Asia (Page 178)

India’s demographic landscape stands as a strategic advantage, characterized by a substantial working-age population (15-64 years old). Projections for 2030 envisage an impressive 1.04 billion individuals within this critical demographic, promising a favorable low dependency ratio.

This demographic dividend, however, is time-sensitive, necessitating swift and informed policy implementation to harness its potential fully.

India’s education ecosystem is central to unlocking this demographic dividend, with about one-fourth of the population falling within the age group actively engaged in educational pursuits.

To meet evolving skill requirements and foster innovation, the focus must shift from enrollment figures to the quality of education. A dynamic, globalized, and sustainable skill set, essential for navigating contemporary complexities, hinges on a foundation of high-quality education.

Interconnected goals

In this context, UN Sustainable Development Goal 4, which emphasizes quality education, emerges as a linchpin in advancing human capital in India. Acknowledged as a critical driver of economic advancement, SDG 4 significantly contributes to sustainable development and plays a crucial role in unlocking India’s economic potential.

By prioritizing human-capital development, SDG 4 aims to achieve universal education from preschool to secondary levels, ensuring a 100% gross enrollment ratio (GER) in schools.

The broader spectrum of Sustainable Development Goals 1-6 collectively forms a comprehensive strategy for enhancing human capital within the framework of sustainable development. These interconnected goals not only align with the broader SDG framework but also underscore the pivotal role of youth capital in India.

The involvement of young people in SDG processes is recognized at the highest levels, highlighting the importance of dynamic representation and inclusivity for successful SDG implementation.

Strategic priorities

Investing in SDGs, particularly in education and health, is paramount for harnessing the potential of India’s youth population. This strategic investment contributes to sustainable development by addressing economic, social, and environmental aspects, emphasizing the interconnectedness of these crucial elements.

Emphasizing the importance of skilling and quality education aligns seamlessly with the broader agenda of human-capital enhancement within the framework of sustainable development. Nurturing a workforce adept at navigating the ever-changing landscape of expertise is instrumental in ensuring long-term economic resilience.

For a developing nation like India, education emerges as a fundamental tool for creating the human capital necessary to sustain development in the 21st century. While significant progress has been made in enrolling children in schools, the focus must shift toward ensuring a quality education.

In times of scarce budget outlays for implementing the SDGs, optimizing financial resources toward educational infrastructure is of utmost importance. The quest for sustainable and inclusive development in India relies heavily on recognizing the transformative power of education and strategically directing resources to bolster the nation’s human capital.

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Five days after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) announced interim measures aimed at preventing the State of Israel from committing acts in Gaza that come within the scope of the Genocide Convention, the butchery of the largely unarmed and impoverished inhabitants of the small strip of land continues unabated. 

The Convention prohibits such things as “killing members of the [targeted] group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, and imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.”

In the first two days after the January 26 ICJ order was issued, for instance, 373 Palestinians were killed in Gaza, the majority of them children and women.   

We should not be surprised that Israel has defied the ICJ. It has defied it before, demonstrating contempt for international law. It sees itself as above the law. It has always acted as though the restraints and limits that law imposes on states and individuals do not apply to it. Israel is special. It can do what it wants.

The main reason for this is the Nazi Holocaust before and during the Second World War. As one of the principal victims of that terrible tragedy, many Jews have come to believe that the suffering they have had to bear somehow absolves them from any wrongdoing. After all, the Genocide Convention itself was a consequence of the Holocaust.

How could anyone now accuse the Jewish state of Israel of genocide? That the victims of a gross, wanton injustice sometimes become the most heinous perpetrators of inhuman crimes against fellow human beings once they gain power is a glaring truth that many Israelis have chosen to ignore.

 If the Israeli elite is so determined to wipe out the Gazan population and tighten its suffocating grip over Gaza, it is because it is part of its ethnic-cleansing agenda that began in 1948 with the expulsion of more than three-quarters of a million Palestinians from their homes to pave the way for the creation of the state of Israel.

Ethnic cleansing of Palestine, it must never be forgotten, is a primary goal of Israel that has now reached a new phase with the current assault on Gaza. 

Economic motives

What renders added significance to the current assault are the underlying economic and geopolitical motives behind the move. It is reported that a trillion cubic feet of gas discovered off the Gaza shoreline in the 1990s could bring massive wealth to Israel if it can eliminate the real owner of Gaza, namely Palestine.

It would enable Israel to supply gas to Europe, replacing Russia. Israel would also become a major player in the formulation of oil and gas policies and the ensuing politics in the region and beyond. This may be one of the reasons the US and, to a great extent, Europe are prepared to provide cover to Israel’s drive to control Gaza.

Gas wealth and its geopolitical promise must be read in conjunction with another plan associated with Israel and the US. Those two countries, it is alleged, are set to build a new canal, the Ben Gurion Canal, from the northern tip of Gaza that will open a new naval route to the Mediterranean and beyond.

It would not only reduce dependence on the Suez Canal but also create a new route for global trade with the East and the West. For the US in particular, the Ben Gurion Canal may well emerge as its much-needed buttress helping to perpetuate its power as a global hegemon.    

This is why Gaza is so critical – for the aggressor that is hell-bent on annexing the strip, and for the victim that realizes the survival of its inhabitants as part of Palestine is fundamental to that nation which is now under Israeli occupation.

The steadfastness of the Palestinian people, their willingness to sacrifice their lives for freedom and dignity, will undoubtedly be a major factor in ensuring that Gaza survives.

The massive support for the people of Gaza expressed by millions around the globe – the millions who are demanding both an immediate, unconditional ceasefire and the free flow of humanitarian assistance to the beleaguered citizens of the strip – will also help to reinforce their cause.

The ICJ directives of January 26 could also have a salutary effect. 

Since Israel is required to submit a report to the ICJ within one month of the announcement of the directives, the Court can do a thorough assessment of whether Israel has complied. If Israel is guilty of non-compliance, the ICJ can request that the UN General Assembly suspend Israel’s membership.    

If suspension does not bring about a positive change in the behavior of the State of Israel, the UNGA can after a reasonable period of time move on to the second stage.

It should then direct all member states to boycott Israel in every sphere of activity – from politics and economics to culture and sports. The boycott will last as long as Israel continues to kill people in Gaza or the West Bank or acts in any manner that contributes toward genocide as spelled out under the Genocide Convention.

A firm resolve on the part of the majority of UN members to act decisively against Israeli arrogance will surely produce the desired result. 

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The Cardinal’s invitation was scrawled on the crumbling paper of a 1634 edition of La Gazette de France, so I knew at once that it was genuine: “Midnight on the 31^st of January, below the Pont d’Alma” – the Bridge of Souls, above the entrance to the sewers of Paris, where I first held séance with Richelieu’s Ghost more than a decade ago.

I dug my waders out of an old trunk and bought a magnum of Chateau Petrus. With the Bordeaux under one arm and a spittoon under the other, I picked my way through the sedimentary levels of the Parisian netherworld, past the 19^th-century brickwork to the medieval stonework and the Roman ruins deep underneath, until I reached the secret ossuary of the Carthusian monks, its walls lined with stacked bones topped by grinning skulls. 

I poured the Bordeaux into the spittoon. An ectoplasmic blob of indeterminate shape inserted a gooey proboscis into the brass neck. Presently it took on the red color of a cardinal’s soutane. There stood before me the Ghost of Richelieu, humming the tune of “Thank Heaven for Little Girls.”

“Eminence,” I stammered, “why did you summon me?”

“Oh,” said the scarlet shade. “I wanted some Petrus. Now that you’re here, you may ask one question and then go away.”

I ventured, “What should the United States do about Iran?”

“That,” the Ghost of Richelieu retorted wearily, “is the wrong question.”

“What is the right question, Eminence?”

“You have already used up your question, Spengler. In life, you get only one. But, as I happen to be dead, I will allow you another. The right question, Spengler, is: What should the Americans do about the South China Sea? The United States cannot produce enough weapons to fight the Russians, let alone the Chinese. Its Ukrainian proxy has run out of artillery shells, which is as much an embarrassment as it is an inconvenience when the Russians are firing 6,000 shells a day. But Ukraine has run out of air defense missiles, so even Russia’s cheap plywood drones are hitting their targets.”

“Pardon my impertinence,” I said, “but how do you know so much about what is happening in Ukraine?”

“Stupid question! A couple of hundred Ukrainians arrive here every day.”

“But what does that mean for Iran, Eminence?”

“It means that the US military is running out of the weapons to defend its ships, not to mention commercial vessels, against obsolete anti-ship missiles and primitive Iranian drones. The American warships in the Red Sea have managed to defend themselves but not the freighters they were sent to protect from the weapons of the Houthis. And before long they will run out of munitions and will have to sail away, leaving America’s credibility to sink in their wake.”

“Doesn’t China suffer from an interruption of its trade as well?” I ventured.

“China’s trade! Ça alors!” The ghost chortled violently.

“China thinks that it is in a struggle for survival against an American empire that is determined to suppress its economy and thereby bring down its political system. It believes that America plans to begin the dismemberment of China with the independence of Taiwan. It has built thousands of missiles and hundreds of planes and scores of submarines to prevent this. By bumbling into the Red Sea, the United States has given China a gift from heaven. China can observe the performance of American weapons against the missiles and drones that Iran manufacturers from Chinese components and gives to the Houthis – in actual engagements, not Potemkin Village tests staged by the defense contractors. It won’t send its own ships and give the Americans a similar opportunity to observe their performance. A legion of Chinese spies with access to the specifications of all the weapons systems of the US Navy could not produce intelligence of this quality! A year ago, a Washington think tank conducted a wargame with China in which the United States exhausted its supply of anti-ship missiles in a week.”

“America has stumbled into a dress-rehearsal for war in the South China Sea, if I understand you correctly, Eminence.”

“Bingueaux!” said the shade. “The little maritime farce in the Red Sea has nothing to do with Gaza, or Iran, or any other such nonsense. It has a double purpose, to provide China with intelligence on the American navy, and to humiliate the Americans when they at length abandon their deployment when they run short of munitions. Only then will China notice that its commerce has suffered and quietly tell the Iranians to tell the Houthis to stand down.”

“What happens then, Eminence?”

“Everything happens then!” exulted the ghost. “Washington exacted Nibelungentreue from European leaders, who are hanging onto their jobs by their fingernails. The German Chancellor has an approval rating of 19% and the French President has a rating of 24%. They will not long survive the humiliation in Ukraine, and American influence will go the way of the Spanish after the Treaty of the Pyrenees. Washington repeated the stupidity of the Austrians and Spanish, who began the Thirty Years’ War with twice the population of France and the wealth of a global empire – yet I beat them! They dissipated their strength in piecemeal campaigns against my proxies – Bohemia, Denmark and Sweden – until they were exhausted.”

“But, Eminence,” I pleaded. “Will there be war with China?”

The Ghost of Richelieu only cackled, and my head began to spin. My words echoed through the ossuary, louder with each repetition: “War with China … war with Chin a… war with China…” The pounding between my ears became excruciating. “Stop!” I shouted, but the pounding only got louder until I became faint.

I woke up next to an empty Moutai bottle and a copy of the People’s Daily.

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Tower 22 is a US base in Jordan, just across the border from a US base at Al Tanf, Syria. It was attacked early in the morning on January 28th – killing three American soldiers and injuring 47 more. Eight soldiers were evacuated, some with physical wounds and others with concussions, described as traumatic brain injuries.

The Biden Administration is misleading the American public about the Tower 22 attack to obscure Iran’s direct involvement and hide the fact that Iraq is complicit in the killing and wounding of our soldiers.

Admiral John Kirby, the coordinator for strategic communications at the National Security Council, said explicitly that the United States is not looking for a war with Iran. He failed to mention that Iran has proclaimed itself at war with the United States and has been using its proxies to attack US bases and killing and wounding American soldiers for years. Iran now controls Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. 

The US Central Command (CENTCOM) said the base was hit by a one-way drone, but no photographs have been released and there is, in fact, no confirmation of what the drone actually hit. From various reports it could have been living quarters, a common meeting area or a cafeteria.

Typically in a drone or rocket attack parts of the weapon survive in the wreckage. Often this includes parts of the drone or rocket body, the engine, sometimes electronic components, actuators, cameras or radios. It is important to retrieve the surviving components because they usually are evidence of the model and origin of the drone or rocket.

Strictly speaking, since CENTCOM says this was a one-way drone, we are talking about a loitering munition. It is likely that the absence of more detailed information is deliberate and would expose Iran’s direct involvement.

On the ground

Tower 22 and al Tanf are in the area where Jordan, Iraq, and Syria meet. The situation is politically complicated because Jordan is an American ally, and the United States has made a massive policy blunder believing it could (and still can) hang onto its bases in Iraq and Syria even though their missions have been badly compromised. This leaves our troops vulnerable to attack and destruction.

Making the US position even more untenable, the Biden administration has been appeasing Iran, which is the main enemy of all US allies in the region – Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States. 

Tower 22 is a US logistics base that supports al Tanf. The attack there was unexpected, although al Tanf has been attacked several times, wounding American troops and killing a US contractor.

Apparently, the Army decided not to do anything to protect Tower 22 because it is in Jordan, which is technically an American ally and not seen as a target of Iran’s effort to control the Middle East “Shiite Crescent,” That conclusion reflects the poor level of analysis in Washington.

What we actually know is very limited. CENTCOM says the attack was carried out by a drone operated by an Iranian proxy – likely the previously sanctioned Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), the Party of God Brigades, which is aligned with the elite Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

KH is a Shia militia that gets money and policy support from Iraq’s government. It has taken part in combat operations against ISIS in Iraq and anti-government forces in Syria. It staffs the 45th, 46th, and 47th Brigades in the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, which were formed in 2014 to fight ISIS and became an official part of Iraq’s security apparatus in 2016.

Tower 22 buildings

Tower 22 is a logistic supply hub with approximately 350 personnel. It supports its larger neighbor, al Tanf, which has approximately 1,200 Americans and houses a Syrian-origin fighting force called the Revolutionary Commando Army, which is trained and directed by the US. Both use containerized housing units and other prefab structures for dining halls and meeting rooms. 

Containerized housing units, abbreviated CHU, are paper-thin structures that often are bunched together.  Sometimes they have some sandbags around the base, and in some instances (but not here) they may also have sandbags on the roof. Usually, an officer above the rank of major gets one of these tiny sheds to himself or herself; otherwise, there are two soldiers in each one.

A CHU has barely enough room for a bed (or two), a small desk and a locker or closet.  Each unit typically has an installed combination air conditioner/heat pump. They generally have steel frames and walls of plywood, tin, rock wall sandwich or other low cost material.

If a shrapnel-filled bomb exploded near a CHU it could do a great deal of damage, since literally nothing stands in the way to stop the fragments. Even individual bullets can fly right through these structures. 

The Army could, of course, provide more secure housing, especially at vulnerable base areas. Congress should investigate why the Army chose to expose US troops to such an obvious risk.

In the past, when al Tanf was attacked, CENTCOM celebrated that it was able to defend these bases. 

The trdth is otherwise. There are “Before and After” satellite photos of one strike at al Tanf that show significant destruction.

Why didn’t air defenses work?

We do not know what kind of air defense systems, if any, may have been at Tower 22. 

The best guess would be the Avenger Air Defense System and Stinger MANPADS, both used by the Army.  (Avenger was previously operated by the US Marines, but it became obsolete and taken out of service.) First fielded in 1989, Avenger is a 35-year-old air system that has never shot down a drone in combat anywhere.

The system is mounted on a HMMWV Jeep-like vehicle and fires Stinger air defense missiles. It can be linked to an external radar source, but typically it is mobile and stand-alone. It does not have its own radar, so the operator has to physically see the threat.

Avenger is present in Syria and Iraq.

Stinger is a MANPADS, that is a man-carried and operated air defense weapon that has to see the threat, just like Avenger. Stinger can have a dual seeker-sensor in the missile’s nose that is sensitive to both infrared and ultraviolet light.

Drone makers using gasoline engines usually port the engine exhaust above the wings and fuselage of the drone to make detection of any heat source difficult. The Stinger missile, in either application, has to “lock onto” the heat source of the drone or other enemy target.  

Both Avenger and Stinger are “fire and forget systems” and, as in the case of Avenger, there are no reports of Stingers shooting down drones in combat. A few drones have been shot down on test ranges to demonstrate they can work.

A Pentagon “preliminary report” says that Tower 22 had its own drone in play and that the enemy drone either took advantage of the US drone’s flight path or was shielded by the US drone, so the air defense operators at Tower 22 did not fire on it.

There is, however, a problem with the story. 

Both Stinger and Avenger are equipped with a system to differentiate between threats and friendlies called IFF (Identification Friend or Foe). In fact, modern IFF transponders, known as Mode 5 class, can identify a friendly if the friendly is “beeping” the right encrypted code; but if it is not sending the correct code then the ground operator must assume it is a threat and take action to destroy it.

In modern combat scenarios, IFF is critical, and most US military drones have miniature IFF transponders on board.

The bottom line is that if there was a US air defense system at Tower 22 it would have had IFF, and the base operators would not have been confused.

Is it possible that the drone the US launched, the drone that caused confusion, did not have an IFF transponder? Perhaps.

The Task Force 99 alternative

In October 2022 CENTCOM created a new organization called Task Force 99 to plan for the use of cheap commercial drones, either bought on the market or 3D printed, for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions (ISR). The organization is based at the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar and is made up of about 15 people.

When Task Force 99 was interviewed last year, it had approximately 98 drones (broken down into 13 types) with ranges between 12.5 and 900 miles. It also produced its own 3D printed drone called Kestrel.

By and large all these are small plastic drones, usually in quadcopter format. Some of these drones are battery powered and include group 1 and group 2 unmanned aerial systems (UAS) platforms. Group 1 small UAS are back-packable and used for “over-the-hill” missions. They typically operate at altitudes under 1,200 feet. Group 2 are somewhat larger and operate below 3,500 feet.

Task Force 99 is tasked with finding unique drone solutions to support US operations in the Middle East. But because Task Force 99 is looking for cheap commercial products, the drones it works with are not equipped with IFF.  

We don’t know whether Tower 99 was using a Task Force 99-supplied drone but given its location and the need to search the perimeter around the base, this would have been a cheap way to do the job.   

There is, unfortunately, in the reporting of Task Force 99, no discussion of how commercial drone systems can be compatible with air defense systems. Nor is there any reported protocol for working with air defenses in order to avoid fratricide situations or fatal mistakes. More information is needed, but the possible presence of a Task Force 99 drone may indicate that air defenses were being shut down during US Army drone operations.

The loitering munition

As former CIA analyst Larry Johnson has expounded, it would take a large munition to cause the damage at Tower 22. We know that multiple drones hit al Tanf causing significant damage. It is also reasonable to think that the strike on Tower 22 was well-planned and intended to cause maximum casualties. This means either the base had been previously surveyed by hostile drones, or the enemy got satellite pictures, or the enemy had spies at the base – or possibly all of the above.

The most likely loitering munition fired at Tower 22 would have been a version of the Iranian Ababil 3. It is manufactured by the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA). It is a single engine drone with an engine reported as coming from German company Limbach Flugmotoren.

Some loitering munition versions of this drone are called Qasef-1 and Qasef-2. In Iraq, the drone is called the Basir-1 and is used by the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq. At least four different terrorist organizations operating under the umbrella of the PMF – the Badr Brigades, Kata’ib Hezbollah, Kata’ib Jund al Imam and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba – have used these drones in past attacks.

There are two other Iranian drones that could have been used. Mohajer-6 was used exclusively by the IRGC in the past.  It is a large drone that carries four precision-guided munitions. It is not a loitering munition (or kamikaze drone), and after delivering its bombs it returns to base, operating somewhat like the Bayraktar Turkish drone that was prominent in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, in Ukraine, Libya and elsewhere.

The other candidate is the Shahed 136, today used widely by the Russians in Ukraine (now under the name Geran-2). It is a loitering munition with a warhead of between 40 and 50 kg.  

The attack on Tower 22 occurred “in the early morning,” meaning the weapon itself was probably launched, some distance away, at night. All these drones are slow flying. It also means that if the soldiers were gathered in one place they would have been at breakfast. If the drone arrived from the East with the rising sun, observing it would have been difficult.

The perpetrators

The Biden administration has been adamant that the actual attack was carried out by Iranian proxies, without naming the group or individuals responsible, although certainly it knows. Moreover, and even more importantly, the administration has avoiding pointing a finger at Iran for directing its proxy or proxies.   

According to Entifadh Qanbar, President & Founder of the Kurdish Protection Action Committee (KPAC), the actual attack was done by Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), an Iranian-sponsored, anti-American Shiite militia operating in Iraq with collateral operations throughout Syria.  It is tied directly to the IRGC-Quds Force. [Jamal Jaafar Ibrahimi, known widely by his nom de guerre Abu Mahdi al-Mohandes, was its leader until his death on January 3, 2020, in a US drone strike at Iraq’s Baghdad International Airport that also killed Qasem Soleimani, the head of Iran’s Quds Force.]

Abu Fadak Al-Mohammedawi is the general secretary of KH and is the overall head of PMF forces in Iraq. KH maintains strong ties with Iran and pledges spiritual allegiance to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The PMF is directly funded by the Government of Iraq which pays for its operations and provides a separate budget for PMF weapons’ acquisitions. According to available Iraqi government budget documents, Kata’ib Hezbollah receives more than $3 billion annually via the PMF from Iraq, in addition to the arms it receives from Iran.  

Abu Fadak, real name Abdul Aziz Al-Mujirish Al-Mohammadawi and nicknamed Al-Khal (The Maternal Uncle), was born in January 1968. He is the chief of staff of the PMF and led the Iraqi militia attack on the US Embassy in Baghdad on December 31, 2019. According to former U.S. Army infantry officer Thomas Kurtzweil, after that attack, the name “Al-Khal” was graffitied over the walls of the Embassy.

Conclusion

The administration is working hard to keep its relationship with Iraq and protect Iran, holding back information that would directly implicate either. This compromises American forces in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan in two ways. 

First, US bases are poorly defended and not strongly fortified, meaning they are relatively easy to attack with drones, mortars, rockets, and missiles. As they have been repeatedly.

Second, the US is allowing Iraq to fund and support hostile operations aimed at US installations and bases in the region. This means that US security information flowing to the government of Iraq (and its military) may be handed off to the Popular Mobilization Forces, as they are a military arm of the Iraqi government – but associated with Iran.

A US policy in which the enemy is part of the government we are supporting cannot work.

In addition to the compromised position of US forces in the region, the US response to attacks has been less than optimal. American passivity encourages even more attacks, exposing American weakness and indecisiveness and humiliating US forces who are hogtied and can’t reply.

With respect to Iran, the Biden administration’s failure to act on hundreds of Iranian-planned and ordered provocations means the situation will continue to deteriorate, and more American lives will be lost. 

The policy is unacceptable.

Stephen Bryen served as staff director of the Near East Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and as a deputy undersecretary of defense for policy.

Shoshana Bryen is senior director of The Jewish Policy Center and editor of inFOCUS Quarterly.

This article was first published by War and Policy and is republished with permission.

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