Workshop supports MSMEs with tools for digital transformation
Final MY5G SME Digital Workshop is scheduled for Dec 6 in Sabah
CelcomDigi Bhd held the second edition of its MY5G SME Digital Workshop in Alor Setar recently. Designed to provide micro and small enterprises (MSMEs) the opportunity to learn and identify suitable technologies and digital…Continue Reading
Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning told a regular press briefing in Beijing that China was helping other countries get their people out. “Recently, some countries have asked China for assistance. From a humanitarian point of view, we have provided convenience for their citizens in northern Myanmar to evacuate throughContinue Reading
The incident last Tuesday (November 14) in which Australian sailors suffered minor injuries from sonar pulses from a Chinese destroyer couldn’t have come at a worse time for Anthony Albanese.
He’d just finished a very successful trip to Beijing. He was about to again meet President Xi Jinping at APEC in the United States late in the week. The incident was potentially serious in terms of unsettling a much-improved relationship.
The HMAS Toowoomba’s sailors had been undertaking the harmless task of unraveling fishing nets from around the ship’s propellers. The vessel was in international waters inside Japan’s exclusive economic zone on its way to a port. It had been supporting United Nations sanctions against North Korea.
The Chinese destroyer had been warned about the divers, but acted anyway.
There were two issues for Albanese: whether to raise the matter with Xi (assuming the President didn’t bring it up) and whether to indicate publicly he had done so.
We don’t know whether he raised it, because his office and ministerial colleagues won’t answer this question. There has been no opportunity to question him since his return at the weekend.
It seems obvious he should have discussed the matter with Xi. He has repeated endlessly that “we will disagree when we must” with China.
Not to canvass the incident would be a cop-out from this formula. It would carry the message that Australia, having established more positive relations with China – to the great benefit of our trade – was now unwilling to be forthright because it did not want to risk setting things back.
The Australian government was careful not to announce the incident until after Albanese was on his way home. The timing was diplomatic.
Then-Acting Prime Minister and Defense Minister Richard Marles said in a statement on Saturday the government had expressed “serious concerns” to the Chinese government, and described the Chinese vessel’s conduct as “unsafe and unprofessional.”
If Albanese did raise the incident, why not say so? Again, only to avoid offending the Chinese and that’s unacceptable.
The government points to Marles’s statement and claims that meant the matter was dealt with at the appropriate level.
This might be convincing if it hadn’t been for the fact Albanese was actually meeting Xi.
The silence is also being defended on the basis of this being a private meeting. This won’t wash either. When the PM and President met in Beijing Albanese gave a very detailed read-out of the encounter, even down to the jokes.
On Monday morning Albanese tweeted a picture showing he was back working with the team. Members of that team appearing in the media have been left intoning the unconvincing talking points.
Albanese should clarify whether he or not he talked about the incident – not just in the name of transparency but to demonstrate that the government’s China policy is as robust as he says. Not to mention that it would be of passing interest to know what the president said, if the matter was in fact one of the topics of their discussion.
The Prime Minister went on Sky on Monday afternoon to criticize the Chinese action but remained silent about whether it had been discussed in the Xi meeting.
He said the action by the Chinese ship was dangerous, unsafe and unprofessional, and one Australian sailor had been injured. It was a regrettable incident. He said this was one of those times when Australia disagreed with China; the event damaged the relationship.
Australia had raised its strong objections to China “very clearly, very directly, through all of the appropriate channels in all the forums that are available.”
But he declined to confirm or deny raising it with Xi, on the grounds he does not divulge private conversations that take place on the sidelines of a conference.
“We’ve raised it very clearly through all of the normal channels.”
“When I was in San Francisco, there was no bilateral meeting with President Xi where you give a readout […] I don’t talk about private meetings on the sidelines, discussions I have with any world leader. That’s how you keep communications open. But I can assure you that we raised these issues in the appropriate way and very clearly, unequivocally. And China – there’s no misunderstanding as to Australia’s view on this.”
Albanese said he always spoke up for Australia’s national interest. “I do so directly,” he said, stressing he did so respectfully, not talking about private conversations.
At a news conference while at APEC Albanese said of the meeting with Xi: “I reiterated to him that it was a very positive visit [to Beijing] that was well received in Australia. And I reiterated to him that the signal that the impediments to trade between our two nations were reducing and being removed, was received positively in Australia.”
Michelle Grattan is Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
“(We) will lead the country steadily and firmly follow the right path. Please give us a chance,” he said. While the United States does not diplomatically recognise Taiwan, it is the island’s most prominent ally and arms supplier. During Hsiao’s three-year stint in Washington, she had enabled US-Taiwan relations toContinue Reading
MANILA – “I do not think anybody wants to go to war,” Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr said following his meeting with Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Cooperation (APEC) summit in San Francisco last week.
“We really should view this as a work in progress. It’s a process,” Marcos Jr added, referring to the two sides’ intensifying maritime disputes in the South China Sea.
The seemingly cordial meeting saw the two leaders agree on the need to establish guardrails in their bilateral relations. Both sides also made their respective redlines clear, with the Filipino president realistically acknowledging that “the problems remain and it is something that we need to continue to communicate [on with our Chinese counterparts].”
With few signs yet of big-ticket investments from the West, Marcos Jr is also intent on reviving frayed economic ties with China, which has yet to implement multi-billion infrastructure pledges in the Southeast Asia nation.
In many ways, the Marcos-Xi meeting mirrored the pragmatic undertones of the much-covered summit between US President Joe Biden and his Chinese counterpart.
Tellingly, the Filipino president immediately visited the US naval facility in Hawaii after the APEC Summit. There, the two allies finalized new defense deals, including on intelligence sharing and maritime security cooperation.
By all indications, Marcos Jr seems intent on enhancing the Philippines’ bargaining position and overall deterrence capabilities vis-à-vis China, while keeping communication channels with Beijing intact.
By combining engagement and deterrence, the Filipino president hopes to reset his country’s terms of engagement with the Asian superpower.
“Let me say that I have waited a very long time to say, aloha!” declared Marcos before a cheering crowd at the Hawaii Convention Center. “The Filipinos and the Filipino-Americans in Hawaii hold a very special place in my heart for all the wonderful experiences that we had here with our Filipino compatriots,” he added, referring to his family’s years of exile in Hawaii following the fall of his father’s dictatorship in 1986.
The Filipino president’s main mission in Hawaii, however, was discussing ways to further expand military cooperation with the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), which is seeking access to strategically situated bases across the Philippines to keep China’s ambitions in check.
During a speech at the Daniel K Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Honolulu, the de facto think tank of the INDOPACOM, Marcos Jr emphasized his country’s intensifying disputes with China.
Marcos Jr said that the situation in the South China Sea “has become more dire” in recent months, with China inching “closer and closer” to dominating waters off the coast of the Philippines.
“Unfortunately, I cannot report that the situation is improving… The situation has become more dire than it was before,” lamented Marcos Jr, acknowledging the desperate conditions and growing fears of armed clashes in the disputed waters.
But the Filipino president stuck an uncompromising line, maintaining “The Philippines will not give a single square inch of our territory to any foreign power.”
Marcos Jr’s two-day visit culminated in a meeting with INDOPACOM chief John Aquilino, who visited EDCA bases in the Philippines earlier this year. The two reportedly discussed ways to further enhance maritime security cooperation through intelligence-sharing and greater interoperability.
With fears of a potential Chinese military intervention over the Second Thomas Shoal, the Filipino leader likely also discussed ways to jointly deter the Asian superpower. Manila has reiterated its commitment to resupply its marine detachment on the contested shoal and fortify the grounded BRP Sierra Madre vessel there.
Over the past decade, the US Pentagon has provided “over-the-horizon” operational support over the shoal by flying drones and sailing warships close to the contested area. But the Philippines and US are now reportedly seriously considering potential contingencies, including an armed conflict with Chinese maritime forces in the area.
The Philippines is also pursuing regular joint patrols with the US and other like-minded naval powers near the contested area. The US has repeatedly emphasized that it will come to the Philippines’ rescue should its troops, vessels and aircraft come under attack by a hostile third party in the South China Sea.
But the two allies are also discussing ways to more effectively counter China’s evolving “gray zone” strategy, namely the deployment of gigantic coast guard vessels and an armada of militia vessels to intimidate rival claimant states in the area.
The Philippines’ expanding security ties with the US may strengthen its hand in the South China Sea, but not without its own costs, not least a “short sharp war” with China in the disputed waters.
The economic costs are already mounting. Amid rising tensions in the South China Sea, Beijing has effectively frozen its investment pledges to the Philippines.
“We have three [big-ticket] projects that won’t be funded by the Chinese government anymore. We can’t wait forever and it seems like China isn’t that interested anymore,” complained Philippine Transportation Secretary Jaime Bautista last month at an investment summit.
Meanwhile, foreign direct investment (FDI) from traditional Western partners has also been falling in the Philippines. Meanwhile, there are growing indications that the Biden administration’s “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework” has hit a snag amid stiff bipartisan opposition at home.
In effect, the West has yet to offer the Philippines any major economic incentives amid Marcos Jr’s hard pivot away from China and back to traditional allies.
As a result, there is growing pressure on the Filipino leader to revive communication channels with Beijing in order to not only prevent an armed conflict in the South China Sea, but also reopen discussions on large-scale investment deals.
The Marcos Jr administration is intent on dealing with the Asian superpower from an enhanced geopolitical position amid deepening defense ties with the Pentagon. It remains to be seen, however, if Beijing is open to any meaningful compromise or engagement in response to Manila’s double act.
Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on X, formerly Twitter, at @Richeydarian
After a failed second attempt in August, Pyongyang said it would carry out the third launch in October, though it never materialised. South Korea has said Pyongyang is providing Moscow with arms in exchange for Russian space technology. Analysts have said there is significant technological overlap between space launch capabilitiesContinue Reading
As China shows sparks of recovery, it’s best not to get too excited about the improving health of Asia’s biggest economy. That’s especially true if you’re Xi Jinping and Li Qiang.
The green shoots seen in October data on China’s retail sales and manufacturing are indeed a relief to global investors and Asian policymakers. The 7.6% year-on-year jump in sales and 4.6% rise in factory output suggest stimulus efforts by President Xi and Premier Li are gaining traction.
Yet weakness elsewhere remains a clear and present danger in the homestretch of 2023.
Hopes that Xi and Li have gotten a handle on China’s property crisis are belied by the 9.3% plunge in real estate investment last month.
The same goes for signs China slid back into deflation. The other big problem: intensifying global headwinds as growth in the US, Europe and Japan disappoints.
Japan’s economy, for example, shrank 2.1% year on year in the July-September quarter, much worse than the 0.6% contraction forecasters expected. Here, Japan shows the difficulty of straddling US and Chinese economies experiencing rough patches.
The US is buckling under the weight of 11 Federal Reserve rate hikes in less than 20 months. The coming US 2024 US election cycle, meantime, will add pressure on President Joe Biden to take an even harder line on China in the form of more trade sanctions and tech curbs.
In China’s case, it’s quite possible to make a credible half-glass-full argument.
Take auto sales. In October alone, passenger vehicle sales jumped 10.2% year on year. In part, this speaks to the industry’s success in rolling out sales promotions and savvy marketing of electric and hybrid vehicles.
Yet it fits with news that in the July-September period, China managed to grow 4.9%, faster than forecasts of a 4.5% pace.
The varying speeds at which the economy is moving is to be expected as China transitions to new growth engines, explains Liu Aihua, a spokesman for the National Bureau of Statistics. It’s all part of a years-long move away from smokestack-heavy industries toward innovation and sustainability.
“Effective” policy tweaks in the economy are bearing fruit, Liu says, describing China as undergoing “wave-like development” and “tortuous progress” toward increased efficiency and productivity.
Yet the move upmarket will not always be smooth. “At present,” Liu says, “the external pressure is still great, the constraints of insufficient domestic demand are still prominent, enterprises have many difficulties in production and operation, and hidden risks in some fields require much attention.”
One such risk is the yawning income gap between urban and rural consumers. The good news, Liu says, is that by some metrics household consumption contributed 83.2% to economic growth in the first 10 months of 2023, a 6% year-on-year increase.
It’s here, though, that the urban-rural wealth divide leaves China’s economy unbalanced. Months ago, when youth unemployment topped 20%, Beijing merely stopped publishing regular statistics on the unsettling measure.
The key to raising rural incomes is diversifying growth engines far more aggressively. No effort is more crucial than reducing the outsized role that the property sector plays in generating gross domestic product (GDP).
“Clearly, the property sector remains a weak spot for the economy, which requires further support in the foreseeable future,” says Hao Zhou, chief economist at Guotai Junan International.
In recent years, real estate-related sectors provided roughly a quarter of China’s GDP. This year, economists at UBS calculate that the share has fallen closer to 22%. Even so, the sector’s chronic weakness threatens to drag down parts of the economy now showing signs of hope.
“Retail sales in October were particularly strong, beating even our above-consensus estimates,” says economist Louise Loo at Oxford Economics. But “at this juncture, we are skeptical that the now-three consecutive months of strong retail sales data are pointing to a permanent upshift in consumers’ spending propensities.”
One important caveat: Year-to-date retail sales data showed low-value discretionary items emerging as an outperforming segment, “consistent with what we think is typical of weak economic recoveries – when the consumer’s willingness to spend rests on smaller-ticket items,” Loo adds.
For China going forward, Gita Gopinath, first deputy managing director of the International Monetary Fund, tells CNBC, “the pressure remains.”
She adds that “there remains a lot of stress in the market. There remains weakness in the market. This is not going to be over with quickly. It’s going to take some more time to transition back to a more sustainable size.”
In the short run, the mixed bag of Chinese data points to the need for more assertive stimulus jolts by the central government in Beijing.
The biggest worry is the “negative wealth effect” emanating from the property market, says economist Jacqueline Rong at BNP Paribas SA. For all the excitement about firmer retail sales trends, Rong notes, the two-year average growth in sales remains well below the 8% pace before Covid-19 lockdowns.
Many local governments also may lack the fiscal space needed to boost far-flung economic regions as property markets sour far and wide.
That explains why infrastructure spending fell 0.2% in October and suggests “the damage inflicted by the housing crash is too extensive to be countered by fiscally constrained local governments,” write economists at Societe Generale in a recent report. “The 1 trillion yuan (US$139 billion) already announced does not seem to be enough.”
Lisheng Wang, an economist at Goldman Sachs, adds that “given persistent growth headwinds from the property downturn, still-fragile confidence and lingering financial risks, we think a ‘policy put’ has been triggered in China and expect the central government to step up easing materially in the coming months.”
Though topline growth is beating the odds, China’s economy is “not out of the woods by any means,” says Stephen Innes, managing partner at SPI Asset Management.
He adds that “this growth suggests a modest improvement in the Chinese economy. However, there are ongoing calls for increased policy support to maintain consistent growth, as there are concerns about the sustainability of the recovery.”
There are concerns about the progress of reforms, too. For all the success Xi’s Communist Party has had in juicing GDP, officials have made little progress in building the robust safety nets needed to stabilize the economy. And to encourage households to save less and spend more.
Making consumption a bigger share of GDP is the key to allowing Beijing to throttle back on fiscal policy and local governments to rely less on leverage. It’s central to phasing out the gigantic shadow-banking system and letting the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) withdraw massive stimulus from the economy.
The need for a recalibration from over-investment to consumption was well-known even before Xi rose to power in 2012. So was the need to create broader safety nets across sectors.
But time and time again, the hard work of engineering took a backseat to short-term considerations. The tendency has been to pour more public works spending into new infrastructure and property. These investments in hardware come at the expense of the economic software needed to raise China’s competitiveness.
This happened after the 2008 global financial crisis. Delay was the response to the 2013 Fed “taper tantrum.” The same with the chaotic summer of 2015, when Shanghai stocks lost a third of their value in just three weeks.
The Covid-19 pandemic deadened Beijing’s reformist instincts. In fact, it was at the height of the pandemic that Xi began his clampdown on Big Tech, starting with Alibaba Group’s Jack Ma. The US Fed’s most aggressive tightening cycle since the mid-1990s hardly helped.
Yet since reopening from the Covid era, Xi’s government is finding that the consumption rebound isn’t what Beijing hoped.
From a policy standpoint, the months ahead will be quite a balancing act. Since he took over as premier in March, Li has prioritized deleveraging over excessive stimulus so as not to incentivize a return to bad lending behavior.
This includes guarding against a major plunge in the yuan that might increase the odds of property developers defaulting on offshore debt.
On Monday (November 20), the PBOC left benchmark lending rates unchanged at a monthly fixing. While many economists think China could do with more policy stimulus, the PBOC is holding the one-year loan prime rate at 3.45% and the five-year LPR at 4.20%.
“Policymakers may want more time to assess the impact of the recent repricing of existing mortgage contracts before they make further changes to the benchmark rate,” says Julian Evans-Pritchard, head of China economics at Capital Economics.
“The big picture though is that, with economic momentum weak and downward pressure on the renminbi reversing, we think rate reductions will come before long.”
Accelerating reforms is even more important to restoring confidence among mainland households and foreign investors alike. Today’s green shoots might prove fleeting without major upgrades that build economic muscle for the long run.
Follow William Pesek on X, formerly Twitter, at @WilliamPesek
China deploys boats to patrol the busy waterway and has built artificial islands that it has militarised to reinforce its claims to almost the entire sea. It has also ignored an international tribunal ruling that its claims have no legal basis. During their meeting last week, Marcos and Xi agreedContinue Reading
Most of the residents CNA spoke to had already paid the amount they were asked to in order to get the keys to their flat.
One resident in his 40s said he felt like he had “no other choice” as what he received was a legal letter and that he would be charged for any delay in payment.
He added that several residents were stressed by the situation as they were renting places at the moment before moving into their flat.
“We didn’t want this dispute to cause any delay to our key collection. So, a lot of us like myself, we just went ahead and paid first (to) get the process flowing.”
Another resident, who wished to be known only as Ms Soon, also told CNA that most of them at Dairy Farm Residences are focused on collecting their keys first to move into their flats.
“Everyone’s just very anxious to collect keys and don’t want to delay any further … because we don’t want the developers to use this (maintenance) fee dispute as an excuse to stall the key collection process,” said the 36-year-old who works in media and advertising.
“Then collectively when everyone has moved in already, as a community, we can arrange for a town hall (and) meet the developer.”
Most of the residents who spoke to CNA were not part of the 20 residents who have been in contact with the developers. These residents pointed out that there has been “zero communication” with the rest of the flat owners apart from the 20 in the group.
“The developer is talking to some residents. But it’s not representative of the entire community,” said the resident in his 30s.
“Up to date, we have not received any official communication from the developer regarding this whole maintenance issue that is currently being blown out of proportion,” he said.
“They should address all the residents … Do an official address either through email, through a Zoom (session), town hall or at least write to the residents to let them know what is their stance on this and whether they are looking into it.”
Noting comments from online platforms such as HardwareZone, Ms Soon said: “People were saying ‘Oh you know, you buy (a) condo you should know that you should fork out a maintenance fee. Don’t complain too much’.
“As a home owner of this project, my concern is not so much about forking out the maintenance fees. I only want to understand why is it at this amount.”
CNA has also contacted United Engineers on the concerns raised by residents.
The maintenance and sinking fees collected by unit owners or subsidiary proprietors are used for the maintenance of strata title developments such as Dairy Farm Residences, said Dr Edward Ti, an associate professor of law from Singapore Management University (SMU).
Sinking fund refers to money periodically set aside by the owners of an estate to cover unexpected emergencies and long-term structural costs.
In all strata developments, unit owners wholly own their unit and are also co-owners of the land and facilities that the development sits on, in proportion to how many shares their particular unit has in relation to all the shares which constitute the development, noted Dr Ti, who is also a fellow of the Cambridge Centre for Property Law.
“In this case, I am not aware how the developer represented how much the maintenance fees were to be (for instance, if there was an exclusion clause or non-reliance clause).
“In general, the developer simply had the duty to act reasonably when they forecast how much the maintenance fees should have been,” said Dr Ti.
He added that it was possible that the costs of maintaining the building now exceed the estimate that the developer had in mind.
“However, it would only be responsible to assert that the developer was intentionally representing a lower estimated fee when the units were marketed if this is substantiated with evidence,” he pointed out.
Similarly, Huttons Asia’s senior director for data analytics Lee Sze Teck told CNA that condominium maintenance fees are always given as estimates during the marketing phase.
“(It) is impossible for the developer to get a contract binding quote from the various service providers from security, cleaning, landscaping, maintenance, pest control and so on,” said Mr Lee.
He added that costs have “escalated steeply” after the COVID-19 pandemic, with manpower, material, shipping and interest costs having gone up.
“This has inevitably pushed up the overall costs of managing a condo.”
SMU’s Dr Ti also said that the developer is statutorily obliged to establish maintenance funds according to the Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act 2004.
When a Management Corporation Strata Title (MCST) – an entity that manages and maintains common areas in strata-titled properties such as condominiums – is formed, the developer is to hand over the maintenance funds and records to the MCST.
After the unit owners take over via the MCST, that is the entity that can decide how much funds should be collected, which is done by ordinary resolution, said Dr Ti.
“Thus, in the event that the (home owners) decide that a lower maintenance amount is sufficient to maintain the development, they may so decide.”
The associate professor added that unit owners are also protected during the period where the developer had collected fees as the developer must hand over the financial records in that period.
These provisions help to ensure that the money collected by the developer were spent lawfully, said Dr Ti.
Japan and China are upgrading and upsizing their naval fleets with affordable, general-purpose frigates amid territorial disputes, mutual missile threats and historical animosity.
This month, Japan launched its eighth Mogami-class frigate, the JS Yubetsu, marking a significant advance in the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force’s (JMSDF) capabilities, The Warzone reported.
The Warzone report says that the Mogami-class frigates, built to serve as the JMSDF’s backbone, feature advanced electronic warfare and sensor suites, and are designed for operation by small crews, underscoring a broad structural shift toward more efficient naval operations.
The Warzone notes that the class is set to replace older Asagiri- and Abukuma-class vessels, with a total of 12 ships planned and the last scheduled for completion in 2027.
Mogami-class frigates have a standard displacement of approximately 3,900 tons and a total displacement of about 5,500 tons, with dimensions roughly similar to the Asagiri-class destroyers. They are powered by a Rolls-Royce MT30 gas turbine and two MAN diesel engines capable of exceeding 30 knots.
The Mogami-class also has a BAE Systems’ Mark 45 naval gun, remote weapon systems, Lockheed Martin’s Mk 41 vertical launching system for surface-to-air missiles and Raytheon’s SeaRAM system.
The Warzone says the frigates also feature advanced electronic warfare suites including the NOLQ-3E system, Mitsubishi Electric’s OPY-2 radar, various sonar systems for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and can support a Mitsubishi SH-60L Sea Hawk helicopter and deploy different unmanned vehicles for minesweeping.
Most significantly, The Warzone notes that these ships are designed for operation by a crew of just 90, enabled by high levels of automation and an advanced Combat Information Center (CIC).
The report says that while the first two Mogami-class vessels were relatively cost-effective, Japan is already planning for 12 “new FFM” frigates, with enhanced air defense capabilities and larger dimensions, to be constructed from 2027 to 2036.
The developments underscore Japan’s commitment to maintaining a strong, technologically advanced naval presence in a challenging geopolitical landscape.
Indeed, the Mogami-class may be Japan’s answer to China’s next-generation Type 054B frigate, conceptualized as a general-purpose naval combatant.
This August, The Warzone reported on the Type 054B frigate, which is larger and more capable than its predecessor, the Type 054A. The Warzone notes that the frigate is equipped with a 32-cell vertical launch system (VLS) at the bow, which might be a universal VLS used in other Chinese warships or a system similar to the one on the Type 054A.
It also features a 100mm main gun, replacing the 76mm gun of the Type 054A, although the exact model of this new gun is yet to be confirmed.
The report said that the Type 054B is armed with two close-in weapons systems (CIWS) for air defense: a H/PJ-11 11-barrel 30mm Gatling gun and an HQ-10 SAM launcher. Although it says that while anti-surface warfare capabilities are not confirmed, there’s speculation about an additional set of VLS cells or slanted anti-ship missile launchers.
It also says that the ship has Type 726 launchers for various defensive and offensive purposes such as flares, chaff, active decoys and anti-submarine rockets.
The WarZone report says that Type 054B is expected to host the Z-20F maritime helicopter, enhancing its ASW capabilities and that the frigate might operate vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) drones in the future.
The Warzone states that the Type 54B’s sensor suite includes a primary radar, a double-sided rotating active electronically scanned array (AESA), a bow sonar and provisions for a variable-depth sonar (VDS) and a towed-array sonar (TAS).
It notes that stealth features have been incorporated into the design, resembling the French Aquitaine-class frigate regarding radar cross-section reduction.
These frigates are set to significantly impact Japan and China’s naval doctrines and fleet composition, as both naval powers are enlarging their fleets in response to rising threat perceptions from one another.
The Mogami class is designed to replace the obsolete Abukuma- and Asagiri-class destroyers, whose age, limited numbers, outdated technology, non-stealth design, and lack of helicopter facilities in the case of the Abukuma-class, may no longer be sufficient to meet Japan’s security needs.
The Mogami-class also marks a move toward greater cost-effectiveness.
In a September 2023 US Naval Institute article, Eric Wertheim notes that the first two ships cost significantly less than US$500 million each, with an estimated price tag of $375 million and $410 million per frigate.
That relatively low cost allows the Mogami class to be built in greater numbers than larger, more capable ships such as the Maya class destroyers, which cost $1.5 billion per ship and cannot be made in large numbers.
Moreover, in line with Japan’s more proactive defense policy, the Mogami class may eventually be offered for export.
In April 2021, Asia Times reported that Indonesia planned to purchase eight Mogami-class frigates, with plans for Japan to deliver four ships starting in 2023 or early 2024 and for the remaining four to be built at state-run PT PAL’s Surabaya shipyard.
While China already has the advantage of lower labor costs and formidable shipbuilding capability, the Type 054B represents a serious upgrade over the Type 054A with better blue water seakeeping, greater endurance and more upgrade potential.
The ship also has better sensors, networking and combat management suites, enabling it to field more capable munitions.
The Type 054B’s AESA means that active production and forthcoming PLA-N blue-water combatants will come with the technology as standard while its embarked Z-20F helicopter will allow the class to match the minimum ASW capabilities of PLA-N blue-water combatants.
Asia Times reported in February 2023 that the Type 054B was developed to improve the Type 054A’s escort capabilities, as the Type 054A’s diesel propulsion could not match the speed of China’s carrier battlegroups.
The Type 054B aims to address that shortcoming with its enhanced propulsion system. Apart from that, the ship’s primary roles are anticipated to be ASW, with secondary roles in anti-air warfare (AAW) and anti-surface warfare (ASUW).