A senior official said on Wednesday ( May 7 ) that Indonesia’s central bank is focused on promoting economic growth without compromising on price stability, including the exchange rate, as the rupiah weakened once more amid rising tensions between India and Pakistan. The central banks will try to strike theContinue Reading
A leading company team predicted that Thailand’s economy and imports will grow less than expected this year as a result of US tariffs on Wednesday ( May 7 ), adding that the nation could gain market share in the US if a price decline was no secured. According to theContinue Reading
The third-largest bank by assets, UOB, reported S$ 1.49 billion ( US$ 1.16 billion ) in net profit, which was unchanged from the prior quarter, supported by report fee income and strong mortgage growth. This was slightly below the mean estimate of two analysts polled by LSEG, who estimated aroundContinue Reading
TOKYO – US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent should be careful what he wishes for when he demands that the International Monetary Fund be a “brutal truth teller” on China.
At a business conference on Monday (May 5), Bessent urged IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva to “call out countries” that “have pursued globally distortive policies and opaque currency practices for many decades.”
Though Bessent was referring to China, hypocrisy abounds as his boss, Donald Trump, pursues the most “globally distortive policies” Asia has ever seen from Washington.
And as Bessent’s Treasury team mulls, on Trump’s behalf, how to execute “opaque currency practices” that have put developing nations in a whirl. These include a possible dollar devaluation and threatening to fire the head of the US Federal Reserve.
But posterity may show that Trump’s most distortive policy of all is making Chinese deflation great again, to the detriment of global prosperity.
For two straight months now, Chinese consumer prices have been in the red. They’ve dropped 0.1% and 0.7% year on year in February and March, respectively.
More ominous, though, is that the producer price index is now down for 29 straight months. In March, wholesale prices fell 2.5%, the deepest decline in four months.
Risks are rising that China faces a “worse-than-expected demand shock” as the “economy is set to face two major drags simultaneously,” says Ting Lu, chief China economist at Nomura.
Those drags include China’s property sector troubles coupled with cartoonishly large US tariffs, currently set at 145%. As these two headwinds collide, Asia’s biggest economy could indeed be in for a shock.
Trump’s tariffs aim to torpedo China’s export engine by erasing US demand for Chinese goods. As factories go quiet and container ships get anchored in the ports off Shanghai, Shenzhen, Ningbo-Zhoushan, Guangzhou and Hong Kong, tens of millions of mainlanders will be furloughed or fired. Nor will they be receiving steady pay to spend in the Chinese economy in the months ahead.
Last month, Goldman Sachs estimated that as many as 20 million workers in China are employed by US-bound export businesses. And then there are the negative knock-on effects of unemployed factory hands. Eateries, transport operators and shopping districts that rely on workers who won’t be working could go quiet, too.
What deserves more attention with regard to mainland consumer sentiment is how the plunge in shipments from China will result in “significant layoffs” in trucking, logistics, retail and other key sectors, says Torsten Slok, chief economist at Apollo Global Management.
Zichun Huang, China economist at Capital Economics, notes that as China “is coming under pressure as external demand cools,” efforts by Xi Jinping’s government to pump money into the economy seem “unlikely to fully offset the drag.” Capital Economics thinks China’s economy will grow by only 3.5% this year, well below the government’s 5% target.
These are hardly the dynamics that an economy struggling to get households to save less and spend more wants. And yet Trump’s tariffs, and the extreme uncertainty surrounding their implementation and timing, might only intensify the deflationary currents roiling Asia’s 2025.
China’s deflation to date has been mild compared with what Japan experienced after the late 1990s. Wang Dan, an analyst at Eurasia Group, notes that Beijing officials “don’t view deflation as a crisis.” Rather, they see weak prices “as a buffer to support household savings during a period of economic transition.”
To be sure, deflation can be benign when falling prices are driven down by productivity improvements, though it’s rare and not typical of broad economic deflation. That said, China’s rapid-fire deployment of artificial intelligence across the economy could be making efficiency gains not yet apparent in total factor productivity (TFP) statistics, which have long been in decline in China.
Economist Kosuke Motani, author of the 2010 book “The Real Face of Deflation”, notes in Japan’s case many viewed falling costs deflation as a stealth tax cut of sorts, offering households a break.
Economist Sheng-Tze Cheng at Peking University also argues that falling prices can help Chinese households by acting as a buffer in times of significant change.
Only time will tell if China is currently experiencing “disinflation” rather than a long-term trend toward deflation. Yet if Japan taught policymakers around the globe anything, it’s that deflation concerns can quickly take on a life of their own.
That’s a problem that China must not take lightly, economists say. It’s now a growing problem for People’s Bank of China Governor Pan Gongsheng, who’s walking a tight policy tightrope.
Along with navigating the property crisis, Pan is struggling to gauge the severity of the trade-war fallout heading China’s way. Pan is also juggling President Xi’s big-picture financial priorities.
They include keeping the yuan stable, not incentivizing bad lending and borrowing decisions with excess liquidity, and avoiding a place on Trump’s “currency manipulator” list.
Xi and Pan are also trying to avoid shaking up the neighborhood in Asia. “The PBOC is only gradually, and intermittently, weakening the dollar-yuan fix in response to US tariffs, partly to avoid damaging trade relationships with non-US partners,” argues Ashok Bhundia, an economist at the Institute of International Finance.
Yet just like Japan, China is learning the hard way that defeating deflation requires more than just monetary easing. Even more than China needs increased amounts of yuan in circulation, it needs productive uses for the capital.
“China has reached the stage of development where domestic, not external, demand – especially in the non-tradable service sectors – should account for the bulk of aggregate demand,” says Michael Spence, an economist at the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University.
With GDP per capita of US$13,000, Spence says, “China has become an upper-middle-income economy approaching high-income status. So, the non-tradable part of its economy should be approaching the size seen in high-income countries: two-thirds of GDP.
“This means that even very strong demand for China’s exports, or strong tradable demand more broadly, could not offset a large shortfall in non-tradable demand. The barriers to Chinese growth primarily reflect weak aggregate domestic demand, largely owing to a shortfall in household consumption,” Spence said.
Unfortunately, he adds, relatively high unemployment, combined with uncertainty about the economy’s prospects, has encouraged Chinese households – already big savers by global standards – to double down on precautionary saving.
Yet, he notes that the declining value of real estate, which accounts for an estimated 70% of Chinese household wealth, is having significant negative effects on consumption.
“As the US learned after the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007-10, repairing balance-sheet damage in the household sector is no easy feat, let alone one that can be achieved quickly,” Spence says.
“Subdued real-estate activity,” Spence says, “has also affected local-government finances, which have long depended heavily on land sales and real-estate revenues. Rising fiscal distress among local governments compounds deflationary pressures.”
Analysts at Morgan Stanley write that “we expect Beijing to navigate the challenges with cautious and uneven stimulus policies: still relying on investment in emerging sectors and urban renewal, while gradually shifting policy towards consumption over the medium term.”
Economist Chen Kang at the National University of Singapore argues that Team Xi may have few tools to avoid the worst of Trump’s trade war. Over time, though, the costs will mount as rising unemployment depresses incomes and consumption, leading to long-term economic damage.
“The Trump tariffs may be the final push that sends it into deflation” that’s hard to reverse, Chen contends.
One big worry in Asia, including neighboring Southeast Asia, is that China will export waves of deflation the way Japan did, with the rising risk of deindustrializing various sectors that can’t compete on price with comparatively cheap Chinese goods.
Economist Brad Setser at the Council on Foreign Relations notes that China has been “driving a lot of deflation in the global price of traded goods.” Setser cites a “big fall” in Chinese export prices in 2023 and 2024.
Analysts at Loomis Sayles note that the “Chinese economy shows signs of green shoots. But deflation will not end in 2025. Uncertainty persists about scale and effectiveness of stimulus.”
At the same time, the bond house writes, US tariffs on Chinese products “would pose more downside risks to China’s growth and inflation outlook in 2025, likely leading to further declines in market rates, in our view.”
Many economists worry that today’s optimism about the US and China sitting down to negotiate a grand trade deal will fade as neither side proves willing to make big concessions. If so, then Trump’s whopping 145% tariffs could entrench, prompting China to increase its own 125% levies on the US.
“On paper, both capitals are waving detente flags,” says analyst Stephen Innes at SPI Asset Management. “But dig a layer deeper, and the path is still littered with landmines. China’s pledge to fight ‘to the end’ wasn’t retired – just shoved behind softer soundbites – and the ‘cancel duties first’ stick remains a non-starter for the White House.”
Dhaval Joshi, chief strategist for BCA Research’s Counterpoint, says that “Trump’s tariffs can be likened to America’s Brexit.” Just as capital fled UK government bonds, now “it will be the turn of US T-bonds to suffer the higher inflation rates and loss of privileged haven status.”
It follows that global investors may lose even more faith in the dollar and US Treasuries. As those shockwaves hit Asia, it might be even harder for China to keep deflation from taking on a life of its own.
Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek
Bangkok: A well-known mountain seeing place on the frontier has been forced to close due to unusual armed clashes in Laos, which are thought to be linked to drug trafficking, and the United States has issued a protection warning. The Phu Chi Fa scenic spot, located on the border withContinue Reading
There was a time when US politics was conducted across mahogany furniture, national security disputes were spelled out in full sentences, and political decisions were filtered through experienced institutions.
With the next coming of Donald J. Trump, who no longer serves as a head of state but instead functions as a market-reactive process, that period is over. The US president has so evolved into a contentious, screen-driven experiment in governance on impulse.
The global business serves as a guarantee, never policymaking.
The engine is Trump, and the engine that is Trump has been broken. According to what they are supposed to be, systems are meant to be precise sets of rules that produce predictable results. Trump, nevertheless, has absorbed the variety and expanded the function.  ,
His presidency also usually acts as a faulty trading bot, unable to have the balance or reasoning of an AI model but sensitive to Dow, Nasdaq, VIX, and Treasury yield fluctuations.
His affected taxes vanish when the Nasdaq drops. Trade war risks are dialed up when bond provides soar. A spike in the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX ) signals a change in foreign policy rather than market instability. This is not management; rather, it is a nervous, jerky-response machine.
Trump’s sudden 90-day tax reprieve for some Chinese tech exports vividly illustrated this new reality. The choice wasn’t the result of any high-level discussion with Beijing or a resuscitation of multilateralism.
Instead, it was a Nasdaq-driven stress reaction to rising equity prices for US tech companies. The industry did not rule the markets, but the industry did.
This new computational uncertainty has paralyzed regional planning in Southeast Asia. As if US policy then follows a straight path, officials and technocrats in Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, and Manila are also putting together actions to Trump’s statement of” Liberation Day” taxes.  ,
However, Trump’s administration no more adheres to timelines or philosophy. It moves using mood figures and uncertainty ticks. And this novel disconnect has the potential to be fatal for commerce and industry in the area.
A Trump tariff on Chinese goods from today might unintentionally hurt Indonesian middle exporters tomorrow. If those manufacturers pivot, they might discover that the price has been eliminated the following month, leaving them vulnerable and cash-strapped.
A week later in Trump World, Thai companies who have their supply chains modified to favour US customers may find their opportunities reversed.
Trump’s flawed algorithm has so stalled investments, stifled planning, and weakened confidence. No creative destruction has emerged, but strategic paralysis has spread far and wide.
China is adapting to this jumbled, disorganized new fact, and it is demonstrating that it no longer desires coherence from Washington. China is instead constructing firewalls by strengthening its tech ecosystem, expanding bilateral yuan settlements, and enhancing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP ). Beijing is hedging against US vacuity as well as US punishment.
That’s because the Trump 2.0 management plays a volatile role rather than a proper one. And volatility players don’t bargain; they react. They don’t act, they say.
This is real-time trading, no diplomacy. The engine tightens its hold with each uneven move.  ,
Without readjusting their objectives, ASEAN people may find themselves reacting both late and incorrectly. Because friends and foes are lumped and axed up, Trump’s trade policy is a simplistic crossbow without a specific goal.  ,
It has evolved into a form of” hammer diplomacy,” which is brutal, conservative, and destructive. Taxes are outbursts, not calibrated tools. And the harm they cause is system-wide confusion and chaos, not just precise discomfort.
Even when exceptions are granted, they arrive too late because the damage to confidence and supply chain integrity has already been done. Not as a buying partner has America lost its credibility, but rather because of instability.
Unfortunately, Trump is now under the control of the world’s economic rulers, who railed against them. Every tax tilt is dictated by the bond business. His administration is now being scripted in real-time using the same methods he sought to stop.
One needs to start reading market indicators instead of communiqués in order to predict the upcoming Trump decision. Is the offer on 10-year Bank increasing? Prepare for tax suspensions.
Does the Nasdaq increase as a result of device property rebounding? Believe sanctions for Chinese technology. Is the VI on the rise? Watch out for fresh, unpredictable White House communications, most likely via Truth Social.
These measures no longer serve as financial sidebars. They are US international policy. What Trump has created is more than just another charade: it is a brand-new governing system, an aggressive, wacky, and extremely unbound by legislation or strategy.
It moves at the frequency of sentiment, and a slow-moving disaster will result in the same kind of political fallout. But despite its length, it wields a lot of power—not through reason, but rather by emotion. Not through politics, but through momentum.
The most effective note on White House letterhead doesn’t appear on letterhead in this modern era; it appears on trading screens instead. That is the computational presidency’s rule. It doesn’t need to consider. It simply needs to keep reacting while making the world sigh in disbelief.
US President Donald Trump has shown a commitment to rely on airpower when his presidency decides that using military force worldwide is needed in the first 100 times of his second term.
The next Trump administration has so far carried out a weeklong attacks against the Iranian-aligned Houthis, who control most of Yemen and launched limited attacks in Somalia. In the event that negotiations over a new nuclear deal fall, the senator has also threatened immediate strikes against Iran.
I find it logical for Trump to use air power. Airpower is less expensive than floor war, and it typically comes with fewer fatalities for those carrying the strikes. This helps to explain why US leaders usually find it attractive, even Trump, a self-declared “anti-war president.”
However, if the Trump administration doesn’t take proper precautions, it may drop into the “airpower trap,” as military planners affectionately refer to it.
This occurs when the mentioned goals of military pressure are too large for airpower to accomplish, which was, if history serves as a guide, result in a face-saving escalation of conflict.
US president like Barack Obama, Bill Clinton, and Lyndon Johnson all fell into this snare. In Vietnam, the Balkans, and Syria, both, ended up with much larger war than they had anticipated, resulting in civilian casualties, peace, and harm to America’s popularity worldwide.
As an expert on US policy toward the Middle East and its location, I think Iran is at risk of joining the airpower capture in Yemen and that the Trump administration may use force against Tehran.
The best chance the US government has of preventing a further increase into a full-scale war might be to acknowledge this military and historic chance and to choose some sort of off-ramp from continued airstrikes.
Research indicates that airpower is most effective when it’s used for constrained goals, such as removing extremist group leaders or degrading rival features, or in support of earth businesses for more ambitious targets, such as strengthening or overturning governments.
A typical mistake among American planners in special is the idea that significant strategic gains can only be made by dropping explosives from the sky, given the elegance of US airpower.
However, when airpower only fails, leaders may feel pressure to amplify the opportunity of a conflict and make more military commitments than they had anticipated.
Johnson chose to send half a million US soldiers to the war after his original airpower-only attempt to stop socialism in South Vietnam failed miserably.
Years of war were the result of that expanded fight, with severe humanitarian and political repercussions for people in Southeast Asia and America, as well as long-lasting reputational harm to the US.
Clinton launched strikes in the early 1990s as a result of her concern for the legitimacy of the US and NATO, almost to the level of deploying ground forces.
In addition, Obama’s first airpower-only plan to “degrade and damage” the Islamic State group immediately faltered, leading to Obama putting hundreds of ground troops in place to battle the team’s territorial gains across Syria and Iraq.
In each case, airpower alone failed to accomplish their goals in the end.
There are arguments to support the notion that Trump could also be stricken by a similar trap.
Trump has chosen an airpower-only strategy to” completely annihilate” the Houthis, a powerful rebel movement that has all but won the Yemeni civil war. The immediate cause of the air campaign is to restore the free flow of shipping in the Red Sea, which the Houthis have forcedly protest Israel’s ongoing war in Gaza. This policy was introduced by the Biden administration and dramatically expanded by Trump.
The first indications are that this air campaign is failing.
The Houthis are unaffected, and the volume of Red Sea shipping continues to decline as it has always been, despite the US burning through finite munitions supplies at a cost of US$ 1 billion to bomb at least 800 sites since March 15. Houthi attacks on Israeli and US ships continue. On May 4, a Houthi missile veeringly past Israel’s Ben-Gurion airport.
In fact, the Houthis ‘ direct attacks and the rapidly rising casualty count among Yemeni civilians from the Trump administration’s bombing campaign appear to be strengthening the Houthis ‘ political standing in Yemen. In a remarkably shocking case, US bombs reportedly struck an African migrant camp, killing and injuring dozens of people.
Similar effects were effected by the brutal bombing campaign by the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis in the late 2010s.
Airpower also played a significant role at the time. The Saudi coalition carried out about 25, 000 air raids against the Houthis, killing or mutilating about 19, 000 civilians, with the support of the United States. However, despite such overwhelming force, the Houthis continued to seize territory and eventually won the civil war, according to experts.
Since then, they have been the de facto rulers of the nation.
Trump is now looking into ways to use force to defeat the Houthis. According to reports, his administration may purchase weapons, training, and enabling anti-Houthi resistance fighters who are allegedly operatively affiliated with Yemen’s government to launch ground operations.
When caught in the airpower trap, proxy use is a common tool for US leaders. These proxies, like the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, or YPG, who helped the US overthrow the Islamic State caliphate in 2019, occasionally accomplish American policy objectives.
US proxies frequently fail in both strategic and humanitarian ways, leading to further escalation, strategic quagmires for the US, and political sovereignty-loss for the people at risk. An instructive example of this was South Vietnam.
The South Vietnamese army and government were so ineffective at defeating the North Vietnamese that Johnson made the decision to launch a ground war after US air force failed, due to corruption, poor governance, weakness, and political infighting.
The anti-Houthi resistance in Yemen resembles the South Vietnamese government significantly more than the Kurdish YPG today. The anti-Houthi forces are poorly trained, according to a report released by the security think tank Soufan Center in 2025, and are viewed as incapable of defeating the Houthis without significant US support.
An estimated 85, 000 Houthis fighter force members make up the anti-Houthi resistance, compared to 350, 000 for the Houthis. US officials can still pursue diplomacy in order to try to find a political solution to the Yemen conflict despite continuing to engage in the air war or turning it into a more global conflict.
Despite the Trump administration’s public threats, Iran, the country’s main sponsor, is already in talks with the US.
The Houthis, for their part, continue to press for the end of the US-backed Israeli-led war in Gaza, as was recently demonstrated by the recent Gaza ceasefire, saying that they will stop attacking ships in the Red Sea.
If the Trump administration wants to avoid getting caught up in a growing conflict in Yemen, it might look into alternative options, such as direct or indirect talks. History is full of instances of what occurs when air power adopts a unique logic.
Wake Forest University professor of politics and international affairs Charles Walldorf
The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the text of the article.
Senior Minister Teo Chee Hean said on Tuesday ( May 6 ) that Asia is essential to addressing the climate crisis and that it should work together regionally to achieve a low-carbon future.
At the beginning of Ecosperity Week 2025 at the Marina Bay Sands , Expo and Convention Center, Mr. Teo, who is also Guiding Minister for National Security and president of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Climate Change, made the remarks.
The annual Temasek conservation function, which will take place from May 5 through May 8, may have a theme centered on Asia’s contribution to combating climate change.  ,
In his keynote address, Mr. Teo outlined the growing world confusion.  ,
The foreign trading system has been altered, the statement read. Redrawing of supply stores is ongoing. A more subjective, interventionist, and dangerous world is emerging as a result of changing global leadership.
As a result, nations are reevaluating their interests, putting a new focus on financial endurance, self-sufficiency, and proper freedom, according to Mr. Teo, adding that it was not surprising for climate interests to take a backseat in such circumstances.  ,
According to Mr. Teo, citing an Asian Development Bank report, Asia could experience losses of up to 41 % of its gross domestic product by 2100.  ,
Extreme weather is expected to cause significant disruptions to food items and other organizations in Southeast Asia, he added.  ,
The fight against climate change may be won or lost, but it is also happening around, in Asia. Not only prone to the problems, our area is. We are essential to resolving it.
Although Asia currently accounts for more than half of the world’s carbon pollution, he said, its emissions per person are also lower than those of the US and Europe.  ,
So, while Asia is anticipated to account for 90 % of the world’s future growth in energy demand, this growth is a necessary consequence of improving people’s lives, reducing poverty, and making sure that underserved communities get access to – for example – , reliable electricity.
” Not only our own path, but the entire world will be shaped by how we decarbonize, and how we source energy, whether from fossil fuels or renewables,” said Professor X.
Krenovator Technology Sdn Bhd ( Krenovator ), a tech talent platform with AI that focuses on identifying and developing talent for businesses, has received seed funding from Ignite Asia, a venture capital and private equity firm with operations in Singapore and Malaysia. The company stated in a speech that the round was still open and that it had been actually closed in early 2025.
The recently secured funds will be effectively used to strengthen Krenovator’s marketing and sales efforts and expand its team.
Krenovator, which was founded in 2019, has grown into a top AI-powered skills platform for business clients, providing IT services to businesses in the oil and gas, transportation, manufacturing, finance, and banking industries, and the telecommunications industries. The business already provides services to clients in Malaysia, the Middle East, and Europe.
Its main strength, in Krenovator’s opinion, is a powerful technology talent sourcing strategy. The organization has access to nearly 30 000 experienced tech professionals, primarily from Malaysia and Indonesia, through its amazing AI-powered program. Krenovator can quickly identify and provide best candidates for clients ‘ crucial tasks thanks to this extensive talent pool. This unique capability, according to the company, has become a key distinguishing factor, drawing in businesses looking for top tech talent.
Krenovator’s program is growing as a vivid ecosystem for tech professionals, allowing for peer connections, and forgetting strong communities.
The money from Ignite Asia, according to Mahadhir Yunus, CEO of Krenovator, confirms Krenovator’s strategy for addressing the digital talent shortage. He continued, adding that Krenovator’s knowing of business IT needs makes it possible for the company to source top-tier skill in Southeast Asia with the help of the AI-powered platform.
He noted that the funding will enable further group growth, program development, and marketplace reach.
Jake Thui, evil president of assets at Ignite Asia, expressed his admiration for Krenovator’s creative approach to the field of technical expertise. He added that Ignite Asia is eager to help the company grow in the region and that the system’s AI-driven procurement and enterprise-focused plan provide a solid benefit statement.
The bottom five percent of Southeast Asian technical expertise is carefully sourced and nurtured by Krenovator’s primary activities to help enterprise IT initiatives. The firm has grown its talent pool in Malaysia and Indonesia to almost 30 000 specialists over the past two decades, increased its customer base, which includes Fortune 500 companies and is public-listed, and doubled its workforce. The significance of this plant financing in order to support its continued growth and delivery is highlighted by latest acquisitions of significant international clients.
In the coming months, Mahadhir stated that Krenovator plans to triple its revenue and increase its clientele, as well as roll out new services, including increased IT offerings and potential Software Tester as a Service, all of which are based on its expertise in technical talent sourcing to support enterprise digital transformation.
As both Washington and Beijing are now more open to communication, the business conflict between China and the United States is beginning to wane.
On May 4, Xie Feng, the Taiwanese Ambassador to the US, urged the US to “act in the nature of justice, respect, and equality” if it wants to hold business deals with China.
In a conversation at a Chinese Embassy celebration in Washington on May 4, Xie said,” The US has much benefited from international trade, enjoying cheap goods from around the globe while leading in funding, technology, and services. ” In 2022 alone, the US-owned enterprises ‘ sales revenues in China significantly exceeded those of the US-owned enterprises’ by more than$ 400 billion.
The China-US financial marriage is “overall healthy and beneficial for both sides.” No one benefits from tax increases. They stifle global growth, lift costs, tangle financial markets, and destroy business.
He emphasized that China is never intimidated by it, but does not need a business battle.
On May 2, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce ( MoC ) announced that” China has noticed the US side talking about adjusting its tariffs.” If the US doesn’t change its inaccurate unilateral tariff measures, it warned that it would show a total lack of sincerity and further erode trust.
Washington, which had suffered greatly from the trade conflict and wished for trade deals, was pleased with the MoC’s affirmation, according to some Chinese media outlets.
After the Wall Street Journal reported on April 23 that the White House may consider lowering taxes on imported Chinese goods pending discussions with Beijing, Beijing’s desire for a major tax cut had grown.
According to a senior White House official, the WSJ reported that China’s tariffs could be lowered from their current level of 145 % to somewhere between 50 % and 65 %, citing a senior White House official.
Many companies in China’s Dongguan and Yiwu have reportedly lost all American purchases and stopped production since the US imposed a 145 % tax on all Chinese goods on April 9. Retail establishments in key locations are closing as a result of declining consumer demand.
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In an exclusive interview on May 4, US President Donald Trump said to NBC blogger Kristen Welker,” The Chinese are getting killed best now.” They are completely destroyed. Their businesses are closing. Their employment rate is “absolutely insane.”
I don’t want to hurt China, I say. I’m not interested in China spending hundreds of billions on construction of more boats, vehicles, and aircraft, he continued.
Welker questioned Trump about whether he would “drop the taxes on China in order to bring them to the table for negotiations.”
” No, why would I do that,” I ask? Trump said.
Had you reduce them, please? Welker “fine-tuned her problem.”
They say,” At some point, I’m going to reduce them because they want to do business pretty much, and you could not do business with them.” Appear, their business is actually doing very poorly. Trump said that their business is collapsing.
He then claimed that the US tariffs had led to significant funding inflows for the country. He stated that he would not allow the tariffs to be eliminated entirely because it would deter businesses from setting up factories in the US.
Trump claimed Chinese President Xi Jinping had called him over the telephone in an interview that was released by Time magazine on April 25. Beijing, yet, claimed Xi had not made the phone call.
Although the verbal conflict between Beijing and Washington has not yet come to an end, Bloomberg reported on May 2 that China has already exempted its 12 % reciprocal tariffs for about$ 40 billion of American goods, which is equivalent to a quarter of all US imports.  ,
Among the exempt materials are 131 medicine and industrial chemicals, among them.
Trump imposed reciprocal tariffs of 10 to 50 % on almost all trading partners last month, but he only allowed 90 nations, with the exception of China, to pay a 10 % tariff in the following 90 days.
It would be “very dumb” for Britain to leave China, the second-largest economy in the world, according to Rachel Reeves, chancellor of the exchequer in the United Kingdom, on April 18.  ,
The European Commission (EC ) stated on April 22 that it will only “derisk” rather than “decouple” from China’s economy in exchange for a trade deal with the Trump administration.  ,
Not Kneel Down!, a movie from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, was released! “on April 29.
It’s like consuming arsenic to quench your thirst to bow to a troublemaker. According to the film, this only furthers the problems. History has shown that being at peace didn’t win you favor. Kneeling only promotes further harassment.
However, the EC also imposed definitive countervailing duties on Chinese mobile access equipment ( MAE), which is used to lift workers during height-related construction projects. The steps, according to the EC, are intended to protect the MAE sector of the European Union from harsh trading practices.  ,
The EU’s anti-subsidy duties range between 7.3 % and 14.2 %. The combined duties range from 20.6 % to 66.7 %, plus the anti-dumping duties that were imposed in January 2025.
A Hebei-based journalist who uses the moniker” Yunshuihan” criticizes the European Union for imposing new taxes on China.
This is standard of “schizophrenia.” The author claims that the EU is concerned about offending the US but wants to enjoy the Taiwanese business.
He claims that the Union wants to please the US by making China hurt, and that China may have to impose a moratorium on imports of rare earths and car parts to Europe.
Another Chinese author claims that because Chinese manufacturers is find ways to lessen the impact, he would not be concerned about the Union tariffs.  ,
He claims that Sinoboom, a Chinese manufacturer of aerial work technology, lately sold 500 scissors lifts to a client in Turkey and changed the product’s label before reselling them to the EU.  ,
Turkey is certainly a member of the EU, but it established a customs union in 1995. In this way, tariff-free exports of industrial and agricultural products to the Euro are possible.
Turkey must impose International tariffs on goods imported from nations outside the EU, but it may waive some for those who make investments there. In addition to a 10 % International tax on imported cars, it imposed an extra 40 % tax on Chinese automobiles in March 2023. Turkey has since last July waived the additional tax for Chinese manufacturers with local factories.
Read: Xi travels to Southeast Asia in the midst of China’s severe trade crisis.