Tokyo: According to officials and media reports from Friday ( Jul 26 ), record heavy rain forced the evacuation of thousands of people across parts of northern Japan as rivers burst their banks wreak havoc on bridges and cars. In Yamagata and Akita regions on the major area of Honshu,Continue Reading
Following NATO’s condemnation of Beijing’s support of the Soviet defense field on July 11, United States leaders, politicians, and non-profit businesses have called for sanctions on Hong Kong businesses and banks.  ,
During a conference with Wang Yi, the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken plans to lodge a complaint about Russian supplies, with him in Laos. He claimed last week that Russia imports 90 % of its nanotechnology and 70 % of its system tools from China.  ,
Separately, Republican US Senator Marco Rubio proposed a change to the National Defense Authorization Act that would give the president the authority to impose sanctions on economic institutions that deal with illegally Russian supplies.  ,
Two US information media sources and an activist group have released their analyses over the past few weeks that look at the level of transshipments of products from the typical high priority list ( CHPL) to Russia.  ,
Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, according to the New York Times, it has reportedly received about US$ 4 billion in limited chips. It claimed that a number of shell corporations in Hong Kong assisted in the shipment of many of these items to Moscow. According to the report, the number was derived from an analysis of Russian norms data since the middle of 2021.  ,
The paper said the cards were sent to Russia in almost 800, 000 supplies by more than 6, 000 businesses. The sixth floor of the Hong Kong company’s sixth floor, located at 135 Bonham Strand in Central, was visited by New York Times staff, who was reportedly involved in the transshipments, but they were unable to meet anyone.  ,  ,
Between August and December 2023, 206 Hong Kong companies, known as consignors, have shipped US$ 750 million of CHPL items to Russia, the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation ( CFHK Foundation ), a non-profit organization based in Washington, said in a report on July 22.
These things include data receivers, system chips and controllers, digital storage and input/output models and various integrated circuits. Other things include dynamic converters, amplifiers, memory cards and diodes.  ,
They were made by 31 American companies, including Texas Instruments, Analog Devices, Microchip Technology, Apple, Intel, Dell and Nvidia.
The CFHK Foundation said it used data collected by the Center for Advanced Defense Studies ( C4ADS ), another Washington-based non-profit organization.  ,
It recommended that the US use its secondary sanctions authority to designate Hong Kong and Chinese banks as primary money laundering concerns ( PMLC ) and to designate Hong Kong as a primary money laundering concern ( PMLC ).  ,
However, an unknown US Commerce Department official was cited as saying in a document on July 22 that the volume of CHPL products shipped through Hong Kong had decreased by 28 % between January and May.  ,
The official claimed that the government’s extreme law enforcement and product supplier wedding contributed to the decrease, but did not explain how it was calculated. However, the standard claimed that Hong Kong is still a haven for Russians to escape international sanctions.
For the same time, transshipments of CHPL things through mainland China, excluding Hong Kong, fell 19 %. The US Commerce Department stated that it wanted to restrict access to the data because it could not get it in its entirety.  ,
All these new figures were made after NATO leaders called China a “decisive facilitator” of Russia’s war against Ukraine in a mutual declaration on July 11. US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated on July 19 that the US is preparing to impose fresh sanctions against Chinese companies that provided dual-use goods to Russia’s Ukrainian military.  ,
Rubio updated the National Defense Authorization Act on July 11th.
He proposed that the US President have the power to impose sanctions on any” covered financial institution” that uses China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System ( CIPS), Russia’s System for Transfer of Financial Messages ( SPFS ) or Iran’s System for Electronic Payment Messaging ( SEPAM ) to clear, verify, settle or conduct transactions with any other” covered financial institution”.
A” covered financial institution” means one located in or organized under the laws of one of the countries of concern, which include China ( including Hong Kong and Macau ), Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba and Venezuela.  ,
By the end of this year, the US Congress is anticipated to make a choice regarding NDAA modifications for 2025.  ,
Rubio had introduced the Crippling Deranged Russian Belligerence and Chinese Presence in Putin’s Schemes Act in March 2022. There have n’t been any updates on it.
As of last fortnight, CIPS has 148 clear members, including Citibank, and 1, 396 indirect individuals around the world.  ,  ,
According to a report released on June 18 by C4ADS,” War Machine– The Networks Supplying &, Sustaining the Russian Precision Machine Tool Arsenal,” China, Hong Kong, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates are among the nations in concern with the supply of computer numeric control ( CNC ) machine tools for Russia.
According to the report, Russia has historically obtained foreign-produced CNC machine tools ( FPCMTs ) from nations whose governments now support Kyiv.  ,
Wang Wenbin, a former Chinese ambassador to Cambodia and a former official of the Chinese foreign ministry, claimed on April 23 that the US is dishonest and reckless because it continues to make excuses about regular business and economic relations between China and Russia while providing significant assistance to Ukraine.  ,
Some experts claimed that the new US sanctions will only raise foreign exchange transaction costs to finance Russian purchases relating to the war, but they wo n’t stop them.  ,
They claimed that while large Chinese banks have stopped financing industry with Russia to evade US sanctions, smaller banks may continue because they do not have multi-dollar businesses. They said different states such as Kazakhstan and Armenia, rather of Hong Kong, can even handle Russian supplies.  ,  ,
Read: US warns Chinese institutions over Russian supplies
Observe Jeff Pao on X:  , @jeffpao3
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission ( ASIC ) is looking into ANZ in light of serious allegations that the bank manipulated the market when it facilitated a$ 14 billion ( US$ 9.2 billion ) sale of government bonds in April of last year.
ASIC has today officially stated that it believes ANZ acted unlawfully. ASIC chair Joe Longo told the Australian Financial Review on Tuesday,” We are talking about you.
The CEO of ANZ has the right to define how he would describe it, but it is clear that it is an research, which means we must by definition believe there is a violation of the law.
Earlier this month, ANZ launched its own domestic investigation into alleged misconduct in its industry sector. ANZ says it is treating the claims” with the highest severity” and has engaged additional constitutional lawyers to help with its studies.
ANZ has also been accused of increasing the value of its bond buying by billions of dollars in order to get “lucrative” government mandates that come from large-scale trading.
Tie markets? State demands? You’d be forgiven for feeling a little lost.
On its encounter, the alleged crime might seem very mystical and professional. However, the Australian Financial Review has suggested that the dispute might turn into” the biggest incident” in ANZ’s 182-year story.
To be clear, these are claims amid an ongoing research by Australia’s business regulation. However, it’s crucial to comprehend exactly what the lender has been accused of doing here and how what transpires in the relationship sector has the power to affect everyone.
You need a thorough understanding of a transaction that sounds a little dry-sounding and quite routine in order to understand the allegations made against ANZ.
The state of Australia frequently takes out loans. It does this by selling so-called “bonds” to shareholders.
An investor purchases a bond, which was once a piece of paper but is now electronic, and in exchange receives (usually fixed ) interest payments known as” coupons,” one each month or year.
At the issuance of the tie, get it after three years, ten years, 20 years or more, the trader gets her or his money again.
You do n’t need to know everything about how bonds function. Bonds are only available on the open market, meaning that their value is shift, and that investors can buy them to other investors.
The investors ‘ returns are a result of both ( a ) receiving those coupons and ( b ) the difference between the amount they spend on the bond and the final principal amount when the bonds are due.
The price of the friendship will drop if standard interest rates rise above the bond’s coupon rate. Because the bond simply would n’t pay enough in comparison to what they want from an investment with that much risk.
Likewise, if standard interest rates fall, the relationship price is likely to walk.
An Australian Office of Financial Management ( AOFM), a branch of the Commonwealth Treasury, issues new government bonds. In order to conduct significant relationship sales, AOFM normally appoints a bank or banks to oversee the process and communicate with investors.
The state contracted ANZ to maintain a sizable A$ 14 billion bond sales in April 2023. ANZ was given access to sensitive information, including information about when the giving do take place.
ANZ was required to purchase bonds from investors who wanted to trade them for new bonds as part of the position. The value of those securities may depend on the gain that investors want from government bonds. Remember that a bond’s value drops if it receives an unrequited gain in excess of what is needed. So, if the expected return increases, the cost ANZ has to spend decreases.
You might have heard the notion: purchase low and sell high. Also, ANZ reportedly sought to do just that.
It is claimed that ANZ allegedly tried to raise bond yields by investing in what is known as the “futures industry,” a market that essentially allows traders to place bets on upcoming interest rate movements.
These wagers even affect the reference rate that determines the cost of new ties. Because the government uses the futures level to determine the profit the business needs for its debt and determine the bond issuer’s coupon rate.
If that prospects price climbs, then so too does the discount price on the government’s new relationship issues. This increases the government’s overall interest costs.
ANZ is accused of manipulating future yields to get it to buy bonds from investors for a lower rate.
ANZ supposedly then reversed its future trades, allowing the price of the securities it held to rise and the general interest rate to fall, earning a profit.
If the claims are accurate, ANZ did have engaged in both insider trading and market manipulation. This would be outlawed.
According to the Australian Financial Review, trading information details to unexpected price moves on and around April 19 of last year.
Up until the relationship was issued on April 19, the data shows that bond prices had risen (yields had risen ), then produces had dropped, leading to a rise in bond rates.
But it’s important to notice this diagram says nothing about cause. Charges may have decreased for reasons related to ANZ.
ANZ has also been accused of overstating its investing success to the state, to secure rewarding friendship control options.
Based on their trading of government bonds and their skills, the state chooses managers. It is claimed that ANZ falsely reported how much buying it did.
According to the Australian Financial Review, ANZ told the government it had “facilitated”$ 137.6 billion in bond trades to the year ended June 2023, when it had really only facilitated$ 83.2 billion – a discrepancy of$ 54.4 billion.
Although it may seem far removed from daily life, what happens on the bond market has the ability to have an impact on everyone.
If found to be true, ANZ’s reported deception was reportedly had cost citizens as much as A$ 80 million. That number reflects how much more interest the government may be required to pay if it issued bonds with higher interest rates than they needed to.
Mark Humphery-Jenner is associate professor of funding, UNSW Sydney
This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.
PUBLISHED: 25 Jul 2024 at 08: 53
According to the Foreign Ministry, Thailand will establish a task force to improve the ability of its financial institutions to conduct due diligence checks on trades that could lead to arms purchases and human rights violations in Myanmar.
After a UN specialist reported on a rise in cash moved via Thai bankers for weapons that the junta used against the civilian population, the government convened with commercial banks and state agencies to check these transactions.
The department said in a speech late on Wednesday that the meeting discussed progress being made in looking into possible connections to the purchases of arms, military equipment, and the Myanmar government.
A task force will be set up by the Bank of Thailand and the Anti-Money Laundering Office to look into the transactions and evaluation procedures to “further teach and improve the skill of Thai financial institutions,” according to the statement.
Bank representatives earlier this month admitted to following rules but lacking the ability to look into all possible arms purchases.
A free empire made up of ethnic minority armies and a resistance movement devoted to a shadow government pits the army, which staged a revolution in 2021 after a decade of democracy.
In a statement released last month by the UN special rapporteur on the situation of animal rights in Myanmar, it was revealed that Thai-registered businesses had used local banks to move funds for Myanmar’s$ 120 million military budget in the fiscal year 2023, up from$ 60 million the prior year.
According to the report, those transactions were putting an end to international efforts to remove the military, which is currently facing the greatest challenge since gaining control.
Throughout the 2010s, many people – including myself – treated it as a truism that manufacturing industries have faster productivity growth than service industries.
Historically that was true, and the reason wasn’t hard to grasp – machines improve faster than human beings do, so industries that depended on better machines naturally tended to advance faster than labor-intensive service industries.
But this particular piece of conventional wisdom stopped being true over a decade ago. In 2011, manufacturing productivity in the US hit a ceiling, and has actually declined in the years since:
Joey Politano has a good post where he breaks this productivity stagnation down by industry and shows that it holds true across industries in general. Here’s his key graph:
Importantly, this manufacturing slowdown isn’t mirrored by a general labor productivity slowdown across the economy! Service industries have been picking up the slack here, and keeping labor productivity growth going:
Service productivity rising faster than manufacturing productivity runs counter to many of the narratives you see in economics and policy debates. But it appears to be the reality for the last 13 years.
Americans seem to be waking up to the fact that something is wrong here. Greg Ip had a good chart showing that the stagnation in manufacturing productivity isn’t worldwide – the US and Japan have done uniquely badly since 2009:
A word of caution here: This data is cobbled together from various different sources. One or more of those sources might have major problems, and even if not, they might make different methodological choices that make them not directly comparable (for example, including subcontractors or not).
But the stagnation is so broadly distributed across manufacturing industries that it’s pretty clear something big is going on here. Anyone who wants to revive the US manufacturing sector, for national security purposes or otherwise, needs to worry about the possibility that something is going especially wrong with the American system.
In fact, the troubles might have begun well before 2011, and simply been masked by two other forces: 1) Moore’s Law, and 2) China.
You’ll notice in Politano’s chart that one sector dominated manufacturing productivity growth from 1987 to 2005 – “computer and electronics.” A landmark 2014 paper by Houseman et al. showed just how crucial this sector was to US manufacturing in that era:
Manufacturing output statistics mask divergent trends within the sector…Real value-added in the computer and electronic products industry, which includes computers, semiconductors, telecommunications equipment, and other electronic products manufacturing, grew at a staggering rate of 22% per year from 1997 to 2007…Real value-added declined in seven industries over the decade…[W]ithout the computer and electronic products industry, which accounted for just 10 to 13 percent of value-added throughout the decade, manufacturing output growth in the United States was relatively weak.
And almost all of the growth in that sector was due to quality improvements — the US wasn’t producing more computers and computer chips, but thanks to Moore’s Law, we were producing better ones:
The rapid growth of real value-added in the computer and electronic products industry…can be attributed to two subindustries: computer manufacturing…and semiconductor and related device manufacturing…The extraordinary real GDP growth in these subindustries, in turn, is a result of the adjustment…for improvements in quality.
Now, producing better stuff, instead of more stuff, is real productivity growth! Moore’s Law represents real improvement in our productive power. But the fact that quality improvement was the main driver of total US manufacturing output for much of the pre-2011 period means that other things may have been quietly going very wrong in terms of the US ability to manufacture large quantities of output.
And at the same time, there was another factor pumping up the US’ manufacturing productivity, especially in the 2010s: offshoring to China.
Until 2001, manufacturing output and manufacturing productivity went up in tandem in the US. Starting in 2001, productivity kept rising for a decade, while output flatlined:
The 2000s were the decade of the China Shock, when the US – along with many other rich countries – offshored a large amount of manufacturing work to the People’s Republic of China.
That raised measured manufacturing productivity in two ways. First, there’s a composition effect. Remember that in the 2000s, even as US manufacturing output per worker supposedly rose, the total number of manufacturing workers was falling off a cliff:
The most productive US manufacturers tended to stay competitive and survive this devastation, while less productive ones were driven out of business by Chinese competition. That composition effect will tend to raise measured productivity even if it doesn’t result in any increase in the productive power of American manufacturing overall.1
Second, offshoring to cheaper countries introduces biases in the data. Houseman et al. (2011) pointed out that when US manufacturers switch to suppliers in cheaper countries, the US government statistics often miss the switch, interpreting it as a rise in product quality rather than a drop in input cost.
That means that the manufacturing productivity benefits of offshoring to China in the 2000s were likely overstated. (Basically, Susan Houseman warned us, and we all should have been paying attention.)
So it’s very possible that serious structural problems in US manufacturing were brewing as early as the 90s but were covered up first by Moore’s Law and later by offshoring to China.
Anyway, let’s talk about some hypotheses as to why American manufacturing productivity flatlined.
One popular explanation for stagnating labor productivity in US manufacturing is low capital investment. Basically, a factory worker with machines is going to be more productive than a worker without machines. If you look at Chinese factories, they’re absolutely chock-full of machinery to help human workers do every task:
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In the US, meanwhile, investment in this sort of capital equipment – and every other sort – has slumped in recent years. Capital intensiveness – basically, the amount of machines per worker – has increased more slowly since the 2009 recession:
Many observers point to this lack of investment as a factor behind slowing productivity. For example, Robert Atkinson of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, writes:
In 2021, China had installed 18% more robots per manufacturing worker than the United States. And when controlling for the fact that Chinese manufacturing wages were significantly lower than US wages, China had 12 times the rate of robot use in manufacturing than the United States…The United States had 274 robots per 10,000 workers, while China had 322.
And he posts the following chart:
Robots are only one small part of capital investment. But they may be an indicator of a more general failure of capital accumulation in US manufacturing. After 2004, although a drop in total factor productivity (TFP) growth was the biggest culprit, capital deepening (an increase in the amount of capital per worker) also made a much smaller contribution to overall US productivity growth than in the years prior:
I should note that Chad Syverson, an expert on productivity measurement, is skeptical of this factor; he points out that there’s no short-term relationship between capital deepening and labor productivity. But that still leaves room for a long-term relationship, since companies presumably take time to learn how to most effectively use the equipment they buy.
If US manufacturers aren’t buying enough machinery, what’s the reason? Poor business prospects, due to slowing technological improvements, Chinese competition, and/or slowing population growth are one obvious cause. If you don’t think your business can expand in the future, why buy machinery in the present?
Another possibility, raised by Robert Atkinson, is that US wages are too low:
[M]any [US] manufacturers can staff operations with a relatively low-paid workforce. This reduces their incentive to invest in raising productivity…[H]igher productivity enables firms to pay higher wages. Still, it’s also likely that the causation runs the other direction, with lower wages providing less motivation for raising productivity.
Of course, Chinese manufacturing wages are also low, but the government puts its thumb very heavily on the scale there, encouraging capital investment instead of letting China specialize in more labor-intensive products and production methods.
It’s also possible that the US financial system is broken when it comes to financing manufacturing. In other countries — China, Japan, Korea, Europe, etc. – manufacturers usually finance themselves with bank loans. In the US, they mostly borrow from markets – i.e., they issue bonds.
US banks don’t do much financing of manufacturing; instead, they concentrate mostly on financing home mortgages, and on various kinds of bond trading. Banks might provide a crucial source of expertise in making loans to manufacturing companies – expertise that bond investors might simply lack. Also, banks are an easy lever for governments like China’s to boost their manufacturing industries by insisting that loans be made at below-market rates.
Finally, American management might just be short-sighted. Perhaps stock-based compensation discourages long-term investment. Or perhaps all the good managers have gone to work in software, finance, and consulting.
So there are a bunch of sub-hypotheses of why capital investment might be low in the US manufacturing industry. But in any case, let’s turn to the next explanation: industry concentration.
In general, US industry has been getting more concentrated since around the turn of the century. This has fed fears of monopoly power. But a lack of competition might also be making US manufacturing industries more torpid and complacent. Politano writes:
Using data on the dispersion of productivity across factories and other establishments, it also becomes clear that the gap between the most and least productive US manufacturers increased considerably since the turn of the millennium. This gap is most stark in previously high-productivity-growth sectors like electronics—a small subset of factories saw substantial (if slower) productivity gains through the 2000s and 2010s while most establishments saw stagnating or declining productivity…[A] small subset of companies remained at the technological frontier, where a much larger share fell behind.
And he posts the following chart:
Syverson also suggests this as one possible explanation:
The second explanation, proposed by Andrews, Criscuolo, and Gal (2015), is that a productivity growth rate gap has opened between frontier firms and their less efficient industry cohorts. Andrews et al. (2015) show that companies at the global productivity frontiers of their respective industries did not experience reductions in their average productivity growth rates throughout the 2000s.
However, most other firms in their industries did see decelerations. It appears that something has impeded the mechanisms that diffuse best technologies and practices through an industry.
Here’s the graph from Andrews et al. (2015):
Now, it’s notable that the divergence is worse for service industries here, even though service-industry productivity in the US has kept on growing.
Also, that chart is for the entire OECD. Politano’s graph shows that the dispersion in US computer and electronics manufacturing productivity mostly happened in the 2000s and leveled off after 2010.
Data from Akcigit and Ates (2019) shows the productivity dispersion for overall US manufacturing mostly happening in the late 90s. So the timing doesn’t really seem to line up perfectly with the observed productivity slowdown since 2011.
But anyway, this could be one thing contributing to manufacturing’s slowdown.
One possibility that I haven’t seen anyone talk about, but which seems like a pretty obvious hypothesis, is that US manufacturers don’t export very much.
Industrial policy enthusiasts tend to be fans of the idea of “export discipline.” This is based on the theory that competing in export markets, instead of staying within the safer and less competitive domestic market, forces companies to adopt international best practices, while also offering them opportunities to develop new markets, invent new products, and absorb foreign technologies.
Manufactured goods figure prominently among the US’ export mix. But compared to other advanced countries, US exports just aren’t very significant as a percentage of its total economy:
A lot of this is just that the US is really, really big. The bigger a company’s domestic market, the less incentive there is to go looking for customers abroad. China is big too, but its government puts its thumb very heavily on the scale in favor of exports. If you’re a manufacturer in Pennsylvania, why bother selling to Korea when you can sell to Florida?
America’s meager exports are exacerbated by its possession of the global reserve currency, which increases demand for the dollar and thus makes US exports uncompetitive. But even if exports rose so much that the entire trade deficit vanished, that would leave the US still behind Japan and the UK in terms of exports as a percent of GDP – and far behind China, France, Germany, etc.
If lots of American manufacturers are ignoring export markets, either voluntarily or due to macroeconomic factors beyond their control, that will also tend to weaken investment. The smaller your expected customer base, the less machinery you need to buy.
So far, all of these hypotheses have come with policy prescriptions attached. The US can incentivize its manufacturing businesses to invest more. It can encourage the circulation of workers between manufacturing companies, in order to diffuse know-how and innovation from frontier firms to lagging firms. And it can subsidize exports in various ways.
There are other hypotheses I didn’t list above2, such as bottlenecks in the manufacturing ecosystem and overregulation of land use, both of which also come with policy solutions attached. But there’s one more common explanation out there that’s much more pessimistic than the others, because it implies there’s very little to be done about the manufacturing productivity slowdown – at least, in the short term.
This is the hypothesis that manufacturing productivity growth depended on a set of key innovations – steam power, chemistry, combustion engines, electricity, computerization, and perhaps one or two others – that have now been mostly fully exploited.
Syverson suggests this possibility:
One is that the “easy wins” among information-technology-sourced TFP gains have largely been won, and producers have entered a period of diminished returns from these technologies. There is considerable evidence that information technologies (IT) were a key force behind the productivity acceleration of 1995-2004 (e.g., Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh, 2008). More recent work like Fernald (2015) and Byrne, Oliner, and Sichel (2015) have presented evidence that these IT-based gains have slowed over the past decade, however.
And The Economist sums this idea up succinctly, writing that “low-hanging fruit might have been plucked more eagerly in manufacturing.”
Why did manufacturing traditionally have such rapid productivity growth? One reason is that manufacturing technology is embodied — whereas improvements in services typically require imparting new knowledge to humans or changing up human organization, in manufacturing you can buy a new machine. This makes it easy to spread productivity-improving technologies. It also increases the demand for innovation, because machines are easier to sell at scale than business processes.
Another reason is that manufacturing is very modular, and thus lends itself to constant rearrangements of the production process. My favorite explanation is how electricity supercharged manufacturing productivity in the early 20th century not by offering cheaper energy, but by enabling the rearrangement of factory floors into a bunch of little independent workstations.
It’s conceivable that both of those processes are now reaching the end of the rainbow that began in the Industrial Revolution. It’s possible that factory floors have been optimized, machine tools installed, and production processes computerized.
There’s no guarantee that those techniques will be able to keep boosting manufacturing productivity at historic rates forever. In fact, manufacturing R&D in the US has grown in real terms since 1990, at an accelerating (linear) rate. But it’s not doing much to boost productivity.
Of course, even if that low-hanging fruit has been picked, manufacturing productivity can still improve. It can still get cheaper energy – which thanks to solar, may now become a reality.
And it can get better inputs – better materials, more high-performing computer chips, and so on. But if the problem of how to set up a factory has been mostly solved, it might put a big damper on overall manufacturing productivity growth – even if AI makes some marginal improvements.
OK but if that’s the case, how come other countries – Germany, Korea, France, etc. – have managed to increase their manufacturing productivity over the past 13 years?
One possibility is that they’re just catching up to the US and Japan, which were the leaders in manufacturing productivity back in the early 1990s. I can’t find a great data set comparing absolute levels of manufacturing productivity across countries over time, but I’ll keep looking.
Another important thing to remember is that we’ve been talking about labor productivity. If manufacturers buy more machinery, labor productivity will go up, because each human can do more. But machinery isn’t free — creating it and upkeeping it comes at a cost. And it’s possible to buy too much of it.
(If you don’t believe me, imagine buying 20 machine tools for each human being in the labor force; they wouldn’t be able to operate it all! That’s an extreme example, but you see the principle.)
It’s possible that all those vast fields of machine tools in the China factory videos are something the US should emulate. But it’s also possible that they’re wasteful — that China has over-automated, and that its economy is going to be held back by paying the upkeep and obsolescence costs on a bunch of machinery that made only marginal improvements in labor productivity.
The way to test this would be to look at total factor productivity. TFP measures the combined productivity of labor and capital (or at least, it tries to). If you pump up labor productivity past the optimal point by buying too many machines, your capital productivity should go down, and your TFP will remain unchanged.
And when we look at the TFP for advanced economies, we see that it has flatlined for every single country on Greg Ip’s chart from above, since right around…2010 or 2011.
China’s TFP has even gone down in recent years.
Now, there are some big caveats here. First of all, TFP is hard to measure, and I don’t entirely trust these numbers. Second, this is TFP for the whole economy, including services, manufacturing, and agriculture – not just for manufacturing alone. So this is very far from definitive proof that humanity has reached the end of the Industrial Revolution rainbow. But it’s at least one hypothesis we should look into.
Anyway, the question of why American manufacturing productivity has stagnated is a very important open question. More than just a few percentage points of economic growth hang in the balance here — defense and defense-related manufacturing will be one of the keys to victory in Cold War 2, and the US has a lot of catching up to do in that regard. So we had better get started chasing down some of these hypotheses — and any other plausible ones we can think of.
1 Note: This may be one reason US and Japanese manufacturing productivity grew more slowly than others in the 2010s. US offshoring to China slowed considerably after the Great Recession, while Japanese offshoring to China was always limited by the political troubles between the two countries.
So some of the relatively faster manufacturing productivity growth of Taiwan, France, etc. in the 2010s might be because they kept going full speed ahead with offshoring to China. This could be a combination of “real” productivity growth (specialization), composition effects, and statistical artifacts similar to the one Houseman et al. (2011) document for the US.
2 Note: I talk about overregulation of land use and bottlenecks in the supply chain so much that I didn’t feel the need to go over them again. Both also have significant weaknesses as overarching explanations for the manufacturing productivity slowdown – in particular, the timing is way off for both. But in any case, my list of hypotheses is not an exhaustive one.
This article was first published on Noah Smith’s Noahpinion Substack and is republished with kind permission. Read the original here and become a Noahopinion subscriber here.
The number for FY2023/24 represents the average annual profit of GIC’s investment between April 2004 to March 2024, while taking world inflation into account.
GIC noted in its statement that the robust performance from April 2003 to March 2004- when capital markets recovered from the strong modification of the dot-com crisis- dropped out of the rolling window for this year’s 20-year return.  ,
The global market was tenacious in 2023 despite economic plan tightening the year before, and prices slowed, leading sturdy performance in danger assets, GIC said. The technical sector’s increased interest in conceptual artificial intelligence even increased profits.
But, geopolitical risks increased with the Russia-Ukraine battle continuing from 2022 and fight breaking out in the Middle East in October.
According to the review,” there are more likely to be renewed prices and lower growth” because of the spectre of product and supply chain disruptions.
CEO Lim Chow Kiat remarked in the statement that the level of uncertainty had “exaggerated significantly” over the past few years, challenging the assumptions made during the past four decades. He cited the rapid technological advancements, weather shift, and political flow in some nations.
Investors no longer need to ponder just where we are in the economic cycle or the interest rate trend’s direction, he wrote.  ,
” This , unprecedented uncertainty translates into a wider range of possible outcomes. Pitfalls , and investments await in similar measure”.
He claimed that the climate change is a good illustration of how GIC’s long-term versatile money can influence behavior.
Investors have begun to realize that financing the transition does require short-term opportunity costs that they are unwilling to bear, according to Mr. Lim, citing a drop in venture and development expense in the sector and fewer exits.
However, a team from GIC’s private collateral department identified businesses that needed funding to expand “first-of-a-kind” projects that usually fall between conventional capital buckets and launched an investment program for natural assets.
” Individual funds like ours is well-suited , to manage climate technology’s potential , J-curve”, said Mr Lim.
Nuclear fusion is one instance of an investment with a longer sky, according to GIC chief investment agent Jeffrey Jaensubhakij.
The portfolio invested in a nuclear fusion business about three years ago, but he claimed the tech is still in its eight to tenth year of development.
In its statement, GIC claimed that elements like tight economic policy in the US, China’s real estate market, and heightened geopolitical tensions are making the world purchase setting appear difficult. But, it claimed that a faster rate of AI implementation would result in higher productivity growth.
The world economy has been adaptable, but that may slow down the disinflation approach, and some big central bankers have postponed their ideas or done less than expected, said the sovereign wealth fund, which manages Singapore’s resources and helps to Singapore’s monthly budget.
Core central banks may not only have to keep rates higher for longer but also have to potentially raise them, according to the report.” If inflation proves more persistent than expected and even increases, core central banks may not only have to keep rates higher for longer. This would increase the risk of a recession and put strain on households and businesses that are already dealing with high borrowing costs.
Mr. Lim responded to a question about the impact of the upcoming US elections by saying that GIC has a high level of confidence in the nation.
” Whoever is in charge, we think the country will continue to do well because they have so many positive fundamentals”, he said, pointing to innovation, talent and deep markets in the US.
” Clearly, the US will continue to be a very important market for us”.
After American authorities claimed that the US might impose sanctions on Chinese banks for facilitating transactions involving shipments to the Russian defense business, China has pledged to take the necessary steps to protect its rights.  ,
At the Aspen Security Forum in Colorado on July 19th, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated that the US is preparing a fresh round of sanctions against Chinese companies that provided dual-use goods to Russia’s war system in Ukraine.
Sullivan claimed that Beijing had seen its problem that some Chinese banks are facilitating unfavorable transactions as a result of its investigation. However, he added that” the image is not really” as China continues to be a major distributor of dual-use objects to Russia’s combat system.
According to him,” There are targeted ways in which they are flexible, but the overall image continues to go in the wrong way,” adding that extra punishment methods can be expected in the coming months.
He claimed that as a result of the US’s efforts to take action if necessary, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen had authorized Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen to impose sanctions on international businesses.  ,
At the same time, US State Secretary Antony Blinken claimed that China is providing the sources for Russia’s defense-industrial center.  ,
” Seventy percent of the system resources that Russia is importing are from China. According to Blinken, 90 percent of the optoelectronics are produced in China. ” And that’s going into the security commercial base and turning into rockets, vehicles, and other arms.”
” China ca n’t have it both ways”, he said. When it contributes to Russia’s ongoing pursuit of peace in Ukraine, it ca n’t simultaneously be said to be saying that. When it is actually contributing to the greatest threat to Europe’s security since the end of the Cold War, it ca n’t claim that it wants better relations with Europe.
On July 11, NATO officials said in a mutual charter that China is a “decisive facilitator” of Russia’s war against Ukraine.  ,
” Both China and Russia are independent big places”, Mao Ning, a director of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said in a press briefing on Monday. China and Russia “have a normal cooperation that does n’t discriminate against any third parties and should n’t turn into a target for external coercion or interference.”
She stated that China will take all necessary steps to protect its reasonable rights and interests and that it strongly rejects all types of unlawful unilateral sanctions and long-arm authority.  ,
China has stated repeatedly that Russia and China did not form an alliance and that Sino-Russian participation is not intended for any third parties. But did NATO talk? Absolutely not”, a Hebei-based military writer using the pseudonym” Xingchen” says in an article on Monday.  ,
He claims that according to statistics, 72 % of Russian weapon parts came from the US, while 60 % of them were imported from the West.  ,
” Based on NATO’s logic, are western countries including the US supporting Russia”? he says. China has been accused of cooperating with Russia by NATO numerous times. Its sinister purposes are visible”.
He adds that NATO, which offered US$ 43 billion of military aid to Ukraine periodically, is the true culprit that is shaking international peace and stability.  ,
In a report released in June 2023, the KSE Institute, a think tank at the Kyiv School of Economics, reported that American companies produced 66 % of the foreign-critical components found in the Ukrainian military’s weapons systems between March and December 2022. According to Newsweek, the majority of these items were shipped via China to Russia.  ,  ,  ,
Another Chinese critic claims that the Biden administration needs to take a strong stance against China now that Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump has gained popularity since being injured in an execution test on July 13.  ,  ,
By smearing China-Russia assistance, Blinken claims that he wants to strengthen his bargaining position when he meets with Taiwanese minister Wang Yi at the ASEAN ministerial conference in Laos this year.
On July 8, Gonzalo Saiz, a scientist at the Center for Finance and Security of the Royal United Services Institute, a United Kingdom-based think tank, told TheBanker.com that some small Chinese lenders operate as “burner businesses” as they can be shut down if they are sanctioned by the US according to Russian trades.  ,  ,
Hera Smith, director and training guide for economic crime adherence, Moody’s Analytics, said big Chinese banks may experience difficulty if they unintentionally process dangerous transactions for smaller banks.  ,
In 2023, China’s exports to Russia grew 46.9 % to US$ 111 billion from a year earlier, according to China Customs. The figure increased only 1.5 % year-on-year to US$ 24.4 billion in the first quarter of this year and fell 3.4 % year-on-year to US$ 27.2 billion in the second quarter.  ,
The changing trend is thought to be a result of the US’s growing efforts to stop China from sending dual-use items to Russia.
Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen stated in a visit to Beijing on April 8 that the US had the authority to impose sanctions on Chinese financial institutions if they were involved in shipments that increased Russia’s military might.  ,
Four more Chinese banks recently stopped accepting payments from Russia, according to a report in the Russian newspaper Izvestia on April 12 after three of the world’s largest Chinese banks did the same in February. A US official told Reuters on April 22 that the country did not have an immediate plan to impose sanctions on Chinese banks.
On June 12, the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control ( OFAC ) revised the definition of” Russia’s military-industrial base” stated in an executive order previously-issued by the US President.  ,
After the amendment, foreign financial institutions that conduct or facilitate significant transactions or offer any services involving Russia’s military-industrial base could face sanctions from OFAC.
Read: China hawk: Fix symbolic, ineffective US sanctions
Follow Jeff Pao on X:  , @jeffpao3
Pan , Gongsheng is n’t famed for acrobatic skills. However, the People’s Bank of China governor set out on a routine on Monday ( July 22 ) that will inexplicably test his motor coordination, agility, and financial balance.
Many traders were surprised to learn that the PBOC made the decision to split a crucial short-term coverage rate for the first time in nearly a year. Lowering the seven-day reverse mortgage rate by 10 base items to 1.7 % was aimed at supporting Asia’s biggest market after first-quarter economic development disappointed. And there are good chances that it wo n’t be the last cut as China has experienced the worst deflation since 1999.
However, the software Pan must carry out is a risky one because the PBOC struggles to stop the yuan from sagging. Officials have begun to establish a floor for 10-year government bond yields at, or about, 2.25 %, as a result. PBOC watchers generally concur that Pan’s group views that amount as a red column for costs, especially given that it hit a record low earlier this month of 2.18 %.
Juggling these dual challenges wo n’t be easy. On the one hand, China’s 4.7 % year-on-year growth rate during the January-March time was a wake-up call for President Xi Jinping’s Communist Party. The specifics in that reading, such as weak retail sales, sluggish industrial activity, and stagnant investment, demonstrate how Xi’s efforts to stabilize a burgeoning property sector and revive consumer prices have n’t been working as planned.
Negative forces, however, are raising another concern bells. Especially after the eagerly awaited Third Plenum planning session last week ended, Beijing must now demonstrate its commitment to economic reform.
As such, the PBOC rate cut is a” step in the right direction”, says analyst Zhang Zhiwei, chairman of Pinpoint Asset Management. However, economic plan is not the most crucial tool for coverage. The impact of governmental policy on the economy is crucial.
However, Pan’s cut smacked of greater necessity than many PBOC observers seemed to believe. As Zhang adds, the central bank “did n’t wait until the Federal Reserve cut first. This reflects they possibly recognize the upwards pressure on China’s business, so they need to take action to address the problem” quickly.
The lessons from Japan, of course, is that beating depreciation requires strong and fast rate activities. But the PBOC is also worried about the next quarter of its 2024 balancing act: letting the yuan weaken drastically.
There are several causes why Xi’s group wants to avoid a weakened yuan. One of the effects of it is that it may make it more difficult for developers of distressed properties to pay off their onshore bill. Beijing should never require or want another definition at the Evergrande Group level.
Second, Xi worries that the yuan’s years of development may be wasted by a weaker exchange rate. Since 2016, when the renminbi was added to the International Monetary Fund’s” special , drawing , right” box joining the dollar, yen, euros and ounce, its use in business and banking has soared.
In 2023, the renminbi topped the renminbi as the money with the fourth-largest communicate in global bills, according to financial communications service , SWIFT.  , It furthermore overtook the buck as China’s most used cross-border economic device, marking a second. Any reason why Xi is devaluing the yuan might stifle growing confidence in the coin.
Third, Xi barely wants to make China a bigger problem in the US elections. The only thing that Democrats and Republicans can agree on is the need to be more wary of China. Why, then, does a falling swap rate inspire Washington?
The strong dollar will be a big emphasis in the months leading up to November 5 thanks to Trump’s selection of Senator JD Vance as his running mate. Trump’s guaranteed levies of up to 60 % on all domestic products are the same as those that may increase in scope if Republicans believe Beijing is manipulating exchange rates.
All of these factors help explain why the PBOC’s motion on Monday “was very reasonable and suggests that additional coverage signal may be incremental,” according to Shane Oliver, an economist at the financial services company AMP.
However, the negative pressures that are weighing down Xi’s$ 17 trillion economy are genuine and have the potential to get worse.
According to Andrew Hencic, a senior analyst at TD Economics  ,” China’s entire business is in a condition of excessive source as it continues to deal with the dead housing market and related debt overhang.”
Domestically, “economy-wide rates continue to sink”, Hencic noted. China’s sinking produce business — and manufacturing —capacity utilization is a good illustration of the accumulating slack in the sector, according to the report.
According to Hencic, history has shown that it takes a extremely long time to restore price growth by rebalancing supply and demand following a fiscal shock, which has had significant negative effects on households and businesses. This might indicate that China’s companies and developers will experience a protracted period of low prices power, which will have significant effects on consumers around the world.
Economist , Alicia , Garcia-Herrero at Natixis information that “increasingly significant problems have been piling up for China during the last few years, including the destruction of the real estate industry, the difficult financial situation of regional governments, fast declining returns on assets because of over-investment and the negative pressures in the economy”.
Garcia-Herrero adds that” the response to all these woes,  , as aired by China’s leadership , during the past few months, will be the further strengthening of China’s manufacturing capacity under the mantra of  ,’new productive forces.'”
China’s manufacturing capacity accounts for nearly a third of the world’s, while its consumption accounts for less than half of it. One might anticipate that measures to encourage private consumption would be the main takeaways from the third plenum given this enormous imbalance, but this does not appear to be the direction China’s leadership is going in, Garcia-Herrero said.
For now, many economists worry that Xi’s efforts to boost consumption are n’t gaining traction. Policies like these can encourage households to save less and spend more.
” The year-on-year decrease in excess savings growth has not yet translated into increased consumption”, says Tommy Xie, head of Greater China research at OCBC Bank. This may be related to households shifting their deposits to wealth management products and paying off their loans early.
Analysts at Maybank add that “instead of quick-fix stimulus, policymakers would need to address the root causes of consumers ‘ risk-averse behavior and encourage them to spend their incomes.” This calls for structural solutions to address fundamental issues like the prolonged downturn in real estate, the shaky employment market, the shoddy social safety nets, and mounting debt burdens.
All of this makes economists attempting to assess the effects of global spillovers. While the overall impact is still largely modest, according to Morgan Stanley’s economists, “it gives central banks like the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank more leeway to take monetary easing measures throughout the year.”
The PBOC, however, concentrates more on global currents than on domestic events. Many economists anticipate that Beijing will use a series of coordinated monetary and fiscal maneuvers to quicken economic demand and prices.
More policy easing is necessary for the duration of this year, particularly on the fiscal and housing fronts, according to Goldman Sachs economist Lisheng Wang.
Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek
After the pandemic, Singapore has become a very updated market and is widely regarded as a hub for innovation in Southeast Asia. Research from Google, Temasek and Bain indicates that ASEAN’s digital economy will surpass S$ 396 billion ( US$ 300 billion ) in gross merchandise value by 2025, with financial services digitalization a primary growth factor.
Financial institutions are continuously adding new products, features, and engaging consumer experiences, making Singapore’s financial services sector one of the most creative and aggressive in the world. Cybercriminals are now looking to take advantage of the expanding online landscape, despite this rapid change.
Financial corporations handle sensitive personal and business information for thousands of customers, including bank information, signup certificates and high-value purchases. These businesses are therefore extremely resilient and frequently the target of attacks in Singapore, frequently through malware or phishing attacks, making the financial services sector one of the most targeted companies by scammers today.
Singapore’s financial services industry was the leading target of phishing attacks in 2022 according to the Cyber Security Agency ( CSA ) in Singapore, with more than 80 % of reported phishing sites found to be impersonating financial institutions.
In most endeavors, swindlers spoofed banking and financial services, most of which were physical risks, according to the 2024 DBIR by Verizon.
According to the Singapore Police Force ( SPF ) annual scams and cybercrime brief in February 2024, nearly 2, 000 Singaporean victims were victims of a string of Android malware scams, and at least S$ 34.1 million was lost in 2023. Scammers have apparently used Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram and TikTok to jam their subjects.
One of the highest-profile new hacking schemes was with OCBC in December 2021, with S$ 13.7 million lost. Some victims reported losing their existence saving right away as a result of spoofed SMS messages appearing in the same conversation string as authentic bank messages that were then directed to fake lender websites.
Out of kindness, the lender reimbursed the afflicted customers in complete, even though it was probably not at fault. A person has no remedy to their financial service provider from a legitimate perspective because they are held accountable for the series of events that result in losses.
Phishing scams that pretend to be banks to steal users ‘ bank or pension account login details continue to make headlines in Singapore. However, this kind of fraud can and should be avoided, and Singaporeans should and can do more to protect them from unauthorised access to their online transactions.
The modus operandi of these schemes has involved enticing patients with “investment opportunities” posted on social media platforms. These promotions, when clicked, direct to messaging programs or false investment sites. Here, patients are prompted to file for an account, accidentally providing their personal and bank information, which are then used for fraudulent actions.
Every financial institution should switch away from the outdated multi-factor authentication ( MFA ) tools like authenticator apps and one-time passcodes ( OTPs ) sent via SMS, which are vulnerable to phishing, according to best practice. MFA can serve as a powerful first line of defense, but not all MFA forms are created equal.
Instead, organizations need to choose strong phishing-resistant Authorization tools like components security keys. Phishing-resistant MFA processes are immune to attempts to deal or circumvent the authentication process because they rely on encrypted verification between the devices or between the gadget and a domain.
They require something you know ( a PIN), something you have, ( the key ), and something you are ( requiring a physical touch ) to gain access to the account.
However, the classic identification devices and responsive techniques designed to protect customers are inappropriate, and the financial services industry needs to move to a strategic approach to security.
Activated through the CPF website, income records in Singapore are then automatically locked, which disables all online transactions. Members can improve the daily withdrawal cap to allow re-enable website withdrawals, which require stronger identification and a 12-hour cooling period.
Customers may call their lender to uncover their accounts, which can be slow and difficult. Taiwanese banks also offer this locking function. Better ways to verify a bank or annuity account owner than to simply lock their accounts completely. These anti-malware safety measures are having an impact on how clients use their bank accounts.
Financial corporations that choose the wrong path from attacks face legal repercussions. The Monetary Authority of Singapore is empowered to impose criteria for tech risk control under the Financial Services and Markets Bill of Singapore.
It has increased the monetary penalties for local financial institutions that are subject to a security breach as a result of oversight to S$ 1 million per occurrence.
This reactive approach to digital protection is the only way Singaporean financial institutions may take action following a violation. They may stop breaches in the first place if they take a strategic approach to computer safety.
A highly effective technique of enhancing economic institutions’ security is to create mandatory present phishing-resistant MFA for bank and pension accounts, which includes passkeys – a new name for FIDO2 passwordless-enabled credentials, a standard that replaces password-only logins with more stable passwordless experiences.
Modern MFA requires that customers provide a strong, modern authentication system, such as a-passkey, which provides an additional layer of security that stops unauthorized access and theft. However, there are key differences when it comes to the kinds of passkeys available.
Passkeys use public key cryptography, a technique that uses a pair of related keys. The public key is kept by the app or website, and the user’s device is paired with the private key, which helps safeguard it from unauthorized access.
It is important to understand that there are two types of passkeys: syncable and device-bound. Syncable passkeys are stored in the cloud and can be shared between various devices, which is convenient but also a risk if the devices are stolen or compromised.
Once a malicious actor has control of someone’s phone through malware, they have access to their syncable passkeys. Device-bound passkeys, stored on devices like phones, computers, or hardware security keys, including YubiKeys, provide a much higher level of security.
For optimal security, Singaporean financial services companies should mandate device-bound passkey authentication for all customers, balancing convenience with strong security. So, even if a customer uses a social media channel to engage in a phishing scam or clicks a suspicious link, their passkey is still safe.
Geoff Schomburgk is Vice President for Asia-Pacific &, Japan at Yubico.
The powerful tales of recognition, risk, and the need to take proactive measures to stop scams and deceptive activities were recently highlighted in the National Scam Awareness Survey 2024 statement from CelcomDigi Bhd.  ,
It revealed that Malaysia is progressing as a highly digitalized country, as 91 % of respondents frequently use society computer centers for a wide range of online services. Malaysians are more easily vulnerable to fraud threats because of the great internet usage. This underscores the need to take more security precautions in order to build a secure and reliable online society.
Idham Nawawi, CelcomDigi CEO  , said,” Now, while we enjoy the benefits of electronic communication, we face a real where frauds and scams have become one of the most pressing social diseases today. The first National Scam Awareness Survey 2024 statement from Commodigi provides actiona ble data and insights that you inform more strategic and focused strategies to combat fraud and scams. Guided by the record, we can handle the gaps in mitigating this incident, develop confidence, and develop a more secure online environment for Malaysians”.
Over the past year, 87 % of the 10, 893 polled across the country, have been more aware of scams and were able to information and explain the nature of the scam they were exposed to. Respondents also acknowledged that it’s dangerous to click unverified references and that exposing personal information can be used against them. Additional features of the review:  ,
73 % of people are aware of the dangers of sharing and revealing personal information via social media.
65 % indicated they would confirm any backlinks received before clicking them, whereas
Prior to sharing them, 52 % of people would screen their private information.
These indicate that the majority of respondents follow standard procedures for protecting their personal information.  ,
However, two-thirds ( 66 % ) of them have encountered some form of scam attempts or situation. These efforts, numbering a remarkable 17, 912, shows that an individual can experience numerous types of frauds through various stations. Voice phone calls ( 76 % ) were the most common type of scam, with pretending to be bank or government representatives or officers. Artificial staff are employed in the scam attempts:
Asking respondents for their personal information ( 31 % ),
causing concern that respondents ‘ bank accounts may be in trouble and threatening respondents to make a specific payment ( 23 % ),
offering government assistance and requesting personal or bank information ( 23 % ).
Additionally, the report noted a tendency of con artists swindling patients who have higher education and income levels. Comparing demographic factors revealed that those with higher education levels had higher rates of attempted schemes than those with just secondary or elementary education or those who made RM1, 000 or less per month.  ,
The survey also assessed Malaysians ‘ awareness on the 997 hotline of the National Scam Response Centre ( NSRC ) for scam reporting, in addition to raising public awareness of the types of scams and scam tactics. 64 % of respondents were unaware they may report schemes to the NSRC line, according to research. Also, the level of knowledge among those who are reportedly in financial distress is the lowest, with 67 % of those who claim to have received insufficient income to pay their monthly expenses no being familiar with the NSRC hotline as a reporting tool for scams.
A quick course of action is a crucial stage for scam victims. However, the report makes it clear that respondents may not have the same levels of resilience to scams, especially when it comes to taking preventative and mitigating measures:
52 % blocked the telephone numbers of scam or suspected swindlers,
32 % advised family or friends, while
19 % either closed their bank accounts, cancelled their credit cards or did nothing.  ,
In response to these studies, the document indicates an urgent need for a whole-of-society approach to actively address this cultural illness. The advice include:
At the federal level, there have been more scam awareness campaigns across several channels, and there has been a greater emphasis on the role of NSRC, which includes allowing more Malaysians to learn from its services,
For the private sectors: To incorporate fraud risk management into company strategy while creating more innovative facilities to protect customers ‘ interests.
Public-private collaborations to choose a multi-pronged strategy to build an environment for a more holistic and strategic precautionary measures.  ,
The review is part of CelcomDigi’s continued battle against scams and fraudulent activities. It is obtainable around  , and on social media platforms for the consumer.  ,