Coral kickstart: Reefs get injection of funds at COP28 to stave off extinction

PRAGMATIC SOLUTIONS NEEDED

The benefits coral reefs provide are vast.

Coral reefs harbour about 25 per cent of ocean biodiversity and provide livelihoods to about one billion people, either directly or indirectly.

Their loss and damage would have major environmental and economic impacts, including in Southeast Asia, home to some of the world’s most precious reef ecosystems.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimated in a major report last year that the degradation of reefs could directly affect the livelihoods of about 4.5 million people in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region alone.

Already, sea temperatures surrounding the coastal areas of the Coral Triangle, a critical ecosystem spanning Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Timor Leste and Solomon Islands, are rising approximately 0.1 degree Celsius every year and could be 1.4 degrees Celsius warmer by the end of the century.

While the challenge to conserve or restore reefs “might seem impossible”, science and technology could “redefine the boundaries of the possible”, said Carlos Duarte, executive director of the Coral Research & Development Accelerator Platform (CORDAP) launched by the G20 to accelerate coral studies.

Professor Duarte has been involved in marine studies for more than four decades and still believes the ocean’s role in the climate discussion is underestimated and its research under-resourced. He estimates funding for ocean research is only 10 per cent of that for terrestrial studies.

“We have plenty of evidence of how we ignore the oceans in every aspect of life and investments in science, technology and conservation,” he said.

He argued that a boost in finance for coral research and technology could result in solutions for thousands of square kilometres of coral.

Instead of sophisticated methods that might work on a small scale, Prof Duarte believes in “pragmatic solutions that are science-based, that are innovative, but that can be applied in every context from developing nations to developed nations”.

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South Korea plunging deeper into sub export markets

South Korea aims to crank up its weaponry shipments with a new type of submarine with the potential to give small and mid-sized navies in the Pacific an asymmetric edge in underwater warfare.

This month, Naval News reported that South Korea’s HD Hyundai Heavy Industries (HD HHI) is developing an indigenous mid-size submarine for export markets. South Korea’s submarine market is mainly divided between HD HHI and Hanwha Ocean (previously DSME).

The report notes that Dr Won-Ho Joo, chief operating officer of HD HHI’s Naval & Special Ship Business Unit, made the announcement. He emphasized the importance of collaboration between HD HHI and Hanwha Ocean to enhance competitiveness in international bidding and shipbuilding, the Naval News report quoted him as saying.

The report also mentions Hanwha Ocean’s commitment to working with over 200 domestic partner companies for submarine procurement and future maintenance projects.

Naval News mentions that HD HHI is planning to participate in the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) and has signed a technical cooperation agreement with Babcock Canada. It has also signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Polish National Defense company PGZ for Poland’s Orka Project, the nation’s submarine program.

South Korea has previously sold submarines to foreign nations. Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) mentions that in 2011, South Korea outbid Russia, France and Germany on a US$1.1 billion contract to supply Indonesia with three Type 209-class submarines.

NTI notes that the first two submarines, the KRI Nagapasa and KRI Ardadedali, were delivered to Indonesia in 2017 and 2018, while the third submarine, KRI Alugoro, was assembled by PT PAL in Indonesia with South Korean support as part of a technology-sharing program.

However, Asia Times noted in March 2022 that Indonesia is reportedly not satisfied with the performance of its South Korean-built submarines, citing power supply problems connected to the batteries, among other technical issues.

Reports indicate South Korea continues to improve its submarines, producing cutting-edge designs that may have already addressed the problems with its earlier models.

In a 2019 article for the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Richard Bitzinger notes that South Korea began building submarines in the 1990s with the KSS-1, which were license-produced German Type 209-class units, producing nine such vessels.

Bitzinger says the KSS-1 was followed by the KSS-2, a licensed German Type 214 class version. He notes that the KSS-2 was a significant upgrade over the KSS-1, which is larger, heavier and, most importantly, runs on air-independent propulsion (AIP) technology. Nine KSS-2s were built between 2006 and 2017.

The KSS-2 was followed up by the KSS-3, one of the biggest conventional submarines at 3,000 tons, making it capable of blue-water operations. Bitzinger notes that the class is heavily armed with traditional torpedo tubes and a six-silo vertical launch system (VLS) for anti-ship, cruise and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).

The KSS-3 is the world’s first AIP submarine capable of launching SLBMs. Bitzinger says later versions of the submarine may have a 10-silo VLS for SLBMs.

Currently, South Korea has 2 KSS-3 submarines, with plans to have nine units. South Korea’s new mid-size export submarine would likely be a variant of the KSS-3, with each unit designed according to technology export restrictions and customer specifications.

South Korea, a major emerging arms exporter, is well-poised to be a major player in emerging submarine markets, most notably in nearby Southeast Asia.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), South Korea was the world’s 9th largest arms exporter in 2022, accounting for 2.4% of global arms exports, with most of its sales going to the Philippines, India, and Thailand.

SIPRI data indicates a massive leap in South Korean arms exports between 2013 and 2017 and between 2018 and 2022, showing a 74% increase between the two five-year periods.

Submarines are high on Southeast Asian nations’ military wish lists, driven largely by fears about China’s increasing naval might in the South China Sea. Regional nations are also engaged in low-level arms races where neighbors seek to keep pace with each other’s arsenals.   

In July 2023, Defense News reported that Singapore received the first of four German-built Type 218SG submarines to replace its aging Archer and Challenger-class units. Defense News notes that the Type 218SG is specially designed for tropical waters and possesses state-of-the-art capabilities, significant payload capacity, high levels of automation, enhanced underwater endurance and optimized ergonomics.

Naval News reported in June 2023 that major shipbuilders such as France’s Naval Group, Spain’s Navantia and Hanwha Ocean have offered the Philippines various submarine deals as the latter struggles to modernize its military amidst increased Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea.

However, given its overreliance on the US and limited defense budget, it is unclear if the Philippines has the political will and resources to pursue its longstanding submarine ambitions.

Asia Times reported in May 2023 that Indonesia had selected France over South Korea as its submarine program’s leading partner. Indonesia plans to acquire two Scorpene-class submarines with a preliminary agreement between PT PAL and Naval Group to collaborate on building two units and establish a joint research and development facility.

Indonesia views submarines as an asymmetric power projection asset, as it does not have the resources to build a blue-water navy.

The New Straits Times reported in February 2023 that Malaysia plans to acquire two more submarines in addition to the two Scorpene-class units it already operates.

New Straits Times says that the first submarine will be acquired between 2031 and 2035 and the second between 2036 and 2040. The report notes that Malaysia views submarines as strategic assets as they are involved in the sensitive South China Sea disputes.

As for China, NTI notes that as of March 2023 China had 56 submarines comprised of six nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) and 44 diesel-electric attack submarines (SSK), with 17 of the 44 vessels running on AIP technology.

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China train cements Widodo's infrastructure legacy

Indonesia welcomed its first high-speed railway in October 2023, the first of its kind in Southeast Asia and a significant leap for Indonesia’s infrastructural development. 

The US$7.3 billion Jakarta-Bandung line, financed by Chinese banks and built with Chinese technology, reflects President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s modernization efforts as well as Beijing’s strategy to tighten relations with Belt and Road (BRI) recipient countries.

PT Kereta Cepat Indonesia China (Indonesia-China High-Speed Railways Limited), a joint venture between four Indonesian and five Chinese state-owned enterprises, built the high-speed line that connects Jakarta to Indonesia’s third-largest city, Bandung, in just 30 minutes. 

Its opening comes after a four-year delay and a 44% increase in its initial $5.5-billion price tag due to Covid-19, military opposition and complications in land acquisition.

Indonesia is the biggest economy and the most populous country in Southeast Asia. Jakarta’s decision to apply the “China Standard” in a piece of critical infrastructure and engineering systems reflects well on the BRI. It demonstrates to others in Southeast Asia the alternative development paradigm China can offer and the sort of knowledge transfer available to the Global South.

China describes the BRI as an infrastructure investment initiative that aims to build railways, highways, airports and more to connect Asia, Europe and Africa. But scholars argue there may be more to it. The BRI likely reflects Chinese attempts to integrate neighbors into a hub-and-spoke type physical infrastructure framework. 

It also attracted criticisms due to a mix of manufactured delays, fiscal pressure, opacity and disregard for the environment. Nonetheless, the BRI offers many developing countries an alternative for development without much conditionality.

Jokowi has pragmatically capitalized on BRI investment to achieve his ambitions and win support from his electorate. The Jakarta-Bandung high-speed line is no exception and cements his legacy as a leader committed to major infrastructure projects. His job approval rating surpassed 80% in May 2023 according to a poll conducted by Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting.

Indonesian President Joko Widodo (C), accompanied by officials, switches on a tunnel boring machine for the Mass Rapid Transport system under construction in the capital city during a launch ceremony on September 21, 2015. Jakarta's first mass rapid transport system is expected to be finished in 2018. Photo: AFP/Romeo Gacad
Indonesian President Joko Widodo (C), accompanied by officials, switches on a tunnel boring machine for the Mass Rapid Transport system under construction in the capital city during a launch ceremony on September 21, 2015. Jakarta’s first mass rapid transport system is expected to be finished in 2018. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP / Romeo Gacad

The Indonesian president has shown unwavering affection towards infrastructure since first coming to power in 2014. He pushed through budgetary and bureaucratic constraints through presidential decree and by expanding the role of state-owned enterprises to make high-speed rail and other projects a reality.

But Jokowi may leave much on the table for his successor next year. It remains unclear whether Indonesia’s new president in 2024 will continue unfinished infrastructure projects such as the extended railway to Surabaya.

Indonesia awarded this project to China over Japan in 2015 even though the latter had already conducted a year-long feasibility study. There were a few reasons behind the decision. 

China did not require any Indonesian government financing or a government guarantee and a business-to-business scheme was expected to reduce the financial pressure for the state government.

China also promised a superior transfer of technology, skills and operational know-how over Japan and proposed the completion of the railway by 2019 which ostensibly helped Jokowi win re-election in 2019. Beijing even cut the interest rate from 3.4% to 2% and signaled the project’s salience by sending high-level officials to negotiate.

Jokowi was one of the 23 heads of state or government who attended the Third Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in October 2023. Chinese President Xi Jinping told Jokowi that his country is keen to expand cooperation with Indonesia. 

China wants to build more trains like the one in Indonesia in Southeast Asia. Image: Twitter

Others in the region like Laos, Thailand and Vietnam may further compete for good quality BRI investment after Indonesia’s successful application of the scheme to its railways. To many Southeast Asian leaders, the BRI remains an easy tool to build legitimacy and economic development despite security concerns.

How much welfare Indonesia’s first high-speed rail line brings to local communities and overall economic development remains to be seen. But this railway proved that the BRI remains relevant for many developing countries. Southeast Asia will continue vying for BRI investment if China offers good deals.

The project marks another win for Jokowi’s legacy and will almost certainly make Indonesia’s next leader more receptive to BRI investment during their presidency, even if they would prefer to hedge economic opportunities against China.

Menghu Xia is a PhD candidate at the University of New South Wales, Canberra.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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China train has cemented Widodo's infrastructure legacy

Indonesia welcomed its first high-speed railway in October 2023, the first of its kind in Southeast Asia and a significant leap for Indonesia’s infrastructural development. 

The US$7.3 billion Jakarta-Bandung line, financed by Chinese banks and built with Chinese technology, reflects President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s modernization efforts as well as Beijing’s strategy to tighten relations with Belt and Road (BRI) recipient countries.

PT Kereta Cepat Indonesia China (Indonesia-China High-Speed Railways Limited), a joint venture between four Indonesian and five Chinese state-owned enterprises, built the high-speed line that connects Jakarta to Indonesia’s third-largest city, Bandung, in just 30 minutes. 

Its opening comes after a four-year delay and a 44% increase in its initial $5.5-billion price tag due to Covid-19, military opposition and complications in land acquisition.

Indonesia is the biggest economy and the most populous country in Southeast Asia. Jakarta’s decision to apply the “China Standard” in a piece of critical infrastructure and engineering systems reflects well on the BRI. It demonstrates to others in Southeast Asia the alternative development paradigm China can offer and the sort of knowledge transfer available to the Global South.

China describes the BRI as an infrastructure investment initiative that aims to build railways, highways, airports and more to connect Asia, Europe and Africa. But scholars argue there may be more to it. The BRI likely reflects Chinese attempts to integrate neighbors into a hub-and-spoke type physical infrastructure framework. 

It also attracted criticisms due to a mix of manufactured delays, fiscal pressure, opacity and disregard for the environment. Nonetheless, the BRI offers many developing countries an alternative for development without much conditionality.

Jokowi has pragmatically capitalized on BRI investment to achieve his ambitions and win support from his electorate. The Jakarta-Bandung high-speed line is no exception and cements his legacy as a leader committed to major infrastructure projects. His job approval rating surpassed 80% in May 2023 according to a poll conducted by Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting.

Indonesian President Joko Widodo (C), accompanied by officials, switches on a tunnel boring machine for the Mass Rapid Transport system under construction in the capital city during a launch ceremony on September 21, 2015. Jakarta's first mass rapid transport system is expected to be finished in 2018. Photo: AFP/Romeo Gacad
Indonesian President Joko Widodo (C), accompanied by officials, switches on a tunnel boring machine for the Mass Rapid Transport system under construction in the capital city during a launch ceremony on September 21, 2015. Jakarta’s first mass rapid transport system is expected to be finished in 2018. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP / Romeo Gacad

The Indonesian president has shown unwavering affection towards infrastructure since first coming to power in 2014. He pushed through budgetary and bureaucratic constraints through presidential decree and by expanding the role of state-owned enterprises to make high-speed rail and other projects a reality.

But Jokowi may leave much on the table for his successor next year. It remains unclear whether Indonesia’s new president in 2024 will continue unfinished infrastructure projects such as the extended railway to Surabaya.

Indonesia awarded this project to China over Japan in 2015 even though the latter had already conducted a year-long feasibility study. There were a few reasons behind the decision. 

China did not require any Indonesian government financing or a government guarantee and a business-to-business scheme was expected to reduce the financial pressure for the state government.

China also promised a superior transfer of technology, skills and operational know-how over Japan and proposed the completion of the railway by 2019 which ostensibly helped Jokowi win re-election in 2019. Beijing even cut the interest rate from 3.4% to 2% and signaled the project’s salience by sending high-level officials to negotiate.

Jokowi was one of the 23 heads of state or government who attended the Third Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in October 2023. Chinese President Xi Jinping told Jokowi that his country is keen to expand cooperation with Indonesia. 

China wants to build more trains like the one in Indonesia in Southeast Asia. Image: Twitter

Others in the region like Laos, Thailand and Vietnam may further compete for good quality BRI investment after Indonesia’s successful application of the scheme to its railways. To many Southeast Asian leaders, the BRI remains an easy tool to build legitimacy and economic development despite security concerns.

How much welfare Indonesia’s first high-speed rail line brings to local communities and overall economic development remains to be seen. But this railway proved that the BRI remains relevant for many developing countries. Southeast Asia will continue vying for BRI investment if China offers good deals.

The project marks another win for Jokowi’s legacy and will almost certainly make Indonesia’s next leader more receptive to BRI investment during their presidency, even if they would prefer to hedge economic opportunities against China.

Menghu Xia is a PhD candidate at the University of New South Wales, Canberra.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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China travellers keen to 'revenge travel', tour agencies expecting spike in demand with Singapore visa exemption

Managing director of Oriental Travel Stanley Foo told CNA that the agency has been badly affected by the drop in Chinese visitors. It saw a 50 per cent decrease in bookings from Chinese visitors, compared to before the COVID-19 pandemic. 

This group used to make up about 30 to 40 per cent of the tour agency’s bookings, but the figure now stands at less than 10 per cent, he added. 

“I don’t really see them anymore, except for business travellers. The group travellers have really reduced dramatically,” said Mr Foo. 

“Pre-pandemic, tourists from China are the top three visitors coming to Singapore. So it’s definitely affecting the tourism industry in Singapore badly, without them. We need their money.” 

In the hour after the announcement of the visa exemption agreement, online travel booking platform Trip.com saw an 80 per cent increase in the search volume for deals in Singapore, said Ms Ru Yi, the company’s general manager for Singapore. 

Searches for flight tickets and hotels also increased by 90 per cent and 50 per cent respectively, she added, noting that from January to October, 1.13 million Chinese tourists arrived in Singapore, making China the second-largest source of inbound visitors to Singapore. 

Tour agencies and industry experts pointed to several factors as to why visitor numbers have yet to completely rebound. 

Malaysia and Thailand also recently granted Chinese tourists visa-free access, and this new agreement will make Singapore more competitive on this front, said Ngee Ann Polytechnic senior lecturer in tourism Michael Chiam. 

“The rate of recovery for Chinese arrivals depends on many factors, and they include foreign currency exchange rate and the rate of economic recovery of the Chinese market. Visa-free arrangements is just one of them,” he added. 

Mr Foo also pointed to the stiff competition from Singapore’s neighbours, noting that spending a night in Singapore could be equivalent to spending three nights in Malaysia or Thailand. 

“The prices of hotels went up dramatically, and this will affect a certain group of visitors,” he added, noting that the price increase was about 20 per cent across the board. 

The frequency of flights between Singapore and China is currently at about 60 to 70 per cent of pre-COVID levels, said Ms Li. 

Singapore Airlines declined to disclose specific figures on demand for flights between Singapore and China due to “commercial sensitivities”. 

China is an important market for the SIA Group, which comprises Singapore Airlines and Scoot, said its spokesperson. 

As of December, the SIA Group serves 23 destinations in China, compared to its 25 destinations before the pandemic, they said. 

There are 150 passenger flights to and from China each week, with Singapore Airlines operating 70 and Scoot operating 80. This is an overall increase from about 132 flights in July, where there two airlines operated 49 and 83 flights respectively.

Research from the Nanyang Technological University (NTU) on China’s outbound tourism in 2023 showed that the country’s travellers tended towards revenge travel, with a “resilient eagerness” to go overseas, said Associate Professor Deng Xin with the university’s business school. 

The visa exemption agreement will eliminate the hassle of visa applications, she added. “I anticipate that the numbers will eventually reach or surpass pre-pandemic levels, although it might take some time.” 

Southeast Asia is China’s top outbound destination, she added. 

“Chinese travellers rank destination safety, unique scenery and being friendly to the Chinese as the top three destination considerations. They long to travel abroad, yet also want to feel at home when travelling in terms of the language and payment choices. Singapore meets all the criteria.”

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Time for Malaysia to recognize the ‘New’ Delhi

The visit by Malaysian Foreign Affairs Minister Zambry Abdul Kadir to New Delhi from November 5-8 was a significant milestone in Malaysia-India relations. Zambry met with his counterpart, Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, for the sixth India-Malaysia Joint Commission Meeting.

The JCM reviewed the progress of the Enhanced Strategic Partnership, which covers areas of political, defense, security, economic, trade and investment, health, science and technology, culture, tourism and people-to-people ties, and also discussed regional and multilateral issues of mutual interest. 

Since the start of the year, there has been a flurry of visits by top Indian ministers to Malaysia. In early June, Minister of State for External Affairs V Muraleedharan met with his Malaysian counterparts, followed by Defense Minister Rajnath Singh in July and Minister of State for External Affairs and Education Rajkumar Ranjan Singh in December.

The visits quite clearly signaled a reset in bilateral relations following the diplomatic row in 2019 arising from then-prime minister Mahathir Mohamad’s remarks about Kashmir and India’s Citizenship Amendment Act.

Zambry also mentioned that the visit of Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim to India is imminent, signifying an upswing in ties.

On the people-to-people front, just this week, Anwar announced that Malaysia would allow citizens of India 30-day visa-free entry to the country with effect from December 1. Given how visa requirements have been one of the most potent deterrents for travel between Malaysia and India, this move signals intent for greater connectivity and desire for enhanced bilateral ties.

Trade relations

India is one of the 10 largest trading partners of Malaysia, and Malaysia is the third-largest trading partner for India among the ASEAN countries. Not only dwelling on the cultural and civilizational ties between India and Malaysia, Zambry’s visit gives promise to more sectors of cooperation in the near future, primarily renewable energy, semiconductors and space. 

India is forecast to emerge as the third-largest economy in the world by 2027. This is an opportunity for Malaysia to initiate and capitalize on partnerships with India in digital, fintech and semiconductor fields.

India has been a success story in digital payments and several best practices can be shared with and adopted by Malaysia, such as the Unified Payments Interface system and RuPay payment service, which would boost overall financial engagement between the two countries. 

India now a global player

Beyond technical cooperation, it is of utmost importance that policymakers in Putrajaya, Malaysia’s seat of government, understand that this is a very different India they are dealing with since the last JCM more than a decade ago.

New Delhi is emerging as a regional trend-setter with increasing global influence through its value and visibility in the Indo-Pacific region. For India on the Indo-Pacific multilateralism front, this year could not have been a better one. 

As Group of Twenty and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) chair, New Delhi’s Global South agenda, and pragmatic, balanced and assertive foreign-policy choices took center stage.

Being a leading proponent of Indo-Pacific cooperation and guided by core policies such as the Neighborhood First Policy, Act East Policy, Africa Outreach initiative, and Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), this past year has quite clearly demonstrated how New Delhi’s role in the emerging Indo-Pacific order is taking new forms and gaining fresh momentum.

In the grand scheme of things, what stands out for India as a significant partner for Malaysia and ASEAN member states in the Indo-Pacific is its ability to take a distinct multi-aligned and multi-pronged approach to partnerships in the region. New Delhi has gradually but intently refined its approach, reflecting an adept compartmentalisation of interests, strategic competition, and geopolitical dynamics.

India is clearly able to balance continued commitment to SCO and BRICS (which means constructive engagement with traditional “rivals” such as China and Pakistan), active collaboration within the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the I2U2 Group (India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the US), and finally, advancement of cornerstone mechanisms like the G20 and BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation).

A sincere commitment to multilateralism and regionalism despite existing deep-seated rivalries makes India by far, the most “centered” Indo-Pacific partner – a reality that has not fully dawned on policymakers in Malaysia or ASEAN. 

These recent developments make the much-documented synergies between India’s and ASEAN’s approach to the Indo-Pacific region, specifically the IPOI and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), that much more apparent – and operable.

It is noteworthy that Malaysia’s alignment to the AOIP is the only articulation of its acceptance of the Indo-Pacific concept. Whether in terms of principles or priorities in the Indo-Pacific region, it is undeniable that India is a natural partner for Malaysia and ASEAN that demands more nuanced attention.

The missing cognizance in Putrajaya that it is dealing with a “new” India is perhaps one of the biggest stumbling blocks to tapping on New Delhi for more meaningful means of cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

With Malaysia assuming the role of ASEAN chair in 2025, it must advocate for active recognition and acknowledgement of India’s ability to be a valued “multilateral connector” for Southeast Asia.

There are real opportunities for ASEAN’s enhanced cooperation with other partners in the Indo-Pacific such as Africa, the Middle East and the Pacific Islands to be brokered by India within existing frameworks and initiatives – such as the Africa Outreach initiative, the recently announced India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and through the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation.

For many states in the region, including Malaysia, the rise of “new” India has understandably not been the easiest thing to calibrate or adapt to. Recognizing change and altering perceptions of New Delhi is a necessity but will be a challenge, nonetheless.

Malaysia’s current relations with India are defined by older, outdated and “safer” narratives, so much so that they do not reflect current realities – and this is a missed opportunity on several counts. India on its current geopolitical trajectory is and will remain an important partner to Malaysia. It is time Putrajaya realizes this too.

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Myanmar’s instability deepens as the world watches silently

Myanmar’s stability has eroded significantly since the 2021 military coup. But the coordinated attack by multiple separatist and pro-democracy groups in October and November 2023 has seen military outposts, villages, border crossings, and other infrastructure overrun.

While the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military, clings to control in central and coastal regions populated by the country’s ethnic majority, much of the country’s border areas are increasingly slipping into anti-government control.

This current turbulence is not an aberration but deeply rooted in Myanmar’s history. Since gaining independence from British rule in 1948, the country has grappled with what is commonly described as the world’s longest-running civil war.

Initial experiments with democracy witnessed limited clashes between Myanmar’s central government and Ethnic Armed Organizations. After a military coup in 1962 that established the junta, more EAOs emerged to challenge government power.

Infighting and splintering among EAOs, coupled with their growing antagonism toward the Burma Communist Party (BCP), itself waging a war on the central government, allowed the junta to implement fragile ceasefires in exchange for limited autonomy. By the end of the Cold War, democratic protests in 1988, the collapse of the BCP in 1989, and free elections in 1990 all suggested Myanmar was cautiously embracing a peaceful future.

Despite losing the elections in 1990, however, the junta did not relinquish power, drawing international condemnation. EAOs and other groups like the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), which split from the BCP, then continued their struggle for two decades until the junta ceded some powers to a civilian administration in 2011.

Elections in 2015 and 2020 saw landslide victories for the National League for Democracy (NLD), as well as some progress toward reconciliation.

But in 2021, the Tatmadaw re-established the junta and plunged the country back into destabilization, culminating in the 2023 autumn offensive by anti-junta forces.

In addition to EOAs and a reorganized BCP, the junta has been forced to contend with People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), loose armed organizations backed by the National Unity Government (NUG), set up by lawmakers and politicians in the aftermath of the coup. Additionally, the role of the Burman ethnic majority and grassroots civil defense forces in opposing the junta has also complicated its response to unrest.

The junta has proved adept at managing its restive elements before, and can also rely on its Border Guard Forces (BGFs) and other pro-government militia groups. But the broad swaths of Myanmar’s society fighting against it have made the junta’s traditional policy of divide and rule far less effective.

Myanmar’s Acting President Myint Swe has said the country could “split into various parts,”prompting Myanmar military officials to retreat to the capital, Naypyidaw, a planned city completed in 2012 that in effect serves as a fortress located near the most restive regions.

Evolving role for China

China’s role in Myanmar has undergone significant shifts since the latter’s independence. Despite Chinese support for the BCP and other communist groups, Myanmar grew closer to China after its isolation from the West in the 1990s. Beijing supported the junta to stabilize Myanmar and prevent adversaries from establishing a foothold on China’s southern border.

Other interests included maintaining access to Myanmar’s raw materials and natural resources, as well as infrastructure development to turn Myanmar into a strategic gateway to the Bay of Bengal through the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

China maintained ties to the junta, democracy advocates, and ethnic groups from 2011 to 2021. However, the 2021 coup disrupted development projects and led to attacks on Chinese-run facilities by rebel groups, and the junta’s inability to protect infrastructure exacerbated historical tension between it and Beijing.

Four Chinese civilians were killed in 2015 after a Myanmar military air strike hit across the border into Yunnan, while the junta burned down a Chinese-owned factory and killed Chinese and Myanmar civilians in 2021.

China’s ongoing support to some militia groups, such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and MNDAA, provides Beijing leverage over the junta and a say in the ceasefire processes.

Chinese firms also often work with armed groups in “special economic zones” near the border, and some of the anti-junta groups regularly cross the border to China to escape the junta and its proxy forces. Beijing’s tacit approval of their activities may also be partially fueled by wariness that rebel groups were becoming closer to the US prior to the new offensive.

Beijing has nonetheless attempted to sustain a balancing act, arresting a UWSA deputy military chief in October and initially ignoring calls for assistance from the rebels after the launch of their offensive. But after the steady string of defeats suffered by the junta, China has since altered its outlook. China’s affiliates now form some of the most powerful groups operating in Myanmar, and its Foreign Ministry has called for a ceasefire.

Organized crime

Myanmar’s porous borders have not only allowed armed groups to flourish but also facilitated the expansion of organized crime networks. Increased cooperation between militant and criminal groups in recent decades, known as the terror-crime nexus, has elevated the power of these groups worldwide.

American efforts to counter communism inadvertently helped develop drug networks in Myanmar during the early Cold War, while transnational organized crime in Southeast Asia burgeoned in the 21st century. The Covid-19 pandemic further established Myanmar as a hub of criminal activity, expanding the funding networks available to the country’s armed groups.

Both local and international criminal networks operate in Myanmar’s special economic zones, engaging in human and wildlife trafficking, slavery, cybercrimes, money-laundering, communication fraud, illegal casinos, and online gambling centers.

The relationships between these entities and governments are intricate, with shifting alliances commonplace. Beijing and transnational Chinese gangs play central roles in Myanmar’s heightened criminal activity. The junta has also had close ties to criminal networks for decades, and since the 2021 coup has become increasingly reliant on criminal activity to finance itself and offset international isolation.

China, while entangled in Myanmar’s criminal underworld, has grown steadily more concerned with rising illicit activity on its border with Myanmar and the willing and unwilling participation of Chinese citizens.

China’s signals to the junta to address the forced-labor networks since May 2023 went unheeded, leading to China issuing arrest warrants for junta allies and the UWSA to raid online scam compounds and trafficked-labor centers in border regions.

However, the resilience of regional criminal groups became evident after the NLD failed to disrupt their activities during the decade of partial democratic rule from 2011 to 2021, and they have only grown financially stronger since.

And despite their interweaving with regional elites, criminal networks and their militant partners have developed newfound agency and an ability to act independently from governments since the 2021 coup.

Militarized ethnic groups

Additionally, while the junta styles its current campaign as a counterinsurgency, Myanmar’s armed groups possess significant military capabilities. Minority groups such as those belonging to the Karen ethnic group were prominent in Myanmar’s armed forces during the British colonial administration, gaining valuable experience.

As in Ethiopia, certain ethnic groups have developed and maintained well-equipped forces capable of both insurgency and conventional warfare.

Like other anti-government forces around the world, Myanmar rebel groups have also embraced new technologies and strategies in recent years. This includes crowdfunding initiatives, which have expanded significantly since 2021, to offset the junta’s control over the central bank and other national economic levers.

Large-scale application of drone warfare has also made a marked difference on the battlefield, even before the current offensive by the rebels.

Myanmar’s militant groups have also worked with European criminal groups to obtain weapons, and groups like the UWSA have proved capable of manufacturing weapons since 2008. The use of 3D-printed guns by Myanmar rebel groups, just 10 years after the first 3D-printed gun was produced, also marks a distinctive feature of the current conflict.

The NUG has meanwhile been busily setting up local civic administration and public services and People’s Administrative Teams (PATs) in PDF-controlled or contested areas, indicative of their state-building capabilities.

Shaky support for junta

Hindered by international isolation, increasingly powerful rebel groups, and a growing dependence on a Chinese leadership willing to support multiple sides, the junta’s outlook appears bleak. But it does maintain some other allies abroad.

Russia grew closer to the junta throughout the 2010s and despite being tied down in Ukraine, Moscow has offered more support for Myanmar since the coup, including the first ever Russia-Myanmar joint naval exercise last month. Bordering states Laos and Thailand also maintain friendly ties to the junta, and Laos, holding the chairmanship of ASEAN since September, has shielded Myanmar from greater institutional isolation.

Myanmar’s other neighbors, India and Bangladesh, are also wary of additional instability and the potential emergence of a failed state on their borders. India has already seen tens of thousands of refugees (as well as soldiers from the junta) cross the border since 2021, while Bangladesh has seen close to a million Rohingya refugees enter the country since 2016, and India has recently shown it is still willing to engage with the junta despite its vulnerability.

Efforts to further unite anti-government forces meanwhile face obstacles due to differences in strategies, objectives, and allegiances. Several organizations have been set up to encourage greater coordination, but infighting is still common.

Some EAOs, such as the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), are still open to adhering to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), while others consider a federal system a viable alternative to complete independence.

Perceived indifference to the Rohingya crisis in 2017 on behalf of the democratic government at the time also reveals the persistent ethnic tensions among Myanmar’s population despite alternative leadership.

Persuading criminal and militant groups to give up their lucrative illicit networks, as well as untangling their links to the junta-dominated economy, will also prove challenging. And with the US diplomatically tied down in Ukraine and Israel and ASEAN’s divided approach to the crisis, China enjoys relative freedom to manipulate the situation on its border.

Yet despite positive relations across Myanmar’s political spectrum, Beijing’s reluctance to intervene more directly only amplifies the persistent uncertainty surrounding Myanmar’s future.

This article was produced by Globetrotter, which provided it to Asia Times.

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Moody's warns US, China it's time to change their ways

Moody’s Investors Service is actively and innocently prodding the two largest bears in the world economy.

Experts at the agency threatened to remove Washington’s final AAA credit score next month. The increase in US 10 time bond yields to 17-year peaks was exacerbated by that volley.

Beijing was the next city to speak Moody growl this week. As Asia’s largest economy struggles with an economic slowdown and a worsening real estate crisis, Moody’S changed its outlook on the Chinese government of debt from” stable” to “negative” on Tuesday ( December 5 ).

A day later, Moody’s went even further by telegraphing potential rating steps against state-owned bank tycoons, numerous Foreign government-backed organizations funding system assignments, and even Hong Kong and Macau.

Threatening downgrades for the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd., China Development Bank, and another behemoths will undoubtedly work if Moody’s is attempting to capture the attention of Chinese leader Xi Jinping. It will also affect international investors who are concerned that Beijing is n’t moving quickly enough to contain contagion risks.

In general, the urge is to respond violently to these instructions. The group of US President Joe Biden carried out that action.

Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen responded to Moody’s risk to drop by saying,” This is a choice I disagree with. Treasury securities continue to be the world’s top safe and liquid asset, and the American market is ultimately strong.

China is also pushing up. Issues of Moody about the aspirations of China’s economic development and fiscal sustainability are unnecessary, the Ministry of Finance of Xi stated on Tuesday, expressing its “dissatisfaction.”

Beijing added that the fallout from financial and property issues is” stable” and that it is working to “deepen measures to tackle risks and challenges.” However, it’s important to take into account the potential benefits of rating agencies like Moody making a timely call for stronger action against the two economical powers.

Janet Yellen, the US Treasury Secretary, disagrees that the country merits a upgrade. Asia Times files / AFP picture

The rules of economic gravity however apply, as Moody’s served as a helpful warning to Biden, Yellen, and Jerome Powell, chairman of the Federal Reserve, in the case of America.

Faith in the money is rapidly eroding as the US federal loan surpasses$ 33 trillion, Biden’s White House raises spending, and the Fed tightens its restrictions with the most vehemence in years.

The price increases in gold and cryptocurrencies are merely the most recent example of how traditional Bretton-Woods economic realities are clashing with contemporary disregard for the ways in which markets you influence perhaps the largest economies.

China, as well. The 24 members of the Communist Party’s Politburo will soon meet to discuss policy priorities and determine rise objectives for the upcoming year. Following that, a course may be charted by the annual Central Economic Work Conference, which will bring up municipal and central government leaders.

A development goal of around 5 % is anticipated for 2024, according to economists at JPMorgan, Standard Chartered, and other major investment bankers.

An optimistic growth target, according to Goldman Sachs economist Maggie Wei,” may help lessen the risk of China falling into a self-fulfilling cycle of melancholy expectations, more depressing growth, and reinforcing negative expectations.”

However, Moody’s is reminding group leaders that economic gravity is more difficult than that.

According to Moody’s, the government and larger public sector may help financially strapped regional and local governments and state-owned enterprises in China, according to its reasoning.

When Moody’s warns of “increased dangers related to functionally and consistently lower medium-term economic growth and the continued reduction of the property sector,” it also speaks for many.

However, it is implied in bold font between the lines that many international investors are n’t buying Xi’s promises to carry out audacious structural reforms. And how new stimulus increases are then “posing wide downside risks to China’s macroeconomic, economic, and institutional strength,” according to Moody.

Chinese President Xi Jinping claims that he now favors more expansion driven by the private sector. Online Screengrab image

China’s finance minister responded by saying that mainland growth is improving in the October–December quarter and that the Chinese economy will account for more than 30 % of global GDP in 2023. That would be consistent with predictions made by the International Monetary Fund ( IMF).

However, there is no timeline for taking action to grow&nbsp, better, rather than just faster, in China’s new rhetoric. According to scholar Lee Lu at Nomura Holdings, more stimulus may become necessary in the short term. We also think it’s too early to say the bottom, he says, “despite the numerous trigger actions announced recently.”

The good news is that Premier Li Qiang is thought to have received Xi’s approval to speed up efforts to reinvigorate the private sector. Li’s team unveiled a 25-point plan package next month to level playing fields and increase funding for private companies.

Eight economic officials and firm tanks are involved in the program, including the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, the People’s Bank of China, National Administration of Financial Regulation, China Securities Regulatory Commission, &nbsp, and National Development and Reform Commission.

The goal is to significantly raise the loan to private enterprise ratio in order to increase innovation and productivity and support more powerful supply chains. According to Li’s group, the goal is to guarantee” ongoing revenue solutions” for private businesses that refrain from “blindly stopping, suppressing, withdrawing or cutting off money.”

The NDRC stated this week that China “is comfortable and more capable of achieving long-term robust growth, and constantly bringing new impetus and options to the earth through China’s accelerated advancement.”

According to scholar Diana Choyleva of Enodo Economics,” Beijing is serious about getting funds flowing to the healthier components of the home field, whether it be personal or state-owned.” &nbsp, They are not satisfied with entrusting the choice to the businesses, which have discriminated against the private market for a number of factors.

Jumpstarting the creation of a high-yield bond market to expand China’s money markets universe is an essential component of the business. Theoretically, a lively and varied range of debt offerings would boost options for private sector financing and boost China’s appeal to investors.

These, Xi’s efforts to make the yuan more popular on international businesses are advantageous. As concerns about the US dollar rise, the battle is gaining momentum. Nothing could hasten that progress more quickly than swiftly and openly putting in place significant reforms.

Here is where Xi and his team needed to win back the confidence of international investors. It is important to note that The Moody’s news did n’t destroy Chinese assets.

The most significant lesson from the Moody’s statement, according to economists at advisory organization China Beige Book, is that their team takes years longer than the majority of China viewers to reach an obvious conclusion. Little brand-new around. Continue.

However, analysts at Citigroup Global Markets predict that in 2024, China’s investment-grade payment issues will be more alluring than those of US counterparts. Following the Moody’s information, Citi experts wrote,” The market has now priced this in to some extent, and China investment-grade has some price.”

In Chongqing, China, a butler is seen strolling along dingy bridges with brand-new residential properties in the distance. Photo: Zhang Peng, LightRocket, CNBC Screengrab, and Getty Images

As Beijing works to regulate real estate markets, Citi experts also cited China’s” stronger, but still fragile micro story.” Chinese money bonds with an investment class are currently up about 5.4 % in 2023.

According to Citi researchers,” China risks are primarily in the price.” The Chinese offshore credit market, which is regarded as an asset and money diversifier for regional investors, tends to do well in times of inland equity-market volatility.

Analysts ‘ concern that China’s time of raising GDP rates solely through stimulus and funding is over, however, is where Moody makes a point.

For starters, “remaining plan room may be limited, as we believe central authorities needs to balance moral liability problems when supporting local governments with substantial debt burdens,” according to scientist Samuel Kwok at Fitch Ratings.

Another is that the quality of mainland growth can only be improved by strong financial retooling that unlocks China’s longer-term growth potential. This trend toward trigger over reform explains why S&amp, P Global Ratings predicts that China will grow below 5 % into 2026.

According to S&amp and P record analyst Eunice Tan, China’s real estate market is still under stress despite stimulus. The cash patterns of property developers and heavily indebted regional government borrowing vehicles are being dented by limited access to credit assistance and higher corporate debt utilize.

As a result, S&amp, P’s Tan claims that the rise website for the Asia-Pacific is moving from China to South and Southeast Asia. Tan notes that this change may limit China’s lenders ‘ medium-term face while enhancing those of India, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

China’s imports decreased by 0.6 %, despite data released on Thursday showing a 0.5 % increase in exports in November year over year. More policy supports are required to promote demand, according to a word from UBS analysts, and the data more dashed hopes of regaining China’s consumption-led economy.

According to OANDA researcher Kelvin Wong, “domestic need has remained weak in China despite continued revival efforts by policymakers via intended monetary and fiscal stimulus steps.”

Therefore, according to Wong,” It seems that the previous one-month treatment of transfer growth recorded in October is probably a “blip” and November’s bad year-on-year growth rate suggests the rolling twelve months of bad growth trend in imports remains intact.”

At the Horgos Port in the autonomous region of north China’s Xinjiang Uighur, business containers can be seen. Image: Xinhua

Global traders are anxiously anticipating the Politburo’s next chamber event as difficulties mount. This once-every-five-year program typically takes place in early December.

The fact that it has n’t been scheduled yet has led to rumors that Xi wants to address a number of pressing issues, such as rising local government debt, deflationary pressures, and real estate to record youth unemployment.

As a madly polarizing 2024 presidential election draws near, the US even faces significant obstacles. The US government’s estimated annualized loan interest payments have increased to the$ 1&nbsp, trillion level, among other things.

Shareholders are free to disregard the financial paths in Washington and Beijing that Moody’s, S&amp, P, and Fitch have to say. However, as payment prospects deteriorate, it is important to keep in mind that some observers, analysts, and investors are n’t buying the party line, despite Biden and Xi’s insistence that they are on top of their individual debt problems.

Following William Pesek on X, previously Twitter, at @WilliamPess

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Woman jailed for getting jobs with forged NTU degree, says she faced economic and parental pressure

SINGAPORE: On Wednesday, December 6, a person was given an eight-month prison term for forging an architectural degree from Nanyang Technological University (NTU) and using it to land numerous processing jobs over the course of 16 years.

She had forged the amount, according to her attorney, to “placate” her mother, who put emotional strain on her. According to Fonseka Wannerichega Hema Ranjini’s attorney, the criminal also had to work to support herself and her relatives, which put her under financial stress.

44-year-old Malaysian woman Fonseka entered a guilty plea to two counts of fraud and lying last month, with additional two charges being taken into account.

Fonseka had enrolled in electrical and manufacturing architecture at NTU in 1998. She withdrew from the program in 2004 because she struggled with the labor and the costs.

The girl faked a Bachelor of Engineering level from NTU in 2004 with third-class honors, according to her attorney, who afterwards claimed that her mother had reduced funding for her education.

Over the years, she used the forged certificate to land a number of tasks, starting with the position of assistant managing director at Marshall Cavendish Education for S$ 4,200 per month.

She also held assistant managing editor positions at Scholastic Education International ( Singapore ), Cengage Learning Asia, and Oxygen Studio Designs as a result of the certification.

She worked as a learning editor in publishing for the Walt Disney Company ( Southeast Asia ), where her highest monthly salary was S$ 6,800, with an additional transport allowance of S$ 1, 084 per month, until the company found her forged certificate after conducting checks.

Won CONSIDERABLE SALARY: DPP

Melissa Heng, the deputy public attorney, asked for eight to ten months in prison for Fonseka on Wednesday, highlighting her efforts to make the signature look authentic and the fact that she was able to secure five jobs with it over the course of 16 years.

According to Ms. Heng,” With each subsequent application, she was able to legitimize her continue, indicating her academic qualifications, and in doing so continue deceiving employers.”

She claimed that Fonseka received a” significant income” between S$ 47, 000 and S$ 83, 000 for some fees.

When Fonseka’s dishonesty was exposed, her answer revealed her lack of regret, according to Ms. Heng.

Although Ms. Heng did not request a payment order, claiming that it was difficult to quantify the harm done, she asserted that the employers who hired Fonseka did require specific educational requirements for the positions offered.

It would n’t be an exaggeration to say that Fonseka was expected to apply in her jobs training derived from the obtaining of her purported degree, she said, adding that the fact that this was present showed the employers valued educational qualifications.

Instead, defense attorney Foo Cheow Ming requested a great or, in the event that the court did not reach an agreed-upon fine, an extremely small jail sentence.

She responded to her mother’s force by defending herself.

According to Mr. Foo, the” series of cascading events” started as a result of pressure from Fonseka’s family, who stopped providing funding for her education centuries ago.

According to Mr. Foo,” Fonseka took the first step of forging a ( degree ) in order to appease her mother because of the intense psychological pressure ( her ) mother placed on her sense of worth and self-esteem.

” Following that, the financial strain of having to make a living and provide for her own parents caused the use of the forged ( degree )”

He claimed that while Fonseka’s “filial devotion remains unwavering” and she continues to care for her parents, his customer suffered “physical and intellectual abuse” from her mother, who has an undiagnosed personality disorder.

According to Mr. Foo, the circumstance of his client could be distinguished from other instances of cheating where the accused person’s public or legal status changed as a result of deception on government agencies.

Mr. Foo said it was” not as if she did n’t work at all,” despite the fact that Fonseka’s actions helped her land jobs she might not have otherwise been able to.

According to Mr. Foo, it was also not a circumstance in which she caused her employers” a gross full loss,” as in the case of blatant theft, criminal breach of trust, or lying.

According to the attorney, Fonseka’s employers did receive her solutions and the price she provided as a result.

If Fonseka’s work is alleged to have been bad, Mr. Foo argued that “employing a genuine graduate is no guarantee against poor or underpar performance on the part of the employee.”

Importantly, he added that there was no possible chance to the general public, clients, or employers because Fonseka did not practice engineering in her jobs, which were primarily in the language or journal sectors.

He deemed the prosecution’s proposed prison sentence to be “excessive and inappropriate.”

According to District Judge Terence Tay, the basic rule for financial offenses is that the word will become harsher in cases where there is a higher economic value involved.

A judicial phrase is appropriate, according to Judge Tay,” as long as the offense in question forces the sufferer to part with property that has more than minor value.”

Given that Fonseka actually worked for her employers, he claimed that the damage done in this case was the problem.

Nevertheless, he claimed that Fonseka’s employment was based on his education, and that there would have been some pay differentials and expectations for the companies ‘ contributions.

According to the judge, her crimes may have embarrassed her businesses as well as depriving another deserving workers of the work she had obtained through deceit.

According to him, it was challenging to identify the offenses, and if” this becomes a prevalent condition,” all employers may be required to check every certificate issued by their staff.

If Fonseka’s family was the one who stopped paying her fees, Judge Tay said he was confused by her alleged sorrow at leaving NTU.

He said,” I do n’t understand how it would ever justify her lying about her educational background, which persisted for many years.”

The judge expressed sympathy for Fonseka’s community position but asserted that there was no evidence to suggest that the events gave rise to the crimes.

He claimed that while Fonseka did a good job for the majority of the jobs she held—aside from the one at Scholastic, where she was fired—her offenses may have disrupted the pay structures at the companies, which are typically tied to academic qualifications, though this could have been replaced over time by job performance.

The judge added that Fonseka was still relatively young and still had a bright future ahead of her,” I think it’s been well-documented that education is not everything.”

While some careers require certifications, others do not, and some people have been successful in these positions, according to the judge. &nbsp,

The accused ought to look into for another possibilities, he said.

He concurred with the trial that Fonseka should not be compensated because it is difficult to quantify the hurt the offenses caused.

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