Circular’s overall evaluation now stands at US$ 30 million thanks to money.Funds will be donated to & nbsp, which will expand its offerings in Singapore and Australia.Circular, a subscription service that specializes in high-end consumer electronics and is supported by Y Combinator, has successfully closed its seed funding round and secured…Continue Reading
8 October 2023 at 18: 30 PUBLISHED
As the People’s Movement for a Just Society ( P – Move ) outside parliament enters its second week, police have outlawed all public gatherings within 50 meters of Government House until Wednesday.
No meetings may be permitted near Government House to avoid disrupting the cabinet meeting on Tuesday, according to an announcement made by Pol Lt. Gen. Thiti Saengsawang, commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Bureau, on Saturday.
Officers will block access to Ratchadamnoen Nok Avenue, which runs from Makawan Rangsan Bridge to the Misakawan intersection, as well as Phitsanulok Road between the House and Phanichayakarn Road, according to a source with the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration( BMA ).
The action is being taken as P – Move’s protest, which started on October 2, shows no signs of slowing down. The party has set up camp outside Government House to require that the Pheu Thai-led administration honor the commitments it made to the group in February.
The team’s nine requirements, which include giving rural populations more say in the management of local sources, fair and equal treatment for marginalized communities in property issues, and universal basic income, were taken into consideration by the state, according to the party.
The party moved their dissent from the UN’s Thailand business to the doors of Government House on October 4.
The Minister of Agriculture, Captain Thammanat Prompow, has been given the task of negotiating with P – Move, according to Deputy Prime Minister and Commerce Minister Phumtham Wechayachai. This year, the agriculture minister did record to the government, he said.
8 October 2023 at 18: 30 PUBLISHED
As the People’s Movement for a Just Society ( P-MOVE) outside of parliament enters its second week, police have outlawed all public gatherings within 50 meters of Government House until Wednesday.
No meetings may be permitted near Government House to avoid disrupting the cabinet meeting on Tuesday, according to an statement made by Pol Lt. Gen. Thiti Saengsawang, commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Bureau, on Saturday.
Officers will block access to Ratchadamnoen Nok Avenue, which runs from Makawan Rangsan Bridge to the Misakawan intersection, as well as Phitsanulok Road between the House and Phanichayakarn Road, according to a source in the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration( BMA ).
The action is being taken as P – Move’s protest, which started on October 2, shows no signs of slowing down. To demand that the Pheu Thai-led state keep the commitments it made to the party in February, they have set up camp outside Government House.
The team’s nine requirements, which include giving rural populations more say in the management of local sources, fair and equal treatment for marginalized communities in property issues, and universal basic income, were taken into consideration by the state, according to the party.
The party moved their dissent from the UN’s Thailand business to the doors of Government House on October 4.
In response, Deputy Prime Minister and Commerce Minister Phumtham Wechayachai announced that Capt. Thammanat Prompow, the Minister of Agriculture, had been given the task of negotiating with P – Move. This year, the agriculture minister may present a report to the cupboard, he said.
Ukraine, which has been devastated by war, is violently reshaping its defense sector in an effort to shed its state-burdened Russian legacy and transform into a modern producer that complies with NATO standards and capabilities and keeps an eye on international arms markets.
In an effort to lessen its present significant reliance on foreign hands, Ukraine wants to become one of the world’s largest arms producers, according to multiplemediaoutlets last month.
Security ministers from Britain and France as well as the secretary general of NATO traveled to Kiev to promote improving Ukraine’s home arms manufacturing capabilities. 20 representatives from the French arms sector were sent by the country’s security chief.
Volodymyr Zelensky, the leader of Ukraine, just announced the formation of the Defense Industries Alliance, which includes 13 major producers of arms. This includes making plans to establish a specific finance to fund the alliance through the purchase of seized Russian assets and dividends received from condition defense funds.
European countries are having trouble keeping their promises to Ukraine’s weapons, especially weaponry ammunition. To address the shortage, the US government has signed deals to establish new production facilities for artillery shells.
Recently, manufacturing facilities for German Rheinmetall and British BAE Systems, which concentrate on armoured vehicles and gun, have also been established in Ukraine.
In the US and Europe, open aid for arming Ukraine is dwindling. In order to fend off Russia’s military assault, Ukraine is being forced to create its own cutting-edge war technology. & nbsp,
Ukraine inherited a sizable portion of the Russian military and defense industries, but over time, major downsizing was brought about by unfavorable financial conditions and perceived ostentation.
Denys Kiryukhin notes in an article published in August 2018 for the Foreign Policy Research Institute( FPRI ) that Ukraine received a sizable military arsenal following the fall of the Soviet Union, including 780 000 soldiers, 6, 500 tanks, 1, 100 combat aircraft, 500 ships, 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles ( ICBM ), and 1, 000 tactical nuclear weapons.
According to Kiryukhin, Russian officials at the time felt that this large military was unnecessary and decided to scale back military personnel and structures. The nation even renounced nuclear weapons as a result of US-led international pressure.
According to Kiryukhin, Ukraine had three military objectives prior to 2014: combat terrorism, take part in peacekeeping operations, and, if necessary, combat regional wars. He points out that while Ukraine’s special operations forces and swift reaction were properly developed, the majority of its military was still in poor shape.
He points out that the Ukrainian military had 700 tanks, 170 combat aircraft, and 22 warships— a formidable but underpowered force — prior to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. In response to losing Crimea to Russia, Ukraine started significant military reforms to restore its dismantled military and adjust it with NATO standards.
According to a report from the US Congressional Research Service( CRS) from January 2022, Ukraine’s defense sector is capable of producing boats, missiles, electronics, vehicles, and other types of security equipment. Ukroboronprom, which manages over 130 state-owned firms, is in charge of the sector.
While Russian officials want to reform Ukroboronprom and increase transparency, such as by passing the On Defense Procurement legislation in July 2020, the CRS review notes that problem, inefficiency, conflict, and opacity continue to pose serious obstacles to development and the application of NATO’s high standards.
The Russian security industry’s decline is due to its historical reliance on Russia, according to Thomas Laffitte in a September 2022 issue of FPRI. Since 2014, bilateral trade has been disrupted, which has led to numerous issues for producers who have had to find new suppliers. He adds that the harm done since Russia’s war in February 2022 has also had a negative impact on Russian manufacturing facilities.
Despite these difficulties, Paul McLeary notes in a Politico article published in December 2022 that NATO is creating an ambitious 10-year plan to rebuild Ukraine’s security sector as part of an ongoing commitment to bring the nation closer to the coalition in terms of training and equipment.
Top NATO consolidation officials have now gathered to discuss ways to support the Russian defense industry while replenishing stocks of weapons and equipment donated to Kiev since the start of the war, according to McLeary. The goal is to move away from Russian equipment and toward NATO-compatible American gear.
In a June 2023 issue of Defense News, Jaroslaw Adamowski observes that Russian defense companies are looking to collaborate with Western suppliers to produce collaborative weapons, with many of them posing as war veterans and selling themselves as such. According to Adamowski, Ukroboronprom is working on shared projects with a number of NATO people, including France, Denmark, Poland, the Czech Republic, and two unnamed partners.
Adamowski pointed out that Ukroboronprom and Rheinmetall, two German companies, have agreed to repair vehicles, with the previous hoping to gain a foothold in Ukraine through additional services. Cooperation, he says, could make it easier for technology to be transferred to Ukraine and used to make” select” Rheinmetall products.
Additionally, he mentions the strengthening of ties between Poland and Ukraine’s defense sector, which has promised Ukroboronprom exposure to production facilities through PGZ, the state-owned defence company of Poland. In order to launch new production traces to produce 125mm pond shells for Ukraine’s government in April of this year, PGZ and Ukroboronprom company Artem, according to Adamowsi, signed a contract.
Adamowski also mentioned that Petr Pavel, the president of the Czech Republic, had stated that his nation would think about giving Ukraine some of its L-159 developed light combat aircraft. The F / A-259 Striker aircraft that Czech aircraft manufacturer Aero Vodochody, which also produces the L-159, developed with Israel Aerospace Industries, will be produced in the future as part of a joint venture between the two governments.
The intricate and expanding network of defense industries between Ukraine and its allies has the potential to spark a global arms sales boom as Europe rebuilds its arsenals and arms dealers search for attractive emerging markets.
The Ukraine War has created excellent marketing options for arms dealers and substantially boosted the arms industry, according to Connor Echols in an article for Responsible Statecraft published in February 2023.
According to Echols, the long-term effects could include the development of a” multipolar” arms business, with the trend toward supply chain safety and resilience diversification away from one or two major suppliers.
Echols points out that American sanctions have recently caused a decline in the Russian security sector, enabling the US to maintain its position as the world’s top arms producer.
He claims that as a result, traditional buyers of Russian munitions like India have grown afraid and have begun to look to other countries, like France and the US, for assistance. He adds that emerging vendors like Turkey and South Korea have been able to display their arms as a result of Russia’s declining share of the global hands business.
In the case of Ukraine, Adamowski observes in a Defense News article from September 2022 that the ongoing conflict has aided it in marketing goods like its Skif and Corsar anti-tank guided missiles( ATGM ) to foreign consumers.
He points out that Ukraine recently sold its Neptune anti-ship missiles, which were renowned for sinking Russia’s Moskva cruiser, to Indonesia as well as its Vilkha multiple launch rocket system( MLRS ) to Egypt. & nbsp,
GUWAHATI, India: According to defense officials, a flash flood in northern Sikkim position on Wednesday( Oct 4) prevented the hunt for the 23 Indian soldiers who were reported missing. Gangtok is the state’s capital. ” Some cars are reported submerged under the slush, and 23 workers have been reported lacking.”Continue Reading
NDP 2025 will follow the concept of “three concentric rings”, with the integrated show at the Padang in the centre, expanding out to live celebrations in the Marina Bay area as well as festivities in the heartlands, said BG Cai.
The parade will feature a mobile column, aerial displays and fireworks. More than 250,000 people are expected to be able to take part in NDP 2025 celebrations during the previews and on National Day itself.
The mobile column is traditionally done in milestone years, and focuses on displaying the full range of SAF and Home Team capabilities in a grand, formal procession, said BG Cai.
“Selected slices” of the marching contingent and mobile column at NDP 2025 will move around the Marina Bay area to engage more Singaporeans, he added.
Crowd favourites like the Red Lions and aerial displays will continue to be a part of both years’ parades.
Last year, Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen said that he would like the parade to be held at the National Stadium in Singapore Sports Hub in 2024.
Asked why this was not the case, BG Low said his team thought the Padang would be better at providing an immersive experience and hosting the dynamic defence display for NDP 2024.
Separately, he added that his team will also pay attention to engaging stakeholders in the area to minimise disruption caused by preparations for the parade, such as rehearsals.
NDP venues are typically announced one year in advance. As the next two parades are being held at the Padang, announcing the venue for NDP 2025 two years in advance allows his team to understudy the NDP 2024 organisers, said BG Cai.
Talking about the venue early also gives his team an opportunity to be “as inclusive and as consultative as possible”, he said.
“We want to be able to cast as wide a net as possible to engage whether it’s the public sector, the private sector, civil society or even Singaporeans across the board, and try to take in their views, their suggestions, their feedback about what they would like to see, how they would like to commemorate 60 years of nationhood.”
SINGAPORE: Circle Line commuters have been advised to transfer to other MRT lines while engineers carry out work to replace a faulty section of the rail crossing.
Train services on parts of the Circle Line have been affected for hours since 5am on Friday (Sep 29), and transport operator SMRT said it expects work to be completed at about 5pm.
A crack on the rail track at the crossing from Promenade to Esplanade and Bayfront stations had been detected at about 2.30am during a routine maintenance inspection.
“Our rail replacement team is currently carrying out the replacement of the rail crossing located between Promenade Station to Esplanade/Bayfront Station along the Circle Line to restore the safe use of the tracks,” SMRT in a Facebook post at about 3pm.
“The work is complex and involves a detailed survey as well as the movement of heavy rails and equipment using engineering trains to the affected stretch. We are working towards having the repairs completed at about 5pm.”
The work has resulted in slower train services for both ways from Dhoby Ghaut to Promenade stations and from Marina Bay to Stadium stations.
This is because trains have been diverted to one track to avoid the affected stretch, SMRT said.
The transport operator earlier advised commuters to factor in an additional travel time of 30 minutes along the affected stretch.
It later urged commuters to transfer to the East-West Line and Downtown Line to continue their journey.
Free regular bus services will be available between Paya Lebar and Dhoby Ghaut and Marina Bay stations and bridging bus services will be available between Paya Lebar and Promenade stations.
CNA has contacted SMRT about how long the disruption is expected to last.
WASHINGTON: A handful of Canadian websites were defaced and the site for the country’s armed forces was briefly disrupted Wednesday (Sep 28) amid simmering tensions with India. The low-level hacks were claimed by an obscure pro-India group going by the name “Indian Cyber Force”, whose logo includes an American baldContinue Reading
Rapid developments in generative artificial intelligence (AI) – algorithms used to create new text, pictures, audio, or other types of content – are concerning regulators globally.
These systems are often trained on personal and copyrighted data scraped from the internet, leading to privacy and intellectual property fears. They can also be used to generate harmful misinformation and disinformation.
On August 15, 2023, a new Chinese law designed to regulate generative AI came into force. This law, the latest in a series of regulations targeting different aspects of AI, is internationally groundbreaking as the first law that specifically targets generative AI.
It introduces new restrictions for companies providing these services to consumers regarding both the training data used and the outputs produced.
Despite these new restrictions on companies, the evolution of the draft text, combined with changes in the wider tech policy context, could mistakenly be taken to indicate that China is starting to relax its drive towards strong regulatory oversight of AI.
Commentators have been quick to observe that the final generative AI regulation is significantly watered down compared to an earlier draft published for comment. Requirements to act within a three-month period to rectify illegal content and to ensure that all training data and outputs are “truthful and accurate” were removed.
It also clarified that these rules only apply to public-facing generative AI systems. A new provision specifying that development and innovation should be weighted equally with the security and governance of systems was also added.
Regarding the wider tech policy context, since late 2020, the Chinese government has utilized a variety of tools, including antitrust and data security enforcement.
The government also undertook seemingly extra-legal measures that resulted in Jack Ma, co-founder of Alibaba, disappearing from the public eye after criticizing regulators in what has commonly been referred to as a “tech crackdown.”
But in line with the domestic economic troubles that China has been facing, the intensity of this crackdown appears to have eased and been replaced by an increased emphasis on domestic tech innovation.
While compelling, these pieces of evidence are red herrings for understanding the future of AI policy in China – a significant change in China’s approach to AI governance going forward is unlikely.
It is correct that the generative AI regulations were watered down, yet it has not been uncommon for the text of draft AI regulations to change after a consultation period. For instance, explicit discrimination protections were removed from a draft AI regulation focused on recommender systems in 2021.
The weakening of the generative AI regulations was arguably more significant than for previous initiatives, yet ongoing work to ensure that AI is regulated effectively, including an early draft of what could potentially turn into a new, comprehensive AI law, is indicative of continued efforts to strengthen the country’s AI governance framework.
Similarly, the label “tech crackdown” has been broadly applied to policies involving different government agencies, targets and justifications.
While some policies – like the probes into technology companies – were largely reactionary and appear to have come to an end, establishing robust AI regulations has been a longer-term policy aspiration of the Chinese government that will likely continue.
Together, these factors suggest that China is continuing to refine how it balances innovation and control in its approach to AI governance, rather than beginning a significant relaxation.
China’s pioneering efforts to introduce AI regulations and the legacy of reactive measures curtailing tech companies could cause a chilling effect that dampens industry outcomes in the short term.
This challenge is exacerbated by the impacts of US semiconductor export controls on the Chinese AI sector, which have forced companies into workarounds as the most powerful chips become scarce.
Though China has attempted to support its AI industry in several ways – such as through financing, providing access to computing and wider ministry reshuffles designed to promote domestic innovation – it is unclear how fruitful these initiatives will prove.
Notwithstanding the potential impact on China’s AI industry in the immediate term, introducing regulations designed to control AI is essential for addressing the risks from these technologies.
These regulations and the practical tools they mandate mitigate harms to individuals and disruptions to social stability. For instance, requirements to watermark AI-generated content are essential for countering misinformation and disinformation.
By comparison, the laissez-faire approach taken by the United States leaves it ill-prepared to address these risks, something that could cause serious disruption in the forthcoming 2024 presidential election.
AI governance tools also support China’s ambitions for global leadership in AI – for instance, through developing international standards that would provide them with a competitive edge.
China’s fundamental approach to AI governance is unlikely to shift significantly, even as it navigates ongoing economic turbulence.
A firm regulatory approach may prove economically challenging in the short term but will be essential for mitigating harm to individuals, maintaining social stability and securing international regulatory leadership in the long term.
Huw Roberts is Doctor of Philosophy candidate at the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford. Emmie Hine is PhD candidate in the Department of Legal Studies at the University of Bologna.
This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.
When Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky met with President Joe Biden, on September 21, 2023, the topic of weapons supply was on the agenda. That same issue almost certainly came up between Russia’s Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un when the pair met earlier in September.
The fact is, with the conflict in Ukraine having now dragged on for more than a year and a half, both sides are increasingly desperate to keep the flow of arms going. And that has alarmed people like Izumi Nakamitsu, the United Nations’ high representative for disarmament affairs, who on September 12 warned of violations of international resolutions against the illegal transfer of weapons and the risk of proliferation even after the war ends.
As an expert on international security and weapons proliferation, I share these concerns. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, efforts were made to forge a global consensus on the spread of weapons.
But the war in Ukraine is contributing to a reordering of global politics that has eroded cooperation to stop the spread of weapons and dangerous technology, such as advanced missiles, drones, munitions and the components and know-how necessary to build them.
The war itself isn’t the cause of this trend. Growing competition between China and Russia on one side and the United States and its allies on the other prompted the drift away from consensus on weapons nonproliferation.
Efforts to encourage global disarmament and nonproliferation date back to before World War I and can be seen in the various conventions to stop the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. But they varied in scope and effectiveness, and it is now recognized that during that time the Soviet Union clandestinely violated treaties, including the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
Global concerns over the threat from terrorism after 9/11 meant that countries looked toward nonproliferation with more urgency. With international support, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1540 in 2004, establishing a legally binding mandate for all member states to confront the illicit proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
It also created an international committee charged with providing support for member states to combat proliferation and develop strategic trade control systems.
Since then, the committee, with broad international support, has assisted states through answering specific requests regarding improving their strategic trade control systems and organizing outreach activities that help individual states address particular issue areas, such as improving their compliance with various nonproliferation regimes.
These events are often supported by numerous states, including China, the United States and Russia. The UN has also instituted multilateral sanctions regimes to address illicit proliferation and its role in conflicts, ranging from sanctions on the North Korean missile and nuclear programs to the now-paused Iran nuclear deal.
This system has seen legitimate transnational cooperation – even among rivals – and success in curbing illicit proliferation
The post-9/11 nonproliferation consensus built upon already existing multilateral export control regimes that sought to limit the spread of dangerous weapons and technology. These regimes differed from Cold War-era trade control regimes, like the pro-Western Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, or COCOM, which sought to limit the spread of weapons and technology to Warsaw Pact countries, that is, those aligned with the Soviet Union and China.
The end of the Cold War brought the creation and expansion of more inclusive nonproliferation regimes – such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, which promotes transparency and greater responsibility in the transfer of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, and the Missile Technology Control Regime, or MTCR, which seeks to limit the proliferation of missile systems and other delivery systems and technology. These followed in the footsteps of the Nuclear Suppliers Group export control regime, which initially included the Soviet Union.
But the consensus on weapons nonproliferation has come under serious threat from increased tensions and rivalry between the United States and both China and Russia – and has come to a head over Ukraine.
Western-imposed sanctions over the invasion of Ukraine have angered Russia and China. To Moscow and Beijing, unilateral sanctions undermine international cooperation and reflect a desire by Western powers – particularly the United States – to assert their will over others.
The United States and its allies argue that sanctions are necessary to counter Russian aggression against Ukraine. They are aimed at increasing the cost for Russia to acquire military goods and technology and make their supply chains more vulnerable to disruption.
Arguments of their merit aside, sanctions have forced Russia to become creative in how it goes about acquiring goods and technology. Russia is increasingly reliant on imports from states that are themselves subject to international sanctions, such as Iran and North Korea, and moving sanctioned items, including weapons, through the Caspian Sea.
Iran has been accused of supplying drones to Moscow and developing drone production facilities and technology, while in return receiving sanction-busting goods from Russia.
Meanwhile, Russia’s increasing ties with – and violation of U.N. sanctions against – North Korea have undercut multilateral nonproliferation efforts against the isolationist Asian state.
North Korea has been able to leverage arms shipments to Russia into Moscow’s greater support for its missile and nuclear programs, as evidenced by the North Korean leader’s recent visit to the Vostochny Cosmodrome in Russia’s far east.
Within this changing geopolitical environment, UN mechanisms to prevent North Korea from building up its weapons stockpile are being eroded. Though Russia and China have voted to renew the UN’s panel of experts committee to assist the enforcement of North Korea sanctions, they also voted against strengthening the sanctions for the first time since 2006.
Western arms transfers, though important for Ukraine’s defense, likewise have consequences for nonproliferation. The US decision to send cluster munitions to Ukraine is particularly controversial. The transfer of cluster bombs could undermine efforts – and the US’s own momentum – toward banning their use, something more than 120 countries have signed on to.
The US isn’t alone among Western states in blurring the line on weapons exports. The United Kingdom and France have exported Storm Shadow land-attack cruise missiles to Ukraine – a move that likely violates the Missile Technology Control Regime’s “presumption of denial” affecting missiles with a 300-kilometer range and a 500-kilogram payload. This presumption of denial, though not legally binding, has guided MTCR member states since its creation, though not without some past tension.
The UK has stated that, given the circumstances, the transfer does not violate the MTCR and has received US support for the export. Any decision by the US to send ATACMS missiles, which Ukraine has requested and the Biden administration has seriously considered, would also greatly undercut any possible continued cooperation with Russia through the Missile Technology Control Regime, as well as China – which, although not a member, has pledged to adhere to its terms.
Arms transfers are vital to Ukraine’s defense, but Western leaders need to be prepared to address the proliferation consequences that may follow.
The Ukraine war has contributed to a fracturing of the global consensus on nonproliferation in a way that erodes cooperation and has seen the rise of policy driven by competing global blocs, as it was during the Cold War.
This is evident not only in the competition for weapons stemming from the Ukraine war, but also in the way that individual countries are levying controls on areas involved in the development of weapons.
Take, for example, the tit-for-tat, unilaterally applied export controls and sanctions between the US and China.
They target areas such as academia, semiconductors, foreign direct investment and battery supply chains. These previously neglected realms are all receiving increased attention because of their role as sources of knowledge and goods for emerging weapons and technology.
Despite these developments, cooperation on weapons nonproliferation is still possible. Even during the height of the Cold War, there was cooperation on arms control and nonproliferation, particularly in the nuclear realm.
Similarly today, the great powers can focus on continued cooperation in areas such as unmanned aircraft, space, nuclear proliferation and deterrence.
The Ukraine war may be a harbinger of a new and more dangerous world regarding nonproliferation, but that doesn’t mean multilateral cooperation to stem the proliferation of dangerous weapons is doomed.
Nolan Fahrenkopf is Research Fellow at Project on International Security, Commerce and Economic Statecraft, University at Albany, State University of New York
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.