Southeast Asia (Page 12)

This content was first published by Pacific Forum. It is republished with authority.

The UK recently published the seventh edition of&nbsp, Global Strategic Trends&nbsp, ( GST7 ), an early milestone in the new government ‘s&nbsp, Strategic Defense Review. GST, a program launched by the previous Labor government, provides geostrategic environment to tell corporate reviews that are conducted every four to five years.

Over the course of its 21 years, GST has expanded to include use in several different countries and gained significant international traction as a result.

Edition seven is the most comprehensive but, covering all international regions and shared spaces (oceans, Arctic, Antarctic, area and cybersecurity ), as well as emerging changes in societies, economy, the atmosphere, technology, conflict and security.

The new version is also far more geostrategic than its predecessors, reflecting a planet that has &nbsp, changed significantly&nbsp, since Labor next came to power in 1997. This more uncertain and risky prospect was the inspiration for the development of GST7.

The development of the world’s population has been a major contributor to that change, with the number expected to increase to 10 billion by 2055, tenfold since World War II. This has already led to the growth of new military and economic forces. Russia, some nations in East Asia, and a large portion of Europe are on the verge of a traditional turning point, when Africa, together with South and Southeast Asia, may begin to experience rapid population decline.

Therefore, as new countries leverage on youth bubbles to increase creative and service capacities, the balance of financial power may change even more. The competition for employees among developed nations perhaps even rise, but growing legal and illegal immigration may also add to already existing social, economic, and social pressures.

With international demand set to&nbsp, boost, the politics of energy could transform deeply. While hydrocarbons may be a major resource for the foreseeable future alongside nuclear power, the&nbsp, green transition&nbsp, could modify the landscape significantly. While positive in terms of carbon pollution, this change also brings new issues.

These include an expansion of equipment in previously congested and contested estates and&nbsp, lakes, opposition over clean technologies and markets, and exposure to the&nbsp, important minerals&nbsp, required to make these technologies, bringing innovative global regions into focus.

For example, 60 % of the country’s now identified&nbsp, sodium debris, an essential component for chargers, is under Latin America, while exposure to these sources is already impacting security&nbsp, in other areas.

Although estimates vary on how much will 3-D printing and automation innovations contribute to onshoring of manufacturing, the majority of economists anticipate that the majority of products will still be produced along extended value chains that span the globe.

New&nbsp, emerging nations&nbsp, poised to take on the mantle of the “world’s factory”, however, mean overall patterns of global trade could&nbsp, change significantly&nbsp, by mid-century as new routes and&nbsp, ports&nbsp, open in the coming decades. These configurations could be further altered by a shift in supply chains brought on by rising geopolitical tensions.

The availability of commodities may also increase competition in shared spaces. Significant deposits of critical minerals and&nbsp, hydrocarbons&nbsp, under the poles and across the&nbsp, ocean floors&nbsp, could see new races to mine these fragile ecosystems emerge, placing increasing strain on the international treaties that protect them.

Global food demand is also expected to increase by&nbsp, 50 % by 2055, creating increasing pressures for land farming and on the seas, including through&nbsp, illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.

Meanwhile, the race for high-tech leadership and control of digital standards and protocols is already growing, particularly given the dual-military potential of many of these technologies.

The development of digital services and communications also presents new potential risks. Artificial intelligence, for example, could prove both the&nbsp, great disruptor&nbsp, of traditional work while creating new forms of employment, with significant implications for economic and social stability.

Digital infrastructure is expanding all over the world. More satellites were&nbsp, launched in the first six months of 2022 than during the previous 60 years, for example, largely by commercial actors.

Subsea cable networks, already carrying&nbsp, 95 % &nbsp, of global internet traffic, continue to expand particularly&nbsp, in the southern hemisphere. These crucial networks will be both more crucial to how the world functions and ever more vulnerable to accidents as well as cyber and physical attacks.

The more frequent, violent, and permanent effects of climate change will cut across these drivers. This coincides with the population expanding and, possibly, shifting to coastal urban areas, the areas that are most susceptible to be impacted by rising sea levels and more destructive storms. In addition, impacts to&nbsp, critical national infrastructure&nbsp, could become more prevalent and damaging.

Meanwhile as ice melt opens up the&nbsp, possibility of new trading lanes&nbsp, across the Arctic, traditional routes such as the Panama Canal are already being&nbsp, impacted&nbsp, by changing temperatures.

Drought and storms could see&nbsp, millions becoming climate refugees&nbsp, in the coming decades, while the viability of some coastal regions and small island states may increasingly be challenged. More recently scientists have warned that some climate tipping points could be&nbsp, reached by mid-century, which could change weather patterns dramatically.

Near universal ownership of portable electronic devices combined with ubiquitous internet access will make the world&nbsp, increasingly connected&nbsp, but also more aware of rising inequality. Although some people will venture into space, the oceans, and the mysteries of life in the coming decades, it’s unlikely that everyone will benefit from these discoveries.

During the pandemic, for example, the world witnessed&nbsp, reversals&nbsp, in the indices of human betterment that had hitherto risen for decades. During that same period, however, &nbsp, 131 global billionaires doubled their wealth. In some areas, the state and the current systems of economic management and governance are now being increasingly questioned.

Combined, these pressures mean the future of geopolitics and security looks increasingly uncertain. The global balance of power is expected to become more congested and contested in the coming decades, even though the US, China, Russia, and other major powers in Europe and East Asia appear to continue to play a significant role. That could lead to larger-scale, emerging medium and small powers playing a more significant role in international affairs in the future.

Pressures on states, however, could also create gaps in governance for other actors to exploit. That includes transnational criminal gangs as well as violent extremism of all kinds. The corporations and the elites that own these assets could also become more powerful global actors as digital, space, and other technologies take a bigger part in how states operate.

The power’s future direction seems to be getting more uncertain at the same time. Earlier conceits that China will surpass all other countries in terms of importance. 1 economy, for example, now look less certain. Russia’s future depends on the outcome of its illegal conflict with Ukraine, as well as the price that China might demand for continued support. The US may face an increasing array of international demands, even if it avoids a turn back to isolationism. which all have more than a “rhyme” of history to them.

But if global order is less certain than at any time&nbsp, since the end of the Cold War, what are the alternatives? GST7 offers five scenarios. Instead of developing strategies based solely on a preferred future, which is frequently a common approach, they are prepared for less palatable world orders as well as the types of actions that might prevent them.

The world might turn to multilateral solutions in the event of a future existential crisis. It is the kind of world that the UN Secretary General requested at his Summit for the Futures.

Alternatively, the current rules-based international order endures, albeit increasingly competed.

However, growing conflict could also result in the creation of competing” spheres of influence” where major global powers impose rules on trade, diplomacy, and security for the nations in their orbits. Given the interdependence of trade and other issues, such a world might not quite be as oppressive as the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Of course, that arrangement could lead to even more bloody wars, and edition seven is the first GST to consider the possibility of a new global conflict. Alternatively, a succession of crises could place states under increasing pressure, with other actors then taking a more prominent role in global affairs.

All these potential futures will need to be taken into account as the new UK government prepares to release the results of its Strategic Defense Review next year. It may not take long to act in the wake of the potential new crises that are a result of ongoing wars in the Euro-Atlantic and Middle East.

Peter Olive&nbsp, ( [email protected]. former Royal Navy officer and senior defense leader, and former senior adjunct fellow at the Pacific Forum. Up until July 2024, Peterson oversaw the UK’s Global Strategic Trends program.

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