Southeast Asia (Page 8)

US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stressed the need for Japan to increase military vigor in mild of China’s growing confidence and the looming threat of a Taiwan emergency during his first official visit to Asia.

From Manila to Hanoi, local leaders have publicly welcomed reassurances of the US’s security appearance, viewing America’s “robust, ready and reliable” approach to China – as described by Hegseth – as a needed barrier that their own militaries cannot support only.

But beneath the hushes of strategic approval is a quieter undercurrent of worry: May America’s Indo-Pacific ultimately cause the region to become unstable rather than recover equilibrium?

US protection concerns have been shown to function more as economic leverage than as corporate interests in new upheaval involving Canada, Panama, Greenland, and Yemen.

” If the US properly restores freedom of navigation ( for shipping roads around the Middle East ) at great cost, there needs to be some additional economic get extracted in profit”, wrote S. M., according to leaked Signal messages reported by various media outlets. Stephen Miller, the White House’s deputy chief of staff, is reportedly the subject of a S. M. theory.

The logic of” America First” extends beyond economics to the realm of security, as articulated by Defense Undersecretary-nominee Elbridge Colby.

America’s Indo-Pacific strategy is clear: deny China regional hegemony through forward military posturing, strengthened alliances and assertive naval operations.

That approach has appeal to many ASEAN states, of course. China’s rise, after all, hasn’t just harmed the security of trade routes; it has militarized the South China Sea and exacerbated regional asymmetries. The US’s focus on deterrence thus presents a timely hedge.

Risk of overreach

However, that deterrent logic is fragile. Consider Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific’s geopolitical tripwire. Through continued high-profile arms deals and repeated rhetorical affirmations, President Donald Trump’s administration has encouraged Taipei.

The US State Department removed the phrase” we do not support Taiwan independence” as part of what it described as a routine update in February.

While these moves boost morale in Taiwan and draw praise in Tokyo and Manila, they simultaneously narrow China’s strategic options.

The People’s Liberation Army’s most recent live-fire demonstrations around the self-governing island highlight a sombering truth: Beijing views US actions as a prelude to a permanent separation. China is more likely to test its resolve the more the US resolute it becomes.

This feedback loop raises the specter of strategic overreach.

Tokyo established the Japan Joint Operations Command, a new body tasked with coordinating its Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces, in conjunction with Hegseth’s Asia tour. This is a significant step toward enhancing Japan’s ability to respond to regional emergencies and enhancing operational cooperation with US forces.

There are currently 55, 000 US soldiers stationed in Japan, 28, 500 in South Korea, and a growing rotational presence in the Philippines. Add AUKUS nuclear submarine deployments and increased intelligence-sharing under the Quad, and the region increasingly resembles a Cold War-era containment arc.

Trump’s strategy, however, lacks the broad-spectrum diplomacy that once supported credible deterrence. His strategy heavily relies on trade coercion without providing a corresponding vision for regional development. His strategy is unsupported by an effective economic program for ASEAN.

The” Liberation Day” tariffs, announced on April 2, 2025, threaten to deliver a sharp economic blow to all ASEAN states, including strategic ally Singapore, despite its Free Trade Agreement with the US and existing trade deficit, not surplus.

Cambodia is the country with the highest tariff, at 49 %, followed by Laos at 48 %, Vietnam at 46 %, and Myanmar at 44 %, despite the country’s trade with the US remaining sluggish because of current sanctions.

Thailand and Indonesia are subject to tariffs of 36 % and 32 %, respectively, while Brunei and Malaysia are each subject to tariffs of 24 %. The Philippines fares slightly better at 17 %, while both Timor-Leste and Singapore face the baseline 10 %.

Trump’s punitive trade measures come without meaningful investment or assistance, further erodering regional goodwill, in contrast to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which continues to position Beijing as the region’s leading infrastructure partner.

There is also a more in-depth historical irony at play. In Washington, Japan’s growing military assertiveness is widely seen as a success of US security leadership. However, Taiwan’s reputation as being essential to Japan’s own national security is revived by its Southeast Asian neighbors, who have bitter memories.

The echoes are obvious: In 1931, Japan justified its invasion of Manchuria in response to the staged Mukden Incident on strikingly similar grounds, shielding important interests from a perceived Chinese encroachment.

Without a meaningful reckoning with this past, Japan’s shift away from postwar pacifism, however US-encouraged, risks alienating ASEAN rather than uniting it under the American banner.

The US “doctrine of denial” is set up for theater-specific flashpoints like Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Senkaku Islands, which poses the greatest risk of overreaching.

However, important ASEAN nations like Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia are not eager to join these permanent alliances. Southeast Asia seeks deterrence without entrapment.

Trump, however, doesn’t offer much nuance. His current zero-sum worldview, where failing to align with America is seen as siding with China, risks alienating the very middle powers whose support is essential to maintaining US power and influence in the area.

As Singapore’s Foreign Minister Dr Vivian Balakrishnan reminded Parliament at last month’s Committee of Supply debate,” We must maintain an omnidirectional balance and a constructive engagement with all partners”.

China’s charm reset

China is waging a parallel campaign to reshape perceptions and re-anchor Southeast Asia in its orbit, even as the US restores deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.

Long gone is China’s snarling rhetoric of “wolf warrior” diplomacy from 2017. A strategic reset is positioned in its place, surrounded by charm, trade, and respect for ASEAN centrality.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is now using the phrase “multipolar world” to advocate for Southeast Asia’s “right to choose,” echoing the language of regional autonomy.

Beijing’s statecraft appears to have shifted from confrontation to courtship. It has also strengthened its position as ASEAN’s largest trading partner for 16 consecutive years.

President Xi Jinping’s upcoming travels to Malaysia, Cambodia, and Vietnam this month reflect China’s deeper, concerted push for personal diplomacy and economic pragmatism.

Even Indonesia’s recent decision to join BRICS and strengthen digital and green cooperation with China underlines a wider regional trend: hedging against American volatility by embracing Chinese steadfastness.

China’s multilateral rhetoric, which promotes regional comprehensive economic partnerships like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and promotes minilateral initiatives like” Security Belt 2025,” gives it even more legitimacy as a partner invested in peace rather than provocation.

To be clear, China’s charm offensive has its own flaws. Take its tense relationship with the Philippines as an example. The Philippines remains a crucial node in America’s first island chain of forward defense.

Hegseth made the announcement during his recent visit to Manila that the US would use more sophisticated military capabilities for joint training, improve interoperability for “high-end operations,” and prioritize cooperation with the Philippines from the defense industry.

Manila has strengthened its security ties to Washington under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., including welcoming more US troop rotations, participating in expanded trilateral exercises with Japan and Australia, and publicly deny Chinese harassment of Filipino vessels close to the Second Thomas Shoal and other disputed sea features.

Meanwhile, China’s maritime assertiveness in the South China Sea has grown more calibrated – aggressive enough to assert red lines, yet measured enough to avoid outright conflict. However, this delicate balance act demonstrates Beijing’s soft-power reset’s limits.

China may outsource and outsource the United States ‘ infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia, but it is unable to quickly address the deep concerns it has caused as a result of its territorial assertiveness. ASEAN nations may engage with Beijing’s diplomacy, but many remain wary of its gray-zone tactics.

In essence, Southeast Asia is balancing, hedging, and gaming both Washington and Beijing. The danger lies in mistaking polite nods for alignment. Trump’s administration must be aware that regional nations favor dialogue over ultimatums and options over dominance.

American abandonment

Critics may argue that Trump’s tough talk has at least reawakened America’s strategic muscle. However, history encourages skepticism.

His first term was marked by erratic diplomacy, with his party wooing Kim Jong Un of North Korea while reneging on crucial multilateral agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Agreement.

For all its bluster – from a Ukraine ceasefire that has failed to hold, to hostages still held by Hamas, to Houthi rebels continuing to menace shipping lanes near Yemen – Trump’s brand of deterrence so far feels more performative than institutionalized.

In fact, Indo-Pacific allies and partners are left to wonder whether US support has a time limit. In” Strategy of Denial,” US Defense Undersecretary-nominee Colby recommends putting together a cohesive coalition to combat Chinese hegemony.

But ASEAN doesn’t just want a wall. Partner who are willing to build bridges are necessary given the country’s young populations, emerging industries, growing infrastructure needs, and desire for investment, whether it be financially, technological, or developmentally.

ASEAN wants a US that can stifle China while also reassuring the area. It wants an America that upholds international rules without provoking war. It desires a US that makes investments in shared prosperity that are supported by an equilibrium-creating security architecture.

Southeast Asia, which has long been a hub for powerful rivalries, is acutely aware that diplomacy without deterrence is a risky move.

Living in permanent proximity to China, and mindful of America’s history of strategic withdrawals, the region understands that US overreach today could lead to hemispheric abandonment tomorrow.

Marcus Loh serves as the director of Temus, a Singapore-based company that offers digital transformation services, where he leads public affairs, marketing, and strategic communication.

He previously served as the Institute of Public Relations of Singapore’s President, and he is currently a member of SG Tech’s executive committee for the digital transformation chapter.

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