Johnson Controls opens new office and innovation center in Singapore 

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  • The area will host the OpenBlue Innovation Center and can provide 450 employees.
  • Office complies with Singapore’s 2030 Green Plan, which promotes green growth.

George Oliver, chairman, and CEO of Johnson Controls at the company's Innovation Center

Johnson Controls, a leader in bright, healthy, and lasting buildings, today opened its innovative office in Singapore. The company, strategically located at One- northwest, serves as a living laboratory for collaboration, study, and development, furthering Johnson Controls ‘ commitment to its partners and community across Southeast Asia.

At the new business opening, Johnson Controls chairman and CEO George Oliver stated that” Singapore’s vibrant and innovative ecosystem corresponds with our vision for a more lasting future, where economic development goes hand in hand with economic management and social duty, ensuring a brighter and more resilient future for all.” Our Singapore company represents a fantastic next stage in our commitment to this vibrant and varied nation, he continued.

The area, which covers 3, 535 square meters, did house around 450 employees and house an OpenBlue Innovation Center that will demonstrate solutions for building owners, operators, and industry leaders to create intelligent buildings that are safe, healthy, and green.

Johnson Controls ‘ OpenBlue Innovation Center is a good example of how businesses are working with our ecosystem to advance innovation and technology growth, according to Jacqueline Poh, managing director of the Singapore Economic Development Board. We anticipate the wise and environmentally conscious building solutions that this center will create and provide to the East Asian region, she continued.

One-North’s connected habitat expands the effect of the novel service, encouraging cooperation with local partners, institutions, and industry experts to advance technology and solution integration to bring cutting-edge innovation to the market.

The new business building also supports The Singapore Green Plan 2030, which strengthens Johnson Controls ‘ commitment to advancing the country’s national plan on sustainable development in the face of obstacles like climate change and urbanization, and furthers Johnson Controls ‘ commitment to advancing the wise area change in Singapore and throughout Southeast Asia.

Johnson Controls claimed, in addition to supporting Singapore’s vision for a brighter and more efficient future, it has equipped more than 40 % of the city-state’s commercial properties with wise developing solutions.

With Singapore as our proper hub, Johnson Controls is well-positioned to promote sustainable development, facilitate innovation, and form lasting collaborations that may shape the region’s and the region’s future.

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Asia dominates list of decade’s top arms importers – Asia Times

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Nine of the 10 biggest arms importers in 2019–23 were countries in Asia (including the Middle East) and Oceania, according to a report on international arms transfers released Monday by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Ukraine became the fourth biggest arms importer globally after it received transfers of major arms from over 30 states in 2022–23, the institute reported.

As for arms exporting countries, the United States, number one on the list, saw a rise of 17% between 2014–18 and 2019–23, while exports by Russia fell by more than half (53%). Arms exports from France grew by 47% and it supplanted Russia as number two on the global list.

Excerpts from the SIPRI report follow:

Asia-Pacific importers

Arms imports by states in East Asia (down 6.1%), Oceania (down 10%) and Southeast Asia (down 43%) decreased between 2014–18 and 2019–23.

China’s arms imports fell by 44% and accounted for 2.9% of the global total in 2019–23. The vast majority of Chinese arms imports (77%) came from Russia. The drop in Chinese imports is due to China’s growing ability to design and produce its own major arms. Its arms imports will probably decrease further as it develops this capacity.

Japan and South Korea are expanding their military capabilities, mainly because of tensions with China and North Korea. Japan (up 155%) and South Korea (up 6.5%) increased their arms imports between 2014–18 and 2019–23. The USA is the main supplier to both states, accounting for 97 per cent of Japan’s arms imports and 72 per cent of South Korea’s.

The two states are investing heavily in long-range strike capabilities. The USA supplied 29 combat aircraft to Japan and 34 to South Korea in 2019–23.

In the category of land-attack missiles with a range of 1000 km or more, in 2023 Japan ordered 400 and planned to order 50 more. These will, for the first time, give Japan the capability to reach targets deep inside China or North Korea.

Taiwan’s arms imports dropped by 69% between 2014–18 and 2019–23 despite heightened tensions with China. However, major deliveries are planned to take place over the next five years, including deliveries of 66 combat aircraft, 108 tanks and 460 anti-ship missiles. All these planned deliveries are from the USA, which supplied over 99 per cent of Taiwanese arms imports in 2019–23.

Australia was the eighth largest arms importer in 2019–23. Despite an overall 21% decline in its overall arms imports during the period, in 2023 it reached an agreement with the UK and the USA to import at least six nuclear-powered submarines. Australia ordered over 300 long-range missiles from the US. (Outside the region, Finland ordered 200 or those and Germany 75. Canada and the Netherlands have also decided to acquire them.)

Arms imports by Southeast Asian states fell by 43% between 2014–18 and 2019–23. However, tensions, mainly with China, continue to drive arms acquisitions by many states in the subregion.

For example, arms imports by the Philippines (up 105%) and by Singapore (up 17%) increased between the two periods. In addition, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore all placed substantial orders for combat aircraft and ships in 2019–23.

Myanmar, which accounted for 10% of all South East Asian imports, used imported major arms in internal conflicts in 2019–23. Its arms imports in the period mainly came from Russia (38%), China (26%) and India (18%).

India’s tensions with Pakistan and China largely drive its arms imports. India’s arms imports increased by 4.7% between 2014–18 and 2019–23, making it the world’s biggest arms importer in 2019–23 with a 9.8% share of all arms imports.

Russia remained India’s main supplier, but its share of Indian arms imports has shrunk from 76% in 2009–13 to 58%in 2014–18 and then to 36% in 2019–23.

India has instead looked to Western suppliers, most notably France and the USA, and its own arms industry to meet its demand for major arms. This shift is also visible in India’s new orders, many of which are placed with Western suppliers, and its arms procurement plans, which seemingly do not include any Russian options.

Arms imports by Pakistan grew by 43% between 2014–18 and 2019–23 and accounted for 4.3% of the world total, making it the fifth largest arms importer globally. Pakistan continued to strengthen its arms procurement relations with China: 82% of its arms imports came from China in 2019–23, as against 69% in 2014–18, and 51% in 2009–13.

Arms imports by states in the Middle East were 12% lower in 2019–23 than in 2014–18. Three of the top 10 arms importers in 2019–23 were in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt. The USA accounted for 52% of Middle Eastern arms imports. The next biggest suppliers were France (12%), Italy (10%) and Germany (7.1%).

Arms imports and the war in Ukraine

At least 30 states supplied major arms to Ukraine after the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, mostly as military aid, meaning that Ukraine was by some distance the world’s largest arms importer in the year 2023.

The USA supplied 39% of Ukrainian arms imports in 2019–23, followed by Germany (14%) and Poland (13%). To broaden Ukraine’s military capabilities, suppliers began to deliver long-range systems in 2023.

For example, Poland and Slovakia donated 27 surplus combat aircraft, and France and the UK supplied missiles with a range of 300 kilometers. During the year, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway also started to prepare for the delivery of over 50 surplus combat aircraft.

Russia relies primarily on its own industry for its major arms. However, in 2022–23 it imported flying bombs from Iran and ballistic missiles from North Korea, the latter in violation of a United Nations arms embargo on North Korea.

Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 increased the demand for arms in West and Central European states. For example, by the end of 2023 these states had a total of 791 combat aircraft and combat helicopters on order for import.

After it launched the full-scale invasion in 2022, Russia began a campaign of missile attacks against Ukraine. In response, many West and Central European states supplied air defense systems to Ukraine and several placed new import orders for them or accelerated existing procurement processes.

In 2023 Poland ordered 12 air defense systems from the USA, and Germany ordered a single but particularly high-value system from Israel. In 2022–23 Austria, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia ordered air defense systems from Germany, while Finland and Slovakia ordered Israeli systems, and Lithuania and the Netherlands ordered Norwegian systems.

In addition, some states ordered missiles for systems being produced domestically or to arm newly acquired imports or their existing systems. For example, in 2023 Poland and Norway ordered missiles from the UK and the USA, respectively, for their new systems, while Germany ordered 500 missiles and Romania 200, all from the USA, for their existing systems.

Read the full study here. Its authors: Pieter D. Wezeman (Netherlands/Sweden) is a senior researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Program. Katarina Djokic (Serbia) is a researcher, Mathew George (India) is the director, Zain Hussain (United Kingdom) is a researcher, and Siemon T. Wezeman (Netherlands) is a senior researcher with the program.

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China’s outbound investment reshaping the global economy – Asia Times

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As economists obsess over plunging foreign direct investment into China, they risk missing a far more important trend: the giant waves of capital zooming in the other direction.

In 2023 alone, Chinese outward direct investment in the Asia-Pacific region surged 37% to nearly US$20 billion. That outflow speaks to how Chinese companies seeking growth abroad are altering financial dynamics from Asia to the West to Latin America.

And how China Inc’s investment ambitions are only just beginning to remake the global pecking order, despite Washington’s attempts to curb its influence.

“China’s ODI has risen substantially since the turn of the millennium,” says Frederic Neumann, chief Asia economist at HSBC. “Only starting to venture out into the international investment landscape in the mid-2000s, China was, in a sense, ‘late to the game.’ However, after rapid increases in the first half of the 2010s, China’s stock of ODI now surpasses that of Japan, Germany and the UK.”

And there’s still room for exponential growth. As of the end of 2023, Neumann notes, the overall stock of Chinese outward investment was just one-third that of the US, and still small relative to the size of China’s economy. At 15.7% of gross domestic product (GDP), Neumann says, “it’s well below” that of the major developed economies and the global average of 34%.

The reason, Neumann explains, is that Chinese firms have strong incentives to “go out” to explore global markets, including the so-called “Global South” developing markets. As China develops, its funding of ODI will be an increasingly vital channel to gain access to resources, markets and trade routes.

The dynamic marks an about-face from earlier policies de-emphasizing ODI in 2016 and 2017 and during the pandemic period. Yet an increasing amount of investment now “would align with broader Chinese economic and political development priorities,” Neumann says.

“We think that Chinese ODI flows are set to accelerate,” he adds. “In our baseline scenario, which envisages ODI rising in line with its recent trend, annual flows could rise by over 50%, with at least $1.4 trillion to be invested abroad between now and 2028.”

There’s an ever more dramatic upside scenario that HSBC is analyzing: China’s ODI rising in sync with per capita gross domestic product. That would mean a near-tripling of the recent pace of ODI to well over $400 billion per year.

China’s outgoing cash contrasts sharply with the 12% drop in overall FDI into emerging Asia in 2023. Roughly half of the investment China is making in the region is going to Southeast Asia, up 27% year on year.

Especially Indonesia. Southeast Asia’s biggest economy, which grew more than 5% in 2023, took in about US$7.3 billion of Chinese ODI last year.

“Indonesia has a track record of navigating shocks and maintaining economic stability,” says economist Satu Kahkonen, World Bank country director for Indonesia.

Incoming president Prabowo Subianto projects 8% growth for Indonesia over the next five years. The challenge, Kahkonen says, “is to build on strong economic fundamentals to deliver faster, greener and more inclusive economic growth.”

To achieve such growth, she adds, “it’s important to continue implementing reforms that remove bottlenecks that limit efficiency, competitiveness, and productivity growth. Doing so will enable Indonesia to accelerate growth, create more and better jobs, and achieve its vision of becoming a high-income country by 2045.”

Clearly, Chinese investment could help Jakarta achieve these lofty goals. That goes for other parts of Asia, too, as China’s global investment trends begin returning to pre-Covid-19 levels.

Significantly, the sectors in which China is focusing are shifting. For example, mining and real estate ODI have declined. More recently, manufacturing, transport, storage and postal services have been among the top sectors. Now, it’s technology, renewable and green energy, electric vehicles and digitalization.

Headline-grabbing EV sector investments include a joint venture between South Korea’s LG Chem and Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt. Others involve mainland automakers putting manufacturing facilities in countries such as Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia.

China’s geographic priorities are pivoting, too. The US and Europe are less in favor, while Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Middle East are seeing more ODI from Asia’s biggest economy.

“The allure of new global markets and evolving business models are driving Chinese enterprises to venture abroad and expand their presence on the global stage,” notes economist Yi Wu, an author of the China Briefing newsletter published by Dezan Shira & Associates.

This, of course, presents new challenges. “While this trend opens doors to promising opportunities for Chinese firms,” Wu says, “the complexity of navigating diverse regulatory landscapes in different countries can be challenging to their global endeavors.”

There’s much about China’s role in the global economy that is being misunderstood. One is the state of US-China ties, the globe’s most important relationship.

“If you think the US is decoupling from China, think again,” says economist Robin Brooks at the Institute of International Finance. “Look at the sharp rise in China’s trade surplus with key ‘trans-shipment’ hubs around the world. Stuff made in China is still heading to the US, just on a more circuitous route. There is no decoupling. Only relabeling.”

Yet the pivot that may matter most is how China’s cash is moving upmarket.

Wu notes that in recent years, Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) “presented tremendous opportunities for China’s ODI investors, leading to a significant uptick in the number and value of investments within these nations.” Yet such BRI projects covered just over 70 countries.

By the end of 2022, Chinese domestic investors had established what Wu calls a “robust global presence” with 47,000 offshore enterprises spanning 190 countries worldwide.

More than 60% of these enterprises were in Asia, 13% in North America, and 10.2% in Europe. That left roughly 16,000 overseas enterprises, around 34% in BRI countries.

All this means China Inc is methodically raising its “presence in the global market,” while “improving local infrastructure and creating massive jobs with their projects launched worldwide,” notes Yu Miaojie, president of China’s Liaoning University.

This includes Latin America. Thilo Hanemann, analyst at the Rhodium Group, notes that the US “is experiencing a post-pandemic boom in foreign direct investment, driven by the resilience of the US economy as well as new industrial policies that incentivize US manufacturing investment such as the CHIPS Act and the Inflation Reduction Act. Chinese companies are notably missing from the party.”

Instead, the burgeoning economies of the Global South are enjoying increased interest from the mainland.

“China’s engagement with Latin America has also been expanding rapidly,” says Wu of China Briefing.

A “substantial catalyst for this expansion,” he notes, was a nearly $3 billion transaction in Peru. There, China Southern Power Grid International acquired two Peruvian assets from Enel, Italy’s largest utility company. It speaks to how “Latin America emerged as a remarkable hub for M&A deals for Chinese enterprises,” Wu says.

Loletta Chow, global leader of EY China Overseas Investment Network, notes that “China remains Latin America’s second-largest trading partner and the region is gradually becoming a crucial economic and trade partner for Chinese enterprises.”

In a November report, EY China calculated that the mergers-and-acquisition deal value by Chinese enterprises in Latin America was $3.3 billion, up 185.9% year on year. The main targets were Peru’s power sector and advanced manufacturing and mobility sector enterprises in Brazil. 

EY Global notes that China Inc’s top interests in Latin America are electronics, cross-border e-commerce, agriculture, healthcare, culture and tourism, logistics, solar energy, and automotive, “signaling broad prospects for future collaboration between the two regions.”

It can also be a way to buttress China’s soft power in the region, notes Linda Calabrese, a research fellow at the Overseas Development Institute. “Therefore,” she says, “investing in renewables has positive non-monetary returns and can improve bilateral relationships.”

Margaret Myers, Asia-region director at the Inter-American Dialogue think tank, notes that Chinese investors “remain focused on traditional sectors of interest, too, including those related to China’s own food and energy security.”

Some of these still account for a significant portion of overall investment, but investment within these sectors is also shifting in ways that are consistent with China’s growing focus on innovation,” Myers says.

In general, she adds, “the sorts of large-scale infrastructure projects” that once characterized BRI “are no longer as emblematic of Chinese investment in Latin American countries as they once were.”

In many parts of the region, Chinese interest in canals, rail, and other major transport and energy, she adds, “is being replaced by a growing emphasis on innovation, whether in information and communication technology, renewable energy, or other emerging industries, consistent with Beijing’s laser focus on its own economic upgrading and global competitiveness.”

More broadly, EY’s Chow adds that “China’s commitment to high-level openness and utilization of international platforms such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China) Summit, Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit, the Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings supported the creation of an open world economy.”

This, Chow says, “has provided a more favorable policy coordination environment for the internationalization of Chinese enterprises. We look forward to the continued release of momentum in China outbound investment in the future.”

Of course, geopolitical currents are written between the lines in bold font. It’s worth noting that among the nations that saw a roughly 100% drop in engagement with China Inc investments between 2022 and 2023 were the Philippines, Mongolia and Papua New Guinea – all places that are at odds with Beijing on a variety of priorities.

As Christoph Nedopil, director of the Griffith Asia Institute, tells Nikkei Asia: “There are various reasons but it is typically due to incorporation of political and economic risks. For example, the Philippines and China have had some cooling of bilateral relationships.”

So do domestic economics. China Inc isn’t making outbound investments in a vacuum. And China’s wherewithal to continue pouring heaps of cash into projects around the globe requires stabilizing the financial system and ensuring GDP growth ends 2024 as close to 5% as possible.

But the ways in which Chinese ODI is offering a fascinating split-screen counternarrative to faltering FDI at home is a potential megatrend that deserves greater attention.

Follow William Pesek on X, formerly Twitter, at @WilliamPesek

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China’s manufacturing powerhouse Guangdong eyes technological transformation

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Using a PIN to Face Challenges

Local and foreign producers have been asked to reevaluate their supply chain methods by rising costs and rising costs. Some businesses have relocated some of their activities to different areas, such as South Asia and Southeast Asia.

Chinese electronic vehicle manufacturers, for instance, have just received government support to establish export-oriented supply chains in response to US and European trade restrictions.

Wang Weizhong, government of Guangdong, noted that despite the challenges still present, the region has also improved the law-based, market-oriented setting to draw significant foreign-funded projects.

He claimed that more than 1, 900 of these companies opened stores in Guangdong in January this year, an increase of 106 % over the previous month.

” We does actively promote the high-end, intelligent, and efficient business. According to Mr. Wang,” we will diligently apply the government’s new round of large-scale equipment regeneration and deployment, as well as major policy measures like reducing logistics costs and trade-in of consumer goods,” he told CNA.

He added that Guangdong’s local technology potential has been in the top spot for the past seven times.

” We will view the creation of new quality productivity as a strategic move and a long-term move,” he said,” and this shows ) strong confidence in the development of Guangdong’s manufacturing industry.” &nbsp, &nbsp,

ATTRACTING TALENT AND Assets

The place has been a key force behind China’s financial reform and expansion. It is located at the intersection of China’s Greater Bay Area ( GBA ), a hub for rapid high-tech advancements that attracts significant foreign investment.

” The GBA will enable the agility of a lot of skills, including those from mainland China, Hong Kong, Macao, and even those from other parts of the world,” said one analyst. Therefore, it is difficult for Guangdong to maintain its current talent while attracting more talent from other regions, according to political scientist Professor Sonny Lo.

He thinks Guangdong continues to be a hotbed for foreign buyers as a result of increasing investments in technical knowledge and better communication to Hong Kong and Macao.

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PM sets ambitious goals for tourism

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40 million foreign visitors are anticipated for this year.

PM sets ambitious goals for tourism
Srettha Thavisin, the prime minister, and French company officials speak yesterday in Paris about potential investment options in Thailand. ( Photo: Government House )

According to Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, the government hopes to draw in an estimated 664 billion ringgit this year from Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.

According to Mr. Srettha, the state has set a global goal of 2.3 trillion ringgit for about 40 million foreigners.

At the Internationale Tourismus Borse ( ITB Berlin 2024 ), the largest travel and trade fair in the world, he made the remarks during a speech on Thursday at the Amazing Thailand Networking Event.

According to him, 28 million international visitors visited the nation last year, which generated about 1.2 trillion baht.

According to the prime minister,” Tourism contributes to the market and opens up employment opportunities for a sizable percentage of the Thai populace.”

According to him, the state intends to use every means at its leisure to grow Thailand’s tourism sector.

The government is making it easier for foreign tourists to travel, with cases being momentary card deductions granted to customers from India, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Taiwan over the past five decades.

Thailand and China both signed a mutual visa exemption deal as part of these efforts, which went into effect on March 1.

The government is also in talks with Asian member countries to follow a” One Visa, Free your Destination” agreement to encourage joint local tourism and more ease cross-border travel in the region, the prime minister said. It is also pushing to achieve visa-free travel arrangement deals with Western states in the Schengen area.

Additionally, Mr. Srettha added that efforts are being made to encourage small towns in areas like Bangkok and Chiang Mai.

” In lesser-known places, there are many interesting native nations and hidden gems. The prime minister said,” We are working to promote these distinctive values and provide tourists with unique experiences in these places.”

The state is also using Thailand’s” sweet energy” or cultural heritage as a selling point to encourage the country’s distinctive and important events, he said.

He even made reference to the Songkran water festival, which Unesco just declared to be humanity’s intangible cultural heritage.

The state plans to hold World Songkran Festival events throughout the entire country starting April 1 through April 21, he said.

Mr. Srettha met with European business leaders in Paris on Friday to talk about Thailand’s potential funding options.

Sébastien Bazin, the chairman and CEO of Accor, a European foreign hospitality business that operates hotels, villas, and vacation properties in Thailand, was one of the people he met.

They discussed approaches to collaborate on tourism and plan co-promotional activities to increase sales.

The primary minister spoke with Pascal Morand, the executive director of the Fédération de la Haute Couture et de la Mode, to discuss the possibility of making Thailand a South Asian style and design hub.

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The maritime issues ASEAN wants to talk about – Asia Times

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Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong issued a stark warning to Southeast Asian leaders this week: the region could face a “devastating” conflict over the South China Sea unless it strengthens its diplomatic and legal safeguards.

Wong said the region was already experiencing “destabilizing, provocative and coercive actions”, in addition to “unsafe conduct” in the air and sea. These were not-quite-so-veiled references to China’s recent actions in the South China Sea.

Other countries in the region – especially Vietnam and the Philippines – share similar concerns about China’s maritime assertions. They question, for instance, what Beijing’s rejection of the 2016 South China Sea tribunal ruling might mean for upholding international maritime laws and keeping crucial sea trade routes open.

This week, Manila again called out China’s “dangerous maneuvers” in the South China Sea. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr vowed not to yield an “inch” to China in the contested waters.

Australia and the Philippines recently signed an agreement to deepen maritime cooperation. This may lead to more joint defense exercises and patrols in the South China Sea.

But not all regional leaders agree about the potential threat. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim issued a warning of his own at the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit this week over the West’s “China phobia.” If the US and Australia have problems with China, he said, “they should not impose it” on Southeast Asia.

Beyond territorial disputes

There is no doubt the great power competition between the US and China sets the strategic backdrop for Australia’s engagement with Southeast Asia.

But while maritime cooperation is increasing among regional states, this doesn’t mean they all agree on the central issues that affect the stability, safety and security of the region’s waters, specifically the South China Sea.

Southeast Asian countries have diverse interests, political systems and strategic priorities. And leaders in the region – like those of many other smaller and middle powers around the world – regularly say they do not want to have to choose between the US and China.

Not all countries are “hedging” to the same degree, but Australia should nevertheless focus its engagement on building genuine partnerships with Southeast Asian countries in their own right – not merely based on perceived external threats – and identifying and addressing shared issues of concern.

At this week’s ASEAN-Australia summit, for instance, Southeast Asian nations drove the idea of a dedicated maritime forum. While the forum did address security challenges such as “gray zone” activities, plenty of other challenges and opportunities were discussed. These included:

  • the importance of the “blue economy” concept, focused on the sustainable use of maritime resources for development and prosperity
  • improving maritime connectivity by ensuring free and open sea lanes of communication
  • bolstering law enforcement and governance to ensure maritime order across the region
  • better addressing environmental and climate change issues.

There was also a strong focus on understanding the local issues facing coastal and Indigenous communities in the region. An estimated 70% of Southeast Asia’s population lives by the coast, where they face increasing livability challenges due to climate change, economic uncertainty and the degradation of fishing stocks and natural resources.

This is not entirely new: ASEAN countries and Australia have been paying closer attention to shared maritime challenges beyond the sovereignty and maritime disputes in the South China Sea.

For example, ASEAN recently released its maritime outlook. In particular, it noted the importance of the region for “global trade, food and energy security and marine biodiversity.”

Opportunities for cooperation

It is no surprise maritime security has reached this level of importance on a shared diplomatic agenda.

While the concerns over China’s activities are real, it’s important Australia and its neighbors to the north focus more attention on the vast range of other ocean-based issues that don’t get as much attention.

These priorities include:

  • protecting open ocean supply chains
  • reducing pollution, in particular plastics, and preventing coral bleaching
  • supporting sustainable, legal and regulated fishing
  • mitigating human, arms and drug trafficking
  • addressing the very real challenges that climate change and rising sea levels present to maritime Asia.

These challenges are often less politically sensitive than strategic concerns, which enhances the prospects of cooperation. This is where science, research and development, knowledge sharing and expert networks can contribute to solving knotty problems. And many of these challenges are transnational, meaning they do not affect one state unilaterally, but often require collective responses.

The challenges are significant. So, too, are the opportunities for collaboration. Getting maritime cooperation right can support the human rights and livelihoods of millions of people across the region.

Rebecca Strating is Director, La Trobe Asia and Professor, La Trobe University, La Trobe University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Japan pumping money into Asia-Pacific’s terror fight – Asia Times

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Amid a growing terror threat in other parts of the world, Japan has been dealing with limited terrorist activity so far. A notorious case of the doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo is a matter of the past, while homegrown jihadist radicalization is negligible. And yet, being an island of safety in a stormy sea is no less of a challenge for the Land of the Rising Sun.

Throughout the past decades, terrorist incidents affecting Japanese nationals or interests have occurred abroad. In a statement aired in 2003, Osama bin Laden, the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks, identified Japan as a potential target.

Twelve years later, at a time when the Islamic State gained global prominence, the nation faced a great tragedy. In 2015, ISIS militants took hostage and beheaded two Japanese nationals in Syria, one of whom, Kenji Goto, was a freelance journalist.

As of today, many experts believe that a protracted armed conflict between Israel and Hamas will play a pivotal role in shaping the terrorist threat landscape in 2024. The ongoing hostilities may fuel terrorist plots and assaults outside the area of conflict, encouraging small cells and lone wolf actors to attack targets associated with one of the sides. 

Just as important is a menace originating from ISIS. The Islamic State caliphate in Syria collapsed five years ago, but make no mistake: The group is still alive and active. To date, the jihadist organization has around 20 branches and networks operating in Africa, Southeast and Southwest Asia and in the Middle East. As for Asia, ISIS extremist ideology remains particularly entrenched in the Philippines and Indonesia. 

In a global fight against extremism, Japan stepped up to the plate by providing aid to international counterterrorism operations. Particularly, Tokyo supports, politically and financially, the US-led international coalition to fight ISIS.

Nonetheless, there is still more room for Japan to increase its counterterrorism cooperation, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, Tokyo has a lot to offer its neighbors, be it security equipment or intelligence sharing. For instance, according to a former FBI agent, nobody in the world is better at physical surveillance than Japan’s law enforcement. 

Now, a new tool has become available: an aid scheme termed Official Security Assistance (OSA). Established in April 2023, the program allows Tokyo to help developing countries raise their security capabilities.

“Over the past decade, Japan has not only strengthened its alliance with the United States but also deepened its military ties with countries such as Australia and its European allies,” Masaki Mizobuchi, associate professor of Middle East politics and international security at Hiroshima University, told this writer. He added:

Japan has expanded its military cooperation with developing countries in Southeast Asia and beyond, focusing on capacity-building support for the militaries of partner nations.

However, until recently, Japan lacked a framework for providing new equipment to the defense authorities of other countries. Additionally, Official Development Assistance [ODA, Japan’s English term for foreign aid], aimed at the socioeconomic development of recipient countries, cannot be used for military purposes.

This restriction has been a significant obstacle to Japan’s foreign assistance efforts. The establishment of the Official Security Assistance is understood to be a measure to overcome this issue.

Professor Masaki Mizobuchi, terrorism expert. Photo: ResearchGate

Mizobuchi said the cooperation areas include such activities as vigilance monitoring, counterterrorism and counter-piracy, humanitarian efforts, and international peacekeeping operations. 

“Nevertheless, as a precaution, The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and its associated operational guidelines will be enforced, thereby restricting cooperation to five specific types of logistical support: rescue operations, transportation, alert systems, surveillance, and minesweeping, as delineated in these guidelines,” Mizobuchi added.

Mizobuchi highlighted four aspects in which Japan’s OSA program can contribute to the fight against terrorism in Asia:

  • equipment and technology transfer,
  • humanitarian assistance,
  • intelligence sharing and cooperation,
  • maritime security.

In terms of technologies, OSA offers possibilities for “supplying non-lethal security equipment, surveillance technologies, and other critical assets that can bolster the counter-terrorism capabilities of partner countries,” Mizobuchi explained. Establishing intelligence-sharing frameworks could help “monitor and counteract terrorist movements, financing, and radicalization efforts across borders.”

“Japan’s advanced capabilities in disaster response can be leveraged to improve regional resilience,” he added. “Given Japan’s strategic interest in maintaining free and open Indo-Pacific sea lines of communication, its assistance could also extend to maritime security, helping to prevent piracy, smuggling, and terrorism at sea.”

Who will benefit most?

Since 2007, the Asia-Pacific region has suffered over 5,000 terrorist attacks. That is fewer than in the Middle East and Africa but considerably more compared with Europe and the United States. Today, terrorism is still a pressing challenge for Asia and needs to be addressed. 

“Countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand could benefit significantly, as they have faced various terrorism challenges, including threats from jihadist groups affiliated with ISIS and local separatist movements,” Mizobuchi said while elaborating on OSA’s advantages.

A Filipino soldier uses binoculars during the siege of Marawi City by Islamic State-aligned militants, July 1, 2017. Photo: Twitter

Especially worth noting is the Philippines, which ranks second most affected by terrorism in the Asia-Pacific region, following Myanmar. The country is attractive to ISIS as the group can make use of sectarianism for recruitment and propaganda. In December, Islamic State put itself back in the spotlight by carrying out a deadly bombing at a Catholic Mass in the southern city of Marawi. 

The first-ever transfer of aid under the OSA framework was agreed upon in November during the visit of Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to the Philippines. Under the deal, Manila receives US$4 million worth of coastal surveillance radars for the navy to enhance the nation’s maritime security.

Counterterrorism activities including joint operations are already on the security cooperation agenda between the two countries. OSA opens up new opportunities in this field and could potentially have an essential impact on the overall security of the region.

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Dragon Ball: Japan manga creator Akira Toriyama dies

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Akira Toriyama Dragon Ball Z graphic portrait seen during a gaming festival in BarcelonaGetty Images
By Fan Wang
BBC News

The creator of Dragon Ball, one of the most influential and best-selling Japanese comics of all time, has died at 68.

Akira Toriyama succumbed to acute subdural hematoma, a type of bleeding near the brain, his studio said Friday.

Dragon Ball is hugely popular around the world and the comic series has also spawned cartoon and film versions.

Fans have paid tribute to Mr Toriyama for creating characters that have become a part of their childhood.

The Dragon Ball comic series debuted in 1984. It follows a boy named Son Goku in his quest to collect magical dragon balls to defend Earth against alien humanoids called Saiyans.

Mr Toriyama had uncompleted works at the time of his death.

Akira Toriyama

Getty Images

He died on 1 March and only his family and very few friends attended his funeral, according to a statement from the Dragon Ball website.

“He would have many more things to achieve. However, he has left many manga titles and works of art to this world,” his studio said.

“We hope that Akira Toriyama’s unique world of creation continues to be loved by everyone for a long time to come,” it added.

Fans offered their sympathies on social media.

“Thank you for creating a manga that represents my youth. Rest in peace, thank you for your hard work,” read a post on X, which instantly got 500 likes.

“It’s too soon, it’s too sad,” another Japanese X user wrote.

“His legacy will live on forever. Thank you for creating the most iconic anime character of all time Akira,” another user wrote.

Born in Nagoya, Japan in 1955, Mr Toriyama broke into the comic book world in the early 1980s with Dr. Slump, which tells the story of a little girl robot Arale and her scientist creator.

But Dragon Ball was his most famous work. To many fans, Son Goku’s journey from a kid who fumbles his martial arts training to a high-flying hero who can shoot bolts of electricity from his hands mirrors their own struggles against self-doubt as they grew into adulthood.

Dragon Ball inspired fan fiction writers and cosplayers who style their hair like the characters’ sharp and pointed locks.

The cartoon version has been dubbed in numerous languages and Dragon Ball action figures are a staple in toy stores from Japan to China and Southeast Asia.

In a 2013 interview with a Japanese newspaper Asahi, Mr Toriyama said he had “no idea” how Dragon Ball became so popular around the world.

He described the series as a miracle, “given how it helped someone like me who has twisted, difficult personalities do a decent job and get accepted by society”.

“When I was drawing the series, all I ever wanted to achieve was to please boys in Japan,” he said, according to news agency AFP.

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Firmer, less peaceful language on Taiwan reunification – Asia Times

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It was less than two days into 2024 when Song Tao, the director of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, called on all Taiwanese to promote “peaceful reunification” with the mainland.

But down in the text, the New Year’s message posted to the office’s website had not-so-subtle wording, as Song warned “the motherland will eventually be reunified, and it will inevitably be reunified.”

The message came less than two weeks before Taiwan held its presidential and parliamentary elections and coincided with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s message that reunification was an all but foregone conclusion.

The thin rhetorical veneer of peaceful reunification has been gradually but significantly replaced with language that is more crisp in “advancing the cause of reunification.”

This week, upon releasing budget figures at the opening of the National People’s Congress, Premier Li Qiang dropped mention of “peaceful reunification” in his government report, according to a Reuters analysis of his speech.

Li reiterated China’s call for “reunification” with Taiwan but added emphasis that it wants to “be firm” in doing so and dropped the descriptor “peaceful”, which had been used in previous reports, Reuters noted.

To be sure, it was not the first time a top Chinese official had omitted the word “peaceful” when referring to Taiwan “reunification.” The firmer language has been repeatedly used by Chinese state officials and has been a mainstay in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) speeches, including in Xi’s speech before the 20th Party Congress in October 2022.

In the president’s words then, he and his countrymen “firmly” grasp “the leading position and initiative in cross-Strait relations, and unswervingly promote the great cause of the reunification of the motherland, which is the goal of work on Taiwan.”

In Xi’s China, the master historical narrative is much more important than the veneer of a peaceful transition. This makes the removal of the language a reflection of current realities and an affirmation that “rejuvenation” through peaceful or more violent methods is the primary focus of the state.

In this effort, China has been consistent dating back Xi’s speech at a 2012 “Road To Renewal” exhibition, where the restoration of China takes precedence over all other objectives. Taiwan is seen as a critical element, as Beijing has called its separation a “result of weakness and chaos in our nation” as noted in a 2022 White Paper, “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era.”

Reunification is also extension of the “Chinese Dream,” which is a collection of national myths and collective traumas manufactured by the state to extend beyond memory, back to the ancient Sui Dynasty of the 6th Century and the glories of the Ming Dynasty, which lasted until 1644. Failure to hold Taiwan is a part of China’s trauma-based nationalism.

So injurious to the Chinese Dream is the threat of failure that “compatriots” in Taiwan who were delicately described as “brothers and sisters” in 1978 are more commonly associated with conspiring to commit the most serious crimes of secession and treason.

Dead now are the remnants of Jiang Zemin’s diplomacy aimed at peaceful Cross-Strait relations, echoed in his report to the 16th Party Congress in 2002, in which the word “peaceful” was used in the Taiwan context nearly a dozen times.

The election outcome in Taiwan was a setback for China, as Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate William Lai won more than 40% of the vote – even though China’s Taiwan Affairs Office had warned on the Thursday before the January weekend election that he represented Taiwan slipping “ever further away from peace and prosperity, and ever closer to war and decline.”

Now, despite economic deflation, there are steep increases in China’s defense spending, up 7.2% for 2024 at US$230.6 billion. The surge in spending comes amid stern warnings about “external interference” and opposition to separatist activities aimed at promoting Taiwanese independence.

Long gone is a much milder approach, evidenced also in Hong Kong well prior to June 2020, when the promise of “one country, two systems” was that of a “high degree of autonomy.”

The decling rhetorical use of “peaceful reunification” also marks the broader realization that Taiwan has moved farther and farther from the control of mainland China. Taiwan’s investment in South Asia and Southeast Asia in 2022 was greater than investments the self-governing island made in mainland China.

Former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen has not only moved Taiwanese companies back from China, but has worked to engineer trade away from the mainland into the broader Indo-Pacific.

Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy, which targets 18 countries, almost doubled between 2016 and 2022. And the breadth of Taipei’s defense-related procurement and related military aid from the United States and other aligned countries makes the island a much more potent foe than it was 20 years ago.

With this reality, Beijing has set its sights on a reunion along the coercive terms it sets. As Taiwan becomes less interconnected and dependent on the mainland, more threats and less diplomacy are likely from Beijing.

Instead, contingency planning will continue to increase, evidenced by the recent weighing of options to blunt the effect of US sanctions in the case of a Taiwan conflict or recent mock drills simulating an island invasion by the military. While the language might simply be the removal of old rhetoric from an old, abandoned foreign policy, it also is symbolic of this new, more dangerous and volatile era.

Mark S Cogan is an associate professor of peace and conflict studies at Kansai Gaidai University in Osaka, Japan. His research interests include Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region, as well as security studies, peacebuilding, counter-terrorism and human rights. He is a former communications specialist with the United Nations, serving in Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.

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ASEAN stands idly by, as usual, on South China Sea – Asia Times

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The latest developments in the South China Sea territorial dispute point to ASEAN’s long-running failure to deal with a major regional problem, highlighting the regional organization’s inherent weakness.

As the confrontations between Chinese and Philippine vessels near the Second Thomas Shoal within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) have grown sharper, the South China Sea has perhaps surpassed Taiwan as the most volatile flashpoint in eastern Asia.

On March 5, the Chinese Coast Guard again employed ramming and a water cannon to attempt to stop a much smaller Philippine vessel from resupplying the soldiers manning a ship intentionally grounded on the reef that serves as a Philippine guard post. 

This time, the Chinese water cannon broke the window on the bridge of the Philippine supply boat, reportedly injuring four crewmen.

Based on its expansive “nine-dash line” claim to ownership over most of the South China Sea, Beijing claims that the Second Thomas Shoal is Chinese territory, demands that the Philippines tow away the grounded ship and refuses to allow repairs to the vessel, which is 80-years-old and falling apart. 

China’s Nine-Dash Line. Source: Facebook

Both Beijing and Manila are treating the showdown as a test of commitment to defending national territory under threat of theft by a foreign government. Manila’s ally, the United States, is obligated to protect Philippine ships and aircraft that come under “armed attack” under a mutual defense treaty.

Typical of its preference for gray-zone tactics, China keeps its actions just below the threshold of what would trigger a US military response. But China is now employing kinetic force that can cause bodily harm, seemingly very close to an “armed attack” even if not with firearms. 

Furthermore, Philippine armed forces Western Command chief Vice Admiral Alberto Carlos says he is running out of vessels to run the re-supply missions because the Chinese water cannon attacks inflict damage that forces the supply boats to withdraw for repairs.

If this situation continues, China will succeed in driving Philippine personnel off a feature they currently occupy, changing the South China Sea’s status quo in Beijing’s favor. 

Washington will unavoidably consider an intervention such as US Navy or Coast Guard vessels escorting Philippine supply ships, or perhaps even standing guard while the Philippines builds a permanent outpost to replace the decaying ship. This could bring US and PRC ships into confrontation with each other, with the potential for further escalation.

In contrast, the Taiwan Strait has calmed slightly as an arena of potential US-China military conflict since the latter part of last year.

Taiwan continues to endure hostile Chinese signaling and, more recently, opportunistic Chinese encroachment into the waters around Taipei-controlled Kinmen island. But Beijing’s reaction to the election of Democratic Progressive Party candidate Lai Ching-te as Taiwan’s incoming president was moderate.

Beijing’s Taiwan policy will be mostly on auto-pilot through late May as the Chinese government waits to hear what Lai says in his inauguration speech. 

ASEAN could help prevent a conflict over the Second Thomas Shoal by unitedly condemning China’s aggressive attempts to enforce its excessive territorial claims. This would be a reasonable position to take.

Twelve years ago, ASEAN and the Chinese government agreed to a Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea, which obligates rival claimants to “resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force,” and prohibits “activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability.” 

China’s actions are clearly non-compliant. 

Then, in 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague declared China’s expansive nine-dash line claim invalid, giving China no lawful basis for asserting sovereignty over areas within the Philippines’ EEZ.  Beijing would be much less likely to bully the Philippines if all the other ASEAN members objected.

Sadly, that is not happening. The same week the Chinese Coast Guard was pummeling a Philippine supply boat with a water cannon, Australia hosted a summit of ASEAN leaders. On March 6, the entire group released a statement, called the Melbourne Declaration, that makes only a vague reference to the tensions around the Second Thomas Shoal.

“We continue to closely follow developments in the South China Sea,” it says. “We encourage all countries to avoid any unilateral actions that endanger peace, security and stability in the region.”

Contrary to the wishes of the Philippine delegation, the statement does not mention the 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The statement displays boldness of conviction on other issues.  It criticizes North Korea for its missile test launches and nuclear tests. It “deplores in the strongest terms the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine.”

And it calls for a cease-fire, increased access for humanitarian aid deliveries and a release of hostages in Gaza. But it gives the Chinese government a pass. 

The Australia-ASEAN summit leader lineup in Melbourne. Photo: ASEAN

While attending the summit in Australia, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim summed up the attitude of some of the ASEAN member states. “China seems to be the leading investor into Malaysia,” he said. “We do not have a problem with China.”

But Malaysia does have a problem with China. Beijing claims territory within Malaysia’s EEZ, Chinese fishing boats trespass there and patrols by Chinese ships and aircraft frequently annoy the Malaysian government.

This is a structural problem. ASEAN members agree to operate by consensus, meaning in practice every ASEAN member has veto power over every ASEAN action and statement.

Observers have criticized ASEAN for its weakness in addressing not only the South China Sea territorial disputes but also the Myanmar civil war, the Rohingya crisis and the problem of transnational air pollution caused by brush fires. Elites in Southeast Asia are themselves critical of ASEAN; most see it as ineffective, slow and unable to act unitedly. 

The relationships that individual ASEAN members have with China vary greatly. At one end of the spectrum is Cambodia, which is nearly a Chinese colony.

At the other end is the Philippines, which in April 2023 opened four new sites for US rotational military access under the two sides’ Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). The Chinese government responded by saying the Philippines is “being used by the US” in “an act that escalates tensions in the region and endangers regional peace and stability.” 

This diversity of orientation toward China makes ASEAN almost incapable of taking a firm position in opposition to China on any strategic issue, even though Southeast Asians are sensitive and averse to Chinese domination.

Cambodia regularly blocks proposed ASEAN actions related to the South China Sea that displease Beijing. A senior retired Singaporean official publicly suggested that because Cambodia and Laos are satellites of China, ASEAN might need to expel them to save itself.

Both Beijing and Washington, for what it’s worth, voice support for “ASEAN centrality.” ASEAN is clearly useful to China as an obstacle to organized resistance against Beijing’s agenda. ASEAN’s usefulness to the US is less apparent.  

Given the economic importance of China to Anwar’s Malaysia and to various other Southeast Asian governments, it is understandable that they generally wish to avoid antagonizing China. 

In this case, however, they risk following that strategy so assiduously that they fumble the larger objective of preventing great power conflict from flaring up within their subregion in the South China Sea.

Denny Roy is a senior fellow at the East-West Center, Honolulu.

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