Tracking the leakage of German assault rifles in Philippines – Asia Times
In recent months, authorities have seized some uncommon European assault rifles in the Philippines ‘ Bangsamoro.
The region’s efforts to end decades of insurrection, problem, and violence highlight a prolonged protection challenge as it looks to conquer a decades of insurgency, corruption, and violence. Additionally, they mention a remarkable Spanish authorities practice.
In the violence-hitting municipality of Datu Saudi Ampatuan, in the heart of the conflict-affected Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao ( BARMM), on November 9, a local official handed over four weapons to the police.
Two assault rifles with Armed Forces of the Philippines ( AFP ) markings and two Heckler &, Koch HK416 assault rifles, which local residents allegedly gave to the official, were included in the weapons.
In one of Southeast Asia’s most arms-saturated regions, a 2014 peace agreement between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front ( MILF ) gave people the opportunity to bring in illicit weapons.
The government just launched an amnesty program that works with regional community leaders to obtain arms in exchange for state funding. Since its release in soon 2023, the plan has produced hundreds of firearms.
But the HK-416 firearms are distinct. They are only used by a limited number of police and military models, and they are not available for purchase on the human market.
According to German information on hands transfers, they could have only been exported to the Philippines between 2006 and 2012. In close proximity to each another, the authorities seized these firearms on at least three more times in 2024.
The initial arrest took place in February when a regional arms trafficker was being detained by police during a bite procedure in nearby Cotabato City. In May, authorities seized another HK-416 from an outlaw Girl chief in Sultan Kudarat, just northwest of Cotabato City. After spotting military men in a car at a local South Cotabato Province traffic checkpoint in July, police took another car.
Since HK-416s have not been seen in illegal flow in any other part of the Philippines, these situations are extremely tight in terms of time and place. Additionally, there is no evidence that they have been seized before 2024. The fact that several of these firearms have been collected by government forces in various circumstances suggests that there are more out there and that they were detainned in a systematic manner.
This raises a crucial issue: how did these ultra-modern rifles, which were only recently purchased by elite units ( Germany’s data suggests only 800 rifles were exported to the Philippines ) end up circulating in illicit possession throughout southwest Mindanao?
In a nutshell, government-held weapons may be diverted into illegal hands in a fairly limited number of ways: through field captures, loss, unexpected or planned fraud, looting, desertion, purposeful state-sanctioned diversion, or corruption. While it’s impossible to know the precise history of these rifles, some of these channels may be discounted.  ,
Numerous military actors who may attempt to seize weapons through fight remain active in the BARMM. This includes the socialist New People’s Army, rogue parts of the MILF, or extreme Islamist parties like Dawlah Islamiyah.
The area is also replete with clan militias, usually overlapping with pro- and anti-government trained parties, that usually engage in violent rivalries. Any of these actors may reasonably seize these rifles by ambushing government forces or pillaging a federal arsenal.
But battle describes have become uncommon in Bangsamoro. Although often, government forces engage in attacks, they do not occur at the same rate or scale as they did in the past.
Armed organizations are typically willing to release pictures of captured weapons, but a constant check of NPA and Islamist resources does not reveal any HK-416-related claims. Several government forces have been launched recently that are powerful enough to feasibly seize several of these rare rifles in one incident.
Also, looting activities are unique and often take place within a larger security problems. When they surrounded the Marawi city ( today a part of the BARMM) in 2017, IS-aligned gunmen may have looted government outposts.
The HK-416s would have appeared in convulsions and loses properly before 2024, so there is little to suggest that they were leaked in this way. However, a spontaneous theft or loss would also be unlikely to divert some HK-416s without drawing major outside attention.
This suggests the weaponry would have been diverted through some method that involved inside support – either through state-backed escape, betrayal, planned fraud, or problem.
A well-known but largely illegal method in Bangsamoro, a hazy integration of state security forces and secret militias affiliated with powerful clans, families, and politicians, would probably take place if any of these diversion pathways were to happen.
The government has relied on security initiatives and organizations that are susceptible to political interference at the local and provincial levels in its effort to stabilize the region. This includes the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units ( CAFGUs ), which are armed volunteers hired to provide extra manpower to military and police units.
Local and regional elected officials have the authority to choose such volunteers and can use their authority to appoint their own cronies or buy off employees, typically giving them access to surplus state weapons.
Additionally, local police units answer local elected officials and the national police force. In this way, powerful clans and politicians can install loyalists in their neighborhood police departments, giving them some access to police armories, licensing procedures, and procurement channels. The 2009 Ampatuan Massacre is still relevant for demonstrating this dynamic, despite being 15 years old.
In a municipality named after the clan itself, gunmen affiliated with the powerful Ampatuan clan massacred dozens of people on November 23rd, that year. The victims were a political rival on his way to register for a local election, his entourage, and journalists documenting the process.
Security forces seized an incredible arsenal from the clan’s militia following the massacre, including machine guns and mortars that could only have been obtained from government armories as well as ammunition that had been purchased by police officers only a year prior.
The ammunition demonstrates how police can serve as a conduit for powerful clans and warlords to obtain weapons from illegal sources. Four officers purchased one million ammunition rounds from a Philippine arms manufacturer in 2008 ostensibly to conduct operations in a province close to the Ampatuans ‘ positions of power. Contrary to government guidelines, the officers reportedly paid$ 400, 000 in cash for the ammunition, despite the fact that they had no official purchase permits.
The ammunition was shipped from Manila to the enumerated province by the manufacturer, and it was taken four months later. Only a quarter of the 1,200 weapons taken from the Ampatuans were registered and legally owned; the rest could have been obtained through police or similar means.
In the BARMM, clan feuds and electoral violence are persistent sources of insecurity. Given the extent of the region’s still-present arms access and violence, the interconnected trends are so severe that they threaten the validity of the peace agreement from 2014. The HK-416s strongly suggest that arms traffickers, prominent clans, and armed actors can still source even modern government weapons through subtle forms of collusive diversion.
Although it may seem oppressing to the government, this highlights two positive aspects that merit praise. Only because the Philippine government actively and creatively seeks to return illicit weapons to state control and because military and police departments publicly disclose each seizure and surrender on their social media pages for the public to see if these HK-416s are identified and tracked can we identify and track them.
Such transparency is invaluable, it illuminates high-level trends that local or provincial units may not be able to detect. This information can help government agencies plan better interventions, such as targeted amnesties for particular high-value weapons or targeted police audits in areas where it is suspected that such weapons are expanding.
It also benefits international stakeholders. Armes exporters can use these reports to identify potential sources of revenue or to discover opportunities to support the Philippine government. Additionally, these disclosures provide a clearer picture of how security conditions in Bangsamoro are changing as they allow interested parties to track the flow of illicit weapons back into state control.
Other countries would be wise to use this information to make a public report.
