BANGKOK: Thailand received one million Chinese tourists between January and May 18, a government official said on Sunday (May 28), after China’s border reopening. The government expects the number of Chinese visitors to meet its target of 5 million this year, with spending of 446 billion baht (US$13.18 billion), governmentContinue Reading
As regional geopolitical attention shifts to Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, it is easy to overlook the Luzon Strait. Yet it is perhaps the most important strategic strait providing exit and entrance to the South China Sea. Moreover, it is the increasing focus of competing US and China intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions.
What makes it so important? The answer must be found in the context of strategic plans of both China and the US in the event of war.
The Luzon Strait is situated between Taiwan and Luzon, the northern portion of the Philippine archipelago. It connects the South China Sea to the Western Pacific. It is important for commercial shipping and cable communications that provide important links among Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asia. Such cables are quickly becoming a security issue in the region.
The South China Sea is a nexus of the US-China strategic contest for domination of the region, and Washington and Beijing have overlapping and converging strategies to win in a kinetic conflict.
Beijing is developing what the US calls an “access/area denial strategy” designed to control China’s “near seas,” particularly the South China Sea, and to prevent access by the US military assets in the event of a conflict. The US response is to prepare to cripple China’s command, control, communications, computer and ISR systems.
This is the “tip of the spear” for both, and both are trying to dominate with it on and under China’s near seas and their straits – particularly the Luzon Strait and the Bashi Channel within it.
For China, the South China Sea has historically been its vulnerable underbelly. It also harbors its vital trade routes, especially for the flow of oil and gas imports.
Most important, the South China Sea provides relative “sanctuary” for its retaliatory-strike nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed submarines based in Yulin on Hainan. These submarines are its deterrent against a first strike on it – something the US, unlike China, has not disavowed.
The US wants to deny China this sanctuary. It uses ISR probes to detect and determine the capabilities of China’s submarines, as well as to track and – in a conflict – target them. So in the event of conflict China would want to avoid having its warships, warplanes and especially its submarines bottled up in the South China Sea where they can be easily detected and destroyed.
Indeed, China would want to prevent this by having these assets break out into the vast Pacific.
Other straits bordering the South China Sea like the Malacca, Sunda and Balabac Straits are too narrow and shallow for submarines to pass through undetected. The Taiwan Strait is adjacent to and heavily monitored by China as well as by Taipei and the US.
This makes Luzon Strait critical in all-out war because the nuclear submarines of both China and the US have a better chance of passing through it undetected. So the Luzon Strait, and in particular the Bashi Channel, have become integrated into the nuclear strategies of both.
The strait is about 250 kilometers wide and contains the Philippine island groups of Batanes and Babuyan that are part of the province of Cagayan. North-south ridges are the prominent topographic features of the Luzon Strait. There are several channels through the ridges, of which the widest and deepest is the Bashi Channel. But all of the channels are deep enough for the passage of submarines.
The US already tries to detect and track China’s nuclear submarines as they enter and exit specially constructed subterranean home berths at Yulin. Indeed, this is the mission of many US ISR probes including the 2001 EP-3 flight that resulted in a collision with a Chinese jet fighter that became a politically dangerous international incident.
So to complete its ISR net that encloses the South China Sea, the US wants to military and intelligence control there to put a “stopper” in the Luzon Strait. The Bashi Channel is the main focus. The US frequently sends anti-submarine maritime patrols and P-8 IRS planes over the strait to detect any submarines using it.
China is particularly interested in topography, water structure and currents there. So is the US. But China is also intent on detecting US submarines moving through the strait.
Although many of its ISR probes are thought to be focused on Taiwan’s defense assets, this may not be so, or at least not the total raison d’être, especially those to the southwest and southeast of Taiwan. Indeed, several times these missions have coincided with the passage of US aircraft-carrier strike groups that are usually accompanied by submarines.
Monitoring and control of the Luzon Strait may be one purpose of the new US access to two military bases in Cagayan province adjacent to the strait. This may well mark the beginning or intensification of a contested military focus on it. Indeed, it may soon rank with the Malacca and Taiwan Straits as tinderboxes for conflict.
If this analysis is correct, it would mean that strategic thinkers in both the US and China are already preparing for conflict – even nuclear conflict. If so, the US-China South China Sea conflicts are just sparring in preparation for a possible existential nuclear contest.
China’s rival claimants and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Philippines in particular, need to appreciate this strategic context and how they are being incorporated or affected by it – and formulate their policies with this in mind.
Hello Globe readers,
It’s good to be back with another edition of Sightlines. If we had to choose a theme, our week in Southeast Asia was marked by elections.
While Timor-Leste voted in favour of the opposition party this week in its latest parliamentary ballot, Cambodia banned the main opposition Candlelight Party from running in the upcoming general elections – sparking widespread concerns over a shrinking democratic space. In Thailand, in the aftermath of last week’s election, the state is wrestling with the eligibility for prime minister of Move Forward Party leader Pita Limjaroenrat after a military-backed senator alleged the opposition chief had failed to declare his shares in a media company.
In the meantime, Southeast Asia Globe spoke with newly elected Move Forward MP Chonthicha “Lookkate” Jangrew, a long-time democracy activist, about her political journey. In the recent elections, Chonthicha won a constituency seat for the opposition after spending almost a decade fighting several speech-related criminal charges for her human rights advocacy.
Away from elections, Vietnam is probing TikTok after the single-party government threatened to ban the app. The state investigation of the video-sharing platform began earlier this month in Ho Chi Minh City.
Environmentally speaking, the region is also looking for new solutions to long-running problems. With the help of satellite data from the U.S. space agency NASA, regional organisations are taking a new approach to cross-border management of the Mekong River. Effective data-sharing between the Mekong basin countries has been elusive in the past. The new satellite initiative will prioritise information about hydropower development and climate change, two of the most pressing concerns along the river.
Last but not least, Laos, once known as the “Land of a Million Elephants,” now faces the harsh reality of losing its iconic species due to deforestation and other habitat loss. The country’s captive elephant business, which provides entertainment to tourists, has been reopened after three years of Covid-19 restrictions, and animal welfare experts fear the increasing commercial pressure may affect the survival of the wild herds. Read more at the link below.
That’s all for this week, may you have a wonderful weekend and enjoy the features!
Mr Wong, who is also Singapore’s Finance Minister, warned that competing regional blocs will make it harder for Asia’s developing countries to sit at the same table as more advanced nations.
To prevent this, the bloc is working to maintain more open economic cooperation, with broad participation across the globe.
While still actively engaging long-standing partners within Asia, the US and the European Union, ASEAN is also forging new ties in other regions including Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.
In his speech, Mr Wong called on economies to not undermine the multilateral trading system, saying rising protectionism will leave all countries worse off.
While he said it is understandable why nations and companies want to de-risk or diversify, Mr Wong also warned that taking it too far could prompt reactions and unintended consequences.
“No one wants to be overly reliant on a single supplier for raw materials, key components, or technology,” said Mr Wong.
“But it is hard to see how de-risking, at its current ambition and scale, can be strictly confined to just a few ‘strategic’ areas without affecting broader economic interactions … Over time, we will end up with a more fragmented and decoupled global economy.”
The term “de-risk” was introduced at the recent Group of Seven (G7) summit, where leaders pledged to de-risk without decoupling from China to reduce economic reliance on Beijing.
On Wednesday, Mr Wong visited Japanese companies working on a hydrogen supply chain network.
As a leader in green technology, Japan can play a key role in facilitating sustainability financing and projects in Southeast Asia, he said.
Mr Wong also welcomed Japan’s intention to cooperate more in regional security.
“Japan has historically adopted a low-key posture in security. But with the passage of time, there is scope for Japan to make a greater contribution in this area,” he noted.
“We hope that Japan will continue to build on the momentum of its recent engagements with regional countries and further contribute to Asia’s stability, security and growth.”
Mr Wong said that despite an increasingly dangerous and troubled world, there are reasons for optimism.
“Asia’s dynamism, shaped by its diverse cultures, resilience and adaptability, offer hope,” he said.
“We can also take heart that countries in the region share a deep commitment to collaboration and a common interest to work together.”
On Friday, Mr Wong is expected to meet Japanese political leaders including Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to further strengthen bilateral ties.
On the outskirts of Ho Chi Minh City, Phuong sees nothing worth scrolling for on TikTok.
“It is an addictive app with bullshit, spam, fake news and unverified content,” he said, asking to be referred to by a pseudonym due to fears of official retribution from speaking with the press.
Phuong, 33, describes himself as a social activist, says he’s been routinely harassed by the police for his outreach and has seen friends arrested for expressing views critical of the government. So despite his misgivings about the video-sharing app, he sees cause for alarm in growing threats from Vietnam’s Ministry of Information to ban TikTok if the company refuses to censor what the state deems “toxic” content.
“I think that controlling TikTok can have a lot of impact on freedom of speech. A lot of people use [it] to express their views,” Phuong said. “[Authorities] want to control all the media, communication and information platforms.”
TikTok went live in Vietnam in 2019 and has soared in popularity since then.
From a choreographed handwashing dance to quell the spread of Covid-19 to the recorded gaffe of Minister of Public Security General To Lam being hand-fed chunks of a nearly $2,000 gold-leaf-encrusted steak by the internet-famous “Salt Bae”, the platform has won the public’s attention.
TikTok now boasts nearly 50 million local users – a number that ranks the socialist state sixth of 10 countries globally with the most on the app, according to research firm DataReportal.
But that success has also caught the eyes of the state, which has promised a probe of the company’s office in Ho Chi Minh City in late May. This comes amidst a recent campaign of dialled-up government rhetoric against the app. Rattled by the flood of unruly content, authorities look ready to tighten their hold over TikTok as the latest step of a decades-long battle to wrangle Vietnamese cyberspace.
At a 6 April news conference, the Information Ministry described the app as a “threat to the country’s youth, culture and tradition” and warned of an outright ban.
A “comprehensive inspection” of the company that began on 15 May is not typical in its scope, said Kent Wong, a partner at business law firm Ho Chi Minh City-based VCI Legal in Ho Chi Minh City. Other large tech platforms, such as Youtube and Facebook, have avoided similar visits by keeping their offices out of the country.
“Having a local office in Vietnam is like wearing a football jersey to be grabbed onto,” Wong said. “This may be an exemplar for other platforms not to establish a presence in Vietnam, or face being a constant target for government inspections and investigations.”
These regular check-ins from officials serve to bolster the government’s tight system of online control. This includes regular crackdowns on activists, journalists and bloggers for “spreading anti-state propaganda” with speech perceived to be critical of authorities.
The government also makes frequent take-down requests of social-media sites, with the Information Ministry reporting that TikTok has already removed 2.43 million videos uploaded by users in Vietnam in the first quarter of this year.
Future controls could ramp that number up, but domestic concerns may just be a portion of Hanoi’s motivation.
Similar to bans and investigations of TikTok by neighbours in Southeast Asia and beyond, experts say the Vietnamese government could be concerned about data security, national sovereignty and China’s influence over ByteDance, TikTok’s Beijing-based parent company.
Nguyen Khac Giang, visiting fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, said an “all-out attack on TikTok” in the Vietnamese press would likely lean on articles about how the app “corrupts young people, how it wastes their time.”
“[But officials] want to know what TikTok is up to in the Vietnamese market,” Giang said. “They are worried it may promote some content that could supplant information about Vietnam’s national sovereignty or maritime disputes.”
The probe
The ongoing investigation of TikTok’s downtown Ho Chi Minh City office spans eight ministries and agencies digging into the company’s Vietnam operations.
A TikTok Vietnam spokesperson told the Globe by email that an “upcoming planned visit” would include inspections from the Information Ministry, Trade Ministry and the General Department of Taxation.
The inspectors are expected to dig into the company’s content distribution, e-commerce deals, advertisements and tax liability. Officials at the April press conference announcing the investigation said its purpose will be to “evaluate the impact TikTok has and its capacity to abide by the law”.
Despite the tough state rhetoric specifically against the app, TikTok’s spokesperson said the probe was “in line with local law for companies operating in Vietnam, not only TikTok.”
“We welcome the opportunity to listen and address any concerns, as well as share the progress we’ve made in Vietnam in the past four years,” they stated.
In general, more legal guidelines for tech firms’ operations are incoming. Vietnam’s first comprehensive data privacy law will take effect on 1 July and a draft law on e-transactions is expected to reach the National Assembly this year.
Enforcing these laws will likely incur new costs on both the state and private businesses alike, said Wong. On the other hand, he added, for measures pointed at online content, the “subjective and arbitrary” guidelines used to identify offending posts could motivate companies to leap into compliance.
“Being constantly concerned about receiving a ‘knock on the door’ or being banned, social media enterprises like TikTok will need to quickly adjust their activities,” Wong said.
Dissent and geopolitics
The government’s concerted approach to regulating TikTok has been years in the making.
The internet wasn’t a primary concern for the ruling party until the mid-2000s. But by the early 2010s, authorities were shaken by Vietnamese activists flocking to the internet – especially during the Middle Eastern social-media-connected protests known as the Arab Spring.
Command of the online space then became a priority, said Giang from ISEAS, and spurred a military push to suppress dissent online – an effort led by the notorious Task Force 47, a reportedly 10,000-member group. This motivation also led to the wide-ranging 2018 Law on Cybersecurity, which attempted to localise international tech platforms while expanding government control of online content.
Phil Robertson, deputy director of Human Rights Watch Asia Division, said TikTok has not yet become a significant platform for Vietnamese activists. Still, some have taken to the platform to “badmouth” police and to express discontent over land confiscation.
“TikTok has potential of becoming an important platform to reach out to a big number of young audiences,” Robertson said. “The Vietnamese authorities restrict or even ban anything that poses a potential risk of getting too popular and thus out of control for them.”
But the clampdown on the Chinese-owned TikTok also showcases Hanoi grappling with the threat of “political interference”, Giang said.
Vietnam and China have a long history of maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Hanoi rejects the “nine-dash line” which shows the sprawling extent of China’s claims in the hotly disputed, resource-rich waters. Any maps shared on TikTok which mislabel Vietnamese islands in the South China Sea, including Hoang Sa and Truong Sa, or show the nine-dash line could be seen as a threat, Giang said.
High sensitivity over maps of China’s nine-dash line has precedent in Vietnam. The government there ordered Netflix to take down an Australian spy-drama which included the nine-dash line in 2021, and the same year there was an uproar over a map on the clothing retailer H&M’s website showcasing China’s disputed maritime claims.
Worries from the government in Hanoi over China’s potential political interference through curated TikTok content would not be unique. India banned the app in 2020, and Australia and New Zealand have banned it from government devices. The U.S. government officially prohibits state and federal employees from using the platform.
In Singapore, TikTok is only allowed on a “need-to basis” for government employees and Malaysia has banned political advertisements on the site.
“When I was in [Singapore] in November last year, officials were telling me that they were very aware of some pro-China narratives that have taken hold… and that was coming across in social media apps,” said Hunter Marston, a Southeast Asia geopolitical analyst and PhD researcher at Australian National University. “TikTok would be an easy avenue for that to take hold.”
Elsewhere in the region, governments have embraced the app for their own purposes. In the Philippines, TikTok played a key role in the campaign of President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. – with influencers producing a steady stream of bubbly content revising the authoritarian history of Ferdinand Marcos Sr.
“[TikTok] is open to Chinese influence inserting subtle messaging and this has been big in the Philippines, especially around Marcos Jr.’s election. TikTok was huge in disseminating misinformation,” Marston added. “[Banning] would be an easy way for Vietnam to prevent that from entering the discourse in Vietnam.”
Moral Panic
Some observers see the threats to ban TikTok as a fearful attempt by authorities to preserve conservative Vietnamese values.
Giang said the TikTok censure fits within Hanoi’s fight against so-called “ideological deterioration”, led by the country’s most powerful figure, General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong.
“TikTok has a huge impact on the younger generation,” Giang explained. “If the Vietnamese government cannot find a way to control it – by frequent reports, by more censorship, maybe by pushing them to promote what they want them to promote – then there will be an issue for national security and losing younger generations.”
A Hanoi-born millennial agreed, declining to give his name for potential repercussions for discussing the government.
“There is an ongoing moral panic that the state and many nationalists are pushing, banking on the fear that TikTok is ruining our youth and destabilising the nation,” he said, noting the general secretary frequently emphasises “the importance of controlling popular culture.”
“They fear that the control may be slipping from them, and they do not even have the capacity to moderate this platform. So they do rely on public outrage,” the millennial added. “I’ll be honest, they care more about preserving stability and trust in the party than about protecting youth from hateful ideologies.”
The social activist Phuong surfs past harmful posts on social media but has concerns about the younger generation’s ability to do so.
Still, he has a bigger issue with the potential of the government to use TikTok to push its own agenda.
“I think the Communist Party will influence TikTok to release news that benefits their party,” Phuong said. “Even [they] will release political fake news to deceive the people.”
SINGAPORE: In order to win bets on an online gambling site, the captain of an e-sports team deliberately lost a match. Malcolm Chung Wai Kiat, 25, was sentenced to four months’ jail on Friday (May 26) and ordered to pay a penalty of S$400. The Singaporean pleaded guilty to oneContinue Reading
MANILA – Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr has not only revitalized defense ties with traditional Western allies but has also doubled down on strategic cooperation with like-minded regional states pushing back against China’s South China Sea assertiveness.
In particular, Vietnam has emerged as a pivotal player in the Philippines’ emerging regional strategy to constrain and roll back China’s ambitions in the hotly contested and geostrategically crucial maritime area.
Earlier this month, Marcos Jr held his third high-level meeting with a Vietnamese official in his first year in office.
During his meetings with Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh on the sidelines of the 42nd Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit and related summits in Labuan Bajo, Indonesia, the two leaders vowed to enhance strategic cooperation with an emphasis on the South China Sea.
Specifically, the Filipino leader advocated for effective agreements that prevent accidental clashes between the two sides, including their fishermen, in the disputed waters.
“I have asked our foreign ministers – our foreign secretary and then the foreign minister of Vietnam – to begin talks so that we can have an agreement so there will be no more problems like this,” Marcos Jr told the media.
The following week, the two countries held a Joint Permanent Working Group on Maritime and Ocean Concerns (JWG-MOC), where they underscored their commitment to jointly advocate for a “substantive” bilateral Code of Conduct (COC) on the South China Sea.
Among those in attendance were senior diplomats as well as Filipino officials from all relevant agencies, including the Philippine Coast Guard, National Security Council, Department of National Defense and Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources.
With Vietnam broadly supporting the Philippines’ landmark arbitration award victory against China at The Hague in 2016, the two sides also agreed “to work together to protect their rights and legitimate interests under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and enhance confidence-building measures between relevant agencies.”
The two ASEAN nations also underscored their commitment to a full range of cooperative activities in the South China Sea, including marine environment protection, search and rescue; fisheries management; oil spill preparedness and response; and marine scientific research.
After years of strategic hiatus under the pro-Beijing Rodrigo Duterte presidency in Manila, the Philippines and Vietnam are once again exploring a potential axis of resistance within ASEAN against China’s creeping domination and militarization of adjacent waters.
Since the end of the Cold War, which pitted Manila and Hanoi against each other on ideological lines, the two Southeast Asian nations have repeatedly found themselves on the same side whenever China flexed its muscle in the region.
Under the Fidel Ramos administration (1992-1998), Manila actively advocated for Vietnam’s admission into ASEAN in order to facilitate regional integration and more stable geopolitical ties across Southeast Asia, thus setting the tone for warm bilateral relations over the succeeding decades.
When China seized the Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef in 1994, Manila, in tandem with Hanoi, advocated for a robust regional response, which culminated in the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC).
A decade later, the Gloria Arroyo administration (2001-2010) negotiated a trilateral Joint Maritime Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) agreement with Vietnam and China as part of broader efforts to jointly manage resources in the contested maritime area.
Since most ASEAN members remained reluctant to confront Beijing, the Philippines and Vietnam often emerged as the hawkish duo within the regional body. In 2010, Vietnam took up the cudgels for ASEAN when it actively advocated for a more robust American strategic presence to counter China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea.
In response, the Obama administration explicitly identified, for the first time, freedom of navigation in the contested waters as a “national interest” priority.
Just as the Mischief Reef crisis in the mid-1990s brought the two ASEAN nations together, the 2012 Scarborough Shoal crisis provided an additional impetus for stronger strategic cooperation.
The year 2014 marked a new milestone for bilateral ties. In a highly symbolic act, Filipino and Vietnamese naval troops played volleyball and football on one of the contested land features in the South China Sea, signaling through sport a new era of friendship and camaraderie.
Then-Philippine Navy spokesman Lieutenant Commander Gregory Fabic characterized the football diplomacy act as crucial to “eas[ing] up tensions”, which he said could serve as a “model of cooperation for the other navies to emulate.”
That year also saw a crucial meeting between then Aquino and then-Vietnamese prime minister Nguyen Tan Dung. Following “productive discussions”, the two sides explored a full range of cooperative initiatives to solidify their emerging new alliance against China.
On one hand, the two sides closely coordinated on the Philippines’ decision to take the South China Sea disputes to an international tribunal in The Hague under the UNCLOS, which ultimately ruled that China’s expansive claims to the sea are unlawful. Manila repeatedly offered assistance to Hanoi should it decide to join or file a parallel case against the Asian superpower.
Moreover, the two sides also moved closer to establishing regularized joint exercises, annual defense meetings and expanded intelligence-sharing vis-à-vis Chinese maritime activities just as Vietnam stepped up its goodwill naval visits to the Philippines.
Towards the end of the Aquino administration, the two sides drafted a “Joint Statement on the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership between the Republic of the Philippines and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam” to provide a roadmap for long-term strategic cooperation.
The election of pro-Beijing Rodrigo Duterte as Philippine president in 2016, however, derailed fast-advancing Philippine-Vietnam strategic relations.
Not only did the then-new Filipino president largely snub his Vietnamese counterparts, refusing to host a single top leader from Vietnam throughout his six years, but he increasingly and subserviently parroted Beijing’s line on the sea disputes.
During his chairmanship of ASEAN in 2017, the Filipino leader repeatedly downplayed the maritime disputes, just as Vietnam urged for a stronger ASEAN stance against Beijing’s militarization of the disputes.
His top political ally and second foreign secretary, Alan Peter Cayetano, along with prominent Beijing-friendly voices in Manila went a step further by often implying that Vietnam is a threat to Philippine interests in the South China Sea.
Bilateral ties hit a new nadir following the deaths of two Vietnamese fishermen that same year following a tragic encounter with the Philippine Navy in the South China Sea. But yet another sea crisis between the Philippines and China helped boost Vietnam’s standing in Manila.
In 2019, Vietnamese fishermen rescued a dozen Filipino counterparts who were almost drowned following a collision with a suspected Chinese militia vessel at the sea’s contested Reed Bank.
The following year, Manila returned the favor by diplomatically backing Hanoi following the sinking of a Vietnamese fishing vessel by Chinese maritime forces in the Paracel group of islands, over which Manila has no claims.
The Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) expressed “deep concern” over the incident and went so far as to state, “We have not stopped and will not stop thanking Vietnam. It is with that in mind that we issue this statement of solidarity.”
Towards the end of Duterte’s administration, yet another Filipino fisherman was saved by Vietnam, underscoring increasingly strong bilateral relations.
The election of Marcos Jr, however, has injected new energy into the bilateral relationship, reviving earlier hopes of a de facto alliance between the two ASEAN nations and South China Sea claimants.
Last November, the Filipino leader held two high-level talks with Vietnamese counterparts, one with Prime Minister Chinh on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, and another in Manila with Vietnam National Assembly Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue in the Malacanang Palace.
During his first meeting with the Vietnamese leader, the two sides vowed to “boost” cooperation with Vietnam “in a wide range of areas that include food security, climate change, defense and food supply.”
The two sides reiterated the same promise during Marcos’ meeting with Vietnam’s top legislator in Manila just days later, as the two sides vowed to continue “building upon excellent relationships between our two countries” and mutually supporting each other in global fora.
Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on Twitter at @Richeydarian
And he says the trend is being seen across the board, “not only in our industry”. “Many [firms] in the bicycle, sports equipment and clothing sectors are facing the same challenge,” he said, “as the inventory pressure facing European and American clients is very high.” Dan Digre, CEO of loudspeakerContinue Reading
Singapore Telecommunications on Thursday (May 25) posted a 14 per cent jump in full-year net profit, as its core businesses benefited from a recovery in international travel and roaming as well as rising 5G adoption. Singtel also recorded robust mobile growth and price lifts supported by increased demand for informationContinue Reading
Updated Silicon Malaysia and Silicon Stars – Pearl of the Orient map launched
MSIA has 225 members, spanning 10 states in Malaysia with headquarters in 18 countries
SEMICONSEA, the event that aims to build connections and foster collaborations for a sustainable Southeast Asia electronics manufacturing industry, is back in Penang for its 2023 edition.
This…Continue Reading