” All forms of media is ]sic ] propaganda, we’re just more honest about it”. But declares the social media profile of , Zhao DaShuai, a part of the , Women’s Armed Police , Propaganda Bureau.
Foreign technique is frequently characterized by its emphasis on deception, but like so many autocratic governments, the Chinese Communist Party frequently states precisely what it is doing and why it is doing it.
It is through this glass of , propaganda , and , social warfare , that China observers should examine the People’s Liberation Army’s “punishment tasks” around Taiwan, collectively referred to as Joint Sword 2024A. These activities, which were launched by Beijing as a response to Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te’s inaugural address on May 20, placed Chinese air and naval property in areas that would help Beijing to remove or establish a blockade on the island.
These activities were accompanied by a propaganda , film, produced by China’s Eastern Theater Command, that showed an enormous salvo of missiles striking targets in Taiwan. The video‘s speakers declare that these strikes are intended to kill Taiwan’s wall of freedom. Hit the base camp of Chinese independence! Reduce off the blood stream of Chinese self-reliance”!
Seeing this in concert with China’s sustained , force campaign , against Taiwan, an motion of , Chinese shipbuilding , that extremely dwarfs American naval generation and a growing Chinese , missile inventory , with increasing threat ranges, one can easily see a grim picture of Taiwanese invincibility. A Chinese defense arrest of Taiwan would be fruitless, the message is clear.
US allies and partners who are considering defending Taiwan might question the viability and worth of intervening against quite a strong adversary as China. Additionally, the giant whose fist encircles their whole island nation may intimidate Japanese policymakers and voters. If weight is pointless, Taiwan and the rest of the world might make the wiser choice by reducing the pain of a future integration.
A mental fait accompli, this feeling is precisely what China seeks. China wants the world to think that no one can stop it and that it has already won.
China’s actual military might is less impressive and fragile than Beijing would have the earth think, despite the advertising. However, China’s control strategy may be successful if it reinforces what China watchers does now tend to believe.
For example, the Associated Press has  , accidentally used , a doctored photo from Chinese state media of PLA military exercises. The narrative is removed from there. Many newspapers, television, social media, and academia now all tell the same tale of Chinese overmatch. In short: It has all the , doctrinal hallmarks  , of effective deception.
Russia ran a , similar playbook , prior to its 2022 full- scale invasion of Ukraine, depicting its military as an overpowering force. The Russian façade of invincibility was quickly exposed by the fierce and persistent Ukrainian resistance against a foe with significant materiel and numerical advantages, even though Russia is and is an existential threat to Ukrainian sovereignty.
It’s another riff on the story of David versus Goliath. What China and Russia fail to remember is that, in that story, David wins.
It takes a multifaceted approach to expose this deception for what it is while exposing the Chinese vulnerabilities it aims to cover:
- First, policymakers and the analysts who inform them must understand the nature and depth of Beijing’s influence operations.
- Second, they must recognize Taiwan’s relative strengths and China’s relative weaknesses in a scenario of invasion.
- Finally, they must thoroughly refute the claims of overwhelming Chinese influence and protect their populations from vile Chinese influence practices.
China’s influence campaign
China’s influence campaign in pursuit of this cognitive fait accompli is conducted across multiple lines of operation. The most obvious includes the overt demonstration of military strength in drills and exercises such as Joint Sword 2024A and accompanying propaganda videos.
China’s campaign is amplified on social media. The Chinese Communist Party provides funding for the , wumao, and tens of thousands of internet users paid by the Chinese government to repeat the regime’s propaganda and swarm those who appear to have views that are critical of it.
In addition, the Chinese government annually produces hundreds of millions of internet posts to , distract users , from any critical discussion of the party. Such influence operations occur not just , on Weibo, the state- controlled Chinese social media platform, but also across X and other platforms to influence Western audiences. Many of these, despite their ham- fistedness, continue to generate significant followings and engagement.
The difficulty of a cross- strait attack
This aggressive squabbling across all information sources is intended to highlight Chinese strength as well as conceal its shortcomings in light of the realities of an attempt to militarily seize Taiwan. Such a mission would call for both an amphibious assault across the Taiwan Strait and the isolation and blockade of Taiwan.
China certainly has the air and maritime strength to , establish a blockade , around Taiwan, but maintaining one could become , strategically , tenuous , for Beijing if it upended China’s economy, especially its international trade. It also would be operationally tenuous due to factors such as logistical sustainment, maintenance, and airspace control and coordination.
Blockade demonstrations like Joint Sword 2024A are extremely expensive and put a lot of strain on Chinese capabilities across the board, despite the temporary nature of the demonstations. A long, protracted blockade would eventually strain the Chinese military system, putting strain on the system to a greater degree, making sustainment improbable and vulnerable to disruption.
Should the United States and its allies intervene militarily, the “patrol boxes” vaunted on , Chinese diagrams , of their latest drill could just as easily become “kill boxes” for Taiwanese and US forces to target Chinese ships, especially those off of the island’s eastern coast.
China’s projection of power from Taiwan’s east coast to the mainland PRC coast is relatively straightforward, and it is likely that China will continue to be superior along these lines of operation. However, allies and partners who could intervene from the territories of Japan and the Philippines or via air and naval power from the Pacific are more likely to support Taiwan’s east coast. China would likely continue its military influence over the Taiwan Strait, but keeping it east of Taiwan is a bad idea.
Policymakers should also highlight the sheer , difficulty , of a cross- strait attack. A multi-layered amphibious assault from China into Taiwan would be larger and more complex than the Allied and Normandy invasion of World War II, which necessitated coordinated planning and coordination, which the bifurcated and politically divided services of the PLA lack.
A more apt analogy might be the failed Allied , Gallipoli campaign , of World War I, because China likely would lack the ability to achieve operational surprise and would be sailing into , deadly waters , filled with , mines , and , munitions. And while Chinese troops may eventually make it to Taiwan’s shores, they likely would find themselves stranded and , contained.
Establishing a lodgment is one thing, securing and expanding it is another. A 2023 , report , by Mark F Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham identifies the many difficulties China would face in establishing a lodgment. The United States and Taiwan could take other steps to halt or stop the establishment of such a lodgment, according to the report.
The , weaknesses , inherent within an authoritarian, communist system only exacerbate these operational factors.
Countering China’s false narrative
Action must be taken both reactively and preemptively to counter China’s vile narrative. First, policymakers must highlight and make the most of China’s strengths and Taiwan’s weaknesses in an invasion scenario to the extent that classification and prudence allow.
They should reinforce, as often as possible, the , will of many Taiwanese , to fight for their autonomy and the strength and willingness of the United States, along with its allies and partners, to , support Taiwan , in such a fight. Put another way, they must demonstrate the net effect for the overall defense of Taiwan of the tightening alliances , and , partnerships that are being forged into a shield that , continues , to repel Chinese aggression.
Policymakers should draw attention to the comparisons between Moscow and Beijing and the example of Russia as an overt “emperor with no clothes.”
Finally, Taiwan and other countries should continue to pursue various other initiatives aimed at educating society against disinformation. Greater efforts to foster media literacy, from grade school to college, will help foster more critical consumers of information who wo n’t be so easily duped by disinformation in general and Chinese disinformation in particular.
Deliberately staffed offices tasked with identifying and combating Chinese disinformation could coordinate with and be amplified by public affairs and information offices across pro-Taiwan organizations.
Taiwan’s allies and partners can combat the potency of Chinese propaganda by exposing the truth about Taiwan’s vulnerabilities and Taiwan’s strengths across a variety of channels, helping to promote more informed and resilient strategies for supporting Taiwan’s security as well as stability throughout the Indo-Pacific.
Lieutenant Colonel Brian Kerg, USMC, is a nonresident fellow in the , Indo- Pacific Security Initiative , at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Follow him on X @BrianKerg.
This article was first published by the , Atlantic Council. The opinions expressed here are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the US Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or any other US government figure.