Southeast Asia (Page 158)

The security environment in the Indo-Pacific has increasingly become volatile due to great power rivalry. 

Australia’s latest Defense Strategic Review affirms that the “defense of Australia lies in the collective security of the Indo-Pacific.” Canberra will be keen to sustain and enhance its role in the Indo-Pacific, particularly to balance China.

Australia’s current capabilities under the “balanced force” model are insufficient to manage larger threats. For this reason, it is eager to pursue missile development and acquire advanced military equipment. 

The review is an important step in evaluating capabilities and charting a course to lead Australia towards a more prominent position in the regional security architecture.

Beijing may be too occupied with larger goals of self-sufficiency, for areas like military engine development, to match US capacities. China enjoys an advantage in defense production, with its manufacturing base and regional supply chains. 

But export controls and collective allied strategy can prevent it from acquiring sensitive technologies and assembling cutting-edge military hardware in the near future. While consolidation of logistics support has augmented its capabilities, China’s primary goal is advancement in defense technology, where the United States and its allies currently have an edge.

But an economic slowdown in China has led to its youth struggling for jobs. Some analyses find that the economic descent of a superpower causes domestic crackdowns — and greater military assertiveness in its neighborhood. Chinese policy may be driven by insecurity and distrust of competitors on the world stage.

China’s posture may be compounded by the threat of Japan’s military buildup in East Asia, and its consequences for the Taiwan Strait in the coming years. In such a scenario, the enhancement of Australia’s military power can also be perceived as a hostile threat, inviting adverse reactions.

In his book Asia’s Cauldron, Robert Kaplan observes that China perceives the South China Sea as its sphere of influence. Given the territorial disputes in the region, China remains anxious about its own security. It has increased military buildup to “project power” in its immediate security ecosystem.

The biggest concern for Indo-Pacific countries may be the military use of the island features reclaimed by China in the South China Sea. These facilities give Beijing an undue military advantage. 

This is not only concerning for Australia due to the volatile bilateral relationship, but also concerning for the Philippines and Indonesia, which are claimants in the dispute. The alleged incursions into disputed areas by Chinese fishing fleets, accompanied by military vessels, have aggravated tensions.

China’s exploration of foreign basing facilities indicates military power projection outside its domestic territories, including in Southeast Asia. The possibility of a Chinese naval base in the Solomon Islands rattled Australia and the West in 2022. 

China’s military presence in the Pacific can be problematic for two reasons: it will allow easy targeting of Australian territory and deny sea space to Australia. This effectively limits military support from the United States and Japan in dire situations.

Even as Canberra remains headstrong about its security interests and alignment with the United States, pockets of the Australian parliament have doubts about fighting an American war in the South China Sea. The recently released review talks of a “whole-of-nation” approach, in a bid to improve Australian public confidence. 

Reservations about fighting an American war will be likely balanced by the benefits from the US alliance. This will mean continued support for the United States in areas like the South China Sea, although this may vary as domestic considerations are taken into account.

If an active military conflict in the South China Sea is to be averted, all security stakeholders —including China — must have a common denominator for discussions. This includes clear understanding of escalatory triggers induced by gray-zone tactics. 

This may be possible when Beijing opens up to concerted dialogue aimed at building trust, with Southeast Asian partners at the primary level and the United States and regional powers at a secondary level.

Despite some resilience in their bilateral relationship in 2023 as well as recent deliberations on trade, Australia and China will remain pitched against one another due to enduring US-China competition in the region. Insecurities around the gap in military capabilities fuel Australia’s drive to modernize its defense industry.

A notable achievement of the new Labor government is the normalization in relations with China, despite a commitment to enhancing defense and strengthening cooperation with the United States and Japan. 

As Australia does not want to antagonize China, greater diplomacy with Beijing can pacify bellicose reactions to Australia’s improved military capabilities. Australia’s improved capabilities are essential to maintaining regional power status and defense against national security threats.

Akash Sahu is an analyst in Indo-Pacific geopolitics and Southeast Asian studies. He leads an independent policy and strategy consulting practice from New Delhi.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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The AUKUS agreement reached in September 2021 has left Australia more deeply entangled with US strategic priorities and war preparations than ever before.

AUKUS reflects the prevalent view within the US security establishment that China’s rise poses a major threat to America’s regional and global dominance – a view, as it happens, strongly supported by Australia’s security elite. 

Australian governments, under the previous conservative coalition and now under Labor, have repeatedly pointed to China’s misdeeds.

In a major address in April, Foreign Minister Penny Wong took issue with China’s rapidly rising defense budget, its militarization of disputed islands in the South China Sea, its ballistic missiles falling in Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and its military drills and blockades around Taiwan.

By contrast, Australia has steadfastly refrained from criticizing the United States for any of its provocative actions, not least Nancy Pelosi’s much-publicized visit to Taiwan or President Joe Biden’s often-stated position that US forces would intervene should Taiwan come under threat.  

Meanwhile, Australian mainstream media have dutifully reported US and Australian portrayals of the “China threat,” and become increasingly vociferous contributors to the anti-China frenzy.

The rhetoric has been faithfully supported by action. The last few years have seen the steady expansion of joint US-Australian military exercises, notably Talisman Sabre and Exercise Pacific Vanguard. 

In addition, the United States now controls or has extensive access to an ever larger array of military assets on Australian soil, including the high-technology bases cluster along the length of North West Cape in Western Australia, the port and air base of Darwin, and the Tindal air base. 

To this must be added the large and still growing Pine Gap facility likely to play a key role in any US conventional and nuclear operations from Africa to the Pacific.

Simply put, once China’s rise came to be seen by the US security establishment as inimical to its interests, Australian governments have been quick to follow suit.

Unsurprisingly, the Australian government secured the services of two retired US admirals and three former US Navy officials as highly paid consultants to advise it during the negotiations to acquire top-secret nuclear-submarine technology. This advice no doubt contributed to the cancellation of the French submarine contract and the establishment of AUKUS.

Motives for militarism

All of which prompts the question: What lies behind Australia’s subservience to US militarism? Much of it has to do with the fact that Australia’s policymakers have traditionally felt most comfortable when connected to the anglophone world and at best uneasy when dealing with the East. 

One other pull factor helps explain the addiction to imperial power. Australia’s political, bureaucratic, military and intelligence elites see themselves as having unique access to an exclusive and powerful club that confers status and privileges – once the British club, now the American club.

They may have reluctantly accepted the demise of the former, but are in no mood to accept the slow but steady decline of the latter.

The first tangible commitment under the highly secretive AUKUS arrangements is the decision to provide Australia with eight nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) at an estimated cost of A$368 billion (US$246 billion).

Costly deal

The plan, however, is fraught with uncertainty and danger. Will the submarines be delivered on time? Will the cost involved greatly exceed the current estimate? 

Added to this are the complex technological and security problems that will inevitably arise. 

First, to build nuclear-powered submarines, Australia will need to be supplied not just with the technology for the nuclear reactors, but also with the nuclear fuel. Transport of such fuels over long distances raises the prospect of diversion to a third party, widely considered a major nuclear-proliferation risk.

Second, the reactors used by the submarines will generate a significant amount of nuclear waste, which will have to be returned to the supplying country or stored in Australia. Either way, the country will face the highly contentious problem of nuclear waste disposal.

Third, there is always the possibility of a nuclear reactor being breached, or at least of a leakage of nuclear materials.

The AUKUS deal poses troubling questions that remain unanswered. If answers are ever offered, they are likely to prove less than reassuring.

In short, Australia has saddled itself with a vast military project of unknown cost and duration and dubious effectiveness. It will contribute to an ever-increasing defense budget that will divert scarce resources from urgent social and economic priorities.

Importantly, it will fan the flames of resentment in China not just among the Chinese leadership, but among a wide cross-section of Chinese society. Beijing has repeatedly argued that the AUKUS project will fuel an arms race and raise the level of mutual mistrust. It will certainly reinforce China’s perception that it is surrounded by a hostile coalition. 

Regional responses

While the reactions of other countries have been generally more subdued, there is no denying the widespread unease AUKUS has already provoked. Some governments, it is true, have accepted the security partnership, but few have done so with undiluted enthusiasm.

Singapore has indicated support in principle for AUKUS insofar as it helps to balance China’s assertiveness and contributes to regional peace and stability. The Philippines, for its part, has gone so far as to characterize AUKUS as “essential to our national development and to the security of the region.”

Japan too has generally welcomed AUKUS, which it sees as “strengthening engagement [of those three countries] in the Indo-Pacific region.”

There have even been indications that Japan would cooperate closely with AUKUS. Some have even contemplated the possibility that Japan might join AUKUS at some future date. It is worth noting, however, that Tokyo has studiously refrained from open support of the submarines deal because the acquisition of nuclear subs remains a highly contentious issue in the context of both Japanese politics and public opinion. 

South Korea too has been guarded in its comments, expressing support for AUKUS insofar as it contributes to regional peace and security, but has said little about the nuclear-submarine program. 

The response of other countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has ranged from unease to open criticism.

Vietnam, notwithstanding its territorial dispute with China, has said little about AUKUS, confining itself to support for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Thailand has gone further and expressed concern that AUKUS could fuel a regional arms race. 

Indonesia has been especially critical. It sees AUKUS as committed to the forward projection of military power that could well provoke China into adopting an even more assertive stance. In Indonesia’s view, Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines could “set a dangerous precedent” for other countries with similar ambitions “to follow suit.”  

Malaysia too has expressed deep misgivings.

While acknowledging the right of the countries concerned to upgrade their defense capabilities, it has more than once made it clear that it expects all countries, including the three AUKUS partners, to respect and comply with Malaysia’s requirements with regard to nuclear-powered submarines, as stated in the Law of the Sea Convention, the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, and the ASEAN Declaration on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN).

India, for its part, has avoided public comment on the issue. While some commentators have suggested that AUKUS could help check “China’s aggression,” many others fear the prospect of an even more assertive China. A growing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean cannot but pose a challenge to Indian interests. 

It remains to say a word about the attitudes of Pacific Island nations. While some have indicated varying degrees of support, notably Fiji, several others have been sharply critical. Solomons Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare lambasted the Australian government’s lack of consultation on the AUKUS deal.

A communiqué issued by four former prime ministers (Marshall Islands, Palau, Kiribati and Tuvalu) described “the staggering A$368 billion” earmarked for the AUKUS submarine deal as an affront to the region, suggesting that these resources could be better spent combating climate change. 

Current leaders in Tuvalu, the Cook Islands and Kiribati, have also pointed to the likelihood that the AUKUS arrangements will make for an increasingly militarized and unstable region. These reactions are hardly surprising. A zone that has endured the catastrophic damage of nuclear testing is unlikely to welcome the intrusion of nuclear-powered submarines into its seas.

US military presence

These varied responses are themselves indicative of the deep divisions that have re-emerged in the Asia-Pacific region. The containment policy pursued by the United States during the Cold War years is back with a vengeance, except that the stakes are now much higher and containment is euphemistically described as “strategic competition.”

Recent years have seen frenetic efforts by the United States to construct an overwhelming military presence in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

AUKUS is but one prong in a multi-pronged “Indo-Pacific” strategy based on the unrelenting modernization and expansion of America’s military alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Australia, and its extensive security arrangements with Taiwan, Singapore, New Zealand and Pakistan. 

Bilateral and multilateral arrangements between the US and these countries involve large and increasingly frequent joint military exercises, vastly expanded programs in maritime surveillance, cybersecurity, construction of new military facilities, and access to a growing number of military bases.

All of this is unfolding in the context of greater interoperability between the US and allied forces, rapidly growing military modernization investments, and the acquisition of new military platforms, including radar systems, drones, military transport aircraft and coastal and air defense systems, including multi-role fighter aircraft and an array of precision-guided air-to-surface and other missile systems.

The militarization of the Asia-Pacific region, which AUKUS will greatly accelerate, has seen military spending in this region rise to US$575 billion in 2022. During 2018-2022, Asia and Oceania accounted for 41% of global arms imports. The largest exporter by far was the United States and the largest importers were US allies.

Arms imports by East Asian states increased by 21% between 2013-17 and 2018-22, with the largest increases recorded by US allies: South Korea (+61%) Japan (+171), and Australia (+23%). Here lies one of the key drivers of the globalization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Unsurprisingly, US-based weapon manufacturers have recorded a massive increase in sales from $103.4 billion in 2021 to $153.7 billion in 2022. For them the Ukraine war and rising Sino-US tensions have been a godsend, except that God had little to do with it.

The main drivers of these trends have been the principal beneficiaries, which include weapons manufacturers, armed private security contractors, a wide array of logistics and reconstruction firms and their combined ability to shape public opinion and policymaking elites through their close connections with mainstream media and their funding of policy think-tanks.

In this sense the AUKUS deal is emblematic of a deeply embedded militarization of economy and society that risks shifting the Asia-Pacific region from competition to confrontation, and eventually war.

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