Thai politics drama unfolds as Move Forward ousted from coalition

Growing tensions in the Thai political opposition broke into an outright schism Wednesday when the Pheu Thai Party announced its intent to break with the popular Move Forward Party in order to form a new governing coalition.

Analysts had speculated ahead of the move that Pheu Thai, the runner-up in the May elections, might drop its progressive counterpart in a bid to form a new government and end a political stalemate with the conservative establishment. 

But the Wednesday declaration still sparked anger and protests from supporters of Move Forward, the largest party in the Thai Parliament. After the announcement, demonstrators burned effigies soaked in fake blood in front of Pheu Thai’s Bangkok headquarters.

“I think this is much anticipated,” said Napon Jatusripitak, a visiting fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, speaking of the break-up. “The only surprise factor is that it came earlier than expected.  Many observers thought that it would take one more round of voting before Pheu Thai had a strong enough justification to kick the Move Forward Party out of the coalition.”

Pheu Thai also stated Wednesday it would run Srettha Thavisin, a prominent businessman, as its prime minister candidate. On 4 August, parliamentarians will vote on Srettha’s candidacy in a joint session – appearing to close the door even more firmly on the chances of 42-year-old Move Forward party leader Pita Limjaroenrat, who was already rejected as a candidate in an earlier parliamentary vote. 

The move is the latest in an ongoing political drama that has consumed Thailand in the months since Move Forward’s surprising electoral success, which marked a strong public rejection of the previous military-backed government, a legacy of the 2014 coup. 

Move Forward and Pheu Thai had together been the foundation of an eight-party coalition that also included a cluster of six much smaller political parties. Now, despite being the largest party in Parliament, Move Forward will be pushed into the opposition by Pheu Thai’s decision. The break-up of the coalition is likely to deepen resentments of the conservative bloc – most notably the military-appointed Senate – among opposition supporters and could spark blowback on Pheu Thai among its own base.

In a bid to soften the blow of cutting out their more popular partner, Pheu Thai leaders said in a statement that they intended to adopt many elements of the excluded party’s progressive platform, including such points as ending military conscription and supporting LGBTQ+ rights. However, they made it explicitly clear that they did not intend to reform Thailand’s strict lèse-majesté law, which prohibits speech deemed critical of the monarchy. 

Move Forward has made amending the law, also known as Article 112 of the Criminal Code, a pillar of its campaign. This won the ire and resolute opposition of conservatives and had gradually driven a wedge between the party and some of the smaller parties of its coalition.

Move Forward Party Leader and prime ministerial candidate Pita Limjaroenrat reacts inside Thai Parliament as votes are counted during the parliamentary vote for the premiership in Bangkok on 13 July, 2023. Photo by Lillian Suwanrumpha/AFP.

On 22 and 23 July, the leadership of Pheu Thai met with representatives from every major party outside the coalition – with the exception of the Democrat Party due to its current lack of leadership – to discuss what it would take for them to support a Pheu Thai candidate for prime minister. 

During these meetings and in press conferences afterwards, each of these parties made it clear they were willing to support a Pheu Thai candidate, but only if the coalition did not include Move Forward.  

Pheu Thai leader Cholnan Srikaew had publicly denied that the meetings and subsequent press conferences were intended as an indirect method of encouraging Move Forward to voluntarily leave the coalition so that Pheu Thai can form a government. But it now appears that is exactly what was happening.

“[Pheu Thai] is basically borrowing other parties as a mouthpiece to try to exclude the Move Forward Party,” said Napon, speaking before the Wednesday announcement made it official.

Whether the meetings were intended as political theatre or a genuine attempt to gauge support, the resolute opposition to Move Forward had left a slim-to-none chance of the eight-party coalition securing the 375 votes necessary to form a government, even if the party changed its divisive stance on the lèse-majesté law.

“Even if [Move Forward] were to withdraw on the pledge to amend Article 112, I don’t think the coalition can expect to gain more seats as long as the Move Forward party is still in the coalition,” Napon said last week.

With the path to government obstructed, tensions had simmered between the eight parties. Before the Wednesday announcement, the leaders of both the Seri Ruam Thai Party and the Plung Sungkom Mai Party called for annulment of the agreement that institutionalised the coalition.

However, the Thai Sang Thai and Fair parties sided with Move Forward and took the opposite position, proposing the coalition simply wait until next May when the Senate’s right to participate in the prime minister selection process expires. They could theoretically then vote Pita into office with their existing support in the lower house.

They will be making a deal with the devil, so to speak, by partnering with parties from the other side of Thailand’s bitter political divide.” 

James Buchanan, Thai politics analyst

Whatever the result of internal debates within the coalition, the unfolding attempt by Pheu Thai to put together a government that excludes Move Forward could be met with significant backlash by pro-democracy supporters of both parties.

“Many Move Forward voters also have a soft spot for Pheu Thai, and are probably former Pheu Thai voters,” wrote James Buchanan, an independent analyst of Thai politics, in a message to Globe before the Wednesday announcement. 

“Likewise, many Pheu Thai voters may also quite admire Move Forward. So it will be controversial if or when (I think ‘when’ far more likely) Pheu Thai decide to ditch Move Forward and try to form their own coalition. What makes it all the more controversial is that they will be making a deal with the devil, so to speak, by partnering with parties from the other side of Thailand’s bitter political divide.” 

Public hostility towards any alliance made across this divide had already begun to manifest before Wednesday’s announcement.  

On 23 July, protestors stormed a joint press conference held by Pheu Thai and Palang Pacharat, demanding the party stick to its previous commitments not to form a government that would include Palang Pacharat and United Thai Nation. The protestors also threw talcum powder at Pheu Thai leader Cholnan Srikaew and Palang Pacharat lawmaker Thamanat Prompowand, and questioned whether Pheu Thai had forgotten the bloody crackdowns on its supporters in 2010. 

Pheu Thai supporters had also begun to air their displeasure about such an alliance. Thida Thavornseth, a former chair of the United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) – an activist organisation whose “Redshirts” have been some of the most active supporters of Pheu Thai – warned Pheu Thai about the consequence of breaking with Move Forward. 

In a Facebook post on 27 July she stated the Redshirts supported all parties with pro-democracy policies, not just Pheu Thai, and that if the party were to join forces with military-aligned parties the UDD would take its support elsewhere.

Even if Pheu Thai is able to effectively manage any backlash that comes from its decision to break with Move Forward, there is still no guarantee that Thailand’s conservative establishment will allow them to form a government, said Buchanan.

“Of course, there is always a chance that Pheu Thai are being strung along by the elites, whose long game is to form a government with neither Move Forward nor Pheu Thai,” he said.


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‘From victim to victor’: A Rohingya journey to Myanmar government

Despite a lifetime of struggle, Rohingya rights activist Aung Kyaw Moe believes there’s a solution to every problem, even when things are beyond his control. 

In June, his persistence led to a landmark moment with his ascension from an advisory role to become the deputy human rights minister to the National Unity Government (NUG). His appointment within the exiled civilian administration – which operates in parallel to the military junta that ousted democratically elected leaders in the 2021 coup – marks the first time a Rohingya representative has held a ministerial position in any Myanmar government.

“I believe that regardless of the challenges, you have all the capacity to be a victor,” he said. “It’s all a matter of how you transform yourself from a victim to a victor.” 

Aung Kyaw Moe has advocated for the rights of the stateless Muslim minority group for more than a decade. He has more than 15 years of experience working in U.N. agencies and non-governmental organisations in Southeast Asia, Afghanistan and Liberia and won several human rights awards, including the prestigious E.U. Schuman Award in 2019.

But although he now has a say in the shadow government’s decisions, the establishment of Rohingya rights in Myanmar is far from straightforward. The embattled NUG still lacks control over territory in Myanmar and faces an authoritarian military that denies the Rohingya citizenship and basic rights. 

In 2017, the Myanmar military conducted a brutal crackdown on the predominantly Muslim majority, pushing more than 700,000 Rohingya into Bangladesh. Today, about a million Rohingya refugees remain there, living in squalid camps with uncertain futures just over the border from their native Rakhine State in western Myanmar.

The persecution of the Rohingya minority is deeper-rooted still, dating back to warfare and displacement in the late 1700s. Later on, post-colonial religious segregation and discrimination caused this population to be considered illegal immigrants in their own country. The government of Myanmar officially categorised them as “Bengali” in 1982, stripping them of citizenship rights and forcing them to live without basic human rights ever since.

Born in Rakhine State in 1973, Aung Kyaw Moe witnessed decades of oppression and violence against the Rohingya people. He began activism as a student when the discriminatory policies against his ethnic group felt increasingly unfair.

“At that time, Rakhine State was an open prison with strict movement restrictions for people like us,” Aung Kyaw Mow said of his youth. “The inspiration [to work in human rights] came from the hardship and trauma.”

Rohingya refugees pray at a temporary shelter in Ladong, in the Aceh province of Indonesia, on 10 January, 2023. Photo by Chaideer Mahyuddin/AFP.

Despite growing up with limited educational opportunities due to his Rohingya identity and religious minority status, Aung Kyaw Moe managed to complete his bachelor’s degree in Yangon. But further education seemed to not be an option for him in Myanmar. 

“[As a Rohingya] there is a double layer of discrimination to overcome in order to truly become who you want to be and influence others,” he said. “I then began to look for alternative ways to achieve my goals.”

He went on to graduate with a master’s degree from Deakin University in Australia. He later participated in leadership programmes through the United States Institute of Peace and the Dalai Lama Fellowship.

Facing threats to his safety due to the nature of his advocacy for the Rohingya, Aung Kyaw Moe also fled Myanmar multiple times and separated from family members as early as 1992, with some of them staying in Rakhine, others fleeing to Yangon or neighbouring Bangladesh. Despite the difficulties, he continued activism while being in and out of the country, testifying about atrocities before the U.N. Human Rights Council and International Criminal Court. 

“It’s hardly acceptable for me. … We could have saved him from being killed.”

Aung Kyaw Moe, speaking of his elder brother 

But his choices also forced him to take a strong stand about cutting ties. Aung Kyaw Moe hasn’t been in touch with his close family members for years to ensure their anonymity and safety from persecution. 

That may not have been enough. Unknown assailants murdered his older brother Than Myint in June near a Yangon mosque. Aung Kyaw Moe believes the killers are likely affiliated with extremist groups linked to the military government. 

“He was just a simple person who was making his life through a small pharmacy that he ran,” he said of his brother. 

Though Than Myint had insisted that his younger brother not worry for his safety, Aung Kyaw Moe said he’d always been concerned about him. 

“It’s hardly acceptable for me because there were things I could do to push him to relocate to a different country, at least to Thailand,” he said. “We could have saved him from being killed.”

But his brother was not his only loss. Aung Kyaw Moe also lost his father in 2012. His father had been arrested and, shortly after his release, suffered an illness that left him paralysed. When he was unable to receive treatment at local hospitals, the family brought him to Bangladesh, where he received only palliative care until he felt strong enough to cross the border back to Myanmar. 

However, Aung Kyaw Moe said the reentry was disastrous – just a few steps on Myanmar soil were enough for his father to fear a new arrest so much that he immediately died of a heart attack.

“That was a big loss for me,” Aung Kyaw Moe recounted. “I was not able to go to the funeral because of the movement restrictions and my activism.”

Despite his immense suffering and hardships, the activist’s first-hand accounts of the crises facing the Rohingya brought global attention to their plight.

One of the most controversial decisions in the course of this, according to him, was whether to join the NUG three years ago as the first Rohingya advisor on human rights in parliament. Criticism came from some Rohingya commentators, who believed this to be just a tokenistic gesture to the international community.

Rohingya refugees attend a ceremony organised on 25 August, 2019 in the camps at Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, to remember the second anniversary of a Myanmar military crackdown that drove their people out of the country. Photo by Munir Uz Zaman/AFP.

But Aung Kyaw Moe stands by his involvement, seeing it as a stepping stone for the future of the Rohingya people.

“We belong to Myanmar and we are part of this country,” he asserted. “Despite whatever happens to us, we don’t want to be a bystander or audience in this historic moment. We will contribute in whatever capacity we are in.”

He sees the inclusion of a Rohingya representative in the cabinet-in-exile as a step towards giving the community a voice in decisions that affect their fate. Aung Kyaw Moe is now well-positioned to shape policy discussions on key issues including the safe return of refugees and restitution for lost lands and properties, as well as constitutional reforms to grant the Rohingya full citizenship and political representation.

Despite everything, Aung Kyaw Moe says he’s hopeful these goals and more can be achieved through non-violent civil disobedience.

“I’m someone who has scars and I know the pain enough to understand the suffering of others,“ he said. Because he went through similar experiences to his fellow Rohingya, he believes he can empathise better with the population in his new role as NUG deputy human rights minister. 

“I will be working for the benefit of my people,” he said. “It’s now on my shoulder to be making it a reality despite … all this political turmoil and shifting political landscape in Myanmar.”


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Fave collaborates with affiliate marketing platform Involve Asia

The partnership adds FindShare loyalty programme to Fave
Though this users can get cashback and spend it across Fave’s offerings  

Fave is collaborating with Involve Asia to integrate FindShare, a cashback and rewards program platform provider in the Philippines. 
Chen Chow Yeoh (pic), Co-founder of Fave, said, “Involve Asia’s expertise in affiliate marketing…Continue Reading

A new era for DCM? | FinanceAsia

The repercussions of recent black swan events are contributing to a new dealmaking landscape – one that continues to ebb and flow as geopolitical tensions rise and governments work to ensure that regional emissions fall.

As regulators respond to global inflation with interest rate hikes, market participants are adapting to the post-pandemic outlook, where the structural integrity of systemic lenders has been called into question; bank runs have been navigated; and a debt ceiling default, narrowly avoided.

“Volatility is the only constant,” Elaine He, head of Debt Capital Markets (DCM) Syndicate for Asia Pacific at Morgan Stanley, told FinanceAsia.

“Bond issuance has been slow as issuers wait on the sidelines because of uncertainty and the increasing rates environment,” Barclays’ head of Debt Origination, Avinash Thakur, motioned. “The biggest factor impacting dealmaking continues to be the US Federal Reserve’s tightening bias.”

“Even if there is a lot of liquidity in the market, the cost of borrowing is too high,” Singapore-based corporate practice partner at DLA Piper, Philip Lee, told FA.

“Most CFOs, CEOs or other corporate decision makers who are in their late 30s or early 40s, would not have even started their careers when interest rates were this high – in the late 1990s, or early 2000s. I suspect it will take some time for companies to adjust to this higher interest rate environment.”

But Sarah Ng, director for DCM at ANZ, holds some positivity amid current market uncertainty. She noted how recent headline events are influencing short-term market sentiment and shaping deal-focussed behaviour, for the better.

“We are seeing narrower open market windows. This has meant that issuers have had to adopt an opportunistic and nimble approach when accessing primary markets,” she offered.

“We did see a degree of caution and a flight to quality, especially post-Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and Credit Suisse, but the sell-off was largely contained to specific bank capital products. What has been surprising, has been the speed of bounce-back in both primary and secondary market activities, with a robust pipeline of issuers and receptive investor base back in play,” she explained.

FA editorial board member and head of DCM for Asia Pacific at BNP Paribas, Manoj Agarwal, agreed that unexpected developments have made market activity very much “window-driven”.

“From an issuer perspective, being prepared and able to access markets at short notice, as and when market windows are optimal, has become important,” he said. 

Furthermore, he noted that market recovery has been much faster this year, compared to the protracted period of indecision brought about by the Covid-19 pandemic.

“Although the year has been peppered with volatility and disruption, market efficiency is also improving, helping to reduce the impact these events have on dealmaking,” he emphasised.

Going local

George Thimont, head of ESG Syndicate for Asia Pacific and leader of the regional syndicate (ex-Japan) at Crédit Agricole, observes three notable trends emerging amid the current, Asia-based dealmaking environment.

“Issuance is broadly down across the board – in spite of good demand from the investor community. From a sectoral perspective, the notable absentees are the corporates, and local market conditions in certain jurisdictions, such as South Korea, have offered good depth and pricing versus G3 currencies.”

Citing Bloomberg data, Agarwal noted that for Asia ex-Japan, 2023 year-to-date (YTD) G3 DCM volume as of mid-June was down by 35.4% year-on-year (YoY), with 2022 already down by 54% compared to the same period in 2021.

But he agreed that South Korea displays some optimism, given that its 2023 YTD deal volumes remain flat, compared to the same period in 2022.

In fact, some of the market’s larger institutions have been quite active overseas. In February, the Korea Development Bank (KDB) issued $2 billion in bonds via Singapore’s exchange (SGX) in what constituted one of the largest public market issuances by a Korean institution in recent years.

Debt from issuers such as sovereigns, supranationals and agencies (SSA) or state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has benefitted, managing director and head of Asia Pacific Debt Syndicate at Citi, Rishi Jalan, told FA

“We expect corporate issuance in the US dollar bond market to be a bit more robust in the second half of the year,” he explained. In the meantime, Jalan said that some issuers are selectively tapping local currency markets where financing terms are lower, such as in India, China and parts of Southeast Asia.

However, not everyone feels that Asia’s regional markets can cater to the demands of the significant dry powder at play.

“Most liquidity in the local currency market comes from the banking system,” Saurabh Dinakar, head of Fixed Income Capital Markets and Equity Linked Solutions for Asia Pacific at Morgan Stanley, told FA.

He is sceptical of the current capacity for local markets to meet the requirements of internationally minded issuers. However, he noted as an exception the samurai market, which he said had proven vibrant for some corporates with Japan-based businesses or assets.

“Larger long-term funding requirements can only be satisfied through the main offshore currencies, such as dollar securities,” he explained.

Turning to the regional initiatives that have been set up to encourage participation in Asia’s domestic markets such as Hong Kong’s Connect schemes – the most recent of which, Swap Connect, launched in May – Dinakar shared, “What we need to see is broader stability.… These developments are great, but for investors to get involved in a meaningful way, general risk-off sentiment needs to reverse.”

“There was huge optimism around reopening, post Covid-19. This has since faded as corporate earnings have disappointed and there has been no meaningful stimulus. The markets want to see policy stimulus and, as a result, corporate health improving. Performance across credit and equities will then follow.”

Sustainable momentum

One area of Asian activity that stands strong in the global arena, is ESG-related issuance.

In March, the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) published the third edition of its report on Asia’s international bond markets. The research highlighted that, in 2022, green, social, sustainability and sustainability-linked (GSSS) bonds accounted for 23% of total issuance in Asia – higher than the global ratio of 12%.

“Demand is still more than supply, and investors tend to be more buy and hold, so we’ve seen that sustainable bond issuance has been more resilient than the market as a whole,” shared Mushtaq Kapasi, managing director and chief representative for ICMA in Asia.

“ESG has come to form an integral part of the dealmaking conversation in Asia. Over 30 new ESG funds have launched here in 2023; the number of ESG-dedicated funds is up 4% YoY; and Asia makes up 11% of the global ESG fund flow as of 1Q23 – up from 5% a year ago,” said Morgan Stanley’s He. 

“The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) government recently came to market as the largest green bond issuer in Asia so far this year,” she added.

Discussing the close-to-$6 billion green bond issuance, Rocky Tung, FA editorial board member, director and head of Policy Research at the Financial Services Development Council (FSDC), shared that the competitive pricing contained a variety of durations and currencies that “help construct a more effective yield curve that will set the benchmark for other issuances – public and private – to come.”

This, he explained, would not only be conducive to the development of green and sustainable finance in the region, but would specifically enrich Hong Kong’s debt capital market.

“ESG-related bonds can provide issuers with an additional selling point to attract investors,” Mark Chan, partner at Clifford Chance, told FA.

“They can demonstrate the issuer’s commitment to fighting climate change for example…. Issuers with a social agenda, such as the likes of the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation (HKMC), can highlight their mission and objectives by issuing social bonds to enhance the investment story.”

In October last year, HKMC achieved a world first through its inaugural issuance of a dual-tranche social facility comprising Hong Kong dollar and offshore renminbi tranches, which totalled $1.44 billion.

“We are also seeing more bespoke ESG bonds such as blue and orange structures,” Chan added, referring to recent deals that the firm had advised on, including the Impact Investment Exchange’s (IIX) $50 million bond offering under its Women’s Livelihood Bond (WLB) Series; and issuance by China Merchants Bank’s London branch, of a $400 million facility – the first blue floating-rate public note to be marketed globally.

FA editorial board member and head of sustainability for HSBC’s commercial banking franchise in Asia, Sunil Veetil, noted that while Asian issuance fell in most segments, green sukuk and social bonds helped sustain momentum.

“For green debt, energy was the most financed project category in Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, accounting for more than 50% of allocation,” he shared, citing a report by the Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI).

“In Singapore, which remains the undisputed leader of sustainable finance in Southeast Asia, around 70% of green debt went to buildings, mainly for the construction of green buildings, and to a lesser extent, for retrofits and to improve energy efficiency.”

“There continues to be regulatory support for ESG bonds, including grants provided by the Asia-based stock exchanges to list green bonds,” added Jini Lee, partner, co-division head for finance, funds and restructuring (FFR) and regional leader at Ashurst. 

A boom for private credit

Crédit Agricole’s Thimont told FA that Asian credit has remained resilient through recent global risk events. Private markets and funds are emerging as alternative sources of capital for those corporates with weaker funding lines, DLA Piper’s Lee observed.

Indeed, the further retrenchment of banks from lending has provided an opportunity for private credit players to swoop in and fill an increasingly large void. Globally, the sector has grown to account for $1.4 trillion from $500 million in 2015 and Preqin estimates that it will reach $2.3 trillion by 2027.

Once a niche asset class, investors are drawn to private credit’s floating rate nature which moves with interest rates and offers portfolio diversification.

Andrew Tan, Asia Pacific CEO for US private credit player, Muzinich & Co, earlier told FA that private credit players aim for investment returns of around 6-8% above the benchmark rate in the current environment.

The firm’s sectoral peers, including KKR, have argued that institutional investors should consider allocating as much as 10% to private credit. Alongside Blackstone and Apollo, the US global investment firm has added to its Asian private credit capabilities in recent years, while new players, including Tokyo-headquartered Softbank, have recently entered the market. In May, media reported that the Japanese tech firm sought to launch a private credit fund targetting late-stage tech startups and low double-digit returns.

Elsewhere in Japan, Blackstone recently partnered with Daiwa Securities to launch a private credit fund in the retail space, targetting individual high net worth investors (HNWIs).

Unlike in the US, where non-bank lenders now outnumber traditional financiers, “Apac remains heavily banked, so we expect to see ample room for private debt to grow in the region,” Alex Vaulkhard, client portfolio manager within Barings’ Private Credit team told FA.

He sees particular opportunity to serve the private equity (PE) space. “Although PE activity has been a bit slower in 2023, we expect activity to return, which will increase lending opportunities for private debt.”

Asia accounts for roughly $90 billion or about 6.4% of the global private credit market, according to figures cited by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) that highlight the market’s growth potential.

The biggest vehicle in Asia to date is Hong Kong-headquartered PAG’s fourth pan-Asia fund which closed in December at $2.6 billion.

However, overcrowding in some markets – notably India, where investors have amassed since new insolvency and bankruptcy laws came into force from 2016 – has made lenders increasingly compete for deals and acquiesce to “covenant-lite” structures, where investor protection is reduced.

But Tan, who is currently fundraising for Muzinich’s debut Asia Pacific fund – a mid-market credit strategy with a $500 million target, believes this only to be a problem in more developed markets such as Australia and is unlikely to become an issue in the wider region.

“If anything, the trend is in the direction of more conservative structures with increased over-collateralisation and stricter covenant protection,” he told FA.

Fundamentally, seasoned private credit participants are aware of the importance of covenant protection, so their likelihood to compromise on this is low, he added.

With monetary policies tightening at one of the fastest rates in modern history and recession looming in several markets, a key challenge for private credit is borrowers’ ability to service their debts.

“There is no doubt that default rates will go up and I would be cautious of cashflow lends with little or no asset backing,” said Christian Brehm, CEO at Sydney-headquartered private debt manager, FC Capital, calling for adequate due diligence when evaluating opportunities in the current environment.

“We would not be surprised to see an increase in default rates, but these are more likely to occur in more cyclical industries or among borrowers who have taken on too much debt in recent years,” Vaulkhard opined.

The managers suggested a tougher fundraising environment ahead, as the performance of fixed income instruments improves to offer limited partners (LPs) attractive returns.

What’s next?

The banking sector’s evolving regulatory landscape is also contributing to Asia’s changing DCM outlook.

Initially proposed as consequence of the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) and with renewed rigour on the back of recent adversity across the banking sector, new capital requirements are set to be rolled out in the US and Europe as a final phase of Basel III. Often dubbed “Basel IV” for their magnitude, market implementation was originally scheduled for January 2023, before being delayed by a year to support the operational capacity of banks and market supervisors in response to the Covid-19 pandemic.

Experts caution that while more stringent banking regulation will challenge Asia’s traditional lending mix, it will also offer opportunity.

“There is a big amount of regulatory capital to be rolled out following the new Basel III rules, which will impact the type of debt to be issued,” said Ashurst’s Lee.

“We have been speaking to issuers who have been anticipating this uptrend as well in the coming years and are building in this scenario in their mid- to long-term treasury planning,” she added.

“Although the implementation of the Basel III final reform package was postponed in jurisdictions such as Hong Kong, those subject to it will no doubt be grappling with the new capital requirements already,” said Clifford Chance’s Chan, noting how its introduction will likely impact banks’ risk-weighted asset (RWA) portfolios.

“Aspects such as the raising of the output floor could potentially see some banks try to charge more for their lending,” he said.

Hironobu Nakamura, FA editorial board member and chief investment officer at Mizuho and Dai-Ichi Life tie-up, Asset Management One Alternative Investments (AMOAI), agreed that the new Basel reforms will lead to more scrupulous risk assessment by lenders, but how this will affect banks’ portfolio construction more concretely, remains uncertain.

“A heavy return on risk asset (Rora) requirements will likely impact banks’ risk asset allocations, region to region. [But] it is quite early to determine whether Asia is risk-off or -on at this stage, from a bank portfolio perspective.”

FA editorial board member and AMTD Group chair, Calvin Choi, proposed that if lending were to become more expensive for global players, there could be upside for regional banks.

“Updated Basel rules will impact global banks operating onshore, adding costs and making them less able to use their balance sheets. Local banks won’t have this constraint, so they will win market share,” he shared.

However, he noted that  for those Asian banks that want to participate in overseas markets, business will become more costly and compliance-heavy. “It will keep more local banks local.”

“All of this will mean a higher cost of borrowing and less capital available to banks…. It will create opportunities for non-bank lenders such as non-banking financial institutions (NBFI), family offices and private funds to fill the gap,” said DLA Piper’s Lee.

“With stricter capital requirements under ‘Basel IV’, we anticipate that bank loan funding will become more expensive for issuers. As such, we could see a return to capital market funding from issuers who have hitherto heavily relied on loan markets this year,” said ANZ’s Ng.

Choi added that this may even lead to Asia’s bond markets being viewed as more competitive than their global counterparts.

“Overall, the DCM market has become slow and stagnated,” Nakamura observed. “However, there are areas where funding is continually needed,” he said, pointing to the energy transition space as well as digital transformation. 

What exactly the new regulatory environment will mean for Asia’s market participants amid macro volatility, rising interest rates and escalating geopolitical tensions, remains unclear. But the developing outlook could offer those able to structure more creative facilities, more business; drive the advancement of Asia’s local capital markets; and support the region’s wider efforts to transition to net zero.

Proponents of private credit remain optimistic.

“Capital raising might cool down in the short-term, but the true private debt lending market is about to kick off,” said Brehm.

“We believe that there is a lot of growth ahead,” Barings’ Vaulkhard stated, sharing that conditions are likely to improve for lenders this year, with spreads widening, leverage falling, and overall credit quality enhancing. 

“We are only at the start of a multi-year growth journey,” Tan concluded.  

 

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In-depth: Exploring Hong Kong and Indonesia’s strategic potential | FinanceAsia

Last week (July 26), Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEX) and the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) marking strategic collaboration aimed at strengthening ties and exploring mutually beneficial opportunities across both markets.

According to the announcements, the partnership will see the exchanges meet regularly to develop new capital market products, including exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and derivatives; enable cross-border listings; and promote sustainable finance across the region, through shared best practices and the development of carbon markets.  

The releases point to the benefits made available through enhanced cooperation, including access to the international connectivity and vibrance on offer via Hong Kong’s marketplace, as well as the talent, creativity and innovative characteristics of Indonesia’s “new economy” participants.

Discussing the news, Singapore-based Clifford Chance partner, Gareth Deiner, who specialises within the firm’s South and Southeast Asian capital markets practice, shared with FinanceAsia his take on the opportunity presented by forging a deeper connection with the market that is home to world’s largest nickel supply.

“The mutually beneficial aspect of this collaboration is that it offers access to a wide pool of North Asian institutional investors and therewith, an enhanced liquidity pool.”

Shanghai and Singapore-based Clifford Chance partner, Jean Thio, acknowledged the significant number of Indonesian conglomerates that operate outside of the domestic market and seek access to North Asia’s investor community.

She highlighted her work in 2022, advising on the spin-off IPO of Chinese dairy farm operator AustAsia Group, a subsidiary of Indonesian agribusiness, Japfa, as demonstrating this point.

“International issuers look to Hong Kong as a way of accessing international institutional capital. The new collaboration complements other regional initiatives, such as Stock Connect.”

Hong Kong and China’s central banking authorities announced in May the launch of the sixth iteration of the regional bilateral scheme, the northbound channel of Swap Connect. The initiative is the first derivatives mutual market access programme globally and opens up institutional entry to China and Hong Kong’s interbank interest rate swap markets.

In terms of the current trends permeating Indonesia’s capital markets, Deiner shared, “Historically, Indonesia’s future-facing minerals – cobalt, copper and nickel – would be exported. But now these are proving key elements of Indonesia’s onshore energy transition story, as they are core components used in the manufacture of wind turbines, solar panels and electric vehicles (EVs).”

“As such, Indonesia has implemented bans on the export of unprocessed nickel ore, in order to facilitate the development of the EV supply chain onshore.”

Deiner and his team advised the underwriters of Harita Nickel’s IDR9.7 trillion IPO on the IDX in April, which media attributed to being part of a government push to privatise state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

Amit Singh, Singapore-based partner and head of Linklaters’ South and Southeast Asia capital markets practice agreed that the newly formed “super-connection” opens the door to meaningful, increased liquidity for Indonesian companies.

“Hong Kong also gains a valuable link with the growing mining and supply chain powerhouse that Indonesia is developing into,” he told FA.

“Mining, minerals and other supply chain-focussed industries are driving Indonesia’s IPO boom in 2023,” Singh explained, pointing to his involvement in Merdeka Battery’s IDR9.2 trillion ($620 million) IPO in April. The PT Merdeka Copper Gold Tbk subsidiary owns one of the largest nickel reserves globally and has a portfolio of EV battery assets across the Sulawesi region.  

“This trend is likely to continue and grow in the upcoming years, and Hong Kong is clearly seeking to position itself closely with Indonesia and its burgeoning strengths in these areas.”

Dual listings

Tjahjadi Bunjamin, Jakarta-based managing partner and head of the finance practice at Herbert Smith Freehills (HSF) partner firm, Hiswara Bunjamin & Tandjung (HBT), agreed that the MoU means that Indonesia will obtain greater access to Chinese issuers and the related international investment base.

“This is particularly important given the dominant role of Chinese companies in the EV ecosystem.”

He explained to FA that the collaboration further enables the exploration of dual listings by both parties: “Both will benefit from a more coordinated approach to listing in the two jurisdictions, as well as more clarity on listing requirements for issuers and investors.”

“Dual listings and increased regulatory cooperation will accelerate the maturation of the Indonesian capital markets, allowing them to more quickly adapt as deal sizes and investor interest and scrutiny in the market widens,” Singh added.

David Dawborn, HSF partner and senior international counsel at HBT, noted that a challenge for the partnership will involve the fact that Indonesia’s capital markets system remains primarily focussed on basic equity and debt securities.

“It could benefit from new ideas and products available through Hong Kong’s capital markets system, which is more flexible and easier to navigate in many aspects.”

In prior discussions with FA, experts have commended Indonesian regulators for their efforts to make the market’s domestic exchange more accessible and attractive as a listing destination.

In late 2021, the Indonesian financial services authority, Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK), approved amendments to the listing regime to allow firms with multiple voting rites (MVR) to participate on the domestic exchange. The move signalled continued progress to bring Indonesia’s capital markets in line with other global exchanges, such as those of the US and Hong Kong, which have had dual class share frameworks in place since the 1980s.

Recent research by the Hong Kong Trade Development Council (HKTDC) citing Refinitiv data suggests that more than 70% and 25% of companies currently listed on IDX meet the minimum capital requirement for listing on Hong Kong’s GEM (which serves small and mid-sized issuers) and main board, respectively. “This implies that there is a huge potential pool of candidates for dual primary and secondary listing,” the report noted.

However, the research added that so far, “only three Indonesian companies domiciled in Indonesia are currently listed overseas, and none are listed in Hong Kong.”

Tech story

Poised to become the seventh largest global economy by 2030, Dawborn underlined Indonesia’s endeavours to become a regional leader for Southeast Asian capital markets, following its success as host of last year’s G20 summit, in Bali.

Already home to a variety of tech unicorns (companies valued at over $1 billion) including Blibli, Bukalapak, Traveloka and GoTo, Indonesia is fast-emerging as a Southeast Asian tech hub, with its internet economy expected to double in value to be worth $146 billion by 2025.

Experts suggest that Indonesia holds significant potential to elevate Asia’s prominence on the global tech stage.

“Where we are in the macroeconomic cycle, with interest rates at an all-time high following another bump by the Fed last week, the landscape is challenging – high interest rates are not the friend of the tech sector. But the minute that inflation starts to settle, I think we’re going to witness the next chapter of Indonesia’s tech story,” Deiner said.

“Traditionally, Southeast Asian companies have always thought of the US when it comes to tech, but the HKEX has worked to be increasingly accommodative for these firms and Hong Kong is starting to prove a very attractive listing venue for those active in biotech,” explained Clifford Chance’s Thio.

“So-called US stock orphan listings (where a company has no operations, investor relations or management in a particular market but chooses to list there) are becoming a real discussion point across the Asian IPO landscape. I agree that Hong Kong may become an increasingly compelling venue for tech firms. In doing so, it supports the regional sector growth story,” Deiner added.

The tech sector is also set to support Indonesia’s efforts in the sustainability space. The market published the first version of its green taxonomy in January 2022.

“The ESG frameworks and disclosure standards of listing venues have become a hot topic in the IPO execution process and in equity offering documents more generally, and the variation in ESG disclosure standards across different international markets is creating a degree of execution friction across transactions in different markets,” Deiner explained.

“I was interested to read that the exchanges highlighted ESG considerations in the MoU as this will hopefully present an opportunity for the two markets to converge on ESG standards.”

“If this leads to a greater uniformity in ESG disclosures across primary equity markets, this could really be a game changer for market activity, and would be a very exciting development to monitor,” he added.

“As Hong Kong already has more developed carbon related, ETF and derivative products and trading systems, Indonesia and the market’s investors will benefit from access to this knowhow and technology,” noted HBT’s Bunjamin.

Jakarta-based corporate partner and capital markets lead, Viska Kharisma, told FA that following the introduction of Indonesia’s Financial Services Omnibus Law in 2023, OJK has been considering marketing more types of offshore securities in Indonesia, including carbon-related instruments.

“We understand that OJK and IDX propose to issue a new carbon market trading regulation in the near future, which should facilitate access by international investors to carbon credit opportunities through Indonesian industrial and mineral companies,” she said.

Reflecting on the opportunity on offer as a result of the official partnership, Deiner shared, “Where there is a cross- or secondary listing as part of a primary offering on any two international exchanges, you’re going to have an element of friction between their respective listing standards and the requirements that one legal jurisdiction or one regulator will impose versus another – and in many ways, the art of dealmaking in large-scale equity capital market (ECM) transactions of this nature, involves getting these two pieces to fit.”

“There’s nothing particularly apparent that has created a roadblock between the markets until now, but then that’s why you have the MoU. Hopefully it will provide a robust basis to ensure that any future obstacles can be navigated or removed,” he concluded.

HKEX declined to comment beyond the press release. IDX, the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN) and a number of Indonesian banks did not respond to requests for comment.

 

¬ Haymarket Media Limited. All rights reserved.

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Japan’s energy security woes not easily solved

Resource-poor Japan has long fretted over its dependence on energy imports. The 1973 oil crisis which triggered oil price spikes and toilet paper panic-buying remains seared in collective memory. The 2011 Fukushima accident and 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine are further unwanted reminders of Japan’s energy security frailties.

Former foreign affairs minister Toshimitsu Motegi once highlighted that “in the field of energy security, we depend on the Middle East to secure ninety per cent of our crude oil needs, and that is why we consider peace and stability of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries vital and extremely important for us.”

One of Japan’s first responses after Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, was to double down on long-standing relationships with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia — leading suppliers of oil to Japan.

On March 17, 2022, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida had a telephone call with Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman wherein both had “an intense discussion on countermeasures against oil price increases.”

In an earlier call with Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, then the crown prince of Abu Dhabi and now UAE president, Kishida similarly requested UAE assistance in stabilizing the international oil market. Phoning up Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, Kishida sought cooperation in stabilizing the liquefied natural gas (LNG) market — Qatar is Japan’s top LNG supplier.

These phone calls were to be followed by Kishida’s in-person visits to Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia in August 2022, which were called off because Kishida contracted Covid-19. In mid-July 2023, Kishida finally made this trip.

Diversifying Japan’s energy mix has been another plank of Japan’s response. Russian aggression against Ukraine nudged Japan back towards nuclear energy — a politically sensitive issue after the 2011 Fukushima reactor meltdown. In August 2022, Kishida announced Japan would restart idled nuclear plants while looking into extending the lifespans of existing ones beyond 60 years.

This photo, taken on March 31, 2011, shows Tokyo Electric Power Co No 1 Daiichi nuclear power plant with white smoke rising from reactors number two and three at Okuma town in Fukushima prefecture. Photo: Maritime Self Defense Force

Anti-nuclear public sentiment has waned in the face of surging energy bills and power shortage warnings. These energy challenges have been triggered not only by the Ukraine war but also by climate change-induced weather events such as recurrent summer heatwaves. Nuclear power is increasingly framed as part of Japan’s “green transformation” to hit net zero targets by 2050 first announced in 2020 by former prime minister Yoshihide Suga.

In May 2023, France and Japan signed an agreement to cooperate in the research and development of next-generation nuclear plants such as sodium-cooled fast reactors. Japan’s Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Yasutoshi Nishimura, declared that the partnership was about “decarbonization and a stable energy supply.” Shutdowns of thermal power plants burning fossil fuels have also added to the pressures on energy grids.

The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry has touted LNG as a cleaner source of energy with lower emissions. Japan is the world’s largest importer of LNG and has announced plans to build a strategic LNG buffer against the risk of disruptions. LNG is primarily sourced from Qatar but other sources of energy in Southeast Asia are also being pursued.

Brunei has long supplied oil to Japan, but it also contributes 6 per cent of Japan’s LNG needs. This is set to grow after Brunei LNG signed an LNG supply agreement with Japan Petroleum Exploration Company in April 2023. Other forms of cleaner energy sources being developed include blue ammonia supply chains with the UAE.

Renewables are meant to contribute 36–38 per cent of the power supply by 2030. But there have been several notable cancellations of wind farm projects by trading companies Sojitz, Kansai Electric Power and Hitachi Zosen due to rising costs of materials and local community opposition.

Japan has also adopted a hedging stance to manage its energy dependency. Although Iran is no longer a significant energy supplier to Japan, an outright US–Iran military conflict would upend Japan’s energy flows from the Gulf region. Japan’s 2020 Diplomatic Bluebook outlined Tokyo’s desire to alleviate tensions by ‘leveraging its position as an ally with the US, and, at the same time, its positive and long-standing relationship with Iran’.

This explains former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to Tehran in 2019, the deployment of Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyers in 2020 for information gathering missions independent of the US-led coalition and restricting the geographical scope of operations to outside the Strait of Hormuz. Japan has also maintained its stake in the Sakhalin-2 oil fields, balancing its energy security needs while strongly condemning Russian aggression.

Doubling down, diversifying and hedging to maintain its energy supply, Japan has had to cope with the vagaries of power politics. As climate change worsens, the need to achieve net zero targets constitutes yet another variable in Japan’s complex calculus.

Yee-Kuang Heng is a professor of international security in the Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of Tokyo, and was visiting researcher and senior academic visitor in the Center for the Study of Existential Risk at the University of Cambridge (2022).

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum. It is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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Marcos’s military pension, US cooperation dilemma

Historically, the Philippine military played a crucial role in the toppling of two powerful presidents. And that helps to explain the sensitivity of pension reform moves currently afoot.

In his secondsState of the nation address, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr hailed the country’s “sound” economic fundamentals despite an uptick in inflation over the past year.

Eager to press ahead with a massive infrastructure initiative, however, he has called on lawmakers to institute new tax measures under the “medium-term fiscal framework,” including value-added tax on the booming digital-economy sector, expanded motor-vehicle user’s charges, and new taxes on the mining sector. 

The government expects to raise between 12.4 billion and 15.8 billion pesos (US$$220 million to $300 million) in additional resources under the first year of the framework’s implementation.

The prospect of new taxes amid historic inflation rates didn’t go down well among the Filipino populace, who are still reeling from one of the highest living costs in Southeast Asia. 

But the president faces an even more sensitive and highly consequential fiscal reform challenge, namely the proposed reform of the Philippine military and uniformed personnel pension, which is has raised fears of a backlash on the part of elements of the country’s powerful security forces.

Confronting the prospect of a fiscal crisis in coming years, the Marcos administration is pushing for “self-regenerating” pension plans for both the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police. 

Marcos’s top technocrats have warned that the status quo is unsustainable, since the pension’s annual payouts could reach the 1-trillion-peso mark by 2035 from 213 billion pesos this year.

In his address, Marcos played down the challenge, promising a soft landing on the issue. Given the Philippines’ long history of coups, however, Marcos needs to keep the military on his side.

And this only raises the stakes for his military pivot to the US, a key source of training and equipment for the armed forces. Reforming the pension is inextricably linked to ongoing plans to expand Philippine-US cooperation under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. 

Duterte’s dilemma 

History offers clear warnings to proceed carefully. To start with, the Ferdinand Marcos Sr regime collapsed in 1986 after a popular coup by his top henchmen, former defense minister Juan Ponce Enrile and military chief Fidel Ramos.

Although mainstream narratives emphasize the “People Power” protests led by the late president Corazon “Cory” Aquino, historians often speak of a “civilian-backed coup” to describe the chain of events that culminated in the overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship. 

In 2001, populist president Joseph Estrada, a Marcos loyalist, was similarly toppled by another round of People Power protests. But the crucial factor was the armed forces’ top brass’s withdrawal of support for the embattled president amid escalating popular opposition.

Over the succeeding years, president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo also faced multiple coup attempts amid chronic corruption and election anomalies, underscoring the influence of the powerful military in shaping Philippine politics. 

A self-described “socialist,” with an avowedly pro-China foreign-policy orientation, president Rodrigo Duterte wasted no time to win over the country’s armed forces. In his first few months in office, he personally visited as many 14 military camps, lavishing praise and promising expanded benefits to soldiers and generals.

Soon, he appointed as many as 60 senior generals and senior officers from the military and security services to cabinet and sub-cabinet positions, making his administration the most militarized in recent memory. 

On multiple occasions, he also revisited his peace negotiations with communist rebels in deference to his generals. He also rescinded his earlier threat to boot out American troops from the Philippines.

As the former president put it in a public address, “the military would oust me” if he fully ignored their concerns. By 2018, Duterte tried to soften the blow of his China-leaning foreign policy by doubling entry-level police and military personnel’s salary, while boosting all ranking officers’ wages by 72%. 

Meanwhile, Duterte also promoted a whole host of friendly generals, while appointing a succession of newly-retired military chiefs to prized civilian positions. The military also benefited from the acquisition of modern weapons amid a billion-dollar modernization program. 

What the military wants 

In fairness, the armed forces remained broadly professional, maintaining their commitment to defending the country’s sovereign waters amid growing Chinese encroachments throughout Duterte’s presidency.

But Duterte’s charm offensive also largely explains the absence of any serious coup attempts throughout his extremely controversial term in office. 

The upshot of the populist president’s policies, however, was a fiscal time bomb, as the government lavished benefits on security personnel in an unsustainable fashion.

Just as the Duterte administration increased wages and benefits, it kept the military’s pension system highly liberal, whereby uniformed personnel are not required to make contributions and retired personnel would receive pension increases whenever active servicemen enjoyed expanded benefits. 

Earlier this year, Philippine Finance Secretary Benjamin Diokno warned that the military pension system was not “not sustainable,” warning that “if this goes on, there will be a fiscal collapse.” In response, former acting defense chief Carlito Galvez warned that any reform of the pension system could force the premature retirement of 70-to-80% of enlisted personnel.

A few months later, Marcos appointed Harvard-trained lawyer and longtime businessman Gilberto “Gibo” Teodoro as the new defense secretary.

His first marching orders to the new defense chief, who also served in the same capacity during the Arroyo administration, was to oversee the rationalization of the military’s pension system by reducing monthly pension for retirees, raising retirement age and/or instituting mandatory contributions from soldiers. 

Recognizing the sensitivity of the issue, Teodoro promised “minimal” financial burden on the uniformed services. 

“We want a self-sustained pension system,” he said, “but it needs a couple of years to load it up in order for it to be self-sustaining.” When asked about the impact on morale of the armed forces, Teodoro emphasized the need to “appeal to their patriotism.” 

As the Marcos administration proceeds to rationalize its historically generous pension system for the military, it will inevitably have to consider the armed forces’ strategic preferences. In particular, the Philippine military supports expanded defense ties with the Pentagon, a key source of training, equipment and aid over the past half-century.

Eager to avoid confrontation with China and its proxies, Marcos has repeatedly equivocated on the exact nature of the agreement with the US. For the military, however, the defense pact is a great boon, thus their preference for a maximalist version of the agreement which expedites modernization of Philippine military and joint preparations with the Pentagon for any potential contingencies in either Taiwan or the South China Sea. 

“If we are to protect our sovereignty and territorial integrity, including the protection of maritime resources that should be enjoyed by our people, we need a 360-degree protection capability,” Colonel Medel Aguilar, armed forces spokesman, told the media this year.

“Aside from equipment, modernization also means getting facilities – such as runways, barracks for our soldiers, and where to store equipment during times of emergency,” the armed forces’ spokesman added. 

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Cambodia enters a new era

Hello Globe readers,

Today it’s the last weekly newsletter of July and we are already looking forward to seeing what August has in store for us.

In the meantime, let’s dive right into the latest features. The week began with the foreseen victory of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) in Sunday’s general election. Just a couple of days later, Prime Minister Hun Sen, the country’s top leader for 38 years, announced he’d soon hand office to his eldest son, Hun Manet. 

Over nearly four decades of Hun Sen’s leadership, both the country and the region have been fast-urbanising. But the rapid development of urban areas has often led to overlooked pockets of poverty within the city landscape. Recent studies show how a holistic approach to improving informal settlements could increase the countries’ GDP by as much as 10.5%. 

Optimistic reports also come from the Asian Development Bank and economic experts who believe the region is fighting on amidst the rising cost of living and growing inflation. The region is also adapting its emergency response techniques to the escalation of global natural disasters, which especially affect the Asia and the Pacific region. 

That’s all for today, may you have a wonderful weekend and enjoy the features below.

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Thailand-bound Chinese activist nabbed in Laos

Lawyer Lu Siwei was attempting to reach Bangkok to board flight to US to rejoin family

Thailand-bound Chinese activist nabbed in Laos
A photo provided by a source wishing to remain anonymous shows Chinese lawyer Lu Siwei at a roadside stop about 300km north of Vientiane, Laos on Thursday. He was arrested on Friday and his current whereabouts are not known. (Photo Supplied)

BEIJING: A Chinese human rights lawyer has been arrested in Laos while en route to Thailand, and activists and family members fear he could be deported back to China and face prison time.

Lao police seized Lu Siwei on Friday morning while he was boarding a train for Thailand. He was reportedly on his way to Bangkok to catch a flight to the United States to join his wife and daughter, The Associated Press reported.

“I’m extremely worried for his safety,” said his wife, Zhang Chunxiao, in a text message seen by the news agency. “If he’s sent back to China, he’d definitely be imprisoned.”

The Chinese foreign ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Lu had a history of taking on sensitive cases and defending people deemed to be political targets by Chinese authorities.

In 2021 he and a colleague were stripped of their licences, reportedly because they were representing the “Hong Kong 12”, a group of activists who attempted to flee the territory after China imposed a sweeping national security law.

Some of them were already facing prosecution for alleged crimes linked to the huge and often violent pro-democracy protests that swept Hong Kong in 2019.

Lu was barred later in 2021 from leaving China for a visiting fellowship in the United States. His wife and daughter both resettled in the United States last year.

Bob Fu, founder of the Texas-based religious rights group ChinaAid, said he was contacted by Lu’s family two weeks ago to assist in his escape from China. ChinaAid earlier this year helped to get more than 60 Chinese Christians resettled in Texas after they were detained in Pattaya for overstaying their visas.

Lu’s arrest on Lao soil reflects how Beijing pursues critics abroad, Fu said, part of a broader clampdown that has instilled fear in Chinese dissents.

Lu was being accompanied by two activists working with ChinaAid when he was arrested. Police also grabbed one of the activists and confiscated his passport briefly before returning it.

Dissidents on the run from the Chinese state have reported harassment elsewhere in Southeast Asia, including the family of one detained by Thai police after bomb threats were called in under their name.

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How one small community is fighting off the dengue fever scourge, as cases accelerate rapidly in Thailand

CLIMATE CHANGE HELPING DENGUE SPREAD

Dengue fever is a disease closely associated with the environment. Rainfall, temperature and airflow all play a part in assisting transmission.

Ongoing research shows the direct connection between climate change and the spread of dengue fever at higher rates and to previously unaffected communities.

In temperate zones with warmer temperatures, mosquitoes may expand their habitats and are able to live in places they could not previously. 

“The primary factor influencing this situation is temperature, as even a one-degree increase can result in a 10 per cent higher chance of dengue fever occurrences, according to the research we have conducted,” said Kanchana Nakhapakorn, an associate professor with expertise on dengue fever and climate change at Mahidol University.

Nakhapakorn explained that mosquitoes tend to stay inactive and rest when the temperature is lower – below 24 degrees Celsius. But when the temperature rises, they become more active and are able to fly around in search of food.

“If the temperature rises, the developmental process from eggs to larvae and adulthood of mosquitoes accelerates, the chances of them reproducing and spreading increase significantly. This also makes it easier for disease transmission,” she said.

With increasing urbanisation, common throughout Thailand and the Southeast Asia region, reduced airflow in cities means mosquitoes have better conditions to breed.

The onset of the atmospheric phenomenon known as El Nino is also expected to bring elevated temperatures and the likelihood of extreme weather that could exacerbate dengue spread. 

Record heat has already been recorded across many parts of Asia this year and changes to rainfall patterns could prove problematic when trying to contain the disease.

“Since dengue fever occurs due to mosquito bites, improper environmental management could lead to its continuous occurrence. If there is an abnormal amount of rainfall, we surely have reasons to be worried and concerned,” Wisit said.

“When there is frequent rainfall, even small puddles can become breeding grounds for mosquitoes that transmit dengue fever,” he added.

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