatu Supreme Council’s swift rejection of his decision to step down, Muhyiddin has confirmation that he is safe politically.

ANYTHING CAN HAPPEN BETWEEN NOW AND 2027

Muhyiddin’s “24-hour resignation” was a shrewd political move. He has emerged stronger politically after the annual party congress when it could easily have turned against him.

More importantly, he is now in pole position to retain the presidency in Bersatu internal elections next year. If he wins without a challenger, then all he has to do is to wait for the next general election, due by 2027 at the latest.

If PN wins that election, then he will break Mahathir’s record as a second-time prime minister.

The bad news, of course, is that Malaysian politics is wholly unpredictable. Anything can happen between now and 2027.

But Muhyiddin’s political stunt ensures that no matter what happens over the next four years, he will remain a major player in Malaysian politics.

James Chin is Professor of Asian Studies at the University of Tasmania and Senior Fellow at the Jeffrey Cheah Institute on Southeast Asia.

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US threatening to hollow out Asia's chips industry

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Even as they share similar concerns about economic security and resilience, the United States’ trading partners in Asia wonder what Washington’s new embrace of industrial policy means for their own development.

With deep government pockets, a large domestic market and potent research and development capabilities, the United States has the economic power to capture a significant share of global investment in targeted industrial sectors. 

The US turn towards protectionism and its desire to shift trade to “like-minded” friends raise fears that the US market will be closed to Asian exports unless US demands for common standards and supply chain configurations are met.

The CHIPS and Science Act, passed by the US Congress in 2022, illustrates Washington’s “reshoring” intentions and their implications for trading partners. The act is designed to “bring back” domestic semiconductor manufacturing that is presently concentrated in Asia by offering a menu of subsidies, tax credits and domestic content rules that promote onshore research, development and manufacturing. 

Bipartisan support for the funding comes from the centrality of semiconductors to civilian and military technology and concerns over the geopolitical vulnerability caused by fabrication that has moved to mainland China and Taiwan.

The CHIPS Act subsidizes onshore investment in semiconductor fabrication, promising US$39 billion of manufacturing incentives on top of 25% investment tax credits. These incentives seem to already be attracting the major semiconductor fabricators and their suppliers to invest in the United States.

According to the Semiconductor Industry Association, from the CHIPS Act’s introduction in 2020 to June 2023, 67 new projects and expansions of existing US facilities were announced in research and development, intellectual property, chip design, semiconductor fabrication and manufacturing equipment, supplies and materials. 

This new activity contrasts with the steady decline in the US share of global semiconductor manufacturing, which fell from 19% in 2000 to only 12% in 2020.

US CHIPS Act is attracting new investment in America’s laggard chips industry. Image: Twitter

Assessing how many of these projects have been attracted to the United States because of CHIPS Act subsidies is difficult. The allocation of these funds has not occurred yet and some of these investments might have been made regardless. 

But US export controls on advanced chips and the equipment and supplies needed to produce them have undoubtedly affected decisions within the industry because they limit the materials that can be sent to China for manufacturing.

The CHIPS Act explicitly pulls investment from global semiconductor companies to the United States, raising fears that US industrial subsidies will hollow out tech industries in other regions. East and Southeast Asia is home to 10 of the 16 semiconductor exporters and the top six suppliers, accounting for 84% of global exports in 2021.

While US subsidies are clearly a response to this regional concentration, expanding production capacity in the United States will affect the markets that these exporters now serve. On the one hand, US chip-related activities may reduce US chip imports from some Asian suppliers. But they may also expand trade in materials, equipment and more labor-intensive activities, such as testing and packaging.

How the industry and the market for Asian semiconductor-related exporters evolve in the future also depends on the actions of other countries. In response to the CHIPS Act, the European Union, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea have initiated or extended subsidy programs of their own.

In 2022 the EU launched the European Chips Act to ease government funding rules for semiconductor plants. In August 2023, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) announced plans to build a $11 billion chip manufacturing plant in Germany, in a deal that reportedly includes up to $5.5 billion in government subsidies. 

The United Kingdom also announced a 20-year strategy for its domestic semiconductor industry, recognizing its inability to compete with massive US and EU subsidies and focusing on areas where it already has competencies.

This high level of intervention in the industry raises the specter of a coming glut of semiconductors and falling world prices, even as the cost of production by new players is expected to exceed those in more established locations. If such a scenario plays out, governments will be tempted to protect subsidized manufacturers behind import tariffs or offer customer subsidies conditioned on domestic content requirements.

The US turn to such restrictions is evident in the Inflation Reduction Act, passed in August 2022, which provides subsidies to purchasers of electric vehicles assembled in the United States. The threat to Asian suppliers is clear if the subsidy race blocks semiconductor export markets and lowers world prices.

Another concern for Asian suppliers may arise from US demands to reduce Chinese involvement in supply chains. To date, Washington has not made such demands directly, but the CHIPS Act’s investment tax credits are contingent on recipients refraining from significant new investments in manufacturing facilities in China. This indicates that the United States intends to reduce links to the Chinese industry.

The implications of such ambitions are unclear. Silicon is produced by a handful of countries, but the largest supplier by far is China. Pressure to find alternative sources will be a problem throughout the industry.

A man walks past a company logo at the headquarters of the world’s largest semiconductor maker TSMC in Hsinchu, Taiwan, on January 29, 2021. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP / Sam Yeh

Even if the United States completely removes China from the supply chains that serve domestic chip manufacturers, it will still rely on imports of legacy chips from foreign partners.

Through ongoing consultations, facilitated in part by the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework’s new Supply Chain Council, Asian exporters may be able to moderate negative spillovers from the emerging semiconductor subsidy race and open up space for their participation in the expanding US industry. 

The Council, envisioned to meet at least annually, is tasked with exploring options to diversify concentrated supply sources for sectors and goods of shared interest. Member countries could work to avoid duplication, maintain open trade among members and gradually modify critical material sourcing.

Mary E Lovely is the Anthony M Solomon Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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'Why would they build another one?': Indonesia ramps up clean energy while adding coal power plants

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Indonesia should focus on renewable energy to meet its future electricity needs, argued Mr Putra Adhiguna of the US-based think tank, Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA).

“Our electricity system is currently too reliant on coal-fired power plants, which already creates an oversupply and in turn creates a disincentive for our electricity provider, PLN, to add more capacity,” he said, referring to Indonesia’s state-owned firm, Perusahaan Listrik Negara.

Another factor “hindering Indonesia’s energy transition efforts”, he said, is the price cap on coal.

Depending on its quality, Indonesia’s energy and mineral resources ministry caps the price of coal for electricity production at US$70 per tonne. The PLN estimates that this year, Indonesia would need 161 million tonnes of coal to feed its power plants. 

The coal price cap makes it difficult for renewable energy to compete. In some countries, the levelised cost of solar energy over a 25- to 30-year life cycle is cheaper than fossil fuels, but that is not the case yet in Indonesia because of the artificial price ceiling for coal.

According to the Jakarta-based think tank Institute for Essential Services Reform (IESR), the levelised cost of electricity from solar is 5.79 US cents per kilowatt hour, while that from coal is 5.68 US cents, making it the cheapest source of energy in the country.

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