Will next Iran president make nicer with the West? – Asia Times
Tehran does have a chance to hit reset on foreign policy issues following years of growing hawkishness. In fact, the degree to which the candidates does pivot to a greater engagement with the West has been a crucial strategy problem.
The country’s highest religious and political authority, the supreme leader, is the final arbitrator of disputes with global powers, but the president of Iran has influence in a political system with multiple political centers.
The presidential election comes as Iran grapple with significant interconnected local, regional, and global issues, which was forced by President Ebrahim Raisi’s dying in a May 2024 plane accident. The UA and UK’s most recent round of sanctions were levied by the government’s market in April 2024 after Iran launched a clear strike against Israel.
Sanctions are n’t the West’s only way to apply pressure on Tehran. Cyber war, soft power and martial could are also at countries ‘ disposal. However, Iran’s activities have continued uninterrupted in recent years, including funding proxy extremist groups, avoiding restrictions through China and Russia, and advancing its regional nuclear and missile plans.
As specialists on US international policy and Iran, we think this raises a crucial issue: Are the efforts of the US and its allies to deter Iran having any impact? And could the West have the chance to alter its position in the political business?
The boundaries of politics
The US and Iran have n’t established diplomatic relations since 1979, when the Islamic Revolution occurred. But that does n’t mean that there are no diplomatic efforts. In reality, there are illegal programs, such as the US working through the Swiss state.
However, at the best days, US diplomatic relations with Iran are tense. They are prone to disturbance when the US or Iran assume management, and their situation has only become worse as Iran’s ties to China and Russia have improved.
The end result has been a discordant political approach when it comes to how the US and the West frequently handle Iran.
This is a byproduct, in element, of China expanding its economic and geopolitical relations to Tehran and increasing its influence in the Middle East. Likewise, Russia has strengthened military, political and economic links with Iran.
Iran does n’t feel compelled to agree with the US and its allies regarding security interests because of this, which has lessened the impact of Western diplomacy.
The Trump administration abandoned the nuclear disarmament deal in 2018, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as a perfect case. European rulers have tried to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, but they were unsuccessful in obtaining Iranian assistance after President Donald Trump resigned from the deal.
Despite this lack of progress, the US and Iran also have lines of communication. In an evident effort to halt US interests in the region, the US made clear to Tehran that it had not been involved in the operation following Israel’s attack on an Iranian Embassy substance in Syria.
Yet, Iran has little opportunity to discuss given the inconsistent, unexpected policies of US leadership.
A pending US-Saudi security agreement may also push Iran further away from its Western allies and China and Russia into their orbits.
In the end, the US and Europe have two objectives: to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons and lessen Middle Eastern issue that is sponsored by Iran.
But, to meeting, both targets seem obscure with Iran’s continued, uninterrupted uranium enrichment and its problems throughout the Middle East constantly taking place.
In the past, Iran gave politics a prospect out of concern that Western hawks who oppose Iran’s nuclear program might not be as fond of showing some determination.
A new revolutionary Iranian chairman might win over the opposition for bringing diplomats to the table of negotiations. However, it may probably have the highest leader’s blessing.
In any case, the next president appears to be more likely to become a hard-liner than the high head. And while the Iranians perhaps feel more diplomatic pressure from both domestic and international allies, they could as well veto existing policy.
Peddling sweet energy
The US and its supporters have turned to various means of pressure on Iran as confidence in finding a diplomatic solution is declining.
American intelligence agencies have carried out a number of cyberattacks and information efforts to undermine Iran’s leaders and their local plans.
For instance, in 2010 a combined U.S. Israel digital operation called Stuxnet hacked the Iranian Natanz nuclear material enrichment facility, degrading and preventing regular centrifuge operations while alerting operators to their normal course of operation.
In response to Iran’s failure to address US safety concerns about nuclear proliferation and its anti-West activities in the area, these businesses continue to this day.
Tehran also engages in virtual warfare. A US statement warned Iran’s use of extreme cyberattacks to attain its policy objectives in a US report from 2023. They include the use of state-sponsored intermediaries to install heinous ransomware and malware.
The Persian election comes amid local unrest, giving the West another means of putting pressure on Tehran: anti-regime propaganda.
Independent radio and news networks supported by the US and its Western allies have targeted the Persian public with anti-Iran government messages and intensified local protests in an effort to lower public support for the current government and stoke unhappiness among the Iranian population.
Falling back on punishment
Iran’s presidential hopefuls have generally promised to retaliate against Western propaganda. According to these efforts, the prospects appear to be sensitive to the sanctions ‘ significant effects on middle-class people, particularly in Iran.
For a variety of factors, the US and Europe have recently increased sanctions against Iran. The European Union imposed a number of sanctions on Iran as a result of its repressive reaction to the protests in 2022 following the death of a younger woman, Mahsa Jina Amini, in police custody. The US and UK most recently used restrictions in April to stifle Iran from bringing drones into Russia and escalating the Middle East conflict.
Punishment, such as those leveraged during the United States ‘ maximum pressure campaign during Trump’s president, have certainly placed some stress on Iran’s economic systems and business. You can see their effect in the government’s high inflation rates and financial recession.
However, some experts claim that Iran’s political efforts have been undermined by the promotion.
Others contend that sanctions have failed because of how Russia and China have aided in providing pleasure by granting Iran access to their businesses.
Although sanctions have clearly weakened Iran’s market, their ability to contribute to the overall goal of bringing Iran back to the table of negotiations, especially in terms of its nuclear programme and local activities, is less certain.
Turning to defense methods?
The US has shown a growing commitment to turn to military action to counter Iranian-backed groups since October 7, 2023, when Hamas insurgents launched a surprise attack on Israel.
In retaliation for a previous drone attack by an Iranian-backed party that claimed the lives of three US support members in Jordan, the US and UK conducted the most notable strikes in February.
To date, Western attacks have had a more metaphorical impact by reducing actions supported by Iran. But they demonstrate the US and its supporters ‘ military can.
In recent years, politics, sanctions and gentle authority have failed to convince Iran’s rulers back to the table. Iran’s fresh president may also continue down the path of withdrawal, but doing so dangers inviting the West to improve its deterrence answer.
Daniel P. Colletti is an American political science professor at the United States Military Academy West Point, while Nakissa Jahanbani is an alternative professor at Penn State.
The Conversation has republished this essay under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.