Turkey’s focus is shifting more and more to establishing a footing in former Soviet republics of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, while the world continues to concentrate on de-escalating the Israel-Has conflict and the ongoing fight in Ukraine.
Shared society serves as the justification for closer relationships. The Organization of Turkic States ( OTS) has negotiated trade and security agreements, which serve as the impetus.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated at the OTS conference last week that Turkey is connected to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan by the Turkish language home. Astana is the capital of Kazakhstan. The Greek leader claimed that echoing calls for a typical Turkish alphabet helped the nations’ unification.
The appeal, though mainly symbolic, was a call for Turkey to abandon Cyrillic, the foundation of the Soviet script, and replace it with the Latin alphabet, which was adopted by Turkey in 1928.
Azerbaijan, an alliance of Ankara, made the transition in 2001, which was seen as a clear rejection of previous Russian law. In the 1990s, Turkmenistan, an OTS spectator, switched to Latin and handwriting yet earlier.
Of course, the business serves as more than just a repository for popular scripts for Turkey. Instead, it’s an emerging andnbsp, tool that could aid Turkey and the NBP in driving Russia out of the South Caucasus and into Central Asia, two strategically significant areas where Turkic-speaking people make up the majority of society. & nbsp,
Whether another members share Turkey’s motivation is the key problem. According to current information, they might not.
For instance, one of Turkey’s objectives is to convince OTS countries to support the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus( TRNC ) and nbsp. TRNC is regarded by the global community as a component of the Republic of Cyprus and is only recognized by Turkey. TRNC is an observer status to OTS, similar to Turkmenistan.
Members of the Organization of Turkic States, however, seem to have different opinions about TRNC. There was no official TRNC presence in Astana last week, in contrast to the previous OTS summit & nbsp, which took place in Ankara in March and treated Turkish-Cypriot leader Ersin Tatar like a head of state.
Another political issues are even more contentious. & nbsp,
Despite being allies, Turkey and Azerbaijan have completely different perspectives on the Israel-Gaza fight. While the citizens of Azerbaijan openly support Israel, and Baku provides Israel with 60 % of its oil requirements, Erdogan spews anti-Israel language.
Another area of contention is business passageways. The Middle Corridor & nbsp project, a transportation route beginning in Southeast Asia and China that travels through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and on to Europe, is quickly coming to fruition with the cooperation of Azebran, Kazakhstan and Turkey. & nbsp,
Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have backed Russia’s plans to construct the & nbsp, Southern Transport Corridor, which would effectively bypass Kazakhstan.
The desire to abandon Russia’s sphere of influence is what most, if not all, former Russian Turkic-speaking nations have in common.
In order to provide Turkey with a chance to engage, Kazakhstan wants to strengthen relationships with its neighboring Turkish says and the West. Kyrgyzstan is a factor as well. Despite being a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization( CSTO ), Russia recently bought Turkish-made & nbsp, Akinci, and Aksungur drones, which are used for border security. & nbsp,
In a 2022 border conflict, Kyrgyzstan already has Turkish-made Bayraktar unmanned aerial vehicles( UAVs ), which it reportedly andnbsp used against Tajikistan. & nbsp,
Turkey is using financial participation in addition to military equipment to encourage engagement with the former Soviet Central Asian nations. For instance, Turkish companies’ investments in Uzbekistan have already reached a & nbsp of$ 1.5 billion, while Ankara’s goal is to reach the US$ 10 billion and its bilateral trade target with Kazakhstan.
However, the issue for Ankara is that OTS people are landlocked nations that are heavily reliant on Russian landscape. For instance, oil and gas pipelines that cross Belarusian territory are used by Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, two major energy exporters, to reach their clients in Europe.
Turkey’s attempt to overtake Russia in the region may be difficult as long as Russia continues to be a significant transit nation for the energy resources of the Turkish world.
The truth is that OTS people from post-Soviet area need Russia just as much as they want to strengthen their relationships to Turkey. Each continues to be a part of the Russian-dominated & nbsp, Commonwealth of Independent States, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the CSTO, which is still led by Moscow. & nbsp,
These alignments imply that Turkey’s vision of an Ankara-led Turkish world order is exceedingly myopic for the majority of Turkish states. For Turkey’s comrades in former Soviet republics, the last chapter with Moscow has not yet been written, even though Erdogan may understand it simply as characters on a piece of paper.
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