SAN FRANCISCO: US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said on Friday (Nov 10) that she and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng agreed to “intensify communication” on economic issues but warned him to crack down on Chinese companies that supply material support to Russia for its war in Ukraine. The two “had candid,Continue Reading
ReutersUS President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping are to meet next week in the San Francisco Bay area, two senior administration officials said.
The encounter on 15 November will be only their second face-to-face meeting during the Biden presidency.
It will be wide-ranging, US officials said, with the Israel-Hamas war, Taiwan, war in Ukraine and election interference to be discussed.
Relations between the two countries deteriorated earlier this year.
The US accused China of sending a spy balloon across its air space. It shot it down off the coast of South Carolina.
There was also a visit to Taiwan last year by then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi, which led China to break off communication between the two nations’ militaries.
Mr Biden is “determined” to restore those channels, US officials said, but China appeared “reluctant” to do so.
“This is not the relationship of five or 10 years ago, we’re not talking about a long list of outcomes or deliverables,” one of the officials said.
“The goals here really are about managing the competition, preventing the downside of risk – of conflict, and ensuring channels of communication are open.”
The bilateral meeting will take place during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) summit, which the US is hosting in San Francisco from 11 to 17 November.
The American officials said US diplomats had raised the importance of re-establishing military dialogue in “nearly every conversation” that US officials had had with their Chinese counterparts over the past year, but with no success.
One of the main sticking points for re-establishing military-to-military communication is the Chinese spy balloon incident which “comes up often” when discussing the silence, one official said.
“I think the balloon episode underscored the difficulty we had at the time to be able to establish high-level, consequential communications with Beijing. And we’ve made that case persistently and consistently,” the official added.
After the incident in February, Secretary of State Antony Blinken abruptly cancelled a trip to Beijing, saying China’s decision to fly an apparent spy balloon over the US was “unacceptable and irresponsible”.
But the trip eventually went ahead in June and Mr Blinken had what he described as “a robust conversation” with Mr Xi.
The leader of the Russian republic of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, recently authorized police to shoot to kill pro-Palestinian protesters who might take to the streets of Chechnya. The orders came in the wake of an antisemitic riot that broke out on Oct. 29, 2023, in the neighboring Russian republic of Dagestan.
It is not that Kadyrov doesn’t support the Palestinian cause; he does. Rather, the order demonstrates that he has a tight grip on the previously rebellious republic and is able to exert his omnipotent power – a power that extends far beyond the borders of Chechnya, a predominantly Muslim republic in the North Caucasus.
Kadyrov is both feared and venerated throughout Russia, and even more so since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Since then, his power and influence have increased significantly within the Russian political sphere. This is due to his contributions to the war effort, including the recruitment of volunteers.
At the same time, he continually flouts the rule of law. In September 2023, for example, Kadyrov posted a video to his Telegram channel showing his 15-year-old son, Adam, beating Nikita Zhuravel, a 19-year-old imprisoned for allegedly burning the Quran in front of a mosque.
Kadyrov praised Adam for possessing the “adult ideals of honor, dignity and defense of his religion.” Russian federal authorities did not condemn the beating of the defenseless prisoner.
How did the leader of a small North Caucasian republic become such a feared figure in Russia?
As scholars of Russian history and Chechen politics, we argue that Kadyrov’s power and political legitimacy are based on brute force, lack of accountability, a personal relationship with Putin and the use of Islam for political gain.
Ramzan Kadyrov’s late father, Akhmat Kadyrov, was a mufti, or Islamic legal scholar, in Chechnya in the 1990s. He and his son Ramzan were also staunch supporters of Chechen independence.
However, Akhmat Kadyrov’s political and religious disagreement with the Chechen pro-independence government after the first Chechen war from 1994 to 1996 drew him into the orbit of Vladimir Putin.
Shortly after the beginning of the second Chechen war, which lasted from 1999 to 2009, Putin – who increased his power and popularity due to his aggressive role in the conflict – installed Akhmat as the leader of the republic.
When Akhmat was assassinated in 2004, Ramzan was 27 years old – three years too young to legally assume the role as leader in Chechnya. He used these years to consolidate his power and ensure his political ascension. To achieve this, he worked on eliminating his political rivals, including those who were once close to his father. Some were silenced, while others were exiled or murdered.
Ramzan was appointed to lead the republic in 2007 when he turned 30. At that time, Russia was conducting a counterterrorism operation in Chechnya using its federal forces. Kadyrov worked diligently to take control of all security-related matters in the republic and eventually succeeded in building a formidable armed force devoted to him personally.
This highly professional paramilitary force, colloquially known as the “Kadyrovtsy,” is formally integrated into the interior ministry and national guard.
These troops serve as a private army that suppresses dissent within the republic and eliminates Kadyrov’s opponents beyond its borders. Members of Kadyrov’s inner circle have been linked to assassinations of the Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov, journalist Anna Politkovskaya, human rights activist Natalya Estemirova and others. Kadyrov has denied any involvement.
Kadyrovtsy also fought in the Syrian civil war as part of Russia’s military support for Syrian president Bashar Assad. They have been present in Ukraine since the start of hostilities in the Donbas region in 2014 and assumed a larger role following the 2022 invasion. This has boosted Kadyrov’s position within the closest circle of Putin’s supporters.
Putin’s ascendance to power in 1999 marked the beginning of the end of the Chechen struggle for independence. Under Putin’s rule, however, Kadyrov and his associates have achieved an unprecedented level of autonomy in the increasingly centralized Russian state.
This autonomy is largely due to the personal relationship between Putin and Kadyrov. Soon after Akhmat Kadyrov’s death, Ramzan famously arrived at the Kremlin wearing a tracksuit, and Putin sincerely comforted the grief-stricken young man. That meeting laid the foundation for a strong patron-client relationship based on Kadyrov’s personal devotion to Putin and the two leaders’ mutual dependence.
In return for Kadyrov’s zealous loyalty and his largely successful efforts in suppressing the North Caucasian insurgency, Putin ceded nearly complete control of Chechnya. He also provided large economic subsidies to Chechnya, enabling Kadyrov to rebuild the republic destroyed by two wars. In the process, Kadyrov became a very wealthy man himself and enriched his close associates.
Kadyrov grew up in a religious family that adhered to the North Caucasian traditional form of Islam called Sufism. Under Kadyrov, Sufism in Chechnya flourished and became the only acceptable form of Islam.
Within Chechnya, Kadyrov uses religion to galvanize supporters and demonstrate his political power. He promotes Islamic values by building mosques and religious schools. He also dictates religious public conduct for the population, including a strict dress code.
This public re-Islamization of the region after a long period of secular communist rule is convenient for Putin as well. It enables the Russian president to demonstrate respect for Islam and gain trust within the Muslim world.
Kadyrov, meanwhile, also uses Islam to boost his profile on the international stage and bolster his political standing in Russia. On Oct. 25, 2023, during Israel’s bombardment of Gaza in the wake of Hamas’ attack on Israel, he expressed his full support for the Palestinian struggle and offered to send his “units” for a peacekeeping mission.
Kadyrov also argues that Chechen units in Ukraine are participating in a holy jihad against the “Western Satanist ideology.” He regularly posts videos from Chechen mosques where attendants pray for victory in Ukraine and liberation of the Palestinians.
Kadyrov has managed to construct an increasingly hierarchical and oppressive political system, one that revolves around the cult of personality of his late father and Ramzan himself. He presides over Chechnya – which waged two wars against Russia in the past 30 years in pursuit of independence – with impunity.
“I am the boss! I am at the steering wheel!” Kadyrov boldly proclaimed in 2011, a mere four years after Putin installed him as the republic’s president. Since then, he has repeatedly defied human rights and the rule of law. His supporters have engaged in abductions, torture and extortion of money from the Chechen population.
Russian law seems powerless to hold Kadyrov accountable, a fact the Chechen strongman underscored in 2015. In response to a covert operation by the Russian police in Chechnya, Kadyrov ordered Chechen law enforcement to shoot anyone – even federal forces – who entered the republic without prior notice.
In addition to his near-absolute power within Chechnya, Kadyrov wields unprecedented authority in Russia at large. Chechen security forces operate with apparent impunity, kidnapping people from across the Russian Federation. Victims include members of the LGBTQ community, whom Kadyrov deems “nonhuman” and “devils.”
At a time of rising instability within Russia, which is entangled in the disastrous war in Ukraine, Kadyrov maintains his strong grip on power in his republic. While other regional leaders are temporary managers, regularly replaced from Moscow, Kadyrov’s power is deeply entrenched.
Kadyrov sees any public display of discontent as a challenge to his authority, and he is ready to brutally suppress it, as he threatens to do with any pro-Palestinian protests. While he remains loyal to Putin, he has his own agenda and cannot afford to be seen as weak.
His outrageous public breaches of the law, as well as societal and political norms, present a unique challenge – and, at times, liability – for the Putinist political system, of which Kadyrov is a pillar.
Anya Free is Faculty Associate of History, Arizona State University and Marat Iliyasov is Visiting Scholar at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, George Washington University
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
The presidential election will determine who gets to lead Southeast Asia’s biggest economy for the next five years, and a question flagged by many political and business watchers is whether the new leader will continue or undo the course set by Jokowi, who is barred by Indonesia’s Constitution from running for a third term.
The third presidential candidate for the 2024 polls, Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto, is scheduled to speak on Monday at another CSIS event.
Mr Ganjar’s foreign policy vision and programmes appear “very similar to Jokowi’s”, noted Mr Bhima Yudhistira, executive director of another think tank, the Centre for Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS).
“Jokowi has been more self-serving in his foreign policy. It’s all about serving the national interest and attracting investment,” he told CNA.
The president has focused heavily on the maritime sector and even created a dedicated coordinating ministry for his vision. Similarly, Ganjar revealed that if elected, guarding the archipelago’s vast waters would be among his top priorities and promised to double the country’s maritime defence budget, which currently stands at US$2 billion per year.
Another key programme, Mr Ganjar continued, would be to increase the power of Indonesia’s passport, which currently allows travel to 75 destinations visa-free. The former Central Java governor said he aims to increase this number to 120 if he is elected president.
How the Bersatu crisis plays out in the coming weeks will shape national politics for the rest of Mr Anwar’s mandate before he calls for fresh polls sometime in mid-2027.
“Bersatu has always relied on PAS and now the crisis is showing that the party is a hollow (political) vessel,” said Mr Syed Azman Syed Ahmad Nawawi, who is the chief executive officer of the International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies Malaysia.
BERSATU’S JOURNEY
Bersatu was founded by former premier Dr Mahathir Mohamad and Mr Muhyiddin in 2016 after both politicians left the long-established United Malays National Organisation(UMNO) over deep differences with then-premier Najib Razak.
The party went on to play a crucial role in the historic victory by the multi-racial opposition Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition in the general election two years later and subsequently assumed leadership roles in government.
Dr. Mahathir was premier for 22 months, before Mr Muhyiddin wrested control of the premiership by leading a group of Bersatu defectors to form a new coalition government with factions in UMNO and the right-wing Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS).
Even after Mr Muhyiddin was forced to relinquish his premiership after 17 months, Bersatu leaders remained as central players in government until the general election in November 2022 that eventually paved the way for Mr Anwar to take over the premiership.
Mr Muhyiddin’s party currently has 27 elected MPs in the 222-member lower house and the party’s leadership has been reluctant to sack the rebelling MPs over fears that it could lead to more elected representatives opting to throw their support for the Anwar government.
Already, the four Bersatu MPs have requested that they be seated along-side government backbenchers, showing that they intend to make a clean break with the opposition.
The latest splintering in the Bersatu ranks reflect the growing restlessness in the party that is bereft of any political funding after its accounts were frozen by the authorities over allegations of abuse of power when the party was in government and concerns over the future of the party’s leadership.
Bersatu insiders acknowledged that Mr Muhyiddin and his deputy, Hamzah Zainuddin, who currently leads the opposition backbenchers in Parliament, do not see eye-to-eye on many issues.
Mr Hamzah, who is keen to take over the Bersatu leadership, does not have widespread support in the party.
The stunning Blitzkrieg of Operation 1027 in northern Shan state over the past two weeks will possibly go down as the most pivotal and daring feat of arms in Myanmar’s many decades of civil war.
In the early hours of October 27, combined forces of multiple ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and a handful of allies attacked Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) installations along the border with China and down the main highway linking Mandalay, Lashio and Muse.
The key border posts of Chin Swe Haw and Mong Ko were seized along with 80 military and police bases. More than 120 military bases have since been overrun and sizeable amounts of arms and ammunition seized, including reportedly a number of 14.5 heavy machine guns (HMGs) that can be operated in an anti-aircraft capacity, vital for countering MAF helicopter gunships and fighter jet attacks.
The operation was planned and spearheaded by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, comprising the ethnic Kokang Myanmar Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army (AA), along with allies the Bama Peoples Liberation Army (BPLA), the reformed Communist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Mandalay People’s Defense Force (MNDF).
Planning such an operation with so many moving parts, players and logistical challenges and achieving the element of surprise makes 1027 an equal parts battlefield and wider psychological victory against the State Administration Council (SAC) junta.
The Brotherhood issued one of its ubiquitous statements (in Burmese and English) outlining the motivations for the operation.
“Our primary objective in launching this operation are multi-faceted and driven by the collective desire to safeguard the lives of civilians, assert our right to self-defense, maintain control over our territory, and respond resolutely to ongoing artillery and attacks and airstrikes… we are dedicated to eradicating the oppressive military dictatorship, a shared aspiration of the entire Myanmar population… (and) combating the widespread online gambling fraud that has plagued Myanmar.”
It is too early to assemble a clear picture of the multidimensional operation. The MAF is still sending resupply columns to the theater of operations, which the TNLA and MPDF are reportedly ambushing on the main road around Kyaukme close to Mandalay Region. Heavy use of air power and artillery, including Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), are harassing the alliance forces but ultimately ground troops must retake territory.
Does the MAF have the foot soldiers to retake over 100 bases, which assuming they existed prior to 1027 still hold some importance to the military? Resistance attacks in Karenni and Karen states, as well as major attacks in Sagaing Region including the capture of Kawlin by the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) allied PDFs contribute to the cascade of bad battlefield news for the SAC.
Reaching for a mono-causal explanation for 1027 is misleading. It was not simply predicated on pleasing the Chinese and clearing call scam center dungeons full of foreign national captives. And it was not just a turf war over control of border casinos, a ridiculously reductionist argument that discards the intersections of the Brotherhood’s multiple motivations.
It was also not simply an attack on a long-term enemy as part of a 14-year-long conflict: the three main groups “came up together”, nurtured initially by the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and over the past several years by the United Wa State Army (UWSA). Nor was it predicated on taking tactical advantage of the SAC’s broader nationwide weaknesses fighting EAOs and PDFs in multiple locations in the Anya theater.
And what it manifestly was not is an offensive designed to buttress the National Unity Government (NUG) and establish some belated bona fides for the anti-coup “Spring Revolution” it claims to represent. It was all of these factors and much more.
The Brotherhood issued another statement on October 31 urging members of the MAGF and their allied Border Guard Forces (BGFs) and Pyithu Sit (People’s Militia) forces to surrender, following the surrender of Infantry Battalion 143 (IB143) in Kunlong Township.
“(1) We pledge to ensure the preservation of every surrendered soldier’s life, safety and dignity. (2) We are committed to preventing any form of torture or arrest. (3) We will exert our utmost effort to facilitate the swift reunification of surrendered soldiers with their families and relatives” along with pledging financial support and medical care,” the Brotherhood statement said.
The SAC National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) met on November 8 to discuss 1027, and it quickly turned into a verbose and embittered history lesson from SAC chairman and Commander in Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. All the blame was heaped onto the MNDAA, as befitting a long-term nemesis, and their motivations for drug dealing, seizing control of the border town of Laukkai and its “153 hotels.”
Min Aung Hlaing described the unfolding operation: “MNDAA made preparations in the Wa region and its main strengths were deployed to attack Chinshwehaw via Namtit Bridge on October 27. In the morning, they passed Namtit Creek and deployed excessive strength to attack Chinshwehaw… MNDAA used a large number of drones and dropped bombs in attacks… TNLA interrupted the communication route to Hsenwi and disturbed Lashio with firing. They interrupted the Mandalay-Lashio communication route near Nawnghkio.”
These are stunning top-level admissions of military intelligence failure and tactical incompetence. Possibly the most telling remark was at the end of the meeting: “President U Myint Swe said that if the government does not effectively manage the incidents happening in the border region, the country will be split into various parts.”
It’s too late for that. Inescapable from this narrative is one of protracted failure on the part of Min Aung Hlaing. It was he who commanded the operation against MNDAA founder Pheung Kya-shin in 2009, breaking a cease-fire. The MNDAA later regrouped and reengaged and in 2015 the Myanmar army lost several hundred troops in renewed fighting with the rebel group.
There has been routine armed conflict between the MAF and the Brotherhood since. Having led a campaign against insurgents 14 years ago only to see these three EAOs grow in considerable size and prowess in multiple states across Myanmar and to further nurture post-coup combatants such as the BPLA, PLA and MPDF is a legacy of MAF incompetence.
It must have been amusing for the Brotherhood to travel to the Mong La enclave on the Chinese border in early June to meet the SAC’s National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPCN) for “peace talks”: “friendly and cordially discussed matters in connexion (sic) with…working together for the peace and development of the Union, trust-building with ethnic armed organizations.”
The painstaking planning for 1027 must have been far advanced by then. The attendance at these “talks” had the sincerity of a sneer, like monotone karaoke with a detested business rival: only self-deceiving Western diplomats gave them any credibility. Operation 1027 serves as the terminal rebuke to the by now utterly discredited pre-coup peace processes.
Secretive machinations by Switzerland and Finland to generate negotiations between micro-EAOs and the SAC are doomed to fail, not least because the former is exhuming the totally discredited Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) as the vehicle to deliver humanitarian assistance.
The NUG rightly condemned these efforts as illegitimate: “These acts will not be recognized and accepted because they are actions aimed at prolonging the reign of the military dictatorship.”
The growing humanitarian crisis of the conflict as a result of Operation 1027 must be addressed. Some 30-40,000 civilians have been displaced in multiple locations while an unknown number have been killed.
International aid donors should respond with increased cash transfers to local aid workers in Lashio and elsewhere, including for Ta’ang, Shan and faith-based groups. To harbor any promise in the JMC as a vehicle for emergency aid delivery over support to local civil society groups would be an affront to humanitarian principles as much as common decency.
In light of recent fighting, these foreign-led attempts to broker a deal with the SAC leadership are simply jettisoning neutrality to artificially inflate a dictatorship.
The Brotherhood and their allies have dramatically underscored a reality evident to anyone looking honestly at the situation: the SAC is finished, and while the ending may be uncertain, the complex of armed actors ushering in ultimate victory is not simply under the NUG. Any future “peace” process must reflect that and planning for that complexity must start seriously now.
By any military management measure, Min Aung Hlaing will go down as the most clearly inept war commander in MAF history. He can huff and he can puff in front of his fellow generals, but it’s clear to most that Operation 1027 is blowing the SAC’s house down.
David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, humanitarian and human rights issues in Myanmar
Srettha clarifies conditions and funding sources, says 50 million people will be eligible for B10,000 handout
Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin on Friday put an end to weeks of speculation about the government’s digital wallet programme, saying it will begin in May and some 50 million people will be eligible for a 10,000-baht handout.
All told, the government will inject 600 billion baht into the economy — 500 billion via the digital wallet scheme and another 100-billion-baht fund to enhance the country’s economic potential, Mr Srettha said at a press conference that was televised nationwide.
The government will give 10,000 baht in digital money to every Thai aged 16 and older, as long as they have an income of less than 70,000 baht per month and less than 500,000 baht in bank deposits. Based on these criteria, an estimated 50 million people will be eligible — down from the 56 million intended originally.
People who earn more than 70,000 baht a month but have less than 500,000 baht in bank deposits, as well as those who earn less than 70,000 baht a month but have more than 500,000 baht in the bank will not be eligible.
Mr Srettha has said the cash handout “will act as a trigger to revitalise the economy”, which has grown by less than 2% per year on average in the past decade, among the weakest in Southeast Asia.
Under the programme, 10,000 baht in digital money will be transferred into a digital wallet on the Pao Tang mobile app, which is already used by millions of people. The transfers will begin in May, three months later than previously planned.
The money must be spent within six months in the district where the recipient’s home is registered. It cannot be transferred to other people or converted into cash.
The handout can be used to buy food and consumer goods only. It cannot be used to buy goods online, cigarettes or liquor; cash vouchers and such valuables as diamonds, gems or gold; and cannot be used to pay off debts or pay for water or electricity bills, fuel, natural gas or tuition fees.
Shops are required to register to join the programme and they must be in the tax system.
The new 100-billion-baht fund, meanwhile, will be used to enhance the country’s competitiveness in various fields, said Mr Srettha. This could include investing in new technologies and development of human resources. The fund is intended to draw people with capabilities in various fields to join in building economic growth.
“I would like to emphasise that this (digital money handout) is not welfare to help the needy, but it is about injecting money into the economy through spending rights to enable people to be partners with the government in reviving the country’s economy while maintaining the state’s fiscal discipline in all aspects,” the prime minister said.
“I want all people who are entitled for it to spend it with pride. Everyone is a contributor to the economic growth and stability of our country.”
The source of funding for the programme has been the subject of heated debate, with critics saying that borrowing would push up public debt to an unsustainable level.
However, Mr Srettha said the most practical approach for the government is to propose a bill to seek a special loan of 500 billion baht. The draft bill will go to the Council of State by the end of this year to make sure it does not contravene any laws and will be forwarded to parliament for debate early next year.
The 11-party coalition led by the Pheu Thai Party has a comfortable majority in parliament and no parties in the coalition oppose the digital wallet programme, according to local media reports.
Mr Srettha expressed confidence that the bill would be passed by parliament in line with Section 53 of the State Fiscal and Financial Discipline Act of 2018, so that the programme can start next May.
The other 100 billion baht for economic enhancement projects would be from state budgets, he said.
Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin tells the public that some 50 million Thais aged over 16 will receive 10,000 baht in digital money. Recipients must earn less than 70,000 baht per month and have less than 500,000 baht in bank deposits. (Photo: Government House)
“China is highly concerned about the conflict in northern Myanmar and urges all parties concerned in Myanmar to immediately cease fire and stop fighting, pay practical attention to China’s security concerns, and work with China to maintain the safety of China-Myanmar co-operation projects and business personnel,” foreign ministry spokesperson WangContinue Reading
Getty ImagesThe US Food and Drug Administration has approved the world’s first vaccine for chikungunya, which it sees as an “emerging global health threat”.
The mosquito-borne disease causes fever and joint pains and can be fatal to newborns.
The FDA’s approval is expected to speed up the vaccine’s global rollout.
This year, about 440,000 chikungunya cases, including 350 deaths, have been reported as of September.
There is currently no specific drug to treat chikungunya. South America and South Asia have seen the most number of cases this year.
The vaccine named Ixchiq has been approved for those aged 18 and above and are at high risk of contracting the disease, the FDA said on Friday. It was developed by Europe’s Valneva and will be administered in a single shot.
“Infection with chikungunya virus can lead to severe disease and prolonged health problems, particularly for older adults and individuals with underlying medical conditions,” senior FDA official Peter Marks said.
At least five million chikungunya cases have been reported since 2008, the FDA said. Other symptoms include rashes, headaches and muscle pain. Joint pains can persist for months or even years.
People in tropical and subtropical regions of Africa, Southeast Asia, and parts of the Americas are at the highest risk of infection because mosquitos carrying the chikungunya virus are endemic in these areas.
“However, chikungunya virus has spread to new geographical areas causing a rise in global prevalence of the disease,” the FDA said.
Data from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control showed that Brazil has had the highest number of cases so far this year with 218,613.
More than 93,000 cases have also been reported in India, where the capital Delhi saw a large outbreak in 2016.
With the war in Gaza reverberating around the world, it is hard to hear anything above the noise. Yet an interview with Ukraine’s commander-in-chief last week came through loud and clear, sparking both an internal crisis in Kiev and an international debate on the future of the conflict.
General Valery Zaluzhny is the man leading the Ukrainian war against Russia’s invasion. For him to voice publicly that the fighting had reached a stalemate was astonishing, even shocking. Yet that was his conclusion: “Just like in the First World War we have reached the level of technology that puts us into a stalemate,” he said. “There will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough.”
It was a surprising admission, which unsurprisingly brought an immediate rebuke from Ukraine’s political leadership. “This is not a stalemate,” said President Volodymyr Zelensky, clearly concerned by the characterization and its impact on Western support.
It was also a rather obvious statement about the current situation. That the Ukraine war is at a stalemate has been clear for weeks, yet it has taken the Gaza war to make that reality clear.
Ukraine’s spring counteroffensive was meant to be a military storm that would finally shift the tide of battle. From the beginning it was plagued by a lack of equipment, and when it finally got started in the summer, it spluttered rather than shocked.
Before the counteroffensive began in June, Ukraine had managed to regain territory from the Russians, mainly around Kharkiv in the east and Kherson in the south.
But since the operation got under way, progress has been slow-going. Across the almost 1,000 kilometers of heavily fortified front line, there has been practically no change. Zoom out from the map of the vast territory occupied by Russian forces, and the areas Ukraine has regained are mere specks.
The New York Times estimated last month that the total area retaken by Kiev across this entire year of fighting is smaller than the capital Kiev itself. That’s a lot of pain for little gain.
This lack of movement has dispirited Ukrainians and their supporters. Allies have paid an enormous price for backing Ukraine through two bloody years and one freezing winter. The US and European countries have given around US$80 billion each in military and financial assistance. At least five countries, including Denmark and Norway, have given the equivalent of 1% of their annual GDP, just to keep Ukraine fed and fighting.
Across the world, the fallout from the Ukraine war has been astonishing, with disrupted supply chains causing a spike in prices, a lack of food and political unrest.
The Global South was placated by the argument from the West that the Ukraine invasion represented a fundamental change in the rules of the global order, and some pain was necessary to rectify it. Then came Gaza, and as Palestinian casualties mounted and Western leaders struggled to even pronounce “ceasefire,” the exceptions to global rules offered to Western allies became clear.
But it isn’t clear the Gaza war is the reason for the Ukrainian stalemate. Instead, the sheer focus from Western politicians on Zelensky shielded Ukraine’s leadership from the flagging campaign. Zelensky’s energetic diplomacy meant that most weeks saw him address one event or another, visiting or being visited by Western politicians. The reality of the war was lost in a whirlwind of cameras and soundbites.
Now, with Gaza taking up the world’s political attention, the lack of front pages about the Ukraine war somehow makes the reality starker. When the politics was in constant flux, it was easy to ignore the frozen battle lines. Now, it is harder to ignore, hence why the splits within Ukraine have become clearer.
There are signs that Western allies are beginning to search for a way out.
Reports in US media, based on anonymous sources, have suggested the topic of peace negotiations has been broached with Ukraine at the highest level.
For now, the official line continues to be that the West, and especially the United States, will stand by Ukraine as long as the country needs help. In reality, though, Washington has priorities of its own, and a contentious and fractious election cycle is looming next year, at which President Joe Biden’s handling of the Ukraine conflict will be an important part of the debate.
That makes Biden himself one of the weakest links in the diplomatic chain that leads to a Ukrainian settlement. He has now staked his personal reputation on two deeply controversial wars, neither of which shows any sign of ending soon.
Meanwhile, Vladimir Putin will be happy to see Biden’s likely opponent Donald Trump return to the presidency – which means there is almost no chance that Russia will negotiate while the US election campaigns are in full swing. Far better to keep the front lines frozen and let Biden take the blame.
If there is no reason for Moscow to end the conflict, then the battle lines could be frozen for at least the next year.
Zelensky has staked his political life on being an uncompromising wartime leader. As it becomes clear Ukraine’s army cannot deliver victory – when even the head of the army says so – it won’t be long before Ukraine’s allies look to put their faith not in a wartime leader, but in someone who can deliver peace, possibly at any cost.
This article was provided by Syndication Bureau, which holds copyright.
Faisal Al Yafai is currently writing a book on the Middle East and is a frequent commentator on international TV news networks. He has worked for news outlets such as The Guardian and the BBC, and reported on the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. Follow him on X @FaisalAlYafai.
