The Maldives ‘ , current turn toward China and apart from India , has boosted Beijing’s lengthy- term push for local control and disrupted New Delhi’s ambition to match Chinese proper competitiveness in the Indo- Pacific.
On , March , 12,  , the Island began setting in motion the expulsion of American forces on the island, ordered by President Mohamed Muizzu.
China’s diplomatic ties with the Maldives and China’s strengthening also mean that Beijing is well on its way to become local supervisor.
China’s broad Belt and Road Initiative, launched in 2013, presents Beijing as the Indo- Pacific’s strong power, with the Maldives having been one of the primary countries to visit.
The , Digital Silk Road, a premier task of Belt and Road, epitomizes Beijing’s purpose to lead the development of international communication, led by Chinese technology companies and telecommunications networks.
The Maldives are a key component of the online strategy. The islands ‘ geostrategic site is , essential to China’s plan , to create a maritime route linking China’s maritime areas to Southeast Asia, the Indo- Pacific, Africa and above. The International Community is exposed to a significant security and espionage risk from the Digital Silk Road, which could allow China to sing king of the castle in one of the world’s most proper locations.
China’s new stirring of discussion, over its usage of , maritime patrols near Taiwan as well as a , continued standoff , with the Philippines, has generated local security issues. Against this backdrop of confrontation, the Maldives remains an ambitious partner of Beijing.
Over a decade ago, when Belt and Road was announced, a subsidiary of Huawei , signed an agreement with the Maldives , to build technological infrastructure in the archipelago, in a project called” SMART Maldives”.
This enormous initiative is slated for completion on the island of Hulhumalé, a region of the North Malé Atoll. With investment from the , China Development Bank, the , Maldivian Housing Development Corporation – a state- owned enterprise – is set to bring the smart city to life.
Without massive investment from China’s state banks, in the billions of dollars, the SMART Maldives project would not be possible. While there is little mention of China’s involvement by the Housing Development Corporation, China’s heavy influence in the project cannot be masqueraded. Despite being , advertised by the Maldivian government , as an eco- friendly and fully sustainable city, Hulhumalé is in its essence another means for China to extend its network of influence across the region and the greater world.
In February, a Chinese research vessel , made a stop at a Malé port,  , raising concerns about China’s potential future use of the Maldives as a waypoint for conducting intelligence- gathering missions in the region. The ship,  , Xiang Yang Hong 03, spent weeks  , patrolling waters near India and Sri Lanka as well as the Maldives.
In 2021, during a previous voyage,  , Indonesian authorities claimed , the same ship turned its tracking system off multiple times.
On X ( previously Twitter ), the independent, open-source intelligence analyst known as “WLVN” on X ( formerly Twitter ) made a warning on March 6 that China planned to provide the Maldives with maritime surveillance systems. A defense pact signed by Beijing and Malé on March 4 approved sending non-lethal military equipment to the Maldives, despite its difficult to verify this claim.
Collaboration in military exercises and the sharing of bilateral maritime intelligence may be a result of the Maldives ‘ continued use as a Chinese maritime hub along the Digital Silk Road.
For China, the Digital Silk Road offers multifaceted benefits. Through extensive market capture, it is a means of expanding Beijing’s national tech corporations in terms of both influence and revenue.
Companies like Alibaba and Huawei, which already have significant footholds in Southeast and West Asia, have agreements with their host countries for servicing and operation, bringing money into China. With this money, Beijing is able to increase its domestic technological potential.
China will also gain a foothold in an increasingly strategic geopolitical area thanks to its increased connectivity in the Indo-Pacific. Chinese companies are investing in and financing the development of Indo-Pacific information and communications technology, which consists of various types of physical infrastructure, in the name of the Digital Silk Road.
Beijing has participated in the development of artificial intelligence and facial recognition technology, as well as the installation of fiber optic cables and the export of 5G technology to the region.
The , Maldives- Sri Lanka Cable, built by , HMN Technologies , ( formerly Huawei Marine Networks ) cost$ 22 million and , uses Hulhumalé , as a landing station. HMN has, since 2020,  , completed 16 undersea cable projects , across 27 countries in the Indo- Pacific, valued at$ 1.6 billion total.
Thus, the Maldives is a growing main market for China for fiber-optic communications in the Indian Ocean region. Beijing’s looming presence as overman in the Indo-Pacific is evidenced by China’s dominance in the regional information and communications tech sector.
Meanwhile, the international community has grown wary of China’s potential exploitation, for malicious use, of the data transmitted across the infrastructure it develops. Such a concern has  , been raised , by the United States.
China’s” smart cities” concept, which Beijing has offered to partner countries under Belt and Road, includes the deployment of thousands of CCTV cameras, developed by companies Dahua and Hikvision, both Chinese. According to the , Observer Research Foundation, 861 cameras have already been erected in the Maldives.
According to reports that Dahua-produced cameras used in European countries to analyze skin color, there are concerns about cybersecurity and espionage related to China’s use of surveillance cameras. Products from both , Dahua , and Hikvision have been deployed in China’s Xinjiang region and have been linked to , human rights violations. These concerns were exacerbated by China’s capacity to deal with the Maldives ‘ nefarious use.
China’s buildup of technological power across the Indo- Pacific region underscores the pace at which Beijing is participating in a , global techno- nationalist race , for control over the , emerging technology industry.
China wants to supplant Western influence in the world’s information and communication technology market by competing with the United States and aiming to do so as much as possible. Beijing’s” Made in 2025” initiative is emblematic of this desire. China is adamant about having a hand in every region of the world, gaining a foothold in physical ICT infrastructure, and promoting the sale of emerging technologies, which it consider to be of great value in terms of geopolitical influence.
There is no better way for Beijing to accomplish this than to invest in Belt and Road flagship projects while also strengthening diplomatic ties with partner governments and moving ahead in the global competition.
There is no reason to reject China’s ambitious projects for small nations like the Maldives, which are dependent on international economic agreements. One of the many nations that China wants to collaborate with is the Maldives. China’s Belt and Road interest, which has risen in intensity over the past few years and will undoubtedly increase, is the emerging Indo-Pacific market.
The Maldives has emerged as a stronghold for Beijing’s expansion as the world’s leading techno-nationalist power, and Chinese technology is a cornerstone of digital authoritarianism. Even if Beijing is ultimately promoted as a hegemonic leader of the Indian Ocean region, Malé is prepared to engage with China to diversify its economic and political agenda.
Joshua Bowes ( [email protected] ) is a research associate at the Millennium Project’s South Asia Foresight Network ( www. southasiaforesight. org ) in Washington, DC, focusing on South Asian security challenges, political conflict and the confluence of extremism and technology.
This article was first published by Pacific Forum. It is republished with permission.