Micron has said it is communicating with Chinese authorities about the decision. Meanwhile, chief financial officer Mark Murphy said it estimates the impact is “in the low single digits percentage of the company’s total revenue at the low end, and high single digits percentage of total revenue at the highContinue Reading
MFP must tackle lese majeste law alone
The Move Forward Party (MFP) has given assurances that its government’s policies will not harm this country’s constitutional monarchy.
However, party leader, Pita Limjaroenrat, said on Monday that moves to amend the lese majeste law will continue, but the party will be alone in the task.
An eight-party alliance led by the MFP has signed a pact outlining the working agenda of their proposed coalition government. The 23-point memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed by the MFP, Pheu Thai, Prachachart, Thai Sang Thai, Seri Ruam Thai, Fair, Palang Sangkhom Mai and Pheu Thai Ruam Phalang parties omitted amending Section 112, known as the lese majeste law.
Among the key items, however, is a charter rewrite, reinstatement of cannabis as a narcotic drug, replacing military conscription with voluntary recruitment, and pushing for a same-sex marriage law without forcing compliance by people who consider it against their religion.
As he announced the completion of their agreement, Mr Pita said it was a historic day because it marked a peaceful transition in Thai politics. The signing was arranged to coincide with the ninth anniversary of the May 22, 2014 coup.
“The purpose of the MoU is to gather common agendas that we agree to push through government and parliament. It’s our collective responsibility,” he said at the press conference.
Mr Pita said every party agreed that the core policies the coalition members all agreed to back must not affect the democratic system with the king as head of state, and the revered status of the king cannot be violated.
The eight parties, with 313 House seats, on Monday met for two hours at the Conrad Bangkok, the venue of the MoU signing, before the ceremony, which was scheduled at 4.30pm.
A source close to the talks said that the MoU was revised at the request of coalition partners, including Pheu Thai, before the signing to include the phrase “the missions of the MFP-led government must not affect the democratic system with the king as head of state and the revered status of the king who cannot be violated”.
According to the source, the signed MoU slightly differed from the version seen by the media. The item on “administration of justice for cases involving expressions of political views” was dropped.
The source said Pheu Thai reportedly disagreed with an amnesty plan since the coalition talks began due to concerns about conflict of interest and the MFP eventually agreed to exclude it from the MoU.
Asked about the lese majeste law, Mr Pita said the draft law, which was submitted to the House in February 2021, would be pushed by the party, and he expected its passage.
He said that under the MoU, coalition partners could push their own agendas as long as they did not contradict the MoU, and the MFP would continue to push for all policies it had campaigned on.
The MFP leader played down speculation he would not receive support from senators, saying the working teams would hold talks with the Senate to allay any concerns senators might have over the MFP’s plans.
Mr Pita brushed off a rumour that Pheu Thai was in talks with the Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP) to form a rival coalition, saying the eight parties were solid.
He said it was premature to discuss the allocation of cabinet portfolios and the House speaker post following reports that he would oversee the Defence Ministry.
Meanwhile, Wanwichit Boonprong, a political science lecturer at Rangsit University, said the MoU would be unnecessary if the MFP-led coalition does not require votes from the Senate or Mr Pita does not face a probe into his qualifications.
“The MoU is something new. It is a written agreement to prevent betrayal. It’s a political tactic. As for policies, they can say what they want. But the signing of the MoU is to give the MFP confidence,” he said.
TOKYO – The Group of Seven (G7) spent the weekend calling for a pivot away from China’s sprawling supply chains and Beijing’s rising economic power.
Yet new data on pivots in the automotive world, released as G7 leaders were signing their communique, reminded investors why it’s too late for that.
China zoomed past Japan in the first three months of 2023 to become the world’s top auto exporter. Driving the milestone: a 58% year-on-year surge in China’s automobile exports in the January-March period to 1.07 million units.
Adding insult to injury, the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers noted that the increase is partly due to deliveries to Russia. It’s a stark reminder that global sanctions on Moscow over the Ukraine war are proving to be more Swiss cheese than the united front US President Joe Biden envisioned.
Tokyo got its own stark warning, too. The other big reason China is exporting more vehicles than Japan Inc is booming demand for electric vehicles (EVs). This is a market, of course, at which Toyota Motor and other Japanese giants looked askance – to their growing detriment.
China didn’t, which explains why Elon Musk built his first outside-the-US Tesla “Gigafactory” in Shanghai, not Yokohama. Tesla’s China operation is, for now, the top exporter of new energy autos. As of September 2022, Tesla had reached 90,000 domestic orders, according to local media reports.
“These are big market shifts happening at a quick pace,” says Jorge Guajardo, a partner at Dentons Global Advisors.
Economist Jack Gao at the Institute for New Economic Thinking adds: “You know this would happen one day. You know it’s EVs they were hoping to leapfrog the competition with, you know the domestic market size would play a key role here. Still, this happened fast.”
Shanghai scoring the Tesla factory was a major coup for then-local Communist Party boss, now national premier Li Qiang. China surpassing Japan in auto exports is arguably the most significant changing of the guard since 2011, when China pulled ahead of its regional rival in gross domestic product (GDP) terms.
It also highlights the kind of transformation Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s No 2 is pledging to unleash in Asia’s biggest economy. In March, Li reassured global investors that the regulatory crackdown since late 2020 had run its course.
In recent years, Li said, “there were some incorrect discussions and comments in the society, which made some private entrepreneurs feel worried. From a new starting point, we will create a market-oriented, legalized and internationalized business environment, treat enterprises of all types of ownership equally, protect the property rights of enterprises and the rights and interests of entrepreneurs.”
The new government, Li said, will “promote fair competition among various business entities, and support the development and growth of private enterprises.”
What’s more, China’s automobile success is apparently picking up increased momentum. Domestic auto groups generally expect Chinese exports to increase 30% year on year in 2023.
This milestone can’t make Japan or the broader G7 very happy. It’s been 14 years, in 2009, since China became the largest market for new vehicles.
Since then, Beijing has generally speaking been more proactive than the US or Japan in jumpstarting the EV market through tax or other incentives. China also saw building charging stations around the nation as a means of creating jobs and growth in regional economies. That’s now paying off.
In the first quarter alone, sales of EVs and other new energy vehicles jumped 93% year on year to 380,000 units. Such autos account for about 40% of China’s total exports. At present, the leading destinations for Chinese-manufactured new energy autos are Belgium, Australia and Thailand.
For Japan, the Thailand piece of the puzzle is particularly ominous. Though often called the “Detroit of Asia,” Thailand has long been dominated by Japan Inc icons. If Thai chieftains decide EVs are the more lucrative bet, Japan might have to relocate factories.
All this should be a wake-up call for Detroit, too, as Republicans attempt to reverse Biden’s policies to promote EVs and greener growth in general. As the global market pivots toward EVs, General Motors’ gas-guzzling trucks might meet no more demand overseas than Toyota’s hybrid vehicles.
One question raised by all this: how could America, which invented the mass production of autos, have been this asleep at the wheel? Likewise, how could Japan, which created a better production mouse trap, have lost the plot this egregiously?
It’s worth noting that the China threat that the G7 is so sure it can contain is only just beginning in the auto space, many analysts say. China is still working to roll out its own mass-produced EV line priced US$10,000 lower than major Western brands.
This test for China Inc remains, of course. To be sure, mainland success stories Chery Automobile and Great Wall Motor are expanding sales in Russia at a rapid clip. It’s unclear, though, if such companies that are funded by entities linked to Chinese municipal governments have the capacity to thrive globally.
Yet the G7 is making it easier for China Inc to spread its wings. After Vladimir Putin’s soldiers invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Toyota, Volkswagen AG and others shuttered Russian production facilities. Mainland automakers promptly stepped into the void.
To strategist Yan Wang at Alpine Macro, new auto data solves a recent mystery. “Why,” he wondered, is China’s “trade surplus going through the roof? This is one of the reasons: Vehicle exports are exploding, while imports tumbled.”
It’s a big deal. To strategist James Thorne at Wellington-Altus Private Wealth, it’s a sign that “the globalization theme is not dead.” And that “China is evolving as it should – to high value-added manufacturing and consumption,” Thorne adds.
Risks abound, of course, as the G7 targets supply chains vital to China making high-quality autos – a likely sign of more tit-for-tat moves between the G7 and China.
In Hiroshima last weekend, G7 leaders stressed their plan is to “de-risk,” not decouple from China, while acknowledging challenges posed by the mainland’s practices which they said “distort the global economy.”
In its joint statement, the G7 stressed: “We are not decoupling or turning inwards. At the same time, we recognize that economic resilience requires de-risking and diversifying.”
G7 leaders added, “We will seek to address the challenges posed by China’s non-market policies and practices, which distort the global economy. We will counter malign practices, such as illegitimate technology transfer or data disclosure.”
Yet the odds of additional curbs from Washington or Brussels remain high. Goldman Sachs economist Hui Shan is doubtful that the US Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS, is done clamping down on China. There may be “more focus on refining the existing tariff, export control and investment regimes once basic frameworks are in place,” Hui says.
“We expect them to be fairly narrowly focused on advanced semiconductors and related technologies, paralleling last autumn’s export controls, and do not anticipate significant restrictions on secondary market portfolio investments,” Hui adds.
On Sunday, the Cyberspace Administration of China said products made by US memory chipmaker Micron Technology had failed security reviews and barred key infrastructure operators from buying from the company.
“US-China tensions and technological decoupling may continue to trigger bouts of volatility in 2023,” says strategist Norman Villamin at Union Bancaire Privée. “Supply chain relocations out of China could also drag on activity via weaker foreign direct investment.”
Despite all the noise, China’s auto industry is shifting into a higher gear faster than many expected. The G7 can try to slow things down, but Beijing is reminding Japan and its Western allies that China Inc isn’t sitting still – and indeed is racing ahead.
Follow William Pesek on Twitter at @WilliamPesek
Thais are eagerly awaiting the reopening of the Preah Vihear temple ruins in Si Sa Ket, after 15 years of suspension, to promote tourism and a peace dialogue with Cambodia.
Due to border conflicts in the area over territory claimed by both countries, access to the temple from Si Sa Ket’s Kantharalak district has been blocked since 2008.
Thousands of soldiers from both countries are still stationed along the border in Si Sa Ket, Ubon Ratchathani and Surin. The patrols are deployed every 10–15 metres, compared to the overlapping stations which had triggered confrontation in 2011.
In 2013, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) demanded both parties withdraw the armed detachment stationed in front of the temple ruins on the Cambodian side. However, the court’s decision allowed Thailand and Cambodia to deploy border patrol forces on the outer frontiers.
Even though the ICJ’s resolution said Thailand and Cambodia should seek a joint agreement to mutually develop areas in and around the Preah Vihear temple, there has been no improvement since the ceasefire in 2011.
Once a popular tourist spot, Cambodia has thwarted access to the Preah Vihear temple ruins from Thailand’s territory for over a decade.
A local source said there had been many attempts from Thailand to join hands with Cambodia in reopening tourism around the temple’s complex.
For example, one Ubon Ratchathani governor province had asked Cambodia to allow tourists to enter Preah Vihear temple via the Si Sa Ket entrance.
The request was rejected outright under the pretext that only Prime Minister Hun Sen is authorised to decide.
Being under military control for 12 years, Cambodia and Thailand have agreed to halt armed responses against each other.
Nonetheless, the Thai army has never revealed the actual number of deployed officers on the frontline, citing security reasons.
The source said the personnel are from Ranger Forces Regiment 2307, Border Patrol Police Division 22 and 12th Infantry Regiment.
Col Boonserm Boonbamrung, commander of Suranaree Task Force’s 1st special unit, said both Thai and Cambodian soldiers are still deployed in the area surrounding the Preah Vihear temple’s areas, governed by the “5+5 Policy”.
The policy says there must be five officers from Thailand and five from Cambodia stationed at the frontier’s coordination point to help translate and coordinate their moves, avoiding misunderstanding.
“If there is gunfire on one side, the other must not fire back in defence. They must inquire first if the gunfire was accidental or caused by other factors,” said Col Boonserm.
Placing their military forces next to each other, many have feared the proximity might trigger a confrontation.
A source said many of the soldiers are Cambodian-speaking men while many Cambodian officers are capable of speaking Thai.
Apart from guarding their country’s borders, both Thai and Cambodian soldiers in the area have spent their time enjoying hobbies together, such as playing volleyball, rattan ball and petanque.
Many socialise over dinner and their supervisors also keep in contact, said Col Boonsom.
Lt Gen Sawarat Saengphon, Commander of the 2nd Army Region, said Cambodian military leaders had told him that both neighbouring countries might have to tolerate the situation as long as the territory claim is unsettled.
Many locals from Cambodia and Thailand had encroached on the disputed area many times. Lt Gen Sawarat said officers have tried to negotiate and send them away from the area.
“To keep the peace, [soldiers] must be stationed at the same spots. No encroachment; no troop advancement. We must keep to our designated spots which were assigned in 2011,” he said.
Cambodian forces have been stationed at Phu Ma Khua, west of Preah Vihear temple, since the clashes in 2011.
Meanwhile, Thai soldiers withdrew and kept their distance 50 metres away from the nearest military post.
However, taskforces from both sides withdrew from the ancient ruins of Prasat Ta Krabey and Prasat Ta Muen temples in 2011.
They are occupying the areas by half until the territorial dispute is resolved.
Recently on May 18, border security forces from Thailand, Cambodia and Laos organised a sports event at Ubon Ratchathani Rajabhat University to enhance military relations between the three countries.
Each country sent 60 athletes to compete. The event was joined by Lt Gen Chea Sopheak, deputy chief of Cambodia’s 4th military region, and Lt Gen Thol Suvan, deputy chief of Cambodia’s 3rd military region, the taskforces overseeing the Preah Vihear temple’s area.
Some believe the two generals are likely to be promoted to take charge of the region, as the current incumbents in those roles are nearing retirement.
A source said Cambodia would reshuffle its military organisation in the Preah Vihear temple area, a new approach endorsed by the son of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, Lt Gen Hun Manet.
The source said that a promising solution to ease the border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia is to allow tourists to access the Preah Vihear temple on Si Sa Ket’s ground and to allow tourists from Cambodia to enter Pha Mor E-Daeng in Khao Phra Viharn National Park.
“If Cambodia allows access to the temple from Thailand’s side, it would benefit tourists and attract more people to visit. [Thailand and Cambodia] should join hands to promote tourism,” the source added.
It is expected that Lt Gen Hun Manet would resolve the land dispute around Preah Vihear temple which could lead to a permanent military withdrawal and sustainable tourism in the future.
The Preah Vihear temple was built on a cliff in the 9th century and completed in the 11th century as a dedication to the Hindu God Shiva.
The site was listed as a Unesco World Heritage site in 2008.
Pha Mor E-Daeng, located on top of Khao Phra Viharn National Park in Si Sa Ket province on the Thai side, was once an entrance to the ancient ruins but the gate has been closed since 2008.
The ICJ said Cambodia and Thailand, as parties to the World Heritage Convention, must work together to protect it as a world heritage site. It urged them to find a joint solution to the disputed area.
Getty ImagesToshiyuki Mimaki says he remembers crying as he looked up at a blackened sunset after the nuclear bomb hit Hiroshima.
He was only three years old at the time, but he remembers the dazed and burnt survivors fleeing past his home in the countryside. He remembers heading into the city with his family, searching for his father in an apocalyptic wasteland.
Over the years he has recounted these fragmented but vivid memories to school children, to journalists, to anyone seeking to document the trauma of the hibakusha, or the atom bomb survivors. These days, they are a small and dwindling group.
“There are only a few people like us who experienced the war and the atomic bombing. We are dying,” Mr Mimaki said, while sitting in Hiroshima’s Peace Memorial Park, where world leaders attending the G7 summit laid wreaths on Friday.
“Sooner or later, there will not be a single hibakusha. How will Japan change by then?”
It’s a fear that echoes through Japan. The world around them has changed. Japan itself has aged and its post-war miracle economy has sputtered, dwarfed by China’s market and might. An anxious Japanese public now wants greater protection from new threats knocking at their door.
The governing Liberal Democrat Party (LDP), whose hands have long been tied behind its back by voters averse to militarisation, suddenly finds the knots loosening. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s government is embarking on the biggest military spending spree in decades, and seeks to expand its armed forces.
Each move to militarise leaves Japan more divided over its pacifist ideals.
“The world is going through a period of turmoil right now,” Mr Mimaki says. “Recently, Prime Minister Kishida started talking about raising the military budget. I thought: Are you going to start a war?'”
Brought to its knees by the use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan transformed from an imperialist power into a pacifist nation in a matter of years.
Its post-war constitution, adopted in 1947 and imposed by occupying US forces, cemented this transformation. It contains a clause known as Article 9: the first paragraph renounces war, while the second promises to never maintain military forces.
The genesis of Japan’s pacifism, Article 9 is at the heart of the country’s struggle to balance the need for defence with its desire for peace. Some believe the law has weakened Japan, but others argue that to change it is to relinquish pacifism and forget the painful lessons of history.
Faced with significant public opposition, numerous leaders have tried and failed to revise Article 9. But with every security challenge, Japan’s government has succeeded in expanding its interpretation further.
The Self-Defense Forces (SDF), Japan’s answer to a military, were created in response to the Korean War and the start of the Cold War. In the 1990s, during the first Gulf War, Japan sent the SDF on peacekeeping missions, dispatching its forces to overseas conflicts for the first time. More recently and controversially, in the face of a rising China and unpredictable North Korea, the late prime minister Shinzo Abe pushed through laws that allowed Japanese troops to fight overseas alongside allies in self-defence.
“Pacifism is an idée fixe of the Japanese public… they are not going to abandon it,” said James D Brown, an associate professor of political science with Temple University Japan.
“Instead, there is a process of reinterpreting what pacifism means. Where once it meant opposition to the use of armed force, it now means opposition to aggression and acceptance of the use of force in the name of self-defence in a growing list of circumstances.”
Japan is once again at a turning point, facing unprecedented challenges that have stoked a fear of encirclement.
An assertive China is spending billions on its military. It has made increasingly daring moves in the South China Sea, especially against Taiwan, which sits on the doorstep of Japan’s southernmost islands. This has fuelled Japanese anxiety that should conflict break out in Taiwan, Japan would not only be pulled into a war between the US and China, but also targeted as an ally. It hosts US military bases and has the biggest concentration of troops outside America.
North Korea poses a perennial existential threat. Its nuclear ambitions have grown more alarming in the past year, with a record number of missile launches, including several that have flown over Japan. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the possibility that it might use nuclear weapons – which this weekend’s G7 summit is addressing – has also spurred worries of a nuclear war. The perils of a tighter Moscow-Beijing alliance also loom.
“There is a general understanding in Japan that we are now living in a very rough neighbourhood,” said Kazuto Suzuki, an international security and political science professor with the University of Tokyo.
Calls for greater militarisation have long been the domain of a minority of conservatives seeking to reclaim national pride. But recent polls show the wider public warming to the idea.
More people now want a bigger and stronger SDF, from 29% in 2018 to 41.5% last year, according to government surveys. Support for Japan’s security alliance with the US has gone up to an overwhelming 90%; and 51% are in favour of amending the second part of Article 9, which stops Japan from having a military.
Even some in Hiroshima are open to it.
“Every time I hear the news about [North Korea’s] missiles, I am horrified,” said a woman who identified herself as Ms Tanaka. “There are cases in today’s world where people are attacked out of the blue… I wonder if it is necessary to see [the spending] as something to protect ourselves.”
This is music to the LDP’s ears. The party, whose founding principle is to advocate for constitutional reform, has always pushed for militarisation, particularly under Abe. In recent years the government has also come under pressure from Washington – notably former President Donald Trump – to do more in their security alliance with the US.
“The government has always wanted to move forward with increasing capabilities in the SDF. In the past the public has been a brake,” Prof Brown said. “Now, that brake is no longer there.”
Under Mr Kishida, Japan has purchased fighter jets, refurbished aircraft carriers, and ordered hundreds of Tomahawk missiles. He has pledged to spend 43tn yen ($311bn; £250bn) on defence in coming years. By 2027, Japan’s military budget will account for 2% of its GDP, and become the third-largest in the world. The LDP is also once again pushing to revise the constitution to spell out the SDF’s existence and make it clear that Japan can maintain a military for self-defence.
Ironically, Mr Kishida has long been considered a dovish figure within the LDP. With close ties to Hiroshima – his relatives died in the nuclear attack – he has advocated for a nuclear-free world. He has even written a book on it. The choice of Hiroshima to host the G7 summit appears to be deliberate as he seeks to ram home the importance of an anti-proliferation strategy.
Mr Kishida’s argument is that to maintain peace in Asia, Japan needs to drastically upgrade its defence. But some observers also believe that his reputation gives his government’s push to militarise a more politically acceptable sheen.
“Dovish figures can make hawkish moves because people don’t suspect their motives,” Prof Brown noted.
But even Japanese hawks don’t broach the idea of building a nuclear arsenal. Unsurprisingly that remains a forbidden topic in the only country to ever be attacked with a nuclear weapon.
Yet Japan’s pursuit of a sturdier defence has seen Abe and then Mr Kishida cross what some consider to be red lines.
Many within Japan, and neighbours such as China, worry what other taboos the country might break in the future.
One possibility currently being debated is whether Japan should send lethal weapons to aid countries under invasion, such as Ukraine. Mr Kishida recently visited and met Volodymyr Zelensky to pledge support. Tokyo already supplies non-lethal defence equipment to Kyiv.
This, noted Prof Suzuki, would be a “test case for Taiwan”. There are already questions over how far Japan would aid the US in a conflict with China over the island.
A more controversial idea is hosting US nuclear weapons, a proposal which shocked Japan last year when it was mooted by Abe. Public support for this option, known as nuclear sharing, is still low, and last year Mr Kishida rejected the idea, saying it ran counter to Japan’s stance against nuclear weapons.
Still, Japan could change its mind under certain circumstances, experts say. These include South Korea gaining nuclear weapons, an increased threat from China and Russia, or if Russia uses nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
Every time Japan crosses a new red line, or mulls over taking that leap, it intensifies the struggle over its post-war identity and its commitment to pacifism.
Some argue that despite its drive to militarise, Japan’s ideals are still intact. While its pacifism may appear “seemingly inconsistent” through the years, its anti-nuclear and anti-war sentiments have remained alive, said Daisuke Akimoto, an expert on pacifism.
What is happening now is simply Japan’s “security policy strengthening in response to the changing strategic environment,” said Dr Akimoto, an adjunct lecturer at Hosei University in Tokyo.
Prof Suzuki agreed, “I do have a trust in the Japanese intent,” he said. “I do have the belief that Japan has committed in the last 80 years to not go to war. We had a very bad experience, and we won’t do it again.”
But others are not so sure. They believe that the constant redefinition of pacifism stretches the principle to its breaking point.
“I think the way [the government] is doing it is dirty,” said Sara Ogura, a student visiting Hiroshima. “They are interpreting in such a way that it deliberately opens up opportunities for the use of force. It leads me to distrust them.”
While the government said “they have no intention of going to war now, I think they are kind of getting ready to go to war when the time comes,” said anti-nuclear-weapons activist Yuna Okajima.
Some also believe the willingness to militarise is fuelled by the lack of a national reckoning with Japan’s own wrongdoings. While there is mandatory “peace education” in schools that covers the two world wars, discussion about Japan’s role as the aggressor and the atrocities it committed in World War Two is often muted.
Graduate student Misuzu Kanda believes that Japan’s “negative history with other countries is sometimes covered up by the nuclear weapons issue”. “I was born in Hiroshima prefecture. The peace education is provided mostly from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki perspective, talking about how we suffered. But at the same time, when we think about peace, I think we need to reflect back on what we did to other countries.”
Her friend, Ms Okajima, agreed: “I think it is a kind of proof that the Japanese government is not willing to face this history. That’s why they would not teach it to young children, it’s to nurture a patriotic spirit, I assume.”
“But if we do not look at our history as perpetrators, there is a higher chance we would make the same mistake.”
Completely flattened by the atomic bomb, Hiroshima today is a tidy and picturesque city nestled among mountains, carrying few traces of its past apart from the Genbaku Dome, the only structure left standing after the attack.
Across a glittering river, at the peace memorial park, lies a cenotaph honouring those who died in the nuclear attack. An inscription is carved in the marble: “Let all the souls here rest in peace, for we shall not repeat the evil”.
Gazing at it, Mr Mimaki acknowledges Japan’s role in the war.
“The atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the end because we started a war,” said Mr Mimaki as he gazed at the cenotaph. “Hiroshima was burned, Nagasaki was burned, and it was the Imperial Japanese Army that made those mistakes.”
“We mustn’t wage war again.”
On Thursday, Singapore and Kenya also signed Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) to collaborate on areas like information and communications technology (ICT), climate change and skills development. The MOU on climate change will focus on the carbon credits collaboration under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. Under Article 6, countries willContinue Reading
SINGAPORE: The new 24-storey National Cancer Centre Singapore (NCCS) was officially opened by Deputy Prime Minister Lawrence Wong on Thursday (May 18).
Accessible via a direct link bridge to Outram Park MRT, the new centre – which is five times larger than the previous premises – has nearly double the number of chemotherapy recliner chairs and beds as well as consultation rooms compared to before.
There are 108 recliner chairs and beds for chemotherapy treatment and 64 consultation rooms. In addition, the building also has three day-surgery operating theatres, two endoscopy suites and 10 radiation therapy facilities.
At the Ambulatory Treatment Unit (ATU), which sees around 150 patients each day, robots deliver prepared chemotherapy drugs from the oncology pharmacy to treatment suites.
According to NCCS, this helps to free up nurses to spend more time attending to patients.
The national compounding hub also features robotic arms to expedite the safe and efficient preparation of intravenous chemotherapy drugs.
Operations in the new building started progressively from December 2022, with all services fully operational since March this year.
While the centre expects to be able to handle double the number of patient visits compared to before by 2030, NCCS’ CEO William Hwang said this will take some time.
“We have a doubling in capacity, in terms of the beds available and consultation rooms and otherwise, but capacity is also a factor of efficiency as well,” said Professor Hwang during a media briefing on May 10.
“How that will pan out in the subsequent years is hard to say except to say that we were previously seeing about 160,000 patient visits a year and with a doubling capacity, hopefully we will have a doubling, in terms of ability to see those patients, contingent on … getting more manpower in the later years,” he added.
He added that the centre has been progressively recruiting more staff over the past few years.
Speaking at the event, Mr Wong said the opening of the new centre was timely, given Singapore’s ageing population.
“The sobering fact is that one in four Singaporeans are likely to develop some form of cancer over their lifetimes,” he said, noting that close to 40 per cent of those diagnosed with cancer currently are aged 70 and above.
“As our population continues to age, we can, unfortunately, expect more people to be diagnosed with cancer,” he added.
According to the Singapore Cancer Registry 2020 annual report, which was published in December last year, nearly 81,000 cancer cases were reported in Singapore between 2016 and 2020.
The new NCCS building was part of the first phase of extensive redevelopment and expansion plans for the Singapore General Hospital (SGH) Campus, which was first unveiled in 2016 by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong to meet growing healthcare needs.
Last year, Outram Community Hospital – which was also part of the first phase of the master plan – was officially opened.
During the launch in January last year, Health Minister Ong Ye Kung said that the total development budget for Phase One is about S$4 billion.
Other key developments include the Emergency Medicine Building, which will open progressively from 2024. This will be followed by the new SGH Elective Care Centre and National Dental Centre, which are expected to open by 2027.
Mr Ong had added that the second phase of the master plan will see the development of a new SGH complex and an improved internal road network.
Besides outpatient care services, the new centre also houses research facilities, where scientists and clinician-scientists can collaborate and drive research that can translate into better health outcomes.
This includes novel technologies to aid in complex single-cell, gene and protein profiling, enabling scientists to uncover the mechanics and development of cancer.
There is also a dedicated facility with chemotherapy chairs and beds for early-phase clinical trials, offering patients access to new cancer therapies.
The building also houses a tissue bank that will contribute to a better understanding of the evolution and development of cancer in Asian populations.
In addition, patients at the new NCCS will also have access to advanced cancer treatments such as proton therapy, which is an advanced type of radiation treatment, following regulatory approval.
NCCS’ deputy CEO (Clinical) Lim Soon Thye said the co-location and integration of research and clinical services in the new building will help to boost collaboration and drive scientific inquiry which could lead to better patient outcomes.
Beyond improving cancer care, Mr Wong said the country must do more upstream through better prevention and early detection.
“Our real goal is to reduce the incidence of cancer to begin with,” he said.
“We are allocating a lot more resources too, not just to treat people who are sick, but to prevent sickness to begin with.”
This includes free screenings for breast, cervical, and colorectal cancer under the voluntarily national primary care programme Healthier SG.
SINGAPORE: The new 24-storey National Cancer Centre Singapore (NCCS) was officially opened by Deputy Prime Minister Lawrence Wong on Thursday (May 18).
Accessible via a direct link bridge to Outram Park MRT, the new centre – which is five times larger than the previous premises – has nearly double the number of chemotherapy recliner chairs and beds as well as consultation rooms compared to before.
There are 108 recliner chairs and beds for chemotherapy treatment and 64 consultation rooms. In addition, the building also has three day-surgery operating theatres, two endoscopy suites and 10 radiation therapy facilities.
At the Ambulatory Treatment Unit (ATU), which sees around 150 patients each day, robots deliver prepared chemotherapy drugs from the oncology pharmacy to treatment suites.
According to NCCS, this helps to free up nurses to spend more time attending to patients.
The national compounding hub also features robotic arms to expedite the safe and efficient preparation of intravenous chemotherapy drugs.
Operations in the new building started progressively from December 2022, with all services fully operational since March this year.
While the centre expects to be able to handle double the number of patient visits compared to before by 2030, NCCS’ CEO William Hwang said this will take some time.
“We have a doubling in capacity, in terms of the beds available and consultation rooms and otherwise, but capacity is also a factor of efficiency as well,” said Professor Hwang during a media briefing on May 10.
“How that will pan out in the subsequent years is hard to say except to say that we were previously seeing about 160,000 patient visits a year and with a doubling capacity, hopefully we will have a doubling, in terms of ability to see those patients, contingent on … getting more manpower in the later years,” he added.
He added that the centre has been progressively recruiting more staff over the past few years.
Speaking at the event, Mr Wong said the opening of the new centre was timely, given Singapore’s ageing population.
“The sobering fact is that one in four Singaporeans are likely to develop some form of cancer over their lifetimes,” he said, noting that close to 40 per cent of those diagnosed with cancer currently are aged 70 and above.
“As our population continues to age, we can, unfortunately, expect more people to be diagnosed with cancer,” he added.
According to the Singapore Cancer Registry 2020 annual report, which was published in December last year, nearly 81,000 cancer cases were reported in Singapore between 2016 and 2020.
The new NCCS building was part of the first phase of extensive redevelopment and expansion plans for the Singapore General Hospital (SGH) Campus, which was first unveiled in 2016 by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong to meet growing healthcare needs.
Last year, Outram Community Hospital – which was also part of the first phase of the master plan – was officially opened.
During the launch in January last year, Health Minister Ong Ye Kung said that the total development budget for Phase One is about S$4 billion.
Other key developments include the Emergency Medicine Building, which will open progressively from 2024. This will be followed by the new SGH Elective Care Centre and National Dental Centre, which are expected to open by 2027.
Mr Ong had added that the second phase of the master plan will see the development of a new SGH complex and an improved internal road network.
Besides outpatient care services, the new centre also houses research facilities, where scientists and clinician-scientists can collaborate and drive research that can translate into better health outcomes.
This includes novel technologies to aid in complex single-cell, gene and protein profiling, enabling scientists to uncover the mechanics and development of cancer.
There is also a dedicated facility with chemotherapy chairs and beds for early-phase clinical trials, offering patients access to new cancer therapies.
The building also houses a tissue bank that will contribute to a better understanding of the evolution and development of cancer in Asian populations.
In addition, patients at the new NCCS will also have access to advanced cancer treatments such as proton therapy, which is an advanced type of radiation treatment, following regulatory approval.
NCCS’ deputy CEO (Clinical) Lim Soon Thye said the co-location and integration of research and clinical services in the new building will help to boost collaboration and drive scientific inquiry which could lead to better patient outcomes.
Beyond improving cancer care, Mr Wong said the country must do more upstream through better prevention and early detection.
“Our real goal is to reduce the incidence of cancer to begin with,” he said.
“We are allocating a lot more resources too, not just to treat people who are sick, but to prevent sickness to begin with.”
This includes free screenings for breast, cervical, and colorectal cancer under the voluntarily national primary care programme Healthier SG.
BBC/Jiro AkibaAt Japan’s Naha airbase in Okinawa, the roar of F-15 fighter jets dwarfs the sound of commercial planes that share the same runway.
Three jets take off one after the other, to start the day’s training – mostly scenarios involving combat and aircraft interception.
At least a couple of jets have gone on “real life scrambles” or emergency calls to intercept suspected Chinese aircraft, say those here.
These routine exercises have taken on a new sense of urgency, according to Lt Col Masatoshi Tanaka.
“We’re very nervous,” he says. “We’ve been facing airspace violations of Japanese territory every day. Chinese activities have expanded in number and quality. They involve UAVs [drones], bombers and reconnaissance planes. There are many active aircraft carriers in this area.”
Naha is part of the Okinawa island chain, which is on the frontline of any potential conflict between China and the self-ruled island of Taiwan. The territory, which Beijing claims and has vowed to take by force if necessary, has become one of the biggest flashpoints in the world, especially as tensions soar between the US and China.
We’re very nervous. Chinese activities have expanded in number and quality
As China becomes more assertive, Taiwan’s security has become a growing concern for Japan, which is hosting the G7 summit in Hiroshima this weekend. And with China expected to dominate the agenda at the summit, Japan’s role as a key player in building regional stability has only grown.
The war in Ukraine and an increasingly volatile Indo-Pacific has pushed Japan to a “crucial position in the alignment of powers,” according to Yoko Iwama, a professor of international relations at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
“We are the linchpin of the network of American alliances and partnerships in the region and I think the Americans are aware of that,” she said.
Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has certainly been making moves to reflect that. In March, Japan normalised diplomatic ties with South Korea after years of terse silence in what has been hailed as a “new chapter”.
That same month, Mr Kishida met India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and then made a surprise visit to Ukraine and pledged $30m (£24m) in non-lethal military aid.
Under him, Japan has announced the biggest military build-up since World War Two, pledging to double defence spending by 2027 – which would give it the third largest defence budget in the world. This illustrates both Tokyo’s urgent need to show that it can defend itself, and also help its closest ally, the US.
Any defence scenario will involve the US, and Okinawa is home to the biggest concentration of US troops in Japan, but the country also needs to show that it can put up a fight. The hope is that this would be enough to deter Beijing and avoid a conflict in the region.
But Japan is close enough to feel the ripples of a conflict that it does not want, but could be pulled into.
When China’s military rehearsed “sealing off” Taiwan during three days of military drills in April, Japan’s defence ministry said a Chinese aircraft carrier was some 230km (145 miles) south of Miyako Island, also part of the Okinawa chain.
When a furious China fired missiles after former US house speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit last year, at least five landed less than 100km from the westernmost Japanese island of Yonaguni.
“Geographically speaking we’re very close to Taiwan and South East Asia, we feel a sense of crisis,” says Yoshitaka Nakayama, the mayor of Ishigaki. The island is about an hour’s flight from the Naha airbase and is a picturesque haven known for fishing and agriculture. Its white sands and crystal blue waters have long attracted holidaymakers and snorkelling fans.
Now, Ishigaki is also home to Japan’s Self-Defence Forces’ (SDF) newest military base. As farmers tend to their crops in the fields around it, soldiers man the gates and cranes and bulldozers move bits of earth as construction continues.
Mr Nakayama says they need to protect themselves: “Chinese ships are patrolling very closely. The equipment we have in terms of missile launchers is for defending ourselves. It’s to protect us in case there are planes or ships that want to attack us. We’re not looking for war.”
Earlier this year nearly 600 troops moved here, including squads capable of launching land-to-ship and land-to-air missiles into the East China sea and beyond.
Ishigaki and the neighbouring chain of islands are in close proximity to two flashpoints. One is the uninhabited Senkaku Islands which Japan controls but China also claims under the name Diaoyu Islands. The other is Taiwan, which is 200km away.
And Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has heightened fears of a potential Chinese attack. As the war rages on there, parallels have been drawn on this side of the world.
There are some similarities, according to Prof Iwama.
“The leader type: Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. But also the claim that a land that is controlled by someone else is yours,” she said. “People see this and are afraid it could happen here.”
She adds that watching large parts of Ukraine being bombed and shelled has brought up memories of World War Two. “You could relate to what was happening,” Prof Iwama says.
But those memories have also angered people in Ishigaki who fear that their home might once again be caught up in conflict. Okinawa, after all, was the site of a historic battle between the US and the Japanese armies.
Now, nearly eight decades later, a military base has renewed those fears, splitting a once close-knit community.
When 85-year-old Setsuko Yamazato, who lost four members of her family in WW2, heard that a military base was being built in Ishigaki, she gathered a “group of grandmas” to speak out against it.
“The first thing that came to my mind was ‘not again’,” she says.
Now, she and the others turn up outside the base every week to protest. With her cane in one hand and a banner saying “give our children a peaceful future” in the other, she chants, stopping at times to cough and take a breath.
“The SDF are coming to the island. They’re building a missile base here,” she chants. “Our island is protected by the God of Miroku, not by the military.”
As someone who experienced war in her early life, she says she does not want to witness another in her old age.
“I don’t want this island to become a battlefield,” she says.
“We’ve been nurtured by the nature and culture of this island. I don’t want that to be destroyed or stolen by war.”
JAKARTA – More than two decades ago, democratic reforms ended the Indonesian military’s dwifungsi (dual-function) role that had underpinned the 32-year rule of authoritarian leader President Suharto since the anti-communist bloodletting of the 1960s.
In doing so, the uniformed branch was effectively removed from the political equation, even if it has retained considerable influence through a nationwide territorial structure and a public image that is second to none.
Now, a proposed revision to the 2004 Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) Law that would dilute the president’s authority over the military and allow more officers to serve in the bureaucracy is causing waves in both military and civilian circles.
Even Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto, a prospective candidate for next year’s presidential elections, doesn’t see the need for tinkering with legislation he feels has been effective in preserving the principle of civilian supremacy.
Some retired generals are opposed to a TNI law at all, arguing that other nations rely not on legislation but on doctrine and protocols to keep their militaries in line. “Why,” asked one three-star retiree, “are they always trying to put us in a cage.”
Dwifungsi was first introduced during a period of martial law in 1957 and then expanded when Suharto took power a decade later to include “every effort and activity of the people in the fields of ideology, politics and economics and in the socio-cultural field.”
By 1980, serving military men held as many as 8,156 positions in all levels of government, from city mayors and provincial governors to ambassadors, state enterprise executives, jurists, legislators and Cabinet ministers.
That had been reduced to about 6,000 in 1995, but despite the reforms that followed Suharto’s downfall four years later, finding jobs for the boys became an increasingly difficult problem in an institution with shrinking duties.
It is unclear who is pushing the changes, but analysts point out that a proposed extension to the retirement age for some senior posts from 58 to 60 would allow TNI chief Admiral Yudo Margono to stay on beyond November when his short 11-month term expires.
Other analysts speculate that the overall move may be a reaction to what one calls “mission creep” by the well-funded national police and their ever-dominant role in the security framework which does not sit well with army generals.
Political activists aren’t pleased at whatever is happening. “The revision of the TNI Law reinstates dual function, violates the Constitution and is betrayal of reform,” the Civil Society Coalition for Security Sector Reform said in a statement last week.
“Instead of promoting TNI as a professional state instrument for defense, the proposed changes will put its reform agenda into reverse,” it said. “We believe some of the changes pose a threat to democracy, a nation of laws, and the advancement of human rights in Indonesia.”
Activists are particularly alarmed about the plan to revoke the president’s prerogative to mobilize and deploy TNI forces, noting Article 10 of the Constitution stipulates that the head of state wields the highest level of authority over the army, navy and air force.
Another article in the 2002 National Defense Law underscores the president’s authority to mobilize the armed forces, despite the head of state not being part of the formal chain of command. He is directly responsible, however, for the police.
The coalition statement said it would be “dangerous” to put the mobilization and deployment of the armed forces outside the approval and control of the president.
“This will certainly restore TNI to the position it once held in the past, wherein it was empowered to act in the face of a threat to security, to undertake a military operation other than war without deferring to presidential decision.”
This, it said, “indisputably goes against the principle of civil supremacy that is fundamental to the concept of a democratic state with regard to maintaining democratic civil-military relations.
Critics are also worried about the new law’s proposed increase in the types of Military Operations Other Than War (OMSP) from 14 to 19, which they say indicates a desire to expand the role of the military beyond the defense sector.
They point out that some of the additions are in fields beyond military competence, including ani-narcotics measures, drug precursors and other addictive substances, and vague missions in support of national development.
A third major point of contention is the plan to increase to 18 the number of ministries where active officers can hold jobs as a way of relieving a logjam in the upper echelons of the 300,000-strong army that has so far defied solution.
Interestingly, the International Institute of Strategic Studies lists Indonesia as having a per capita ratio of one active serviceman per 1,000 population, one of the lowest in the world and on a par with East Timor and Cameroon.
Under the 2002 law, serving officers can currently hold positions in 10 different institutions, including the Defense Ministry, the Political Coordinating Ministry, the National Defense Institute, the National Search and Rescue Agency, the anti-narcotics and counter-terrorism agencies and the Supreme Court.
Although the numbers vary, military spokesmen have said in the past there are about 100 generals and more than 500 colonels who have no designated jobs, many of them so-called “expert staff” on the packed eighth floor of the Defense Ministry.
Apart from an end to dwifungsi, the shortage of positions is put down to a 2005 extension to the retirement age from 55 to 58, fewer internal security threats since Aceh and East Timor, and a failure to retire officers if they don’t make the grade by a certain age.
When the issue surfaced four years ago, there were concerns that discontented colonels might either stray towards religious extremism or shift their loyalty to Prabowo, Widodo’s then-presidential rival and a former three-star general.
But shedding colonels and one-and-two-star generals ahead of retirement – and ending what is effectively a womb-to-tomb vocation – could only worsen morale.
Analysts believe a better way to alleviate pressure at the top may be to reduce the annual Indonesian Military Academy intake of 150-200 cadets and cut back recruitment of specialized junior officers from the country’s universities.
In 2019, as part of a review of the country’s 15 regional commands, Widodo authorized the upgrading of many of the Type B resort commands (korems) to Type A status, but that created only a handful of new positions for colonels and brigadier generals.
Back then, National Defense Institute governor Agus Widjojo described opening up the bureaucracy to more serving officers as a “one-dimensional” plan which ignored the side effects or failed to offer any long-term solution.
“It is not a way to solve the problem of officers who don’t have jobs,” said the retired three-star general who played a major role in getting the military out of politics and is currently the Indonesian ambassador to the Philippines.
Both Western-educated, Widjojo and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, then chief of staff for socio-political affairs, initiated the first moves to depoliticize the military in 1999.
Over the next two years, the police were separated from the armed forces and active-duty officers were ordered to leave their posts in the bureaucracy and either take early retirement or return to the military, which many did.
But it wasn’t until 2004, just months before Yudhoyono became the country’s first directly elected president, that the remaining military and police appointees were finally compelled to quit Parliament.
The TNI’s pervasive territorial structure remained in place, although Yudhoyono did issue a decree placing all military businesses under the umbrella of the Defense Ministry, saying that command authority tended to destroy good corporate governance.
In the years that followed, the military kept a generally low profile – until successive TNI commanders, first General Moeldoko, now Widodo’s chief of staff, and then General Gatot Nurmantyo, began seeking a wider domestic role for the military and openly talked about their own presidential ambitions.
Fearing it may represent the thin end of the wedge, pro-democracy activists have continued to question why military officers who either retire or voluntarily leave the service opt for a political career, sometimes unreasonably so.
Despite everything, however, the TNI has a far better public image than the national police – or for that matter any other institution. A Kompas survey last February gave it an 86.5% approval rating, with the once poll-topping Anti-Corruption Commission (24%), the Constitutional Court (52%), the police (50%) and Parliament (29%) trailing in its khaki wake.
