Southeast Asia (Page 41)

This post originally appeared on Pacific Forum and has since been republished with authority. Read the original below.

Despite having a long-standing appearance in Southeast Asia, France’s recent engagement in the region remains limited. France has been formalizing its Indo-Pacific method since 2018 in an effort to strengthen its regional property, establish its position as an Indo-Pacific strength, and establish new ties with Asia.

Yet, despite this technique, France’s success in Southeast Asia is also lacking, as it prioritizes the Indian Ocean due to its geographical interests, forming the basis of its Indo-Pacific foreign plan.

France’s interest is also divided according to handling continued conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the war in Gaza, and local European affairs, which threaten Europe’s security and need France’s leadership.

Southeast Asia’s difficult geopolitics, including sea disputes and competition among significant powers, are possible sources of conflict. Also, Southeast Asia’s increase as the most powerful area in the world prompts a reassessment of France’s geographical coverage.

The French administration’s plan report,” France’s Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific”, emphasizes a devotion to a second way in the region. Given that some Asian nations are less advanced in this area, it aims to work with all well-intentioned capabilities that are committed to non-traditional surveillance, particularly in terms of addressing climate change.

Southeast Asia is very vulnerable to climate change, facing problems like rising sea levels, heat waves, storms, floods and extreme weather events. As a head in the fight against climate change, France may draw on its expertise, funding, and study to work with Southeast Asian nations in this crucial field.

Given Vietnam’s significant contribution to world rice exports, this focus aligns with ASEAN’s existing needs, as evidenced by recent droughts in southern Vietnam that have affected rice cultivation.

But, France’s approach to Southeast Asia faces restrictions compared to countries like Japan, the US and China, as it cannot provide large-scale equipment leasing or military technology gifts.

France can use ASEAN’s advantages in non-traditional security, while another big powers concentrate on other areas. This method is well-suited to ASEAN’s present interests, especially in addressing climate change and other pressing local issues.

Regarding political engagement, France is actively involved in supporting ASEAN-led mechanisms and promoting ASEAN centrality. France became the first member of the European Union to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia ( TAC ) in 2007.

Additionally, France has accredited its Ambassadors to ASEAN since 2009, indicating its commitment to engaging with ASEAN. A workshop on regional security, titled” Navigating through Concurrent Security Challenges: How to Keep ASEAN in the Driver’s Seat,” was sponsored by France in December 2023.

This workshop aimed to address challenges and provide support to ASEAN-led mechanisms and ASEAN centrality, showcasing France’s dedication to strengthening ASEAN’s role in regional security.

Both France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific ( AOIP ) share common points, as they seek partnerships with like-minded countries based on a shared vision of challenges and solutions.

Both emphasize keeping a neutral position and refraining from taking sides, which aids in the establishing of trust between France and ASEAN. The 2020 ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute survey on Southeast Asia’s state ranked the EU as ASEAN’s second most trusted partner, after Japan.

Given that it is a significant member of the EU, France has a significant advantage in fostering trust and cooperation with ASEAN.

France’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific, emphasizing neutrality and a third-path approach, benefits ASEAN by promoting multilateralism and reducing concerns about relationships with other major powers like China, the US and Japan.

From ASEAN’s perspective, France’s strategy is seen as a major power supporting ASEAN-led institutions and strengthening multilateralism and balance in the region. ASEAN wo n’t have to deal with pressure to take sides because France does n’t participate in alliances like the Quad and AUKUS.

Being able to support major powers that maintain a neutral stance given ASEAN’s relatively weak voice in comparison to major powers, having support from major powers that maintain a neutral stance is essential for bolstering ASEAN’s multilateral efforts. For France, this position allows it to exert more influence in ASEAN’s areas of strength.

France can use its favorable standing to strengthen its influence within ASEAN and promote regional stability and cooperation by adhering to ASEAN’s principles and objectives.

France, a strategic partner for ASEAN?

Among ASEAN countries, France has different levels of cooperation.

Although many Southeast Asian nations have historically sourced their weapons from Russia, the Ukraine conflict and subsequent sanctions have caused ASEAN to diversify its sources.

France, now the world’s second-largest arms exporter overtaking Russia, holds 11 % of the global arms market and has seized this opportunity to sell arms to ASEAN countries.

For instance, France sold two Scorpene submarines to Indonesia on April 3, 2024, and French weapons company Nexter Defence System is working closely with the Indonesian government to create a domestic weapons industry.

Furthermore, on December 9, 2023, France and Malaysia reinforced their strategic partnership in defense, underscoring ASEAN’s role and France’s role as an observer in the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting Plus ( ADMM Plus ).

Additionally, Singapore and France aim to enhance ties through a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership ( CSP) by 2025. The Philippines and France made a commitment to strengthen defense cooperation and pursue an agreement that would allow them to send troops to their respective territories on December 2, 2023.

France has actually deployed patrol ships in the South China Sea several times to demonstrate its commitment to upholding maritime security in the area.

While France maintains good relations with Indochina, particularly through economic and Francophone activities, the relationship remains relatively limited. This is especially true for Vietnam, which has been hailed as a crucial partner for France in Southeast Asia.

France and Vietnam celebrated their strategic partnership’s tenth anniversary and relationship’s fiftyth anniversary in 2023. Despite historical difficulties, this relationship has the potential to become a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, similar to the progress made in the US-Vietnam relationship.

However, this process requires significant efforts from both countries. It is interesting that, despite significant official visits between France and Vietnam, the French president has not traveled to Vietnam during significant occasions, such as the 50th anniversary of their relationship.

In contrast, other European nations, including the Netherlands and Eastern European countries, who are all EU members, have sent their presidents to Vietnam, most recently in 2023, establishing crucial diplomatic relations that Vietnam established in 1973.

Efforts must continue to leverage Vietnam’s strengths in sectors such as textiles, footwear, agriculture and aquaculture within the framework of the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement ( EVFTA ) to strengthen economic ties.

For strengthening bilateral relations, France and Vietnam must collaborate in key strategic areas. This includes encouraging French investments that are in line with Vietnam’s foreign investment strategy and promoting partnerships in high technology and industry.

Both countries recognize the importance of cooperation in sustainable development, ecological transition, and combating climate change, necessitating joint efforts on an international scale.

To promote environmentally sustainable practices, this partnership should include infrastructure development, energy transition projects, and sustainable transportation initiatives. Regarding arms sales, although Vietnam has shown interest in French weaponry, the high cost has posed challenges.

Despite the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Vietnam’s military cooperation with Russia continues successfully. By enhancing Vietnam’s ability to develop its own weapons, France might consider doing so in the future in a manner akin to what it intends to do for Indonesia. This approach is in line with Vietnam’s current requirements and could lead to a stronger defense cooperation between France and Vietnam.

France and ASEAN have a lot of potential for cooperation, and both parties have agreed on priorities and priorities. However, to fully realize this potential, France must translate its vision into practical actions and initiatives.

By doing so, France can strengthen its partnership with ASEAN and significantly contribute to regional stability, development, and cooperation.

National ChengChi University’s Tran Thi Mong Tuyen is a professor.

First published by Diplomatie Magazine N. 127 in France, this article was originally written in French.

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Pope Francis said,” The way we are called to follow is the way we are called to follow,” while on a visit to Jakarta’s Istiqlal Mosque, the largest mosque in Southeast Asia, on September 5.

The papal visit to Indonesia, the second since 1989, was characterized by religious compassion as the cleitmus. For many in Indonesia, a nation usually embroiled in religious strife, the priest’s concept of compassion has been a pleasant one.

The leaders of Indonesia are at least figuratively committed to the idea, as seen in the tunnel that connects Istiqlal to the Catholic church same or in the pope’s speech praising” Unity in Diversity,” which he praised while meeting with President Joko Widodo.

But while there is much to admire in Indonesia’s linguistic embrace of compassion, critics say day to day experiences are less forgiving for religious minorities. Some also worry that politicians will continue to be divided.

In this 80 % Muslim country, the answer to the papal visit has been overwhelmingly positive. The pope had already cultivated kindness for the plight of Rohingyas and Palestinians thanks to his outcry.

His somewhat understated manner impressed a community that is accustomed to leaders surrounded by extravagant extravagance. Indonesians were appreciative of the priest’s choice to abandon a fancy car for a more practical purpose, opting instead for a simple Toyota Innova Zenix, where he was then sat in the front desk and waved to masses from a lightly rolled-down window.

Pope Francis ‘ decision to travel commercially rather than by personal jet, his cheap observe, and his boots have been thoroughly dissected by mainstream media and social media users.

Near GBK facility, where the bishop held a size, a handful of Muslims may be spotted accompanying Catholic buddies. A woman paired a robe with deely-boppers with messages of pleasant and the priest’s face.

Perhaps a government request that TV channels refrain from broadcasting the customary evening call to prayer and instead display a text message on the screen failed to stoke many unanimity.

The Prosperous Justice Party, Indonesia’s just Islamist group, grumbled. However, its leaders were careful not to condemn the bishop, suggesting it had been the government’s concept and framed their issues in terms of compassion.

” Truthfully, continuing as usual may show the beauty of compassion in this region”, said Jaizul Juwaini, the party’s political leader. There is no issue as long as the size is going on, and the call to prayer can still be broadcast.

In the meantime, representatives from various significant Muslim organizations made it clear that giving a Catholic a sign of courtesy was not an issue.

Indonesia has long been cultivated as a country that values modest Islam and intercultural tolerance. Over half of Indonesia’s population lives in Java, where Islam has a distinctive local twang when it sits behind and even if it is in sync with existing Hindu-Buddhist lifestyle and other localized beliefs.

Politics has even a part to play. The country may be largely Arab, but Indonesia’s leaders, much worried their inland nation could balkanize, are keenly aware that non-Muslims form majorities or big minorities in different areas.

To prevent issue, the constitution guarantees freedom of religion. Obviously, the law also says the position is based on “one great God” – a request to Islamist groups who wanted to establish an directly Muslim condition post-independence.

But for administrative purposes, the express recognizes six religions – recently given some standing to other beliefs – stretching one divine heaven to somehow include acknowledgement of not just Muslims, Protestants, and Catholics but likewise Hindus, Buddhists, Confucians and several nearby religious groups.

While there was a worrying rise in spiritual murder in the country in the first decade of the 20th century, effective counterterrorism efforts have managed to largely control this once-potential danger.

Hindu, Buddhist, and various religious communities are not subject to the persecution that has led to the migration of minority religious populations from large areas of the Middle East.

We need to look at how things are here, says Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, a leading advocate for the Freedom of Religion or Belief,” so we ca n’t just compare ourselves to the Middle East, but we ca n’t just compare ourselves to other foreign countries.”

The primary concern for him is a need for social harmony that, when needed, can override liberties. Indonesia’s model essentially relies on allowing formally recognized religions to live without allowing for intermingling or heterodoxy.

Relationships, for example, remain spiritual affairs in laws. Interfaith organisations are therefore prohibited by law, with a Supreme Court decision last month closing a legal gap by attempting to file marriages in court. The best course of action for couples is typically one group getting married abroad, often reverting, or getting married there.

A 2006 ministerial decree, which makes religious minority reliant on the majority’s consent for construction of new houses of worship, is another significant problem. The end result can be a powerful reject in some circumstances.

Just west of Jakarta, for example, the John the Baptist Catholic church has been waiting for like rights since 1993. Sometimes, passes that are granted may consider themselves subject to restrictions, such as avoiding them in areas where they are accessible to passersby.

Yet Muslims may consider themselves affected by these laws, mainly the Ahmadis, Bahais or perhaps Shia who are viewed as sinners by some Sunnis, who represent the majority of Indonesia’s Muslims.

However, in Jayapura in the Indonesian province of Papua, a major mosque was forced to close its tower in 2018 because it was taller than the spires of all the churches where local Christians, who made up the majority of the population, were gathered.

Interestingly, the Indonesian Ulema Council, an important Muslim system, truly argued Christian requirements should be respected provided that they were “appropriate”.

With political devolution post-democratization in 1998, dynamics are often hyper-local. Christin Rinawati, an Indonesian Catholic, described the stark difference between living in the province of Yogyakarta, in southcentral Java, and Bekasi, West Java, just a few hours away.

In the former, her Muslim neighbors are pleased to have a welcome Christmas visit. Some in the latter were receptive to this, and local Catholics were concerned about gathering for choir practice in private homes.

Even in Yogyakarta, dynamics can be starkly different because there is only one cemetery for both Christians and Muslims in some areas. Others segregate grave sites or even object to the arrival of Christian residents.

On a national level, some worry that Indonesia is slowly becoming less tolerant. ” Things may have been easier for religious minorities under Suharto’s dictatorship”, says Ihsan.

” This is n’t necessarily because mentalities have changed. However, because of that, we were governed with an iron fist. Ihsan says that democracies have given hardline groups the chance to spread their ideas and stoke up opposition. &nbsp,

Indonesia’s strict blasphemy laws, which ban insult to any religion, have become a rallying point for Islamic hardliners. A Muslim influencer who filmed himself trying to eat pork on social media and a bar that foolishly attracted attention by offering free drinks to anyone named Muhammad have fallen foul of these accusations.

More gravely, in 2017, Indonesia was rocked by accusations that the Chinese Christian governor of Jakarta, Basuki” Ahok” Purnama, then running for reelection, had committed blasphemy.

While some Muslim leaders expressed opposition to the demonstrations, other important leaders backed them, either out of genuine belief or fear of being outflanked in piety.

Purnama would ultimately lose the election and face blasphemy-related sentencing after serving two years in prison.

” These religious tensions are often caused by political factors”, argues Father Baskara, a senior Jesuit in Indonesia. ” We are ok as long as politicians do n’t use religious issues as their way of getting things,” he said.

The priest, in fact, believes that Indonesia’s tolerance is improving, claiming that things have. Even the resurgence of the Israel-Palestine conflict has n’t had repercussions for religious harmony in Indonesia in the same way it has in the past, he claims.

In North Sulawesi, there was a conflict between pro-Israeli evangelical Christians and Islamic organizations, but the government intervened quickly to stop the conflict.

Although the measures taken against them raised some difficult questions about religious freedom, the government’s crackdown on hardline Islamist groups may have also contributed to maintaining the order.

Others, however, take a gloomier view. ” You have to look at the number of discriminatory regulations”, says Andreas Harsono, a researcher with Human Rights Watch.

He contends that these are gradually expanding as laws restrict Ahmadis ‘ ability to practice freely or force Muslim girls to wear headscarves wherever they choose in school, despite regulations that affect not just houses of worship.

Communities can engage in numerous minor conflicts and suffer minor injustices, of which few actually make the news, within the bounds of these laws.

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