Companies (Page 63)

With worldwide attention focusing abroad, it might not have received much attention in recent months. However, the international sanctions tracking organization for North Korea’s dissolution has raised fears about the uninterrupted flow of North Korean munitions from Ukraine to Gaza.

The effectiveness of UN sanctions against North Korea has truly declined for decades. The Panel of Experts, which was tasked with monitoring and reporting on Northeast Vietnamese sanctions violations, was renewed in March with Russia’s veto.

While UN sanctions are theoretically still in power, and the United States, European Union, Australia, Japan and other countries still abide by them, Russia and China do no.

With no police supervision in place again, North Korea will now be able to ship its arms and other black-market products to its allies – most notably Russia, China, Iran and Syria – with less fear of repercussions.

Complex efforts to evade restrictions

The UN has passed a number of commitments sanctioning North Korea for its atomic programme since 2006. In recent years, though, North Korea has tried to find brilliant new ways to get around them.

For instance, North Korea has purchased a number of ships to cover up its trading activities through top companies. Before later transferring control of the ships under North Korean flags to “flags of convenience,” which arouse less fear in international waters.

The Panel of Experts discovered in 2023 that North Korea has a shorter turnaround between the boats ‘ consolidation and their refining. The state makes less effort to conceal the fact that the boats were bought to facilitate illicit trade, as a result.

North Korea continues to spoof its ships using the Automated Identification System ( AIS ) to further facilitate its illicit trade. This allows its ships to convey a fake identity and/or area to law enforcement, port and business government, and other boats.

The government also creates false send licenses to “launder“, or mask, the true names of its submarines to dodge sanctions.

In contrast, North Korea’s boats are actually altered in ships, often in China, where they remain for weeks at a time.

For instance, North Korea recently modified two ships in Chinese shipyards to conduct business without pinning anyone, presumably with the assistance of non-North Asian companies.

The top companies that had Foreign nationals serving as their managers and were incorporated in Hong Kong and the Seychelles owned and managed the boats. They were afterwards “acquired” by the North Korean government in first 2022 after being used for some suspect business for a while.

Investing out in the empty

North Korea also feels more at ease talking to nations that are unlikely to impose restrictions, such as China and Russia.

For instance, it is no more engaging in complex maritime trade routes to shadow its transactions. A number of boats linked to North Korea are just following a direct route between North Korea and China, according to reports from the Panel of Experts.

Agents who trade goods on the behalf of North Korea, especially those in China, do so frequently and without incident.

And many of North Korea’s purchases, particularly those involving fuel, are happening as ship-to-ship payments in waterways around Northeast Asia. This alleviates the need for North Korean-linked boats to use international ships, which is denied by UN sanctions.

The UN Panel of Experts has discovered clusters of exchanges well within China’s special financial zone off its southeast coast, despite the majority of exchanges occurring in North Korean territorial lakes. This, again, suggests the North Koreans are indifferent about diagnosis.

North Korean munitions in Ukraine, Africa and the Middle East

North Korea has increased its weapons exports and strengthened its alliances, especially with Russia, as a result of this tightening in sanctions protection.

By February 2024, North Korea’s intelligence reported that the country had illegally transported about 6,700 containers ( loaded with three million artillery shells ) to Russia via sea and rail after Kim Jong Un’s visit in September 2023. Additionally, it increased the production of its factories to boost Russian supply.

Russia has since launched an array of short-range nuclear missiles from North Korea against Ukraine. The weapon components appear to have been imported through a significant import program led by North Korea.

In Kharkiv, Ukraine, the non-governmental business Conflict Armament Research discovered 290 pieces, allegedly from 26 businesses in eight nations, when it was looking at the remnants of a North Korean missile in the first half of 2024.

Three-quarters of those parts came from the United States. The pieces had likely been re-exported to North Korea after being sold to businesses in other countries acting for North Korean customers.

The finish of extensive export control will then allow it to expand its client base.

For instance, a 2024 Panel of Experts statement noted discussions between staff of KOMID ( North Korea’s major arms seller ) and a Myanmar firm in 2022. A North Korean minister and junta members in neighboring Mali had discussions about building a weapons factory there in 2023 at the time.

Worryingly, North Korea may also now seek to bolster its military ( and potentially nuclear ) ties with Iran and Syria.

Hamas apparently used North Korean munitions in its functions against Israel starting in October 2023. These were possibly transported from Iran’s companies.

Although North Korea has long had ties to Iran, any expansion of its military systems and know-how with Tehran may improve if it had access to China and Russia as stay details for personnel and products.

However, the fact that North Korea is increasingly being governed by Russia and China does not always indicate that the three countries are forming a coalition. However, China is vulnerable to such statements.

North Korea has a tradition of playing the Soviet Union and China off one another during the Cold War, exploiting their rivalries to gain from both without being completely compelled to join sometimes.

With that said, where Russian and Chinese passions are aligned vis-à-vis North Korea, there is the ability for assistance. All three countries are strategically interested in reducing American influence in East Asia ( and elsewhere ) with a strategic goal. North Korea and its friends have a chance to reach a common reason in this.

These relationships will presently bloom thanks to sanctions reporting and oversight, and North Korea will now be able to expand its weapons export industry without any repercussions.

Justin Hastings, Professor of International Relations and Comparative Politics, University of Sydney

The Conversation has republished this post under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

Continue Reading

Near-peer adversaries China and Russia are gearing up for unheard hybrid warfare strategies that target the US homeland, according to a recent report from the US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command ( TRADOC).

The document says the US country, usually considered a shelter, is now vulnerable to its near-peer adversaries ‘ standard, cross and asymmetrical war tactics.

In contrast to dynamic strikes, these adversaries are greatly investing in capabilities designed to destroy and harm soft targets on US soil by leveraging data and computer operations to produce significant effects with little risk of escalation.

In the event of a discord, China and Russia are likely to switch from gentle, unattributable digital and information operations to more explicit, devastating physical actions, according to the TRADOC report.

It mentions the potential use of ultra-long-range systems with conventional payloads, asymmetric platforms and commercial off-the-shelf unmanned aerial systems ( UAS ) to target critical infrastructure and military operations.

The adversaries ‘ willingness to rise their actions with these skills, which could threaten US military readiness and deployment, are also noted in the report.

Additionally, the report provides additional information about how the spread of innovative technologies and worldwide communications makes it harder to keep your movements and operations secret from the enemy.

The US Army’s ability to project force and sustain operations during large-scale combat operations ( LSCO ) could be severely hampered by this transparency and adversaries ‘ focus on anti-access/area denial ( A2/AD ) efforts.

Composite war has a universally accepted definition and is criticized for having no conceptual clarity. Nevertheless, it provides useful insights into modern security and defense problems.

Cross warfare entails combining traditional and innovative power techniques in a coordinated effort to exploit an opponent’s weaknesses and produce synergistic effects.

Through their expenditure in long-range conventional-strike technologies like tactical aircraft, ships, and yet hypersonic weapons, China and Russia pose a regular threat to the US country.

In a 2021 article for the Texas National Security Review ( TNSR ), Bruce Sugden says that China and Russia are investing in long-range conventional-strike capabilities that could threaten the US homeland. According to Sugden, China is developing similar skills, while Russia has currently deployed devices capable of striking the western US.

He mentions that Russia has deployed standard cruise missiles with the capability to strike targets from ships and long-range aircraft across the western US.

Likewise, he says China is enhancing its multi-domain conventional precision-strike capabilities, developing a long-range bomber and the Type 093B nuclear-powered guided missile submarine ( SSGN), which could threaten Alaska, Hawaii and possibly the US West Coast.

Sugden notes that China and Russia does build intercontinental-range fast weapons to harm the US country. He points out that these investments reflect a broader trend of both nations improving their long-range conventional precision-strike capabilities, which includes advancements in command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance ( ISR ) systems to support these operations.

He argues that the threat of nuclear conflict escalating as a result of regular strikes on a nuclear adversary’s territory is increased by proper uncertainty due to unclear Chinese and Russian positions on nuclear thresholds and escalating in response to conventional attacks.

Although there are major overlaps between China and Russia’s cross and asymmetrical warfare strategies against the US homeland, the two have in common common characteristics, including destructive cyberattacks on vital infrastructure, and disinformation campaigns to diminish the US without a strong military conflict.

Anthony Cordesman and Grace Hwang mention that Chinese hybrid warfare against the US might involve multi-domain operations that incorporate military, economic, technological, and informational strategies in a report from July 2020 for the Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS ). Important tactics include disruptive cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure, extensive cyber espionage, and economic coercion through the Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI ).

Cordesman and Hwang claim that China has influenced the US through social media, financial warfare, and conspiracy theories during the Covid-19 pandemic to diminish the country without causing any open hostilities.

In a December 2020 CSIS statement, Cordesman and Hwang mention that Russian hybrid war combines regular military activities with unusual techniques, cyberattacks, and psychological war. They claim that Russia’s hybrid warfare operations, like those with China, aim to achieve political goals without engaging in direct military hostility with the US.

They describe Russian hybrid warfare efforts as featuring disinformation, cyberattacks, political subversion, economic coercion and manipulation of social media to sow discord and influence political outcomes in the US.

Russian hybrid warfare initiatives, such as the 2016 Democratic National Committee ( DNC ) hack and social media manipulation, are mentioned by Cordesman and Hwang.

They add that there are ongoing cyberattacks on US political and infrastructure targets and a wider active measures campaign utilizing espionage and disinformation. Additionally, Cordesman and Hwang assert that Russia uses economic manipulation to achieve strategic advantages because of its position as the country’s primary energy supplier.

Meanwhile, Seth Jones mentions in a February 2021 CSIS article that Russia has conducted significant cyberattacks against US government agencies and companies, exemplified by Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service’s ( SVR ) 2021 cyberattack, which affected up to 250 US federal agencies and businesses. &nbsp,

According to Jones, Russia and China use information to influence US political discourse and policies. He makes mention of Russia’s efforts to exacerbate social and political tensions through campaigns against anti-Black Lives Matter and Covid-19.

He points out how China’s economic policies, such as those used by the BRI, have an impact on the US’s standing in international politics. Jones claims that China monitors Chinese students and conducts operations on US university campuses.

He claims that Russia also uses organizations like the Internet Research Agency to carry out cyberattacks and information operations.

In a September 2023 Institute for the Study of War ( ISW) report, J. Matthew McInnis mentions that Russia views hybrid warfare as a means of achieving strategic goals before the adversary realizes that war has begun, blurring the lines between domestic and international conflict, peace and war, and peace and war.

In contrast, McInnis says that China sees warfare as increasingly civilianized. He claims that China uses non-military means to neutralize threats and gain advantages, and that its comprehensive national power concept includes a wide range of issues.

He points out that great power competition is still taking place in China and Russia as a continuous process that is escalating and dwindling in intensity but still a matter of fighting. McInnis contrasts that approach with the US event-based approach to conflicts.

He points out that the US tends to employ elements of national power episodically and often segregated among various agencies, lacking its near-peer adversaries ‘ continuous, combined approach.

Continue Reading

While all the focus in the past week has been on a&nbsp, significant problems for America’s when premier semiconductor firm, Intel, which laid off 15 % of its work power, hidden from view is another wrongdoing – a$ 3.9 billion project to build a&nbsp,” secure area” semiconductor&nbsp, manufacturing&nbsp, service. Considering that Intel now operates a semiconductor factory in Arizona, it is likely to discover this facility.

If you are about to ask what will be produced at this facility, do n’t bother since the project is classified. It’s not difficult to understand what is happening and why it’s a big mistake ( like the$ 59 billion investment that will primarily fund foreign and domestically held companies ‘ establishment of facilities in the US), despite the hidden details. Because the CHIPS Act is a nonpartisan waste of money, only the weak tax will (once once ) been robbed.

Some of the foreign companies financed under the CHIPS Act are: Samsung ( Korea ), TSMC ( Taiwan ), Global Foundries ( UAE), BAE Systems ( UK), Global Wafers ( Taiwan ) and Amcor ( Australia ). Because all of these businesses have a lot of money, US wealth is not required.

The Secure Enclave project is based on a single knowledge record that, like the project itself, is classified. &nbsp, However, the gist of the intel-report is that an adversary could get into a semiconductor manufacturing plant ( a fab ) and somehow insert bad code into the chip manufacturing process, aka spyware.

The CIA continued to claim something like this may occur despite the fact that there is no conclusive evidence that any commercially produced device has ever been compromised. We are actually betting billions of dollars on subpar knowledge without any factual proof to back it up.

Some Pentagon and intelligence officials have been having a dream about the need to thoroughly specialist microchips for some time. It is apparent that this issue may occur because the majority of the chips in the US military and intelligence systems are made in Asia. It was fueled by some Foreign devices and other devices, including surveillance cameras, which were discovered to possess backdoors, allowing the Chinese to monitor defense, brains, and government operations.

The easy solution would be for the state to buy just made-in-America materials with made-in-America cards. What appears to be common impression did not appeal to state buyers, according to &nbsp. &nbsp, They doubled down buying more and more products either chock full of Chinese-made components– or, even worse, only buying Chinese items off the shelves. &nbsp,

A good example is security devices. The defense left after it was widely known that cheap camcorders made in China had backdoors, either purchasing more for basic security and other programs, or avoiding disposing of the damaged goods, yet after receiving an order to do so.

People who compromises cards made for martial and intelligence software is supposed to stay away from the protected area. &nbsp, This means that the manufacturer will have solid protection. This is a significant issue because many of the US semiconductor industry’s workers are immigrants from abroad, whether they are from India, Pakistan, or from Asia’s farther east ( including China ).

By 2030, according to The Semiconductor Industries Association, the CHIPS Act ( without secure enclaves ) will call for 115, 000 new workers. Says one statement:

Companies will need to increase their hiring drastically in the field to meet these ambitious figures. A two- or four-year degree in engineering or computer knowledge may be required for many of these positions. Early research has revealed that the network for US individuals is insufficient. In order to close the hiring gap, many businesses will probably turn to foreigners and employ and maintain international students. &nbsp,

One out of every five tasks, even more, will likely be filled with immigrants who are qualified in STEM fields (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics ).

If the service is classified, the stable enclave cannot employ foreigners. Finding US residents with the knowledge necessary to work in a crowded and understaffed shop in Arizona may prove to be the secure area program’s Achilles heel. ( US defence companies also are facing hiring deficits. Does anyone really envision signs advertising jobs for building submarines at a Yankees game?

Assuming the income is used to actually create a secure service, it will be a pretty low-volume producer of specific components. &nbsp, This means the price per device may be celestial. &nbsp, The CHIPS income in no way fixes that trouble. This results in a completely out-of-control increase in the cost of weapons ( and it is already on par with defense goods being significantly overpriced and less and less affordable even for “rich” nations ).

There are other issues, also. A specialized factory wo n’t be in competition with the commercial sector, so its products are likely to fall far behind the latest technology and do so quickly. This implies that the safe neighborhood did eventually create outdated and overpriced junk.

But it gets worse. &nbsp, Everything is for completely. &nbsp, To stay Secure Enclave worthwhile, the government will need to encourage the Enclave’s customers to buy undervalued and poor safe products. Why would any defense company pay outrageous prices for parts that can be purchased for sale for less than that? &nbsp, And why would it opt to put inferior parts in its equipment?

Intel has recently developed a couple of new processors that incorporate an artificial intelligence&nbsp, engine. &nbsp, The idea is to equip a new generation of PCs ( personal computers ) with built in AI. &nbsp, The first new product is called Meteor Lake.

Intel is manufacturing the chip at its plant in Ireland, not in the United States. &nbsp, According to reports, Intel is having trouble making the chip and is losing billions of dollars. &nbsp, Its superior follow-on chip, called Lunar Lake, also has been outsourced, but this time to Taiwan Semiconductor ( TSMC). &nbsp, Intel ca n’t make it and wo n’t.

Intel’s stock is in the tank, the company has stopped paying dividend and it is laying off 15, 000 workers. It is not unfair to say that Intel will lose a net of 25, 000 jobs as a result of the problems the company is facing and the lack of thorough corporate vetting by the Department of Commerce, which is awarding out CHIPS money, and that Intel’s products will need to be outsourced for the company to survive.

Intel’s saga is likely to be repeated by many other semiconductor companies that are getting&nbsp, handouts&nbsp, under the CHIPS Act. &nbsp, There is no guarantee any of them will end up being competitive.

Many of the foreign companies are excessively rich: so the CHIPS Act is just a bribe for them to locate manufacturing&nbsp, in the US. &nbsp, Many of them, including TSMC, are not going to bring state-of-the-art production to the US for two reasons:

• They will want to maintain the company’s control over their best technology without risking losing it in the US.
• TSMC will want to keep US export controls on its market.

Why take a chance on yourself by getting paid for something you do n’t need?

Nothing in this is to suggest that the$ 59 billion CHIPS Act investment will yield nothing positive. Refuse to think about it if the goal is to fund domestic manufacturing by funding foreign and domestic businesses.

Former US deputy undersecretary of defense Stephen Bryen is a recognized authority on security strategy and technology.

This article was first published on his Substack, Weapons and Strategy. It is republished with permission.

Continue Reading