Southeast Asia (Page 123)

MANILA – “I do not think anybody wants to go to war,” Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr said following his meeting with Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Cooperation (APEC) summit in San Francisco last week.

“We really should view this as a work in progress. It’s a process,” Marcos Jr added, referring to the two sides’ intensifying maritime disputes in the South China Sea.

The seemingly cordial meeting saw the two leaders agree on the need to establish guardrails in their bilateral relations. Both sides also made their respective redlines clear, with the Filipino president realistically acknowledging that “the problems remain and it is something that we need to continue to communicate [on with our Chinese counterparts].”

With few signs yet of big-ticket investments from the West, Marcos Jr is also intent on reviving frayed economic ties with China, which has yet to implement multi-billion infrastructure pledges in the Southeast Asia nation.

In many ways, the Marcos-Xi meeting mirrored the pragmatic undertones of the much-covered summit between US President Joe Biden and his Chinese counterpart.

Tellingly, the Filipino president immediately visited the US naval facility in Hawaii after the APEC Summit. There, the two allies finalized new defense deals, including on intelligence sharing and maritime security cooperation.

By all indications, Marcos Jr seems intent on enhancing the Philippines’ bargaining position and overall deterrence capabilities vis-à-vis China, while keeping communication channels with Beijing intact.

By combining engagement and deterrence, the Filipino president hopes to reset his country’s terms of engagement with the Asian superpower.

“Let me say that I have waited a very long time to say, aloha!” declared Marcos before a cheering crowd at the Hawaii Convention Center. “The Filipinos and the Filipino-Americans in Hawaii hold a very special place in my heart for all the wonderful experiences that we had here with our Filipino compatriots,” he added, referring to his family’s years of exile in Hawaii following the fall of his father’s dictatorship in 1986.

The Filipino president’s main mission in Hawaii, however, was discussing ways to further expand military cooperation with the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), which is seeking access to strategically situated bases across the Philippines to keep China’s ambitions in check.

During a speech at the Daniel K Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Honolulu, the de facto think tank of the INDOPACOM, Marcos Jr emphasized his country’s intensifying disputes with China.

Marcos Jr said that the situation in the South China Sea “has become more dire” in recent months, with China inching “closer and closer” to dominating waters off the coast of the Philippines.

“Unfortunately, I cannot report that the situation is improving… The situation has become more dire than it was before,” lamented Marcos Jr, acknowledging the desperate conditions and growing fears of armed clashes in the disputed waters.

But the Filipino president stuck an uncompromising line, maintaining “The Philippines will not give a single square inch of our territory to any foreign power.”

Marcos Jr’s two-day visit culminated in a meeting with INDOPACOM chief John Aquilino, who visited EDCA bases in the Philippines earlier this year. The two reportedly discussed ways to further enhance maritime security cooperation through intelligence-sharing and greater interoperability.

With fears of a potential Chinese military intervention over the Second Thomas Shoal, the Filipino leader likely also discussed ways to jointly deter the Asian superpower. Manila has reiterated its commitment to resupply its marine detachment on the contested shoal and fortify the grounded BRP Sierra Madre vessel there.

Over the past decade, the US Pentagon has provided “over-the-horizon” operational support over the shoal by flying drones and sailing warships close to the contested area. But the Philippines and US are now reportedly seriously considering potential contingencies, including an armed conflict with Chinese maritime forces in the area.

The Philippines is also pursuing regular joint patrols with the US and other like-minded naval powers near the contested area. The US has repeatedly emphasized that it will come to the Philippines’ rescue should its troops, vessels and aircraft come under attack by a hostile third party in the South China Sea.

But the two allies are also discussing ways to more effectively counter China’s evolving “gray zone” strategy, namely the deployment of gigantic coast guard vessels and an armada of militia vessels to intimidate rival claimant states in the area.

The Philippines’ expanding security ties with the US may strengthen its hand in the South China Sea, but not without its own costs, not least a “short sharp war” with China in the disputed waters.

The economic costs are already mounting. Amid rising tensions in the South China Sea, Beijing has effectively frozen its investment pledges to the Philippines.

“We have three [big-ticket] projects that won’t be funded by the Chinese government anymore. We can’t wait forever and it seems like China isn’t that interested anymore,” complained Philippine Transportation Secretary Jaime Bautista last month at an investment summit.

Meanwhile, foreign direct investment (FDI) from traditional Western partners has also been falling in the Philippines. Meanwhile, there are growing indications that the Biden administration’s “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework” has hit a snag amid stiff bipartisan opposition at home.

In effect, the West has yet to offer the Philippines any major economic incentives amid Marcos Jr’s hard pivot away from China and back to traditional allies.

As a result, there is growing pressure on the Filipino leader to revive communication channels with Beijing in order to not only prevent an armed conflict in the South China Sea, but also reopen discussions on large-scale investment deals.

The Marcos Jr administration is intent on dealing with the Asian superpower from an enhanced geopolitical position amid deepening defense ties with the Pentagon. It remains to be seen, however, if Beijing is open to any meaningful compromise or engagement in response to Manila’s double act.

Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on X, formerly Twitter, at @Richeydarian

Continue Reading

Japan’s natural security ally in Southeast Asia is the Philippines. That country, which is an archipelagic nation like Japan, has seen a continuous increase in security pressure from Beijing.

Prime Minister Fumio Kishida visited the Philippines on November 3 and met with President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. The two leaders agreed on expanding their bilateral defense cooperation to address security challenges due to China’s growing military activities in the South and East China Seas.

The two reached an agreement on starting negotiations for a defense pact, a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) that would help facilitate the presence of visiting forces and further conduct military training activities collectively. 

Kishida asserted that a defense agreement with the Philippines would allow the deployment of Japanese troops to the country, which would strengthen ties between the two nations and work on countering China’s aggressive behavior. There have been increased tensions in the East and South China Seas and both Tokyo and Manila are locked in territorial disputes with China. 

In June, Japan had sent a coast-guard patrol ship, the Akitsushima, to the Philippines and participated in a trilateral exercise with the US and the Philippines. Long-standing treaty allies of the United States are Japan and the Philippines. Because of this, their armed forces have been exposed to and probably impacted by American military tactics for a long time, which facilitates cooperation among them.

Moreover, Japanese leaders believe that stronger security ties with the Philippines could bolster deterrence in the Western Pacific. Japan has been steadily expanding its security engagement with the Philippines as Tokyo is also trying to move away from its pacifist stance, which was explicitly evident in its revised National Security Strategy document that came out in December 2022. 

Both Japan and the Philippines explored the idea of such an agreement in 2015. However, this has now taken an urgency due to China’s assertive behavior.

As part of its Official Security Assistance (OSA) program, Japan intends to donate coastal radar systems to the Philippine Navy, valued at about $4 million, to enhance its capabilities. With the announcement in April that the Philippines will be among the primary beneficiaries of the aid program, Japan has given Manila access to air surveillance radars, satellite communications equipment, and coast-guard vessels.

Moreover, with the launch of the OSA, Japan has broken with its long-standing policy of not using development aid for anything other than disaster relief in the military.

The Terms of Reference (TOR) pertaining to the Japan Self-Defense Forces’ (JSDF’s) humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations in the Philippines were already signed by the two leaders in February. The two nations are currently preparing to expand their cooperation into the military sphere.

Relations between the two nations date back at least six decades. Japan is the largest supporter of infrastructure development in the Philippines, contributing funds to the construction of bridges, railroads, and the Manila subway, among other projects.

Concerns have been expressed regarding China’s objectives in the region and readiness to abide by international law and standards due to its military buildup and increasingly assertive maritime maneuvers. Beijing claims that because it has “indisputable sovereignty” over some South China Sea islands, its activities are legal.

Perhaps nowhere are these worries more felt than in the Philippines, where Chinese warships have been obstructing fishermen’s passage and Manila is unable properly to explore oil and gas deposits in a region that an international tribunal has determined to be part of its exclusive economic zone.

In the contested waters, tensions between China and the Philippines have recently increased. Chinese ships crashed into a Philippine Coast Guard ship and a supply boat in the South China Sea in October. Japan and the US both condemned the incidents and reaffirmed their commitment to support the Philippines in the event of an armed attack.

Japan denounced the incident and sided with the Philippines in preserving the maritime order, while Manila accused Beijing of purposefully colliding with its boats. It is evident that Manila’s and Tokyo’s decision to strengthen security ties was significantly influenced by their growing concerns about an increasingly assertive China.

Way forward

The two nations are in the process of negotiating a Reciprocal Access Agreement, which may enable cooperative military exercises and other joint operations by their armed forces. The Philippines has similar agreements with both the United States and Australia, and Japan has separate agreements of a similar nature with the United Kingdom and Australia.

The Philippines is seen as essential to preserving regional security and stability because of its location relatively close to Taiwan and along important maritime trade routes. This is because there are worries in some circles that a crisis similar to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could arise in the region.

An RAA between Japan and the Philippines would facilitate joint exercises and give the JSDF more access to Philippine bases, possibly even enabling rotational deployments. Such an agreement would also greatly facilitate the JSDF’s deployment to the Philippines during emergencies such as natural disasters.

Furthermore, the agreement would enhance trilateral collaboration with US military forces. The United States was able significantly to strengthen its defense posture in the disputed South China Sea and close to Taiwan this year thanks to an agreement reached by Washington and Manila that allowed access to four more military installations in the Philippines. 

The Marcos administration canceled several development projects under Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative and suspended a military exchange program with China because of the recent severe deterioration of Sino-Philippine relations.

Kishida’s visit to Manila also included a number of agreements in the tourism and infrastructure sectors, coinciding with the two nations’ strategic alignment on matters of defense and security. They not only share the same interests in the area of maritime security, but they also agree that resistance to Chinese coercion is necessary.

Japan aims to uphold the US-dominated “rules-based international order” and secure the “free and open Indo-Pacific” vision amid growing concerns over China.

It is unlikely that the Philippines is the only nation that would welcome increased security cooperation with Japan given China’s persistently assertive actions. Most notably, Vietnam has accepted Japan’s offers of patrol boats and participated in maritime drills with it. Meanwhile, it has been suggested that Japan may provide military support to Fiji and Malaysia in the future.

Though it has undoubtedly gotten off to a slow start, Japanese security engagement could soon pick up momentum.

Continue Reading