No China stimulus? Time to buy – Asia Times

Do not get Taiwanese companies because you think a big fiscal stimulus is coming. Get Chinese shares because a big fiscal signal is not needed.

The bull situation for Chinese stocks is not that stimulus may save the economy. The bull event for Chinese stocks is that homeowners are sitting on US$ 20 trillion in payments with nowhere to go.

The managed destruction of the property market is ongoing. Authorities have curtailed money management products and their inherent guarantees.

Money controls prevent easy access to foreign goods. And the coming storm of high-tech technology companies in clean power, semiconductors, aviation, robotics and biotech will have a lively equity market to get off the ground.          

China ’s economic transformation will be ill-served by flood-the-zone stimulus which – if we recall – is what got us the real estate bubble and subsequent “three red lines ” credit limits in the first place. What China ’s economic transition needs is better execution of “establish the new before abolishing the old. ”

What if we generate of China ’s new stimulus methods? The grab bag of goodies – reserve requirement ratio ( RRR ) cut, lowered interest/mortgage rates, special local bond sales, cash for clunker programs– are all bullets pointing in the same direction. But the power falls well short of a bazooka.

Trillions of renminbi ( RMB) in fiscal stimulus have been dangled but apparently withheld given the non-meeting held by the National Development and Reform Commission ( NDRC ) after the holidays. What has been offered will help China achieve 5 % gross domestic product ( GDP ) growth this year, hardly a lofty goal.

The only interesting policy is the People’s Bank of China ’s ( PBOC ) unexpected support for equity markets through 1 ) a collateral replacement scheme to increase risk assets at institutional investors and 2 ) a program to encourage bank lending for share buybacks.

While some ascribe this to an effort to drink consumer confidence, the likelier inspiration is an effort by the PBoC to redeploy some of China ’s$ 20 trillion in family bank deposits.

China ’s roaring property market in the past couple of weeks has given the box of laws a vote of confidence. Note that private marketplaces are behaving far more sensibly than global markets.

China ’s markets took one year off from October 1-7for National Day breaks – enough time for global markets to roll wild and unrestrained thoughts about fiscal stimulus of RMB2 trillion, RMB4 trillion, RMB6 trillion and RMB10 trillion.

The following pain in Chinese stocks traded in Hong Kong and through global ETFs occurred in Shanghai and Shenzhen after industry reopened.

Properly attributing local business confidence is of course unthinkable. Low prices from beaten down shares provide a healthy surface.

The NDRC non-meeting may include lanced the cook of huge trigger expectations. The business has good determined that China is severe about utilizing capital markets. What it needs to figure out then is that China ’s financial woes are not as grave as made out to be.

How well has President Xi Jinping managed China ’s market? Much of the company hit is predicting Japan-style stagnation, if no inevitable decline. That, of course, has been the situation for years.

According to one famous China-based economist’s 2015 forecast, President Xi’s financial performance may have earned him God Emperor standing in the mythology of China ’s socialist officials:

My assumption is that, under President Xi’s name, 2013-2023, common growth rates are unlikely to reach 3-4 %. That’s not my prediction, that ’s the upper limit of my prediction… I think that if President Xi is able to pull off average growth rates of 3-4 % during his 10 years in office, he will have accomplished something that we should really be astonished. It would be truly impressive, almost on par with what Deng Xiaoping did in the 1980’s …

In President Xi’s first two conditions, China ’s economy grew at a 6. 2 % compound average growth rate ( CAGR ), nearly double the upper limit of said predictions. China substantially outgrew all major markets except India. Somehow, our analyst was hardly twice as dismayed.

Perhaps it was President Xi’s personal problem, extending his time in office past the usual two five-year words. Alternatively of graduating with double starred first accolades from our scholar, Xi has only extended his experiments trying to earn an extraordinary triple or even a double starred second.

Han Feizi’s assessment of President Xi’s economic performance is considerably less generous. Economic growth of 6. 2 % CAGR in Xi’s first two terms is not at all astonishing; it was, in fact, modestly below expectations ( Covid 2000 to 2022, what can you do? ).

Han Feizi did not and does not share our Beijing economist’s bleak assessment of the economy that Xi inherited and thus cannot grant bonus points for outperformance:

[President Xi] inherited a much more difficult economy than we think. There’s a huge amount of debt. There’s a huge amount of unrecognized bad debt.                

While China did take on a lot of debt and take it on quickly, Han Feizi fundamentally disagrees that the amount of debt and the quality of the debt is all that problematic.

It has been his correspondent’s contention that the size of China ’s economy is significantly understated compared to OECD national accounts ( see here ).

China ’s debt-to-GDP ratio is, thus, closer to ~125-200 % instead of the often quoted ~300 %. Moreover, this debt largely financed housing and infrastructure – long-lived assets with relatively low maintenance capital – able to generate value for decades.

China still has 15-20 % of the population to urbanize. Given urbanization of 1 % of the population per year, overbuilt housing should naturally resolve itself by kicking the can down the road.

As such, China ’s debt is nowhere near capacity. Xi inherited an economy headed in the wrong direction, not an economy out of runway. With property investment hobbled by redline credit limits in 2020, China nonetheless continued to grow 5 % by redirecting lending to advanced manufacturing.

A sentiment that Han Feizi might share with our Beijing economist is that Xi’s record is incomplete. No marks can be given until he sees things through. Things being another transformation of China ’s economy and society, which Han Feizi has written about before ( see here ):

China wants America’s Silicon Valley but regulated, Japan’s car companies but electrified, Germany ’s Mittelstand but scalable and Korea’s Chaebols but without political capture. It wants to lead the world in science and technology but without cram schools. A thriving economy but with common prosperity. Industry without air pollution. Digital lifestyles without gaming addiction. Material plenty without hedonism. Modernity without its ills. This is, of course, a wish-list and unrealistically ambitious. But these mad scientists sure as hell are going to try. They’ve developed a taste for it.

Various pieces of this transformation have started to take shape. The anti-corruption campaign under Xi’s tenure has been unyielding and dare we say transformative. China ’s once low-trust and loutish public of the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras is now unrecognizable, able to sustain high-trust business models like shared bikes and take-only-what-you-paid-for vending machines ( see here ).

The professional environment for China ’s young grads is surely far less treacherous than the get-rich-quick-at-any-cost mentality of the go-go days.

Output from the “new three” industries – solar, batteries and EVs – are surging, although capacity appears to be growing even faster. Deflation across multiple sectors has set off alarm bells. Although not ideal, China ’s deflation is fundamentally different from Japan’s in its lost decades.

Simplistically, deflation caused by decreasing consumption ( demand curve shifting in ) is bad; deflation caused by increasing production ( supply curve shifting out ) is good.

Unlike Japan, which suffered two recessions in the 1990s, demand in China is still growing, if weaker than optimal. Japan’s deflation started when Tokyo was the most expensive city in the world with cantaloupes selling for$ 100 each. This is not the same deflation China is currently dealing with.

China ’s real disposable household income grew 6. 1 % in 2023. In recent years, regulators have crimped the income of previously high-flying professionals in finance, tech and real estate. Upper-tier income growth has stalled while lower-tier income growth has been robust.

Economist Simon Kuznets ’s prediction that inequality would rise in the early stages of economic development before peaking and falling as wealth increases is playing out perfectly in China while it confounds expectations in more capitalist economies.      

And, of course, Han Feizi does not believe China ’s economy is egregiously unbalanced ( perhaps not even unbalanced at all ) and thus has no need for massive consumption stimulus.

This is the key reason Han Feizi was not “astonished ” by China ’s ability to maintain growth over 6 % in Xi’s first two terms. There is no need for consumption to outgrow investment to signal economic health ( see here ) and thus no need for massive consumption stimulus.

China ’s regulators and anti-corruption investigators have ransacked the nation’s banks and brokerages and detained high-profile bankers, attempting to put a leash on an industry with a natural tendency to run amok. The PBoC’s support for equity markets may signal confidence in the clean-up work recently performed.

So yes, buy Chinese stocks. Valuations are still cheap, and$ 20 trillion of savings has nowhere to go. Equity markets are being prepared for China ’s high-tech future.

Growth is more sustainable in a high-trust and more equal society. No there will not be a massive consumer stimulus. But that is precisely why you should buy, not sell, China.