Yevgeny Prigozhin, the creator of Wagner Private Military Company( PMC ), gave another of his fierbrand interviews as he declared victory in the Bakhmut battle.
He vehemently denounced the Russian defense minister and his chief of staff, Russia’s” heavy state ,” which included the political administration, the” quasi-defense” establishment, and the elites who protect their children from the front lines of battle.
He admitted that he doesn’t know why the war in Ukraine is being fought, but added that” as long as there is a battle, we have to battle it well.” How Prigozhin gets away with it when people are receiving jail terms for much milder criticisms begs the question of how he spoke the terrible truth in this.
He represents the opinions of a sizable portion of Soviet culture, is the answer. These people support conflict, but they criticize how it is fought and are disgusted by the corruption and incompetence that have claimed the lives of soldiers.
Those who can work politically and, if necessary, forcefully, giving Prigozhin a sense of common resonance, share this anti-elite but” nationalistic” sentiment.
The” heroes” of the so-called Russian Spring, the men who participated in the insurgency in Donbas starting in 2014, stand out among these figures. The widespread belief in the west is that this uprising was solely a Kremlin plot.
However, my conversations with field officers and officials like Igor Strelkov( real name Girkin ) suggested then. Many of these officers were driven by personal views; they dreamed of creating a brand-new” Novorossiya” in eastern Ukraine that idealized Russia, as opposed to the crony capitalism that defines Putin’s Russia.
I was certain that they were sincere in their ideas and willing to sacrifice both their own and other women’s lives for a greater cause. I’ve come to believe that this group does play a part in any dire situations, and it might soon happen.
The Russian state, which at first was unsure of how to handle these strongly pro-Russia but disorderly individuals, came to understand that they could pose a threat. Since 2017, they have begun to get repressed.
Rightwing Russian nationalism’s primary website academic tool, Sputnik-i-Pogrom, was blocked, and its director Yegor Prosvirnin passed away in dubious circumstances in 2021. Those who did survive were kept in the dark about politics and the media, so they focused their efforts on” milblogging.”
Men who enjoy fighting
These are men who adore conflict and everything associated with it, including the tools, strategies, traditional battles, wargaming, attire, and thrills of combat. They are present in all societies, but in Russia, the action in Ukraine gave them the opportunity to rise to social fame.
These” online warriors” emerged from the shadows and entered politics. Big audiences are drawn to their resources on the well-known software Telegram.
More people in Russia have subscribed to channels like Rybar( 1.13 million subscribers ), WarGonzo( 1.3 million ), and Igor Strelkov, the former” minister of defense” of the self-declared Donetsk People’s Republic( 790.000 ), who started the initial uprising in 2014.
They identify as voenkory, or war correspondents, and engage with their people by posting articles and videos. Viewers value their frank assessments of the reality on the front lines, their knowledgeable sources, engaging news, and engaging guests.
Social feelings are important, and the” soldiers” have developed a popular sub-culture. It has its own legends, including Vladlen Tatarsky( Maxim Fomin ), who stole money, served time, escaped from jail after being shelled by a tank, participated in the Donbas uprising, wrote three memoir books, and served as the channel’s host. In a recent targeted burst, he was killed. Even if it was a brief experience, war was an experience worth having for Tatarsky and those like him.
Tatarsky was involved in the YouTube channel” Reverse Side of the Medal ,” which promotes military garb and insignia like the Wagner group’s red skull and two mortar shells, which have gained popularity as a badge of honor.
clash of cultures
Thus, two very different military cultures collide: a rigid and top-heavy ministry of defense establishment that is supported by the state, and the guerrilla tactics of volunteers and private military companies( PMCs ) that rely on initiative and improvization.
These two teams are afraid of one another. The defense ministry has been reticent to give Wagner a lot of weapons. Prigozhin criticizes them for the defense failure in the meantime. Putin, meanwhile, observes and seems to like the generals’ opposition.
The state may have to rely on this” warrior” district both on the front lines and to help keep a pro-war momentum in society, so it cannot afford to placate them. However, the Kremlin is even aware of the dangers involved because” warriors” like Prigozhin can be difficult to handle and may grow ambitious.
Individual enmities and divergent perspectives on the future of Russia exist, and their camp is not consistent. However, signs of a social force that could affect Russia’s post-Putin results are starting to take shape.
This district will be the one most willing to take action if an internal turmoil— such as Putin’s sudden death, for instance— opens a window of opportunity and the ruling elite loses power. They will have access to organizational, economical, and advertising resources thanks to people like Prigozhin.
Prigozhin may rise to the position of functionary, even if he is not a monarch. Therefore, we must look beyond merely observing the Kremlin’s hands in all directions to identify autonomous actors who have the potential to move and shake the new order.
At King’s College London, Anna Matveeva is a visiting senior research fellow.
Under a Creative Commons license, this post has been republished from The Conversation. Read the article in its entirety.