Companies (Page 396)

In early May, a US delegation consisting of 25 defense contractors arrived in Taiwan for a security summit, aimed to increase interoperability between the US and Taiwanese militaries. It marks the latest step toward Taiwan’s years-long efforts to strengthen its defense capabilities and pose credible deterrence to the Chinese military.

The military relationship between Taiwan and the US expanded significantly during former president Donald Trump’s administration. Washington approved major arms sales, increased cooperation with the Taiwanese military, and conducted more naval patrols in the Taiwan Strait to emphasize the US position on Taiwan.

During President Joe Biden’s administration, it was revealed that dozens of US military personnel were training Taiwanese forces on the island since at least 2020, numbers that have increased since.

And while conscription was previously considered an outdated military policy characteristic of the Cold War, the war in Ukraine has reversed this notion. Taiwan’s attempted transition to Western-style volunteer force in previous years now appears far less credible in being able to realistically oppose the Chinese military, and Taiwan’s government has since reverted to upholding its military reserve system.

But though Taiwan’s 1.7 million reservists appear to form a formidable challenge to China’s roughly 2 million active military personnel, Taiwan’s forces largely exist only on paper. Its military currently only has 169,000 active members and an estimated 300,000 combat-ready reservists, according to Wang Ting-yu of Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

The Taiwanese government was therefore quick to explore increasing training times for reservists after the outbreak of war in Ukraine, and in December 2022 lengthened conscription from four months to one year, bringing praise from the US. By boosting pay and training, the Taiwanese government hopes to bolster its forces and bring it closer to South Korea’s 18-month compulsory military service.

Asymmetric forces

But China’s population of 1.4 billion dwarfs Taiwan’s mere 23 million, meaning additional Taiwanese conscription initiatives are futile if China resorts to additional conscription as well. Taiwan’s US$19 billion defense budget also pales in comparison to the $230 billion spent by Beijing.

Washington’s hypothetical efforts to resupply the relatively isolated island of Taiwan during a conflict would meanwhile prove far more difficult than the ongoing Western effort to assist Ukraine. While stockpiling weapons could partially negate this issue, a prolonged conflict or blockade of Taiwan by China would steadily diminish Taiwan’s ability to continue fighting.

With the inherent disadvantages of the Taiwanese armed forces and the unwillingness of even the US to commit officially to the island’s defense, Taiwan’s government has explored increasing engagement with the private sphere to ensure its security. This month’s US contractors’ visit was just part of Taiwan’s recent efforts to increase engagement with both domestic and foreign private military firms.

Before the breakout of conflict in Ukraine in 2022, Taiwan had taken incremental steps toward greater privatization in its defense sector, such as privatizing the state aircraft manufacturer Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation in 2014.

However, the war in Ukraine completely altered the Taiwanese government’s view of private war. Russian private military and security companies (PMSCs) have been active in Ukraine since 2014, while the Russian PMSC known as Wagner has played an essential part in the war and in Russian propaganda. 

Various Western and Russian PMSCs are also fighting in Ukraine, while Chinese civilian drones have been used to great effect by both sides.

The Taiwanese government has since taken significant steps in engaging with Taiwan’s private sector to increase drone production. But more notable are the proposed changes to the Private Security Services Act, which regulates PMSCs operating in Taiwan, early into the war.

Taipei has various types of private services to consider, such as those providing security, consulting, and training services, intelligence gathering, logistics support, and cyber and maritime security.

Enoch Wu, a DPP politician and a former special operations soldier, founded the security and civilian defense organization Forward Alliance in 2020. Alongside programs to treat injuries and respond to crises, Forward Alliance’s combat training programs expanded significantly after the outbreak of war in Ukraine.

The number of Taiwanese private programs run by various companies “specializing in urban warfare and firearms training” has also increased since the start of the war, according to Voice of America.

In September 2022, Taiwanese entrepreneur Robert Tsao pledged to spend US$100 million training 3 million soldiers over three years in the Kuma Academy (also known as the Black Bear Academy).

While his claims are ambitious, Russian billionaire Yevgeny Prigozhin’s financing of Wagner has already played an integral role in the war in Ukraine, at the same time drastically increasing his stature in Russia and notoriety abroad.

Because of its own limited industry, any Taiwanese effort to promote greater military cooperation with the private sphere would require Western assistance.

The US scrapped its mutual defense treaty with Taiwan in 1979 to normalize relations with China, but the Taiwan Relations Act enables the US to provide Taiwan with the means to defend itself, and privatization could make it easier for the West to support the Taiwanese military.

Alongside weapons deals, Western PMSCs like G4S have been active in Taiwan for more than two decades and could quickly expand their operations on the island.

Greater cooperation with Western PMSCs may not be able to help Taiwan repel a Chinese assault. But they could complement Taiwanese military efforts to create a volunteer force modeled on Ukraine’s Territorial Defense Force and advocated by former Taiwanese defense chief Admiral Lee Hsi-min.

The US has explored developing guerrilla forces in the Baltic states to harass Russian forces if they were to invade, and growing the multiple private initiatives already under way in Taiwan could form a powerful guerrilla network that could remain active even if Taiwan’s military is forced to stand down.

Limitations and dangers

But committing to privatization has its own consequences for Taiwan.

The role of Chinese PMSCs abroad has grown significantly over the last few years, with an estimated 20 to 40 Chinese active largely to guard Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure projects.

However, China’s 7,000-plus PMSCs operating domestically “suggests ample opportunity for the future growth of internationally active” Chinese firms according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

And, while Chinese law prohibits them from using force abroad except for defense, Beijing’s assertion that Taiwan is part of China’s territory could erode legal and political barriers to using them.

In recent years, China has also deputized maritime militias of fishing boats to swarm parts of the South China Sea and establish control over certain areas. By collaborating with Chinese PMSCs, these militias could even avoid Taiwan and surround the Kinmen, Matsu, or uninhabited Pratas islands.

Although these islands are claimed by Taiwan, they are geographically closer to China. This could be justified on the grounds of economic interests or security concerns. The use of these fishing militias to harass Taiwan could make up for significant underdevelopment in Chinese PMSC capabilities and help China to avoid using its official military forces.

The scale of cooperation between the Taiwanese government and private military actors is so far limited. But Taiwan’s manpower shortages and lack of official military and diplomatic ties have made the prospect of private military assistance far more attractive.

The lack of international regulations sustaining Taiwan’s recent increased engagement with the private military sphere, however, will further encourage China to respond in kind.

Ukrainian oligarchs turned to PMSCs to protect their assets in Ukraine after 2014, while Kiev has come to lean heavily on foreign PMSCs to supplement the war effort. Wagner and other Russian PMSCs have meanwhile grown in importance to Russian military efforts in Ukraine as well.

The growing power of PMSCs in Ukraine, as well as worldwide, suggests further military privatization of the dispute over Taiwan may be inevitable.

This article was produced by Globetrotter, which provided it to Asia Times.

Continue Reading

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has ruled Turkey for the last 21 years. In the first few terms of his rule, Turkey experienced significant economic growth and a reduction in inequality. This was widely believed to be a reason for Erdoğan’s long-term popularity.

Then, inflation hit a 24-year high of 85.5% in November 2022, creating speculation that economic instability would count against Erdogan in the 2023 general election.

Despite this, running against two opponents in the first round of the election, Erdogan attracted more than 49% of the vote, setting him a very low bar of gaining less than a percentage point in Sunday’s two-man runoff. Some argue that his vaunted “great achievements” in science and technology are a significant reason for his continued popularity.

In the weeks before the first round, Erdogan made a flurry of announcements about his “great achievements” and upcoming projects. He unveiled plans for Turkey to send its first astronaut to the International Space Station by the end of the year.

The Teknofest Aerospace and Technology Festival was held to showcase many of these projects to the public. Erdogan also showed off Turkey’s new multipurpose amphibious assault ship and a new Turkish armed drone, capable of taking off from aircraft carriers.

Erdogan clearly hoped that these announcements would boost his popularity, by creating an image of Turkey becoming a world leader in science and technology. Erdogan’s government also oversaw the country’s Black Sea natural gas pipeline project, an attempt to make Turkey energy independent.

And more than $68 billion had been invested in the national defense industry as part of a plan to make Turkey a world leader in defense products.

Creating Turkey’s own car

Although the car industry has had an important role in Turkey’s economy, it has been dominated by foreign car companies. But the idea of having a national car brand has had a long history. In 1961 the military government attempted to develop the first Turkish car, Devrim, as a symbol of modern Turkey, but it was not very successful. This desire for a Turkish national car was even made into a popular film.

In 2017, Erdogan invited six business groups to produce a 100% domestic and national car by 2023, a year that marked the 100th anniversary of Turkey’s republic as well as being an election year.

The six business groups and the Ministry of Science, Technology and Industry formed Türkiye’s Automobile Joint Venture Group (Togg) in 2019, aiming to build the first fully Turkish-made car, which was also going to be an electric vehicle. Togg received the highest support package believed to have been given to any automotive firm in Europe and North America (about $3.5 billion).

Despite the extensive financial support and hype, the Togg car could not be “100% domestic and national” because domestic suppliers didn’t have the capacity to make the key parts. Crucial complex and expensive components, such as the battery, had to be imported.

In the end, only 51% of the Togg car was domestically sourced. This led to a change in the way it was described, rather than a “100% domestic and national” car Erdogan began calling it “the car of Türkiye” and claimed the product as a Turkish industrial win.

Social costs

With political economists Gabor Scheiring and Tamas Gerocs I have been investigating the implications of the policies related to Turkey’s car industry on social and economic development. Policy interventions that led to the development of Togg and Erdogan’s other “achievements” came at the expense of workers. Changes during the Erdogan years made subcontracting legal for big firms, resulting in more insecure and low-paid employment.

The number of unionized workers in the car industry dropped from 68% to just 17% between 2003-23. Labor rights abuses were reported in Togg’s plant.

Most people in Turkey are unable to afford to buy a new average car, let alone the Togg car, which will be sold for Turkish lira 953,000 ($47,500). This is about 112 times the minimum wage. More than 70% of workers in Turkey earn the minimum wage or less.

Togg received extensive public support despite its inability to keep the promise of a 100% Turkish car and despite deteriorating working conditions. In a survey, 94% of the population supported the initiative and this support was primarily based on nationalist and patriotic grounds, such as “helping one’s own country.”

The car was portrayed as a major success that would add “success to Turkey’s list of ongoing achievements”. Erdogan described Togg as the “shared pride of Türkiye and 85 million people.” The businesses involved in Togg were declared “brave fellows.”

Even supporters of the opposition were in favour of Togg and criticized opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu for not showing enough support for such an important initiative.

Rallying nationalist support

It is no surprise that Erdogan’s “great achievements” were at the center of his election campaign. Just days before the first round, Erdogan drove around in the first Togg car to get media coverage. He said the car “will hit the roads of Europe with all of its models” soon and the Europeans “will say ‘crazy Turks’ are coming.”

The government has created an understanding that every Turk must work “hard to elevate the country to the level of developed civilizations.” Low pay and insecure employment are the sacrifices workers must make for their country to reach this goal. Those who die in work accidents such as the mining disaster in Soma are called martyrs.

However, despite his inability to turn around the economy, Erdogan’s projection of Turkish success and place in the world would seem to have been a winner.

Merve Sancak is a lecturer in political economy at Loughborough University.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Continue Reading