Southeast Asia (Page 151)

If AUKUS is to bring peace and stability to & nbsp, Southeast Asia, Australia needs to take into account three crucial issues.

Australia may initially establish respect with its neighbors in Southeast Asia, particularly those who are essential to the success of AUKUS. Second, Australia needs to make sure AUKUS abides by international rules. Finally, Australia needs to pledge to forge a stable and peaceful relationship with China.

Australian supporters of the AUKUS contend that by preventing China’s expanding martial influence in the region, it may strengthen stability in Asia-Pacific. However, detractors contend that Australia should focus more on proper security cooperation with its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region than on its conventional European allies.

The main issue facing AUKUS reviewers is Southeast Asia’s response. Like other divisive local issues, Southeast Asian nations aren’t all in favor of the AUKUS. The multilateral agreement appears to be welcomed by the Philippines and NBP, as are Vietnam and Singapore, albeit indirectly. Malaysia and Indonesia pose a greater threat.

This shouldn’t come as a surprise. Indonesia and Malaysia have historically been afraid of extra-regional military presence, while the Philippines, Vietnam, and Singapore have typically welcomed it. Indonesia’s unease dates all the way back to Sukarno, its first chair.

Gaining the trust of its neighbors is in Australia’s best interests. Fear may destroy Australia’s efforts to forge closer ties with the area, especially in Indonesia, one of its most significant neighbors.

It’s essential to ensure clarity and improve conversation. After being shocked by AUKUS ‘ lack of prior conversation, Australia is working to improve communication with its South Asian counterparts.

Retno Marsudi, the foreign minister of Indonesia, and Prabowo Subianto met in February 2023 to discuss proper security concerns in the Indo-Pacific with Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong and Minister of Defense Richard Marles.

Indonesia reiterated” the importance of transparency in AUKUS cooperation and … a commitment to nuclear non-proliferation ,” indicating that the United Kingdom was on the agenda.

Following the publication of the Joint Leaders Statement by the AUKUS in March 2023, Vice Admiral Mark Hammond, the Australian Chief of Navy, traveled to Southeast Asia on a & nbsp and met with the Indonesian Navy’s Chief, Abdul Muhammad Ali, in Jakarta.

Admiral Ali stated in a public lecture after their meeting that the Indonesian Navy thinks the AUKUS & nbsp will abide by international law. & nbsp: Indonesia has toned down its concerns even though they still exist.

By outlining its AUKUS strategy in the most recent & nbsp, Defense Strategic Review, Australia has also increased transparency. The best way to & nbsp, regain and retain Southeast Asia’s trust is through intense communication and transparency.

It’s also crucial to comply with international laws and nbsp. These nuclear-powered ships won’t be carrying nuclear weapons, Australia has emphasized. AUKUS will abide by all International Atomic Energy Agency ( IAEA ) safeguards and not break the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ( NPT ).

However, the IAEA and NPT are still debating whether transferring radioactive materials to Australia might violate their obligations to exchange nuclear incendiary devices, infringing on their security measures. Australia has reaffirmed in response that it does not intend to construct any boats that are capable of producing nuclear arms.

Australia must abide by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea( UNCLOS ) rules regarding the passage of submarines in addition to fulfilling its nuclear treaty obligations. Users of the Indian parliament are concerned that Australia’s nuclear-powered submarines will probably pass through the coastal Sea Lanes.

Australia’s nuclear-powered submarines are permitted to travel through Indian waters during times of peace under UNCLOS rules for Archipelagic Sea Lanes passages, innocent passageways, and travel routes. But there are various obligations in each paragraph.

When passing through Indonesia’s designated Archipelagic Sea Lanes or the straits generally used for global navigation, the submarines can stay buried. However, when passing through regional waters or non-designated inland waters, they may surface and display their flag.

For Australia to win Indonesia’s faith as its quick neighbor, it is crucial to abide by UNCLOS regulations. Countries in the area might view Australia as a menace to regional balance if they break them.

Australia has also pledge to maintain a cordial ties with China. While balancing China’s expanding supremacy may be advantageous, escalating tensions between Australia and China is one of the main issues facing Southeast Asia.

Ismail Sabri Yaakob andnbsp, the prime minister of Malaysia, stated shortly after the AUKUS announcement in September 2021 that the country might” provoke other powers to take more aggressive action in[ the ] region, especially in the South China Sea.”

All Southeast Asian nations, including those that welcome the AUKUS, are probably concerned about China’s increased aggression. The key to preserving peace and security in the area will be how Australia and China may resolve their differences amicably.

China’s obnoxious behavior in the area properly be resolved by AUKUS. However, despite the fact that it is in Southeast Asia’s best attention to have the United States and its allies, including Australia, as dependable partners, China is one of the most significant financial partners. Any conflict between China and Australia would be fatal for the area.

To manage the fragile balance of deterring China without escalating tensions, it will be essential to establish and maintain South Asian trust through American transparency and adherence to international law.

Aristyo Rizka Darmawan teaches international rules at Universitas Indonesia and holds a PhD in Asia and the Pacific at The Australian National University.

This andnbsp, post, and was initially published by East Asia Forum and are being reprinted with permission from Creative Commons.

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The Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness( IPMDA) was established when the four leaders of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (” Quad”) met in Tokyo and released an a & nbsp joint statement.

The stated main goal of this initiative is to increase marine security and website awareness by providing Indo-Pacific countries with cutting-edge technologies and training assistance to improve their real-time marine awareness capabilities.

Although it is not directly stated, China is the target of this initiative’s efforts to combat illegal sea assertiveness and preserve the provincial status quo. Nevertheless, the idea of the IPMDA as a wholly anti-China action raises concerns for local states that want to participate in the initiative, posing additional difficulties for efficient implementation.

As a result, despite extensive media coverage and numerous comments from Quad governments, the IPMDA is still in its infancy one month later. Despite serious worries about China militarizing the Indo-Pacific area, exploiting offshore resources, and having a maritime army, the IPMDA has made insufficient progress.

For the successful operationalization of this relationship, Quad countries may take into account a number of factors. Additionally, in order for this program to be successful, the Quad countries must convince locals that it is intended for inclusion and not just to restrain Chinese exercise.

Regional states that would otherwise want to participate are concerned that IPMDA is a purely anti-China action. The diversity element is required to dispel the notion of local partners that the IPMDA is merely intended to thwart China’s marine maneuvers in the region because most local states do not share an interest in constraining China.

IPMDA: What is it?

The IPMDA offers a common platform for implementing the marine strategic relationship between the Quad countries and their partners in the Indo-Pacific. The IPMDA program primarily focuses on keeping an eye on local sea areas, securing open communication channels, and giving local partners capacity-building tools.

In addition to the Quad’s inherent proper interest in containing Chinese belligerence in the area, particularly the South China Sea, the initiative explicitly calls for maritime domain awareness.

To partners in the Indo-Pacific, the IPMDA & nbsp officially offers and / or offers” near – real-time, integrated and cost-effective maritime domain awareness.” It seeks to address issues such as natural disasters, human and weapon trafficking, illegal, unreported, and unregulated( IUU ) fishing and dark shipping.

The initiative intends to use a professional andnbsp, satellite-based and bbhp tracking services to address the problem of vessel identification. This will help nations combat dark transport, which involves ships operating with their automatic identification system transmitters turned off, and to provide” faster, wider and sharper” maritime image of regional partners’ exclusive economic zones and stop illegal activities in ungoverned maritime areas.

Additionally, the initiative will use partners’& nbsp, already-existing information fusion centers, such as those in India, Singapore, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands( which, in particular, also signed a security pact with China in April 2022 ), for information sharing.

This real-time gathering and dissemination of coastal intelligence is intended to open the door for an efficient international collective security apparatus that takes into account the national maritime strategies of like-minded Indo-Pacific states.

The IPMDA is the first instance in which the United States has combined the nations of Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, and the Indian Ocean area into a single entity. It is not the country’s first US-led maritime security model.

But, East Asia has not been included( possibly because the East China Sea already has a well-oiled maritime domain knowledge device between the United States and Japan ). The western Indian Ocean region and island nations like & nbsp, Seychelles, and Mauritius are also not covered by the IPMDA.

Due to the incomplete consideration of all Quad partners’ marine concerns, the geographical scope of these regions leaves the Indo-Pacific with a fragmented maritime domain awareness picture.

For instance, the IPMDA does not take into account India’s marine concerns regarding available and safe sea lines communications, piracy, terrorist activity, unreported and unchecked fishing, or weapons trafficking in the european Indian Ocean.

This shows that even though the IPMDA covers more earth than its predecessors, there are still restrictions that make it difficult to effectively raise awareness of the coastal area.

How might the IPMDA advance?

All participating nations must undertake to closing the significant gaps in current information-sharing, capacity-building, and coordinated action practices, as well as resolving issues like engineering connectivity, source accessibility and vessel identification, if the IPMDA is to be successful.

The IPMDA is essential for preventing illegal activities in coastal areas, advancing a rules-based global order in the great seas, giving regional partners with restricted resources access to low-cost surveillance technologies, and enhancing maritime cooperation and stakeholder dialogue.

The IPMDA may encounter a number of bottlenecks, which rear countries must investigate. The problem of vessel identification is prolonged because it requires a lot of data and many Indo-Pacific nations lack the tools necessary to effectively patrol their territorial waters.

The IPMDA may take a two-pronged strategy to address this problem: investing in openly accessible information-sharing methods and identifying technologies, as well as training maritime law enforcement personnel to mildly police and monitor international waterways.

The issue of asymmetric tool convenience and asset management by partner countries must also be taken into account by the IPMDA. The Quad countries should implement international maritime exercises in the area to show combined capability and provide marine domain awareness collaborators with interconnected technologies like radar systems and data regulation processes in order to mitigate this.

Policymakers and safety strategists must also strike a balance between their interests in preserving an open and free Indo-Pacific and limiting China’s hostile appearance there in order to preserve the throughput of their allies.

In order to implement the IPMDA in a comprehensive and long-lasting manner, there is still much work to be done. Concerns that could possibly problem partners in the Indo-Pacific region must be addressed by Quad countries in order for the coastal domain awareness picture to be effectively implemented.

No country would want to unnecessarily incite China’s wrath, but many are looking for alternatives to Beijing ‘ forceful presence in the Indo-Pacific area when it advances their shared maritime principles and serves their own interests.

Quad nations must take into account that nations in the Indo-Pacific are motivated by rational concerns that are very different from their own, particularly in light of the China danger. For instance, within ASEAN, nations like Indonesia and the Philippines have various worries about China.

Indonesia and the Philippines have participated in joint naval exercises with the United States, but Indonesia‘s approach to the Indo-Pacific is based on the ideas of & nbsp, ASEAN importance and equality, including China, as opposed to US Indo – Pacific plan. In order to successfully apply the IPMDA, all partners may get similarity and on various levels.

To successfully implement a marine site awareness strategy, Quad countries should collaborate with current regional collaboration institutions rather than attempting to create their own mechanism for deploying the IPMDA.

For instance, the IPMDA specifies which information-sharing centers will be used for data collection on maritime activities, but it makes no mention of establishing connections with already-existing, such as in & nbsp, Madagascar.

Similar to this, a focus on capacity-building and human capital development through the IPMDA will only serve the interests of an organization like ASEAN, which had harmony dealing with both China and the United States( and, by extension, the Quad ).

On the other hand, the effort would reassure Southeast Asian nations of the Quad’s dedication to advancing local marine security and open the door for them to believe that the IPMDA goal of building capacity is real and not just a front for Quad partners to act on anti-Chinese sentiments.

It is still too early to judge the effectiveness of the Quad’s IPMDA program, despite the fact that it is a step in the right direction. To address issues with the current IPMDA effort and support comprehensive and powerful maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific, the Quad must start engaging with local stakeholders right away.

What needs to be seen is how quickly member countries can band together for this program, which will determine how successful it is. A few of the many issues that need more investigation include how the IPMDA does affect local protection dynamics and how China may react to such a international initiative.

Ahana Roy and nbsp are here. Research Associate at the Organization for Research on China and Asia( ORCA ), New Delhi, is 1604 @ gmail.com and nbsp.

Pacific Forum was the original publisher of this article. With agreement, Asia Times is republishing it.

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The largest stone Buddha in the world, currently being built in Naypyidaw, the military funds of Myanmar, is said to be able to withstand winds and earthquakes measuring up to 8.8 on the Richter scale at a speed of 193 kilometers per hour.

According to state media reports, the enormous 25-meter Buddha, which weighs over 5,000 tons and was etched from more than 20,000 tons of granite, is almost finished after three and a half years of construction.

Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the head of the State Administration Council ( SAC ), is also evidently excited based on reports of his June 29 visit to the construction site.

During his page visit, Min Aung Hlaing boldly declared that the project will be built completely” without foreign specialists” and has employed over 150 workers, including those from the Myanmar Engineering Society and Military Engineering Corps.

According to state media reports, the Maravijaya-carved image depicts a very typical Buddha present” with 32 wonderful features and 80 little characteristics of the Lord Buddha.” & nbsp,

The goal of the monument was portrayed as calm in a document that covered the first part of its assembly in October 2021, just as numerous conflicts were raging in Myanmar following the February coup that year that established the SAC.

The Buddha image is being constructed with the intention of demonstrating the success of Theravada Buddhism in Myanmar to the rest of the world, preserving the nation’s peace and tranquility, helping to develop the area through the appointments of local and foreign visitors, and advancing position growth.

Actually before his tragic and terrible revolution, Min Aung Hlaing had taken a keen interest in the enormous monument’s construction. He is said to have often stopped by significant council stages of the statue.

He saw the” Unnalon Holy Hair installation,” for instance, in May. The third part of the image was transmitted and installed on February 13 at the fortunate hour and date of 2:43 am. The statue’s conclusion appears to be a bet on the defense ruler putting his spiritual fortunes on it.

Given that his junta is in charge of a sharp reversal of advancement gains over the past ten years and that hunger levels are once again hovering around 40 % of the community, this may lead many people in Myanmar to question his spending priorities.

Giant Buddha figures are not uncommon in South Asian Myanmar or Theravada Buddhist nations.

The Maha Bodhi Tahtaung in Monywa, which is home to a 90-meter-long reclining Buddha with 31 surfaces inside as well as the second tallest Buddha monument in the world, has some of the largest Buddhas in Myanmar.

( The Statue of Unity in India, which stands at 182 meters tall, is the tallest Buddha statue in the world. )

In Bago City, the popular Chaukhtatgyi in Yangon’s Bahan municipality, and the Mon State capital of Mawlamyaing, there are also enormous reclining Buddhas, all of which serve to highlight the long history of religious building and support for the Tibetan clergy, or sangha, in Myanmar.

The Lawka Chantha Abhaya Labha Muni, also known as Kyauk Taw Gyi Pagoda, which was carved in 2013 from 700 tons of stone that were winnowed down to 400 plenty when finished, will be dwarfed by the Maravijaya Buddha. The monument was so large that it needed to be transported by particularly constructed barges and railways.

While enormous religious statues are ubiquitous in Myanmar, so too is the defense rulers’ pursuit of celestial absolution for widespread crimes. Min Aung Hlaing is merely the most recent autocrat to support spiritual building initiatives in the fervent belief that creating enormous Buddhas will result in their good reincarnation rather than their return to the” eager spirit realm ,” where they belong to be incessantly tormented by their numerous victims.

There are increasing reviews of SAC officials engaging in yedaya, or Myanmar dark secret, which is also frequently used by centuries of religious generals, in addition to the construction of enormous religious institutions.

The State Law and Order Restoration Council( SLORC ), the current junta regime’s clear inspiration, visited Myanmar with a Buddha Tooth Relic that had been taken from China in the middle of the 1990s. To increase their spiritual well-being and appease the Tibetan priesthood, that oppressive regime constructed beautiful temples, apparently using forced prison labor.

The government and dharma haven’t always gotten along. In the recognized Buddhist council, the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee, there have occasionally been friendly, about parasitic relations, particularly with traditional or ultranationalist monks.

Activist priests staged people marches to protest declining living standards and the then-military regimes’ fatal socio-economic policies at other times, including in 1990 and 2007. These protests were met with antagonistic opposition from the two energy centers.

The rise of the Buddhist monk-led Patriotic Association of Myanmar, or Ma Ba Tha, which contributed to an increase in anti-Muslim persecution and at times open violence, put the relationship between the military-controlled central state and Buddhist clergy to the test during General Thein Sein’s 2011 – 16 administration.

The most well-known pro-military priest is Sitagu Hsayadaw, who was revered throughout the nation up until his backing of the Ma Ba Tha led to some unrest. To the dismay of many in Myanmar, Sitagu expressed help for the coup shortly after it was staged and continues to approach up to Min Aung Hlaing, as Myanmar Here’s director Swe Win noted earlier in 2023.

Aung San Suu Kyi has reportedly been urged by senior National League for Democracy ( NLD) officials to step down from politics and work to bring about peace in the nation by the powerful Ottama Thara of the Thabarwa Monastery in Thanlyin township, which is close to Yangon’s commercial capital.

In the intensely spiritual but horrifyingly aggressive conflict areas of Sagaing and Magwe, some monks previously associated with Ma Ba Tha are then reportedly supporting SAC-raised death squads like the Thwe Thouq( blood drinkers) and terrible militias such as the Phyu Saw Thee.

State media frequently reports that despite the monks’ purported ignorance and possible because of their alleged support for the SAC, the anti-coup resistance has targeted them for assassination. Some monks are also known to play their standard roles in health, education, and humanism while also participating in covert assistance for resistance initiatives.

Even though the revered monastic disbanded the Ma Ba Tha in 2017 and apparently urged the government not to step a revolution in January 2021, the beautiful funeral arrangements for the past chairperson of the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee, Bhamo Hsayadaw, who passed away at the age of 94 on May 25, were another sign of his spiritual compulsions.

At the June 6 death, Pallbearers included Min Aung Hlaing, Vice Senior General Soe Win, and other top SAC authorities in an apparent effort to accumulate good works to balance out their numerous combat crimes.

The silicon sculpture of Bhamo Hsayadaw will feature cutting-edge synthetic teeth to represent his distinctive smile, the creation of renowned sculptor Aung Kyow Tun, as if to emphasize the surreal aspects of these spiritual performances.

However, Min Aung Hlaing’s enormous Buddha statue in Naypyidaw won’t be looking over kindly on him or his junta as Myanmar suffers from a brutal multi-sided war, serious army violence, natural disasters, and heartbroken economy.

In fact, in March, officials abruptly covered the granite statue’s face as stripes appeared around its eyes, causing the Maravijaya picture to appear to cry. It was hardly a good omen for an religious dictator looking for religious pardon for his numerous, well-documented karmic crimes.

Separate scientist David Scott Mathieson focuses on conflict, charitable, and human rights issues in Myanmar.

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