Southeast Asia

The visit by Malaysian Foreign Affairs Minister Zambry Abdul Kadir to New Delhi from November 5-8 was a significant milestone in Malaysia-India relations. Zambry met with his counterpart, Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, for the sixth India-Malaysia Joint Commission Meeting.

The JCM reviewed the progress of the Enhanced Strategic Partnership, which covers areas of political, defense, security, economic, trade and investment, health, science and technology, culture, tourism and people-to-people ties, and also discussed regional and multilateral issues of mutual interest. 

Since the start of the year, there has been a flurry of visits by top Indian ministers to Malaysia. In early June, Minister of State for External Affairs V Muraleedharan met with his Malaysian counterparts, followed by Defense Minister Rajnath Singh in July and Minister of State for External Affairs and Education Rajkumar Ranjan Singh in December.

The visits quite clearly signaled a reset in bilateral relations following the diplomatic row in 2019 arising from then-prime minister Mahathir Mohamad’s remarks about Kashmir and India’s Citizenship Amendment Act.

Zambry also mentioned that the visit of Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim to India is imminent, signifying an upswing in ties.

On the people-to-people front, just this week, Anwar announced that Malaysia would allow citizens of India 30-day visa-free entry to the country with effect from December 1. Given how visa requirements have been one of the most potent deterrents for travel between Malaysia and India, this move signals intent for greater connectivity and desire for enhanced bilateral ties.

Trade relations

India is one of the 10 largest trading partners of Malaysia, and Malaysia is the third-largest trading partner for India among the ASEAN countries. Not only dwelling on the cultural and civilizational ties between India and Malaysia, Zambry’s visit gives promise to more sectors of cooperation in the near future, primarily renewable energy, semiconductors and space. 

India is forecast to emerge as the third-largest economy in the world by 2027. This is an opportunity for Malaysia to initiate and capitalize on partnerships with India in digital, fintech and semiconductor fields.

India has been a success story in digital payments and several best practices can be shared with and adopted by Malaysia, such as the Unified Payments Interface system and RuPay payment service, which would boost overall financial engagement between the two countries. 

India now a global player

Beyond technical cooperation, it is of utmost importance that policymakers in Putrajaya, Malaysia’s seat of government, understand that this is a very different India they are dealing with since the last JCM more than a decade ago.

New Delhi is emerging as a regional trend-setter with increasing global influence through its value and visibility in the Indo-Pacific region. For India on the Indo-Pacific multilateralism front, this year could not have been a better one. 

As Group of Twenty and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) chair, New Delhi’s Global South agenda, and pragmatic, balanced and assertive foreign-policy choices took center stage.

Being a leading proponent of Indo-Pacific cooperation and guided by core policies such as the Neighborhood First Policy, Act East Policy, Africa Outreach initiative, and Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), this past year has quite clearly demonstrated how New Delhi’s role in the emerging Indo-Pacific order is taking new forms and gaining fresh momentum.

In the grand scheme of things, what stands out for India as a significant partner for Malaysia and ASEAN member states in the Indo-Pacific is its ability to take a distinct multi-aligned and multi-pronged approach to partnerships in the region. New Delhi has gradually but intently refined its approach, reflecting an adept compartmentalisation of interests, strategic competition, and geopolitical dynamics.

India is clearly able to balance continued commitment to SCO and BRICS (which means constructive engagement with traditional “rivals” such as China and Pakistan), active collaboration within the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the I2U2 Group (India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the US), and finally, advancement of cornerstone mechanisms like the G20 and BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation).

A sincere commitment to multilateralism and regionalism despite existing deep-seated rivalries makes India by far, the most “centered” Indo-Pacific partner – a reality that has not fully dawned on policymakers in Malaysia or ASEAN. 

These recent developments make the much-documented synergies between India’s and ASEAN’s approach to the Indo-Pacific region, specifically the IPOI and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), that much more apparent – and operable.

It is noteworthy that Malaysia’s alignment to the AOIP is the only articulation of its acceptance of the Indo-Pacific concept. Whether in terms of principles or priorities in the Indo-Pacific region, it is undeniable that India is a natural partner for Malaysia and ASEAN that demands more nuanced attention.

The missing cognizance in Putrajaya that it is dealing with a “new” India is perhaps one of the biggest stumbling blocks to tapping on New Delhi for more meaningful means of cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

With Malaysia assuming the role of ASEAN chair in 2025, it must advocate for active recognition and acknowledgement of India’s ability to be a valued “multilateral connector” for Southeast Asia.

There are real opportunities for ASEAN’s enhanced cooperation with other partners in the Indo-Pacific such as Africa, the Middle East and the Pacific Islands to be brokered by India within existing frameworks and initiatives – such as the Africa Outreach initiative, the recently announced India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and through the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation.

For many states in the region, including Malaysia, the rise of “new” India has understandably not been the easiest thing to calibrate or adapt to. Recognizing change and altering perceptions of New Delhi is a necessity but will be a challenge, nonetheless.

Malaysia’s current relations with India are defined by older, outdated and “safer” narratives, so much so that they do not reflect current realities – and this is a missed opportunity on several counts. India on its current geopolitical trajectory is and will remain an important partner to Malaysia. It is time Putrajaya realizes this too.

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Myanmar’s stability has eroded significantly since the 2021 military coup. But the coordinated attack by multiple separatist and pro-democracy groups in October and November 2023 has seen military outposts, villages, border crossings, and other infrastructure overrun.

While the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military, clings to control in central and coastal regions populated by the country’s ethnic majority, much of the country’s border areas are increasingly slipping into anti-government control.

This current turbulence is not an aberration but deeply rooted in Myanmar’s history. Since gaining independence from British rule in 1948, the country has grappled with what is commonly described as the world’s longest-running civil war.

Initial experiments with democracy witnessed limited clashes between Myanmar’s central government and Ethnic Armed Organizations. After a military coup in 1962 that established the junta, more EAOs emerged to challenge government power.

Infighting and splintering among EAOs, coupled with their growing antagonism toward the Burma Communist Party (BCP), itself waging a war on the central government, allowed the junta to implement fragile ceasefires in exchange for limited autonomy. By the end of the Cold War, democratic protests in 1988, the collapse of the BCP in 1989, and free elections in 1990 all suggested Myanmar was cautiously embracing a peaceful future.

Despite losing the elections in 1990, however, the junta did not relinquish power, drawing international condemnation. EAOs and other groups like the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), which split from the BCP, then continued their struggle for two decades until the junta ceded some powers to a civilian administration in 2011.

Elections in 2015 and 2020 saw landslide victories for the National League for Democracy (NLD), as well as some progress toward reconciliation.

But in 2021, the Tatmadaw re-established the junta and plunged the country back into destabilization, culminating in the 2023 autumn offensive by anti-junta forces.

In addition to EOAs and a reorganized BCP, the junta has been forced to contend with People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), loose armed organizations backed by the National Unity Government (NUG), set up by lawmakers and politicians in the aftermath of the coup. Additionally, the role of the Burman ethnic majority and grassroots civil defense forces in opposing the junta has also complicated its response to unrest.

The junta has proved adept at managing its restive elements before, and can also rely on its Border Guard Forces (BGFs) and other pro-government militia groups. But the broad swaths of Myanmar’s society fighting against it have made the junta’s traditional policy of divide and rule far less effective.

Myanmar’s Acting President Myint Swe has said the country could “split into various parts,”prompting Myanmar military officials to retreat to the capital, Naypyidaw, a planned city completed in 2012 that in effect serves as a fortress located near the most restive regions.

Evolving role for China

China’s role in Myanmar has undergone significant shifts since the latter’s independence. Despite Chinese support for the BCP and other communist groups, Myanmar grew closer to China after its isolation from the West in the 1990s. Beijing supported the junta to stabilize Myanmar and prevent adversaries from establishing a foothold on China’s southern border.

Other interests included maintaining access to Myanmar’s raw materials and natural resources, as well as infrastructure development to turn Myanmar into a strategic gateway to the Bay of Bengal through the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

China maintained ties to the junta, democracy advocates, and ethnic groups from 2011 to 2021. However, the 2021 coup disrupted development projects and led to attacks on Chinese-run facilities by rebel groups, and the junta’s inability to protect infrastructure exacerbated historical tension between it and Beijing.

Four Chinese civilians were killed in 2015 after a Myanmar military air strike hit across the border into Yunnan, while the junta burned down a Chinese-owned factory and killed Chinese and Myanmar civilians in 2021.

China’s ongoing support to some militia groups, such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and MNDAA, provides Beijing leverage over the junta and a say in the ceasefire processes.

Chinese firms also often work with armed groups in “special economic zones” near the border, and some of the anti-junta groups regularly cross the border to China to escape the junta and its proxy forces. Beijing’s tacit approval of their activities may also be partially fueled by wariness that rebel groups were becoming closer to the US prior to the new offensive.

Beijing has nonetheless attempted to sustain a balancing act, arresting a UWSA deputy military chief in October and initially ignoring calls for assistance from the rebels after the launch of their offensive. But after the steady string of defeats suffered by the junta, China has since altered its outlook. China’s affiliates now form some of the most powerful groups operating in Myanmar, and its Foreign Ministry has called for a ceasefire.

Organized crime

Myanmar’s porous borders have not only allowed armed groups to flourish but also facilitated the expansion of organized crime networks. Increased cooperation between militant and criminal groups in recent decades, known as the terror-crime nexus, has elevated the power of these groups worldwide.

American efforts to counter communism inadvertently helped develop drug networks in Myanmar during the early Cold War, while transnational organized crime in Southeast Asia burgeoned in the 21st century. The Covid-19 pandemic further established Myanmar as a hub of criminal activity, expanding the funding networks available to the country’s armed groups.

Both local and international criminal networks operate in Myanmar’s special economic zones, engaging in human and wildlife trafficking, slavery, cybercrimes, money-laundering, communication fraud, illegal casinos, and online gambling centers.

The relationships between these entities and governments are intricate, with shifting alliances commonplace. Beijing and transnational Chinese gangs play central roles in Myanmar’s heightened criminal activity. The junta has also had close ties to criminal networks for decades, and since the 2021 coup has become increasingly reliant on criminal activity to finance itself and offset international isolation.

China, while entangled in Myanmar’s criminal underworld, has grown steadily more concerned with rising illicit activity on its border with Myanmar and the willing and unwilling participation of Chinese citizens.

China’s signals to the junta to address the forced-labor networks since May 2023 went unheeded, leading to China issuing arrest warrants for junta allies and the UWSA to raid online scam compounds and trafficked-labor centers in border regions.

However, the resilience of regional criminal groups became evident after the NLD failed to disrupt their activities during the decade of partial democratic rule from 2011 to 2021, and they have only grown financially stronger since.

And despite their interweaving with regional elites, criminal networks and their militant partners have developed newfound agency and an ability to act independently from governments since the 2021 coup.

Militarized ethnic groups

Additionally, while the junta styles its current campaign as a counterinsurgency, Myanmar’s armed groups possess significant military capabilities. Minority groups such as those belonging to the Karen ethnic group were prominent in Myanmar’s armed forces during the British colonial administration, gaining valuable experience.

As in Ethiopia, certain ethnic groups have developed and maintained well-equipped forces capable of both insurgency and conventional warfare.

Like other anti-government forces around the world, Myanmar rebel groups have also embraced new technologies and strategies in recent years. This includes crowdfunding initiatives, which have expanded significantly since 2021, to offset the junta’s control over the central bank and other national economic levers.

Large-scale application of drone warfare has also made a marked difference on the battlefield, even before the current offensive by the rebels.

Myanmar’s militant groups have also worked with European criminal groups to obtain weapons, and groups like the UWSA have proved capable of manufacturing weapons since 2008. The use of 3D-printed guns by Myanmar rebel groups, just 10 years after the first 3D-printed gun was produced, also marks a distinctive feature of the current conflict.

The NUG has meanwhile been busily setting up local civic administration and public services and People’s Administrative Teams (PATs) in PDF-controlled or contested areas, indicative of their state-building capabilities.

Shaky support for junta

Hindered by international isolation, increasingly powerful rebel groups, and a growing dependence on a Chinese leadership willing to support multiple sides, the junta’s outlook appears bleak. But it does maintain some other allies abroad.

Russia grew closer to the junta throughout the 2010s and despite being tied down in Ukraine, Moscow has offered more support for Myanmar since the coup, including the first ever Russia-Myanmar joint naval exercise last month. Bordering states Laos and Thailand also maintain friendly ties to the junta, and Laos, holding the chairmanship of ASEAN since September, has shielded Myanmar from greater institutional isolation.

Myanmar’s other neighbors, India and Bangladesh, are also wary of additional instability and the potential emergence of a failed state on their borders. India has already seen tens of thousands of refugees (as well as soldiers from the junta) cross the border since 2021, while Bangladesh has seen close to a million Rohingya refugees enter the country since 2016, and India has recently shown it is still willing to engage with the junta despite its vulnerability.

Efforts to further unite anti-government forces meanwhile face obstacles due to differences in strategies, objectives, and allegiances. Several organizations have been set up to encourage greater coordination, but infighting is still common.

Some EAOs, such as the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), are still open to adhering to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), while others consider a federal system a viable alternative to complete independence.

Perceived indifference to the Rohingya crisis in 2017 on behalf of the democratic government at the time also reveals the persistent ethnic tensions among Myanmar’s population despite alternative leadership.

Persuading criminal and militant groups to give up their lucrative illicit networks, as well as untangling their links to the junta-dominated economy, will also prove challenging. And with the US diplomatically tied down in Ukraine and Israel and ASEAN’s divided approach to the crisis, China enjoys relative freedom to manipulate the situation on its border.

Yet despite positive relations across Myanmar’s political spectrum, Beijing’s reluctance to intervene more directly only amplifies the persistent uncertainty surrounding Myanmar’s future.

This article was produced by Globetrotter, which provided it to Asia Times.

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