On the heels of the 16th BRICS mountain, India and China have lately come to an agreement to end their protracted border standoff in the northern region of the India-China Himalayan border. Since the death of 20 Indian and an undetermined number of Chinese troops in a high-mountain conflict on June 15, 2020, conflicts have erupted.
After Prime Minister Narendra Modi took office and began boosting ties with the United States, China’s major grievance with India became public. India began putting together contracts that successfully made it a US partner and supporter in South Asia.
China perceived this as part of Washington’s broader” China containment policy”, which was central to former President Barack Obama’s” Pivot to Asia” strategy during his second term. China attempted to exert pressure on India in response, attempting to prevent it from aligning itself very strongly with the US.
On August 29, 2016, India and the US signed an adapted version of the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement ( LEMOA ). In reply, China ramped up pressure on India, especially at the Doklam tri-junction, where the edges of Bhutan, China and India merge.
In an effort to relieve tensions, India’s then-foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, visited Beijing and assured his Chinese rivals that India was committed to resolving variations through a high-level system.
This led to the first casual conference between Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Wuhan, China, on April 27–28, 2018, where both officials  , discussed and agreed on several issues to handle their differences.
On the eve of the first 2 2 dialogue between the two nations, India continued to sign another fundamental agreement with the US, the Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement ( CISMOA ).
On October 11-12, 2019, the following casual conference between Modi and Xi took place in Mahabalipuram, Tamil Nadu. The mountain, however, appeared to be a disappointment, possible due to Modi’s determination to align more closely with the US by agreeing to a third basic deal. Xi of India’s purpose to define its relationship with the US may have been Modi’s blunt response during their conversations.
Xi later made this notion during a formal visit to Kathmandu, Nepal, shortly after the Mahabalipuram conference. Xi it warned that “anyone attempting to cut China in any part of the country may end in smashed body and shattered bones,” which could have been interpreted as a covert response to India’s growing ties with the US.
Following the deadly clashes in Galwan on June 15, 2020, the Indian media—often referred to as” Godi media” for its pro-Modi stance—launched an intense anti-China propaganda campaign. India continued to strengthen its ties with the US despite China’s concerns and Modi’s earlier assurances to Xi at the Wuhan summit.
India’s fourth foundational agreement with the US, known as the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Intelligence ( BECA ), was signed on October 26, 2020, further bolstering its partnership. This was done in response to the General Security of Military Information Agreement ( GSOMIA ) being signed earlier in 2002. By moving forward with these agreements, India formally aligned itself with the US, disregarding Chinese objections.
Modi sounded assured that his enticing relationship with then-US President Donald Trump would give India preferential access to US technology and markets. During his visit to the US, Modi even campaigned for Trump’s re-election at the” Howdy, Modi”! event in Houston, Texas, where he famously cheered,” ‘ Abki Baar, Trump Sarkar’, rang loud and clear”. ( meaning” Next term, Trump’s government” ).
High-ranking US officials at the time frequently predicted that an Indian caravan of American companies would move from China. However, this shift never substantially materialized, and US investment in India remains minimal. Instead, India’s trade dependence on China has increased significantly.
In his second term as prime minister, Modi appoints S. Jaishankar in 2019, hoping that his pro-American stance will encourage investment and technology in the United States as well as secure preferential access to Indian goods in American markets, as China did in the 1990s.
However, treaties and regulations that the US government has in place mostly limit the scope of the US government’s role in its economy to establishing a legal framework for international trade and investment. The host nation is responsible for creating a conducive investment environment, which American investors have long felt is lacking in India. Instead of increased US investment, major American companies like Ford, General Motors and Harley-Davidson exited the Indian market during this period.
Recently, it was hoped that assembling Apple’s iPhones in India would be a successful venture. However, the initiative experienced significant setbacks as a result of a high rejection rate of 50 %, concerns about E coli bacteria contamination, and lower worker productivity than in China. As a result, India’s economic gains from joining the US and becoming a partner did not materialize as planned.
On the geopolitical front, meanwhile, India lost significantly. It once regarded South Asia and the Indian Ocean as its main areas of influence, but none of its neighbors, who have since become US allies, still do so. India has arguably grown closer to the US as a subordinate ally.
This was made clear when the US carried out a Freedom of Navigation Operation ( FONOPS) in the Indian Ocean on April 7, 2021, which sparked a strong backlash in Indian academia and media despite India being a US partner. Additionally, the US has been accused of fueling anti-India sentiment in neighboring countries and covertly helping to oust pro-Indian governments in Sri Lanka, Nepal, and the Maldives.
This made India realize that Washington expects it to renounce its” strategic autonomy” and that its assertions of a regional sphere of influence in South Asia are unacceptable.
Henry Kissinger famously remarked,” It may be dangerous to be America’s enemy, but to be America’s friend is fatal”. This sentiment seems to fit India’s experience perfectly. At regional gatherings, the US continued to press India politically.
Meanwhile, despite India’s rhetorical trade restrictions on Chinese goods, its trade with China continued to grow. India’s increased trade with the US was largely driven by its rising imports from China. This interaction revealed that while China is required by China for its economic growth, China is not required by India.
Ultimately, after four years of experimenting with foreign policy, the Modi government came to understand that China’s cooperation is essential for India’s economic development. The economic adviser to the prime minister claimed that because of its dependence on India and the possibility of growing Chinese investment, China would likely refrain from intervening in border issues.
On the other hand, the West put more pressure on India to oppose Russia following the conflict in Ukraine. India was persuaded to abandon its relationship with Russia by the US, promising in exchange for arms if it continued to purchase Russian oil.
Despite this pressure, India has continued to buy cheap Russian oil and is currently Russia’s largest oil buyer. Russia accounts for approximately 36 % of India’s arms imports. India’s national interests are at odds with the US’s pressure on it to refrain from purchasing arms and oil from Russia.
Recently, the US and Canada have been pressing India to cut off from China and leave the BRICS. Following the murder of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, Canada’s expulsion of Indian diplomats highlighted this effort. In addition, the US Department of Justice has started legal action against an Indian government employee in connection with Gurpatwant Singh Pannun’s alleged attempted murder.
Modi’s allies now recognize that maintaining a relationship with China is crucial for India’s economic development. India would face significant challenges if China placed trade restrictions on it. India can no longer expect the benefits the US provided China in the 1990s.
Additionally, the US-US alliance agreements have proven ineffective in putting pressure on China. Due to India’s protectionist industrial and international trade policies, which favor the return of manufacturing to America, Modi has come to terms with this country’s ability to obtain preferential market access, technology, or investment from the US. Consequently, he has also acknowledged that India can seek technology, investment and market opportunities from China.
Dr. Manmohan Singh’s government was arguably more resilient than any other administration in India to withstand American pressure. Before the 2014 elections, the US exerted significant pressure on India to support its” Pivot to Asia” policy.
However, Singh’s government resisted these demands. When the US detained and conducted Indian diplomat Devyani Khobragade, there was a significant backlash in India. In response, the Singh administration withdrew the privileges of US Ambassador to India, Nancy J Powell. She resigned as ambassador and went through immigration the same way she would any other US citizen upon her return to the US.
In a show of defiance, Delhi Police erected barricades in front of the US Embassy in New Delhi, and associated institutions and organizations were subject to restrictions. Singh continued to oppose becoming a US ally despite losing the subsequent election six months later. He instead chose to temporarily put the border dispute aside in favor of pursuing a policy that promoted economic development through partnerships with China.
Conversely, Modi’s policy aimed at becoming a steadfast ally and partner of the US, which was intended to serve India’s interests, has proven to be fundamentally misguided. India’s national priorities have been squandered and given up by the ongoing border tensions with China. Modi has come to understand the truth in Kissinger’s words about the dangers of being America’s friend.
One of the worst decades in India’s history in terms of international relations was witnessed by the first and second terms of Modi’s administration. India has experimented with international and geopolitical strategies for unprecedented opportunity costs during this time. Modi is shifting from the US to China in his third term, aiming to change course.