Chinese vent anger at Trump’s trade war with memes, mockery

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BEIJING: While China’s leaders use their economic and political would to combat Donald Trump’s business war” to the finish”, its army of social media soldiers are embarking on a more playful campaign online.

The US government’s tax campaign has seen Washington and Beijing impose eye-watering duties on goods from the other, fanning a conflict between the economic powers that has sparked worldwide recession worries and sent markets into a spiral.

Trump says his plan is a reaction to decades of being “ripped off” by various locations and aims to bring manufacturing back to the United States, forcing companies to hire US employees.

But China’s website troops have been taking advantage of the huge leaps in artificial intelligence to make jokes highlighting that many of the products bought by Americans such as shoes and smartphones are made using inexpensive Chinese labour.

Defiant posts have shot to the top of most-searched lists on social media, flooding platforms with patronising comments and jokes.

In one video, a Chinese Internet user opens his hands to reveal what goods he buys from the United States – nothing.

His dozens of videos railing against the United States have accumulated tens of millions of views on TikTok, officially blocked in China but accessible through a virtual private network (VPN).

” Donald Trump started a trade war, so… ( expletive ) MAGA,” he says in one video, referring to Trump’s campaign slogan of Make America Great Again.

‘ Two-faced behaviour ‘

The user, based in northeastern China’s Liaoning province and who asked to be identified by his online persona” Buddhawangwang”, told AFP the posts were a way of “venting my anger”.

The 37-year-old poster said he moved to California in 2019 but” threw away” his green card four years later – angry over “prejudices against China”.

AI-generated videos putting Trump, Vance– who sparked outrage with comments referring to ' Chinese peasants ' – and Musk on footwear and iPhone assembly lines quickly went viral. — AFPAI-generated videos putting Trump, Vance– who sparked outrage with comments referring to ‘ Chinese peasants ‘ – and Musk on footwear and iPhone assembly lines quickly went viral. — AFP

That included “fake news” about Xinjiang, the far-western region where Beijing is accused of widespread human rights abuses against minorities. China denies the claims.

Now, he feels vindicated in his quest to “debunk Western propaganda”.

For many in China – whose status as” the world’s factory” fuelled its meteoric rise as an economic superpower – the idea of Americans making their own shoes or phones is laughable.

AI-generated videos putting Trump, US Vice President JD Vance– who sparked outrage with comments referring to” Chinese peasants” – and tech mogul Elon Musk on footwear and iPhone assembly lines quickly went viral.

Others show rows of befuddled overweight shophands fiddling with sewing machines as Americans make clothes, shoes and electronic devices.

The alleged hypocrisy of US officials railing against China while enjoying the fruits of globalisation has also been targeted.

One post traced a dress worn by White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt to Chinese online shopping platform Taobao.

” Attacking’ Made in China ‘ is work; enjoying’ Made in China ‘ is life,” one comment read.

” Two-faced behaviour. Don’t wear it then, don’t use it,” another said.

Another post shared by Beijing’s foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning showed Trump’s trademark “MAGA” hat marked” Made in China” – with a price tag indicating an increased cost.

‘ Made in China ‘

Elsewhere, Chinese users have taken to TikTok to show Americans how they can get around the swinging tariffs – going to China and buying goods straight from the source.

In one, a man in a warehouse claiming to work at a factory making Birkenstocks in the eastern hub of Yiwu sold pairs of the iconic sandal for just US$ 10.

” We have seven colours,” he says, pointing to multiple pairs of shoes displayed on a cardboard box with the words” Made in China” printed on it.

” If you need, please contact me,” he added, gesturing towards stacks of boxes behind him.

” There certainly is nationalism here,” Gwen Bouvier, a professor at Shanghai International Studies University who researches social media and civic discourse, told AFP.

The videos make “fun of how rude JD Vance is and, by extension, the Trump administration”, Bouvier said – a timely clapback against the vice president’s “peasants” comments.

But beneath the humour there is likely deep concern over the impact of the trade war on China’s export-dependent economy.

Censors on the country’s strictly regulated Internet appear to have scrubbed out narratives that warn of the effects they may have on Chinese consumers and manufacturers.

On China’s X-like Weibo platform, all comments under the hashtag” The United States will impose a 104 % tariff on Chinese goods” have been removed.

By contrast, the hashtag” America is fighting a trade war while begging for eggs” – a reference to soaring prices for the kitchen staple – was viewed 230 million times.   – AFP

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Small businesses in China fret over US tariffs, look to manage costs

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The Sanyuanli business in Beijing, which sells imported products and appeals to expatriates, is also affected by the price war.

Because her provider isn’t replenishing the property, shop owner Peng Binglan said she will have to force her to stop selling imported US bread in her business. &nbsp,

” A lot of people, including us, may not be able to be if things keep going this way.” We simply won’t be able to continue working,” Peng, who has sold her goods on the open market for 18 times, said. &nbsp,

CHANGING TO OTHER Businesses

Before the price jolt, China’s economy was currently grappling with a number of fundamental issues. &nbsp,

Users have been reluctant to spend despite the nation meeting its 2024 development goal, which included an increase in the economy by 5 %, as a result of a protracted housing crisis and rising poverty. &nbsp,

Foreign manufacturers will also be hit severely by the steepened US tariffs, requiring them to expand to different markets to lessen the impact. &nbsp,

According to Yue Su, principal analyst for China at the Economist Intelligence Unit,” Europe and Japan are the markets that are meaningful big enough, significant enough to withstand China’s increased customer goods exports.” &nbsp,

Yue claimed that China should think about boosting trade between those two nations in order to boost Chinese goods. &nbsp,

When he and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez were greeted in Beijing on April 11th, Chinese President Xi Jinping gave the impression that he was extending an olive tree to Europe.

Xi called on the West to help multilateralism and empty cooperation while stressing that China and the European Union may have against “tariff bullying.”

China is also keen to improve its economic relations with South Korea and Japan, with state media reporting on multilateral trade ties following a high-level gathering in Seoul in March.

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The Chinese Century won’t mean what most expect – Asia Times

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Some people are unsure whether the 21st century will turn out to be the Taiwanese Century because of the insultingly stupid economic self-harm and slow descent into authoritarianism. New York Times journalist Thomas Friedman&nbsp, says yes:

A Chinese business said,” There was a time when people came to America to see the future.” ” Then they come these”.…

President Trump is focused on what groups National trans athletes can competition on, and China is focused on transforming its companies with A. I. so it can outrace all our businesses. Trump’s” Liberation Day” approach includes doubling the amount of tariffs and gutting our nation’s academic institutions and workforce, which encourage innovation in the United States. China’s liberation strategy is to open more research colleges and double down on A. I. driven development …

[ W]h is the reason China’s production behemoth is today so powerful: it makes things cheaper, faster, better, smarter, and more filled with A. I. China places an emphasis on STEM schooling, including science, technology, engineering, and math. Each year, the nation produces some 3.5 million STEM graduates…]T] he best are world class, and there are a lot of them…

Over 550 Foreign places are connected by high-speed road that makes our Amtrak Acela look like the Pony Express.

Matt Yglesias also recently tweeted ( and then deleted ):” For the first time in my life, I really just think America may be cooked and it’s gonna be the Chinese century.”

Tyler Cowen&nbsp, has his questions, arguing that Chinese victory free-rides on a bunch of American-provided people products:

China’s advancements in the field of technology are amazing. BYD has the best and cheapest energy vehicles…Chinese AI, in the form of DeepSeek and Manus, has shocked many Europeans with its inventiveness…Yet American and most of all American identity is not over yet. These breakthroughs by China are true, but they rest on a foundation of American values and corporations more than it might seem at first …

The uncomfortable fact is that China’s size depends on British power and influence. The Chinese trade system, for example, requires a relatively free world buying order…If the world breaks down into deeply selfish protectionist trading blocs…where did the Chinese sell the rising output from their factories? …

The Chinese growth and stability type also requires relatively stable power supplies…If the Western alliance program collapses, who is to keep the Middle East somewhat stable…China scarcely seems up to that task…Another danger on the horizon is atomic proliferation…The more nuclear powers inhabit the world, the more China is hemmed in with its foreign policy ambitions…

There is much to rue in the first few months of Trump’s foreign and economic policy, but China is far from being able to take the baton. They are coming in second and doing a fantastic job of doing that because Americans still hold the lead despite our flaws.

Surprisingly, I think Friedman is more right than Tyler here. Over the past few years, I’ve written a few articles about this subject, and I believe that when we look back on the 21st century, we’ll probably refer to it as the Chinese Century, or at least the first half of it.

But the reason I say this is because what it means for a century to “belong” to a specific country will change from what it meant in the 20th — and often in ways that will not be very pleasant.

What does it mean for a century to “belong” to a country?

There is no one reason why the 20th century is frequently referred to as the” American century.” It’s just sort of a gestalt impression that the US was the most important country during that century. There were many dimensions where this was accurate:

  • The US had the largest economy in the world, and was the dominant manufacturing nation.
  • The US was militarily dominant, having the world’s most powerful military for almost the entire century.
  • The US set the standard for how a modern lifestyle should look in one of the richest and richest economies.
  • The US was a technological leader, producing by far the largest share of the scientific discoveries, breakthrough inventions, and commercial products that changed the world.
  • Through its output of movies, music, television, games, fashion, and ideas, the US was culturally predominate.
  • The US was geopolitically central, it played a key role in creating and sustaining various international institutions, created the world’s largest and most powerful network of alliances, and provided global public goods like freedom of the seas.
  • The US was historically central, playing the most important role in shaping many of the key global events of the 20th century — the World Wars, decolonization, the Cold War, and globalization.

In fact, I think that America’s unusual significance in nearly every area of the 20th century influenced our entire modern conception of recognizing countries as centuries. It’s hard to think of other historical examples where one country has had such broad-spectrum dominance.

The United Kingdom in the 19th century, which led to the Industrial Revolution and the creation of a globe-spanning empire, has come closest to being on par with this country. But even the UK was never as militarily or culturally dominant as America was in the 20th century.

As for older comparisons, only the Mongol Empire in the 13th and early 14th centuries really measures up. For one nation or empire to overshadow all the others, the globe was typically just too fragmented and technological advancement was too slow. Even the Roman Empire, the Abbasid Caliphate and the Tang Dynasty were more regional superpowers than global ones.

Anyway, the point is that there is no justification for us to assume that anyone will rule the 21st century, just like America did in the 20th. The historical norm is&nbsp, multipolarity, with different countries and empires having modest leads in various different dimensions for various periods of time.

Now, you can argue that globalization and continuous technological progress are both here to stay, meaning that future centuries are permanently more likely to have one dominant country. That’s probably true to some, some, and some extent, in my opinion. But as I’ll explain, I also think that the nature of both globalization and technological progress are changing in ways that will bias the 21st century toward multipolarity.

And some of these changes will result from the power transition from the US to China. Simply put, 20th-century America&nbsp, invented&nbsp, the game that it won, whereas China will use its power to invent ( and win ) a different sort of game.

China’s greatness will be different from America’s greatness

You might not be aware of this, but I believe that China and the US are very similar culturally rather than as two distinct” Eastern” and” Western” civilizations. 1&nbsp, But I’m not much of a cultural determinist, I think technology and institutions tend to matter more. Here, the similarities far outweigh the differences.

One area where China already far surpasses America is in&nbsp, state capacity. This is from&nbsp, a post I wrote back in 2023:

In his book,” China’s Economy: What Everyone Needs to Know,” ( which is excellent and highly recommended ), Arthur Kroeber presents a grand, unified theory of the nation’s economy, arguing that it can mobilize a lot of resources quickly and effectively but can’t use those resources in an optimally efficient way.

So in the case of say, building too many apartments, or&nbsp, failed Belt and Road projects, or wasteful&nbsp, corporate subsidies, the lack of efficiency can really bite. However, China’s resource-mobilizing approach can accomplish things on a scale no other country has ever accomplished before if we want to build the world’s largest high-speed rail system, create a world-leading car industry from scratch, or build a significant amount of green energy…

Remember a few years ago, when a bunch of people were&nbsp, sharing this map&nbsp, of a hypothetical U. S. high speed rail system? …Of course, the map and&nbsp, others like it&nbsp, were pure fantasy, in 15 years, California’s much-ballyhooed high speed rail project has &nbsp, managed to almost complete&nbsp, one small segment out in the middle of nowhere.

That’s the extent of the high-speed rail prowess of the US, but China’s authorities actually built the map! … In the last 15 years, China, starting from scratch, built a high-speed rail network&nbsp, almost as twice as long as all other high-speed rail networks in the world, combined. You can look these numbers up on Wikipedia, I’m not going to be exaggerating. As of last year, China had 42, 000 kilometers (km ) of high-speed railways in operation, with another 28, 000 km planned. That’s compared to just 2, 727 km in Japan, with its famous shinkansen.

Back in the middle of the 20th century, the US had much higher state capacity than it does today; it was able to surpass all other countries during World War 2, construct the interstate highway system, and so on. But modern Chinese state capacity vastly exceeds even America’s peak.

What other country could have maintained the kind of cruel, under-controlled Covid lockdowns that China managed to keep through 2022? Of course, past a certain point, these lockdowns were probably counterproductive, and they were certainly&nbsp, dystopian. But they were certainly a demonstration of the awesome power of the Chinese party-state.

China’s size is equal to that of the US, so if its economy grows, it will eventually become even more economically dominant. &nbsp, The UN predicts&nbsp, that by 2030, China will represent 45 % of all global manufacturing, higher than the US ever achieved, except for a brief moment after World War 2.

Keep in mind that as service industries expand, manufacturing accounts for only 5 % of China’s GDP. So unless China somehow turns out to be uniquely weak in the service sector, we can probably expect its overall economic dominance to be just as big as America’s was, or bigger.

Nor do I think the loss of US export markets will hurt China much. Tyler inquires,” Where will China sell the rising output from their factories?” The answer to that question is” China”. Contrary to popular belief, China has a less export-intensive economy than countries like France, Germany, or South Korea:

Source: &nbsp, World Bank

China had a brief period of export-oriented growth in the 2000s, but that’s basically over. China currently sells the majority of its products to Chinese consumers. Even the vaunted” Second China Shock” is mostly an overflow phenomenon, for example, China has become the world’s top car exporter, but the vast majority of the vehicles it makes are for domestic consumption.

Source: Brad Setser, &nbsp

In this sense, China is becoming more like the 20th-century US — a very large economy that has some prominent exports but is fundamentally domestically focused. Lack of demand from America is highly unlikely to cripple or even substantively reduce China’s economic progress, especially as the Chinese economy shifts to services.

No, China’s current real estate bust won’t likely reverse its economic growth in the same way that the Great Depression has permanently halted America’s.

With economic dominance will come military dominance. Due to nuclear proliferation and the shift in technology toward tactical defense ( basically, drones and missiles blow up vehicles and guns shoot down drones ), smaller nations of the world are now probably more able to withstand conquest and dominance by their larger neighbors.

But China’s size and manufacturing strength will allow it to overwhelm any nation that resists it and that threat will be enough to overawe most.

But the similarities probably stop there. China’s enormous size, smaller resource endowments, and inefficiently high level of government involvement in the economy are likely to prevent it from achieving the kind of world-beating living standards that America enjoyed ( and still enjoys, at least for the moment )…

China will be the world ‘s&nbsp, biggest&nbsp, economy, but only because it’s four times the size of America, it probably won’t be the&nbsp, richest. This implies that while the world’s citizens may admire China’s enormous train stations, soaring skyscrapers, and endless infrastructure, they may not be clamoring for the same quality of life as the Chinese.

In terms of technological leadership, China will certainly shine — but not in the same way America did. In a post last month, I argued that China overall is a highly innovative country, but that due to weak IP protections and other institutional factors, its innovations tend to be a blizzard of incremental improvements with few dramatic breakthroughs.

This may seem like a condemnation of China’s system to American ears, but to China’s leaders, this is probably just fine. If China simply appropriates or copies any new invention and scales it up more efficiently than anyone else can, it still comes out on top. And coming out on top is much more important to China’s leadership than advancing the overall development of human knowledge and wealth, in my opinion.

If weak IP protections discourage breakthrough discovery and invention all over the world, so what? That just reduces the risk that the rule of the Chinese Communist Party will be destabilized by the emergence of new techno-economic paradigms.

Some people might contend that AI will alter this formula. If people all over the world are able to create breakthrough innovations on their mobile phones using open-source AI algorithms, the cost of breakthroughs might come down so much that IP protections don’t really matter.

If so, the world will have reached the end of the technological era. But even in that scenario, China will likely be able to appropriate, scale, and commercialize all of those innovations. It will still be the technological leader, just not the kind the US was.

I anticipate that China will be more isolated and less powerful than America was in the cultural realm. Partly this is because of language — English is far more internationalized than Chinese will ever be ( though AI will erode this barrier significantly ).

But it’s also a result of social control. China is a deeply repressive nation, with universal surveillance, fine-grained media and speech control and ubiquitous censorship. That’s the kind of society where only anodyne, cautious artistry can flourish, except in tiny subcultural pockets too small for the government to worry about.

China’s leaders will likely continue to be paranoid about allowing in foreign ideas. They will continue to use the Great Firewall to “protect” Chinese people from the memes and ideas produced by the rest of the world.

China will only experience a weak and lag-related artistic and cultural ferment. It will be orphaned from the global discussion, and the country’s creativity will instead be channeled into the technological and commercial space.

So while I expect China to produce some hit video games and big-budget movies, I don’t think it will do much to push the boundaries of culture, despite the individual creativity of its people. Although TikTok and other Chinese tech products will have an impact on global culture, the main content will be produced elsewhere.

As for geopolitics, I think Tyler is certainly right that China will provide fewer&nbsp, global public goods &nbsp, than America did. It will be more focused on protecting its own trade than it will be on promoting international maritime freedom. Its military will make sure energy supplies reach Chinese shores, but probably won’t be interested in making energy globally abundant.

Research is another example, China’s government will make sure China dominates every frontier technology, but won’t care as much about expanding the frontier. Despite the sneers directed at America’s self-appointed role of “world police,” global security was yet another. It was more willing to fight regional conquerors than China has shown so far.

But I think Tyler overestimates the negative impact on China from the collapse of American public good provision. China’s military will be perfectly capable of doing it themselves if America stops defending Chinese shipping and energy supplies.

There is nothing unique about the US Navy, just like there was nothing unique about the British Navy. And in fact, since I predict China will guard only&nbsp, its own&nbsp, trade and energy supplies and leave other countries out to dry, the Chinese Navy may be able to accomplish its goals more cheaply than the US could.

In other words, I anticipate that China will be a much more self-sufficient power than America was in the late 20th century. It’ll be more like the US of Teddy Roosevelt’s time — mostly inwardly focused, but occasionally intervening in smaller countries ‘ affairs out of economic self-interest or desire for glory. International organizations and forums will either become irrelevant or serve as tools for China to control smaller nations.

In sum, I predict that this&nbsp, will&nbsp, be a” Chinese Century”. This may not hold as strongly in the second half, when&nbsp, China’s low fertility rates start to bite&nbsp, and India really starts hitting the top of its own trajectory.

However, I anticipate that China will be the world’s most powerful country in terms of both economic and technological terms for the next few decades, a historically unmatched marvel of size, resource mobilization, and innovation. America’s orgy of self-destruction will only hasten this future.

And yet, in my opinion, the Chinese Century will be disappointing in many ways, particularly for those who reside outside of China itself. A world where every invention gets grabbed and copied by Chinese state-sponsored companies is a world less filled with wonder ( though AI may help here ). A world where Chinese warships guard Chinese trade and leave other nations to fend for themselves is a more chaotic, less secure, less egalitarian world.

Other developing nations have less opportunity to grow, in a world where China produces everything for itself without relying on foreign manufacturers. A world where China tolerates regional conflicts and preserves peace only in its own backyard is a more dangerous, violent one. And a world in which the most important country keeps its culture a secret from everyone else is drab, less creative.

In other words, I’m more confident than Tyler about China’s ability to prosper, build, innovate and dominate in a world where America collapses in on itself. I think Thomas Friedman is right, and that unless something big changes, China is headed for at least half a century as the globe’s preeminent power.

A Chinese Century will, in many ways, be an improvement over the American Century, which makes me feel somewhat depressed. Perhaps the US efflorescence was a very rare and special thing, whose like we will not soon see again.

Notes:

In summary, America never had a single traditional culture, while China nearly destroyed it during the Maoist era. Both countries have substituted consumerism and technological progress for traditional cultural relationships.

Americans and Chinese people both dress sloppily, cut corners at work and drive to the mall in crocs and shorts, eat high-calorie greasy food and harbor grandiose, vague, usually unrealistic dreams of personal wealth and success. On the other hand, both maintain close, frequently contentious family relationships, with “amoral familism” being practiced in both locations.

Both have a passion for real estate. Both are large, diverse societies with significant social divisions, with the majority of them racial, while the majority are urban/rural and class divisions in China.

In addition, both” Han” and “white” are synthetic ethnicities created to unify large, diverse populations. Both Americans and Chinese people tend to have pride in the size and power of their countries.

I’ve made the casual observation that Chinese people adapt to American culture more quickly than other immigrant groups, and that Chinese people find me to be much more “foreign” than people from Europe, Canada, or Australia. Your mileage may vary, of course.

This article was originally published on Noah Smith’s Noahpinion&nbsp, Substack, and is republished with kind permission. Become a Noahopinion&nbsp, subscriber&nbsp, here.

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Farmers oppose US beef import plan

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Suppliers are already having issues with FTAs.

PUBLISHED: 18 Apr 2025 at 05: 49

Representatives of cattle farmers rally at the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives on Thursday to express concerns over a government plan to allow US beef imports in exchange for certain trade deficit items. (Photo: Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives)
On Thursday, cattle farmers gather at the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives to voice their concerns about a government plan to allow US meat goods in exchange for a number of trade deficit things. Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives ( Photo )

The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives received a rally at the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives to voice their concerns about a state plan to allow US meat imports in exchange for some business gap things. The Beef Cattle Association of Thailand joined with more than 60 related organizations.

The farmers worry that a move like this would hurt the local market, which is already under strain from cheap imports from Australia and New Zealand.

Members of the association have written to the prime minister in opposition, according to Sitthiporn Boorananath, vice president.

” We think allowing US beef and meat imports would only exacerbate grower struggles,” we said. He claimed that the effects of free trade agreements with Australia and New Zealand currently apply to us.

The organization contends that this plan conflicts with Thai laws that forbid the use of growth hormones in cattle, a process that is prevalent in the US.

Growth hormones are recognized as harmful, and their inclusion in Thai beef had put a strain on Thai consumers ‘ health.

Little cattle farmers were excluded from discussions, according to Mr. Sitthiporn, who criticized the government’s new handling of the issue. He remarked,” The government gave focus to big pork producers before backing down, but now there is a push to buy meat or beef offal instead.”

He added that the association may also ask the ministers of finance and business to reconsider the policy in its petition.

It claims that over 1.4 million households that raise cattle in Thailand are currently struggling with falling animals costs.

These producers have been subject to economic hardship as a result of goods under the free trade agreement with Australia, which they claim has raised concerns about the region’s food safety.

The plan has” a direct impact on Thai cattle farmers,” he said, adding that the number of families with over 9.6 million cattle is “above 288 billion baht.”

Cattle farmers across the nation will protest if the government decides to allow the importation of meat and meat offal, according to Sewiang Saengkhaw, a farmer of beef cattle in Phatthalung.

The government argues that the plan is an incentive to demand lower transfer taxes on Thai goods entering the United States. The exports would hurt native cattle farmers, particularly the small-scale producers, who are already suffering from lower cattle prices and who have been forced to stop raising cattle entirely.

The organization warned that the imports of US meat was hurt Thailand’s status on world markets in addition to financial concerns. Thai steak may not be imported into countries like Malaysia, Vietnam, and China, which have strict growth hormone laws.

The Thai Cattle Association urged the government to reevaluate its trade policy in order to protect farmers and maintain the nation’s long-term financial security.

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Trump’s tariffs leave China’s neighbours with an impossible choice

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last 24 days
Koh Ewe

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Getty Images A women wearing a dark blue shirt and a yellow headcloth in a garment factory in Cambodia. She is tending to fabric on a table. Behind her are rows of tables with other similarly dressed women.Getty Images

When US President Donald Trump hit China with levies in his first term, Asian investor Hao Le saw an option.

His business is one of thousands of ones that have come into direct competition with West-restricted Foreign exports.

Le’s SHDC Electronics, based in Hai Duong, is a budding industrial hub that sells$ 2 million ( £1.5 million ) worth of phone and computer accessories to the US each month.

But that income may dry up if Trump imposes 46 % tariffs on Asian goods, a program that is currently on hold until earlier July. That would be” fatal for our company,” Le claims.

He continues,” We may compete with Chinese materials, and selling to Asian customers is not an option.” This is not just our issue. Some Asian businesses are having trouble in their own apartment market.

Some local suppliers were harmed by Trump’s tariffs in South East Asia as a result of a abundance of cheap Chinese imports that were originally intended for the US. But they also opened new doors for other companies, usually into global supply chains that wanted to cut their dependency on China.

Trump 2.0, however, threatens to opened those windows. And that’s a blow to rapidly expanding nations like Vietnam and Indonesia, who are poised to become important people in fields ranging from bits to electric cars.

They even find themselves stuck between the country’s two biggest economies- China, a powerful ally and their biggest trading lover, and the US, a key trade industry, which could be looking to reach a deal at Beijing’s expense.

Getty Images China's President Xi Jinping and Malaysia's Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim smile and shake hands at the official residence of the prime minister in Putrajaya. They both wearing suits and blue ties.Getty Images

This week, Chinese President Xi Jinping has been speaking to Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia, urging people to unite against Trump’s taxes. Given how important South East Asia is to the Taiwanese economy, the journey was much planned but has a new urgency.

China earned a history$ 3.5tn from imports in 2024- 16 % of its exports go to South East Asia, making it the biggest industry.

Prior to Xi’s attend, Malaysia’s trade secretary Tengku Zafrul Aziz told the BBC on Tuesday,” We can’t decide, and we will never choose between China and the US.”

” We will protect [ourself ] if the issue is about something that we feel is against our interests.”

A wake-up phone

South East Asian institutions scrambled into deal-making function in the weeks following Trump’s broad taxes.

Trump called Asian head To Lam, who he described as a “very successful call,” to offer to fully repeal tariffs on US products.

The US business is essential to Vietnam, an emerging technology superstar where manufacturing companies like Samsung, Intel and Foxconn, the Chinese company contracted to produce handsets, have set up shop.

In the interim, Thai authorities have a plan that calls for higher US goods and assets. Since the US is their largest import business, they are hoping to avoid Trump’s 36 % tax on Thailand.

” We will show the US government that Thailand is not only an supplier but also an ally and economic mate that the US can rely on in the long term”, Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra said.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( Asean ) has ruled out reprisals for Trump’s tariffs, instead choosing to emphasize both the US’s economic and political significance.

Getty Images A man in a blue jacket on a motorcycle rides past a factory in Bac Ninh province, Vietnam, with a giant Samsung sign. Behind him are green cars parked outside the factory.Getty Images

” We understand the concerns of the US,” Mr. Zafrul told the BBC. ” That’s why we need to show that really we, Asean, particularly Malaysia, can be that gate”.

South East Asia’s export-focused markets have benefited from both Chinese and US trade and investment. However, Trump’s paused charges was stifle that.

Indonesia, which may confront 32 % taxes, is home to vast copper resources and has its sights set on the global energy vehicle supply network. Malaysia, which is becoming a hub for semiconductors, could become subject to 24 % taxes.

Cambodia, a Taiwanese alliance, is subject to the highest charges: 49 %. One of the poorest countries in the region, it has thrived as a trans-shipment hotspot for Chinese companies seeking to skirt US taxes. 90 % of the clothing companies, which are primarily exported to the US, are presently owned or run by Chinese companies.

Trump may have put a stop to these taxes, but” the damage has been done,” according to Doris Liew, an scholar from Malaysia’s Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs.

” This serves as a wake-up visit for the region, not only to minimize reliance on the US, but also to re-balance overdependence on any one business and trade mate”.

South East Asia’s get and China’s lost

Xi Jinping is trying to send a staunch information in these uncertain times: This add hands and stop being “bullied” by the US.

That is no easy job because South East Asia also has trade hostilities with Beijing.

Isma Savitri, a business owner in Indonesia, worries that Trump’s 145 percent tariffs on China will cause more opposition from Chinese rivals, who are unable to trade to the US.

Smaller companies like us feel constrained, according to Helopopy’s user of the nightgowns line. ” We are struggling to survive against an onslaught of ultra-cheap Foreign items”.

One of Helopopy’s well-known pyjamas is available for$ 7.10 ( 119, 000 Indonesian rupiah ). According to Isma, she has seen comparable pieces of art in China for roughly half the price.

” South East Asia, being near by, with empty trade systems and fast-growing industry, naturally became the dumping terrain”, says Nguyen Khac Giang, visiting fellow at the ISEAS Yusof-Ishak Institute in Singapore. ” Politically, many nations are reluctant to confront Beijing, which adds another layer of vulnerability.”

Getty Images A man sitting in a small clothing shop in Jakarta's Tanah Abang Market, surrounded by neatly stacked men's shorts. To his left and right are mannequins of men's legs, wearing shorts from the shop.Getty Images

Despite consumers ‘ requests for more reasonably priced Chinese goods, including everything from shoes to phones, thousands of small businesses have been unable to match these low prices.

More than 100 factories in Thailand have closed every month for the last two years, according to an estimate from a Thai think tank. Local trade associations claim that around 250, 000 textile workers were fired in Indonesia during the same time, including Sritex, the region’s largest textile manufacturer, after about 60 garment manufacturers shut down.

According to Mujiati, a worker who was fired from Sritex in February after 30 years,” When we see the news, there are many imported products flooding the domestic market, messing up our own market.”

” Maybe it just wasn’t our luck”, says the 50-year-old, who is still hunting for work. Who can we contact with complaints? There is no one.

South East Asian governments responded with a wave of protectionism, as local businesses demanded to be shielded from the impact of Chinese imports.

Indonesia blocked the popular Chinese online retailer Temu and considered 200 % tariffs on a range of Chinese goods in the previous year. Thailand increased import inspections and added a tax on goods worth less than 1,500 Thai baht ($ 45, £34).

This year Vietnam has twice imposed temporary anti-dumping duties on Chinese steel products. Additionally, Vietnam is rumored to be planning to impose a stricter tariff regime on Chinese goods that are being shipped from its territory to the US following Trump’s most recent tariff announcement.

Getty Images Female workers in blue face masks and blue uniforms, seated at a long table in a shoe factory in Hunan, China. They are working on a pile of brown boots.Getty Images

This week, Xi’s agenda would have been to address these worries.

China is concerned that channelling its US-bound exports to the rest of the world would “end up really alienating and aggravating” its trading partners, David Rennie, the former Beijing bureau chief for the Economist newspaper, told BBC’s Newshour.

The Chinese leadership faces a significant diplomatic and geopolitical problem if a tidal wave of Chinese exports ends up stifling those markets and causing employment and jobs.

China hasn’t always had a positive relationship with this area. Barring Laos, Cambodia and a war-torn Myanmar, the others are wary of Beijing’s ambitions. South China’s territorial disputes have strained ties with the Philippines. Trade has been a balancing factor in other countries like Vietnam and Malaysia, but this is also an issue.

But that might change now, experts say.

Getty Images A line of blue rubber gloves hanging on a production line in a dimly lit roomGetty Images

South East Asia “had to consider whether they actually wanted to offend China.” This makes things more complicated, according to Chong Ja-Ian, associate professor at the National University of Singapore.

China’s loss could be South East Asia’s gain.

In Vietnam, Hao Le claims that there have been more inquiries from American customers looking for new electronics suppliers outside of China. Such decisions are currently made within days.

Malaysia, with sprawling rubber plantations and the world’s largest medical rubber glove maker, has nearly half the world’s market for rubber gloves. However, it is on track to surpass China as its main market sharer.

Like most of the rest of the world, the region still has a 10 % base tariff. And that is bad news, says Oon Kim Hung, president of the Malaysian Rubber Glove Manufacturers Association.

Customers will find paying an additional 24 % on Malaysian gloves to be much preferable to the 145 % levy they will have to pay for Chinese-made gloves, he claims.

” We’re not exactly jumping off the cliff, but this may be a good thing for our manufacturers as well as those in Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia,” we said.

Additional reporting by Bui Thu and Tessa Wong

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Trade war has caught Wall Street between a rock and a hard place – Asia Times

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The trade war between China and the US has spiraled into uncharted territory. On April 10, the Trump administration imposed a tariff of 125% on all Chinese imports. China called the actions unfair and responded with similar measures.

Within the broader debate around unravelling economic ties between the US and China, where economic interdependence has increasingly been viewed as a threat to US national security, this escalation raises questions about whether global finance is also reducing its presence in China.

After all, the risks of financial connectivity with China have been discussed prominently by US policymakers in recent years. And many financial analysts have spent much of the past year discussing whether China has become “uninvestable” due to rising geopolitical tensions.

However, as I show in a recently published study, most global financial firms have continued to expand their presence in Chinese markets over the last decade, even as tensions have intensified.

Crucially, they have done so on China’s terms, operating within a system that prioritizes government oversight and policy goals over liberal market norms. This pragmatic accommodation is quietly reshaping the global financial order.

China’s capital markets, which have historically been sealed off from the rest of the world, have been opening up in recent decades. This has prompted global financial firms to expand their footprint in China.

Investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan have taken full ownership of local joint ventures. And asset managers like BlackRock or Invesco have established fund management operations on the Chinese mainland.

Yet China has not liberalized in the way many in the west expected. Rather than conforming to global norms of open, lightly regulated markets, China’s financial system remains largely guided by the state.

Markets there operate within a framework shaped by the policy priorities of the central government, capital controls remain in place, and foreign firms are expected to play by a different set of rules than they would in New York or London.

Foreign investors have been allowed to buy into mainland markets, but through infrastructure that limits capital outflows and preserves regulatory oversight.

Rather than adapting China to the global financial order, Wall Street has accommodated China’s distinct model. The motivation behind this is clear: China is simply too big to ignore.

Take China’s pension system as an example. Whereas pension assets in the US amount to 136.2% of GDP in 2019, in China these only amounted to 1.6%. The growth potential in this market is enormous, representing a trillion-dollar opportunity for global firms.

Consequently, index providers such as MSCI, FTSE Russell, and S&P Dow Jones – key gatekeepers of global investment – have included Chinese stocks and bonds in major benchmark indices.

These decisions, taken between 2017 and 2020, effectively declared Chinese markets “investment grade” for institutional investors around the world. This has helped legitimize China’s market model within the architecture of global finance.

America strikes back

In recent years, Washington has sought to curtail US financial exposure to China through a growing set of measures. These include investment restrictions, entity blacklists, and forced delisting for Chinese firms on US stock exchanges. Such actions signal a broader effort to use finance as a tool of strategic leverage.

The moves have had some effect. Some US institutional investors and pension funds have declared China “uninvestable” and are reducing their exposure. American investments in China have roughly halved since their US$1.4 trillion peak in 2020.

But attributing this solely to geopolitical pressure overlooks another key factor: China’s underwhelming market performance. A protracted property crisis, a government crackdown on tech companies and a weak post-pandemic economic recovery have made Chinese markets less attractive to investors in purely financial terms.

More strategically oriented investors from Asia, Europe and the Middle East have invested more into Chinese markets, filling gaps left by US investors. Sovereign wealth funds from the Middle East, especially, have engaged in more long-term investments as part of broader efforts to strengthen economic cooperation with China.

And at the same time, many Western financial firms have doubled down on their presence in China, expanding their onshore footprint. Since 2020, institutions such as JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs and BlackRock have opened new offices, increased their staff, acquired new licences and bought out their joint venture partners to operate independently as investment banks, asset managers or futures brokers.

It has become more difficult to invest foreign capital in China. But Western financial firms are positioning themselves to tap into China’s huge domestic capital pools and capture its long-term growth opportunities – even as they tread carefully around geopolitical sensitivities.

Fragmenting financial order

It is too early to predict the long-term effects of the current geopolitical tensions. But Wall Street is trying to placate both sides. On the one hand, it is adapting to capital markets with Chinese characteristics. And on the other, it is trying not to antagonize an increasingly interventionist America.

However, while holding its breath amid further escalation and having scaled back some of its activities, Wall Street has not left China. It is instead learning how to work within the constraints of a system shaped by a different set of priorities.

This does not necessarily signal a new global consensus. But it does suggest that the liberal financial order, once defined by Anglo-American norms, is becoming more pluralistic. China’s rise is showing that alternative models – in which the state retains a strong hand in markets – can coexist with, and even shape, global finance.

As tensions between the US and China continue to rise, financial firms are learning to navigate a world in which existing relationships between states and markets are being reconfigured. This process may well define the future of global finance.

Johannes Petry is CSGR research fellow at the University of Warwick.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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No winners in US trade war

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In: South-East Asia
สัมภาษณ์ท่านฑูตจีน ที่สถานฑูตจีน
สัมภาษณ์ท่านฑูตจีน ที่สถานฑูตจีน

The introduction of bilateral tariffs by the United States has gotten a lot of international attention. The Women’s Republic of China’s Ambassador to Thailand, Han Zhiqiang, shared his thoughts on the subject.

A trade deficit constitutes a crime?

International business is fundamentally based on the resources and comparative advantages of each nation, with deliberate exchange and reciprocal benefit at the forefront.

Because Thailand has a value benefits, British firms chose Thailand as a foundation to make tough drives and then sell them back to the United States.

What of the United States ‘ trade deficit in services, which amounted to an enormous US$ 295.2 billion in 2024, if one claims that Thailand has a business deficit with the United States and deems that Thailand is engaging in cruel business and should be subject to tariffs? Does that mean the United States is unjust to its international trading partners? If the world punish the United States in retaliation?

The mutual levies in place in the US violate fundamental economic principles. The foundation of global economic development is labor sector and free trade.

In reality, the United States has been the biggest contributor to the international trading system. American consumers are satisfied with high-quality, affordable goods from all over the earth, while the US retains merits in high-value industries like finance and technology. The director-general of the World Trade Organization ( WTO ), Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, once said that” the United States is the biggest winner in global trade.”

Tariffs as force

The US uses tariffs as a means of exerting severe pressure on its trade partners in an effort to get from them.

In fact, this is social strength putting pressure on trade partners by acting unjustifiably unilaterally. Imagine if every nation put itself second and relied on its reputation as the world’s top strength if there were over 190.

The world may turn into a powerful woods. The global order may be severely impacted, and fragile and marginalized nations would incur.

The United States has stifled global supply chains and caused a severe recession, drawing powerful criticism from many different countries, by starting a trade war.

Anwar Ibrahim, the prime minister of Malaysia, urged Asean nations to stop being careless.

Singapore’s Prime Minister Lawrence Wong warned that the US’s actions are putting the world in a new era of random power, isolationism, and danger.

Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, claimed that the US’s hostile tariff policy would have serious effects on the world economy and harm consumers everywhere. It was described as a” tragedia of global trade,” according to Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney.

What did China say in response?

The main value of China-US economic and trade relations is common advantage. Both nations are significant dealing partners for products, services, and other types of investments. China and the US have a lot of reasons why maintaining balance and green growth in economic and trade relations between the two nations is important, as well as maintaining stability.

The truth is that both China and the US profit from each other’s cooperation. However, both suffer when they fight. Protectionism is not the answer because there are no victors in a trade war. The success of China and the US serves as a chance for them to compete against one another, hardly a danger.

China won’t fight off a trade war, but it must retaliate if taxes are absurd. China has taken strong measures to protect both fairness and justice for society, as well as its legitimate freedom and the regulations of global free trade.

The trade war started with the United States, and in the close, it has hurt both people and itself. Shoppers in America bear the brunt of the costs.

According to research from the Peterson Institute for International Economics ( PIIE), importers, downstream businesses, and consumers in the United States are ultimately responsible for over 90 % of tariff costs.

This reality has just been reflected in the US stock and bond markets ‘ recent rollercoaster-like uncertainty.

A saying from the Chinese language is,” One lifts a stone just to drop it on one’s own feet.”

I think the US’s improper use of taxes does sway criticism from nations all over the world as well as from the country’s intelligent and discerning citizens.

Trade relations between China and Thailand

Both China and Thailand have a shared coming thanks to their geographical proximity. We are significant trading partners for both products and industrial bars.

China and Thailand should work together to promote bilateral trade, promote flexibility, and promote connection in supply chains in the midst of global financial turmoil.

We may use platforms like China-Asean assistance mechanisms, the WTO, and other forums to need all countries to uphold the principles of non-discrimination, flexibility, and peaceful coexistence in order to simultaneously protect and promote an empty international cooperation environment.

China will continue to work harder and offer growth prospects to nations like Thailand.

With a population of 1.4 billion and a buyer business worth almost US$ 7 trillion, China welcomes more premium Thai goods into its industry.

China may encourage local institutions, business organizations, and business representatives from both nations to strengthen ties.

We will even support Chinese businesses in Thailand to fully exploit the nearby commercial chain, collaborate with Thai SMEs for shared development, and contribute to the growth of Thai industry– all of this while assisting Thailand’s transition to a online and natural economy.

China and Thailand are willing to work together to establish a model for economic and trade assistance, promote balance in an uncertain world environment, and increase confidence in global economic growth.

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Eratani secures US.2 million Series A to boost Indonesia’s agricultural transformation

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In: Technology
  • To promote the adoption of cutting-edge technology, funds will be used.
  • states to have given more than 34, 000 producers in Java and Sulawesi authority.

Eratani CEO Andrew Soeherman (left) and CFO Bambang Cahyo Susilo

Eratani has successfully raised US$ 6.2 million ( RM27.3 million ) in a Series A round despite a sharp decline in startup funding across Indonesia. Clay Capital led the square, along with IIX, SBI Ven Capital, AgFunder, Genting Ventures, and TNB Aura.

The organization said in a statement that the increase supports the government’s accelerated goal of achieving national corn self-sufficiency by 2027, which is a top priority for the Prabowo management. It also highlights investor confidence in its ability to change Indonesia’s rice field. With this additional funding, Eratani may promote the adoption of advanced technologies, including precision farming equipment, on-farm mechanization, and sustainable farming practices, it added.

These innovations are intended to increase efficiency and profitability while also supporting Indonesia’s wider goals for conservation and environment.

Eratani claims that its end-to-end program for smallholder grain farmers has produced solid results since its foundation in 2021. More than 34, 000 producers in Java and Sulawesi have been given this authority, many of whom have for the first time had access to formal financing. Additionally, the business has increased farmer incomes by 25 % and yields by an average of 29 % on over 13, 000 hectares of rice farmland in 2024. Additionally, it reported that it supported farmers in promoting the production of over 112,000 kilos of rice and grain, which would improve the country’s food safety.

According to Andrew Soeherman, co-founder and CEO of Eratani,” we’re demonstrating that economic and social effects you get hand in hand with economic sustainability.” Our main objective is to support Indonesia’s food safety goals while focusing on building a strong foundation that allows us to level effectively.

Eratani’s strategy addresses the most pressing issues facing Indonesia’s grain sector by connecting recently dispersed stakeholders and offering extensive support throughout the farming cycle. Smallholder farmers can access economical financing, high-quality inputs, agricultural consulting services, and improved marketplace access thanks to the company’s digital platform.

Eratani co-founder and CFO Bambang Cahyo Susilo emphasized that digitalization is a key factor in achievement. By utilizing data-driven insights, we can manage risk more effectively and help wiser choices on the ground. As we expand into important towns across the country, this not only increases operating efficiency but also encourages the creation of a more resilient gardening habitat.

More than 70 % of the world’s population consumes corn normal, making it a staple in many developing nations. However, it is also one of the most polluting vegetables. Compared to the whole aircraft industry, floating rice fields account for roughly 1.5 to 2 % of global greenhouse gas emissions and account for nearly half of all emissions from farmland. Also, rice has a particularly large water footprints, requiring 2, 000 to 5, 000 litres of water per kilogram, which is two to three times more than other important grains.

Clay Capital, the head investor, highlighted Eratani’s distinctive market positioning. According to lover at Clay Capital, Gerard Chia,” Eratani is redefined what smallholder producers in Indonesia can do.” Their farmer-first, included model sets them apart from normal agritech systems because they act as the” connective tissues” in a highly fragmented wheat farming habitat. Eratani has the potential to influence systemic change by introducing lasting farming methods and opening up new opportunities for producers as carbon markets continue to evolve, in addition to improving producer incomes and productivity.

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Chinese dragon elegantly twirled around American eagle’s neck – Asia Times

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There is an image that likely increasingly haunts the minds of US strategists: a Chinese dragon, no longer just coiled in defense but elegantly entwined around the neck of the American bald eagle. Not to suffocate but rather to regulate the bird’s breath.

The symbolism is not hyperbole. It captures a world where China, long caricatured as the imitator, has now morphed into a systemic rival, outrunning and outgunning the United States in critical business and security sectors.

From technology to trade, currency to cyber power, the Chinese state has mastered the long game. 

As Graham Allison warned in “Destined for War”, the Thucydides Trap is not only about the inevitability of conflict between rising and ruling powers. It’s also about the erosion of assumptions that the West has long taken for granted—namely, that liberal democracies will always innovate faster and govern better.

That assumption is collapsing under China’s weight. Let us now turn to the strategic sectors where China has not just caught up, but, in many instances, sprinted ahead.

1. Semiconductors: from dependency to near parity

Semiconductors, once China’s key vulnerability, are now the arena of its most dramatic gains. Despite Washington’s embargoes on Huawei and export bans on advanced lithography equipment, Beijing has poured over 1.5 trillion yuan into its domestic chip ecosystem.

China’s 14nm chips are now being produced domestically at scale, and according to Dr Dan Wang of Gavekal Dragonomics, an economic consultancy, “China is only a node or two behind global leaders, and catching up fast.”

This acceleration is powered by “dual circulation”—a policy that embeds state subsidies across the entire supply chain, from rare earth mining to chip design. 

In contrast, the US remains fragmented. The CHIPS and Science Act is slow-moving and could be scrapped while American fabs are still dangerously dependent on geopolitical choke points like Taiwan.

And it’s not clear that forcing Taiwan to build fabs in the US will even remotely work due to a lack of skilled labor and relevant supply chains.

2. Electric vehicles: Tesla in the rearview mirror

China’s BYD, not Tesla, is now the world’s top EV manufacturer. In 2023, it overtook Tesla in global sales and its footprint now spans Latin America, Europe and Southeast Asia.

Why? Because China owns the supply chain. From lithium in Bolivia to cobalt in the Congo, Chinese firms like CATL dominate the upstream. They also control over 75% of global lithium battery production.

As Professor Tu Xinquan of the China Institute for WTO Studies notes, “Beijing treats EVs as the next strategic industry, not just a consumer product.” The result? China is setting the global terms for green mobility.

3. Artificial intelligence: authoritarian efficiency at scale

While Silicon Valley battles over ethics and data privacy, Chinese AI firms race ahead by leveraging the scale of their digital ecosystems. 

With 1.4 billion citizens contributing to vast data pools, firms like SenseTime and iFlytek are training machine learning models at a rate unimaginable in the US.

Stanford’s AI Index 2024 noted that “China now publishes more peer-reviewed AI papers than the US and the EU combined.” 

More importantly, the integration of AI into national surveillance systems—facial recognition, behavioral analytics and even predictive policing—is an institutional advantage in authoritarian governance.

4. Space & hypersonics: leaping over the Pentagon’s horizon

In 2021, China tested a hypersonic glide vehicle that stunned Pentagon officials. It circled the globe before hitting its target—a demonstration of capabilities that America did not anticipate and does not have.

Today, China launches more satellites than any other country, and its Tiangong space station functions independently of NASA. 

This is not just about prestige. It’s about owning low-Earth orbit (LEO) infrastructure and building an integrated command architecture.

According to James Acton of the Carnegie Endowment, “China’s civil-military fusion in space tech gives it a decisive asymmetry—the ability to repurpose civilian launches into military capacity overnight.”

5. Quantum computing and cyber sovereignty

China’s quantum leap is not metaphorical. It has already built a city-level quantum communication network in Hefei and launched the Micius satellite to demonstrate secure quantum encryption.

While the US still grapples with theoretical breakthroughs, China is operationalizing quantum networks—one step closer to unhackable communication.

Simultaneously, China’s cyber units under the PLA Strategic Support Force have matured into a formidable force. 

As cybersecurity expert Adam Segal warns, “Unlike the US, where cyber operations must go through inter-agency review, China’s centralized command is more agile, more ruthless and more strategic.”

6. Infrastructure diplomacy: steel, fiber and sovereignty

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was once dismissed as “debt-trap” diplomacy. Yet in 2025, it has morphed into a network of real-world influence. 

Over 70 ports, 150 countries, and countless rail links are now locked into Chinese logistics systems. Malaysia’s ECRL and industrial parks under the “Two Countries, Twin Parks” initiative are cases in point.

In contrast, America’s Build Back Better World (B3W) never took off due to a lack of institutional backbone and material delivery.

7. Financial innovation: dollar dependency, yuan strategy

Though the dollar still dominates, China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) now clears over US$400 billion in yuan-denominated transactions annually.

As Professor Eswar Prasad of Cornell observes, “CIPS, when coupled with the digital yuan, offers China a way to de-dollarize bilateral trade without directly challenging the dollar’s global reserve status.”

Even in ASEAN, Indonesia and Malaysia have signed local currency settlement agreements with Beijing. The implications are serious: the US no longer controls the plumbing of international finance unilaterally.

8. Pharmaceuticals and public health diplomacy

Sinopharm and Sinovac may have drawn Western skepticism during Covid-19, but they reached over 80 countries. China became the pharmacy of the Global South, capturing new health markets.

Meanwhile, China controls up to 70% of active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) exports—vital for antibiotic and chronic disease drugs. Even the US Food and Drug Administration has flagged this as a national security risk.

9. Maritime dominance: steel leviathans in Asian waters

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is now the largest navy in terms of number of vessels, with China launching new destroyers, frigates and carriers at an unmatched pace.

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), China’s naval shipbuilding capacity exceeds the US by a ratio of 3:1 annually.

This has strategic consequences: with militarized reefs and carrier-killer missiles, Beijing is remaking the Indo-Pacific naval order—challenging the US Seventh Fleet’s dominance.

Conclusion: The end of complacency, the beginning of multipolar discipline

The Chinese dragon did not roar its way to supremacy. It studied the American system—its think tanks, capital markets, academic networks and defense-industrial base—and replicated a version of it with Chinese characteristics: centralized, agile, state-backed and global.

This is no longer a contest of ideologies. It is a contest of capacities.

For Malaysia and ASEAN, the time for strategic hedging has reached its limit. As Professor Lee Jones warns, “Neutrality in a bifurcating world must be underwritten by genuine resilience—economic, technological and political.”

China’s dragon does not need to strangle the eagle. It merely needs to squeeze at the right moments. And in that tightening grip lies the uncomfortable truth of 21st-century power: it is no longer about who dominates, but who endures.

Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is professor of ASEAN studies at the International Islamic University Malaysia. His analyses have been published across Asia and Europe, with a focus on strategic diplomacy, interdependence and power asymmetries.

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