Southeast Asia (Page 144)

MANILA – As China-Philippine tensions escalate over disputed features in the South China Sea, the United States and its regional allies are lending Manila a firm helping hand in asserting its claims.

“In the role of the United States in those resupplies, they were providing freedom of navigation, they were conducting freedom of navigation operations on their own uncoordinated with us,” said Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro, referring to recent news of the US Pentagon’s operational support during the Philippines’ latest resupply mission to the contested Second Thomas Shoal.

Last week, the Philippines conducted a follow-up resupply mission to the contested shoal by delivering basic goods to its marine detachment stationed on the grounded BRP Sierra Madre.

Reports said that a US Navy P-8A Poseidon reconnaissance aircraft was hovering just over the horizon in a clear show of support for the Philippines. The two long-time allies share a mutual defense treaty.

“Well, they (US) might have coordinated it. But that’s below my level of coordination if ever,” the Philippine defense chief added, refusing to provide more details on top-level coordination with the US during the latest Philippine resupply mission.

Earlier, both the US State Department and Pentagon reiterated their mutual defense treaty (MDT) commitment to aid Philippine forces in the event of skirmishes with China in the South China Sea.

But the US isn’t the only major ally providing support. Last week, Australia, which has a status forces of agreement with the Southeast Asian nation, conducted a historic Combined Amphibious Assault Exercise with the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Zambales, which faces the South China Sea.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese is set to visit Manila early next month, reportedly the first “state visit” by any Australian leader in recent memory. Meanwhile, Australia, Japan and the Philippines also conducted joint patrols in the South China Sea in a clear show of strength amid rising tensions in the area.

Australian Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles indicated that more joint patrols are in the cards in the coming months, as the Philippines fortifies defense ties with traditional allies.

Following this month’s Second Thomas Shoal showdown, when Chinese coast guard vessels blocked a Philippine resupply vessel with water cannon fire, the US came under pressure to show more support to its treaty ally.

In recent years, the two sides have coordinated to ensure the US can provide robust “just-over-the-horizon” operational support in times of need. At the same time, the two allies have sought to strike a fine balance in developing military ties so as not to overly provoke China.

This enhanced cooperation with the US has emboldened Philippine forces to challenge China’s de facto blockade, with both the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine Coast Guard pressing ahead with asserting Manila’s claim in the area.

The shift in tack has been apparent with the transition from former president Rodrigo Duterte, who favored a non-confrontational policy toward Beijing, to Ferdinand Marcos Jr, who has shown a willingness to tackle China head-on in the contested sea.

Chinese analysts quoted in the state-run Global Times warned earlier this month that “Manila has increasingly become a bridgehead in Asia for the US’ anti-China push, at the cost of its own security and interests.”

“Geographically close to China, bases of the Philippines that Manila allows the US-led Western forces to use to attack China if a cross-Straits conflict breaks out, would inevitably become battlefield(s),” Global Times quoted Chinese military expert Song Zhongping as saying.

Song questioned “Is this Manila’s best strategic choice to secure itself? Or it would work the opposite.”

Legally, the contested Second Thomas Shoal is a low-tide elevation, which can’t be claimed as a “territory.”

But since it falls within the Philippines’ 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zone (EEZ), giving the coastal state exclusive rights over exploiting fisheries and subsea resources, Manila maintains that it has no obligation to explain its presence in the area, especially to China.

In 2016, an arbitral tribunal at The Hague, formed under the aegis of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ruled against China’s expansive “nine-dash line” claims, which cut into the Philippines’ EEZ including across the Second Thomas Shoal.

“We are not going to back down in exposing their aggressive behavior in the West Philippine Sea,” said Jay Tarriela, the Philippine Coast Guard spokesman for the West Philippine Sea, ahead of the latest resupply mission.

Accusing China of trying to “block, harass and interfere” with the Philippines’ resupply mission within its own EEZ, he described the showdown as a “David and Goliath” situation.

The reality, however, is that the Pentagon provided certain operational support, suddenly making the showdown more of a Goliath versus Goliath situation.

The presence of the American surveillance aircraft near the disputed shoal, combined with the Philippines’ deployment of relatively large resupply vessels, appeared to deter China from employing coercive means.

This was not, however, the first time that the US and the Philippines coordinated their actions in the area.

Over the past decade, China, emboldened by its occupation of the Manila-claimed Scarborough Shoal following a months-long naval showdown in mid-2012, has repeatedly sought to squeeze Philippine marines out of the area by imposing a de facto blockade.

In response, the Barack Obama administration deployed drones and surveillance reconnaissance to assist the AFP’s resupply missions.

In 2016, then-US Defense Secretary Ash Carter boarded the USS John Stennis aircraft carrier during a patrol in the area in order to push back against China’s growing assertiveness.

Yet China continued to press its claims during the Duterte administration, which adopted a broadly subservient approach towards Beijing. In 2018 and 2019, Chinese vessels tried to disrupt Philippine resupply missions to the Second Thomas Shoal.

Following another incident in late 2021, as Duterte began to warm up to the Pentagon and reverse his pivot to Beijing, two Chinese coast guard ships blocked Philippine vessels from providing supplies to BRP Sierra Madre.

In response, the US rhetorically reaffirmed its mutual defense obligations to the Philippines in the South China Sea.

Earlier this year, Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of the US Indo-Pacific Fleet, made it clear that the US is prepared to assist its Southeast Asian ally in the area.

He accused China of “frequently interfer[ing] with [Philippines’ Second Thomas Shoal] resupplies,” which is “clearly unlawful.”

Adding to the strategic equation, Australia, Japan and the Philippines are now also conducting joint patrols in the South China Sea. Moreover, the Philippines and Australia also conducted the Amphibious and Land Operations of the Indo-Pacific Endeavor 2023 (ALON).

A first-of-its-kind operation, the bilateral exercises were nominally meant to enhance interoperability and the Philippines’ overall coastal defense capability.

As many as 2,200 troops from both nations, along with American forces, participated in the joint exercises. Canberra deployed state-of-the-art weapons systems, including F-35A Lightning-II aircrafts and M1A1 Abrams tanks that were joined by US Marine Corps V-22 Ospreys and the Philippine Marine Corps amphibious assault vehicles.

Leaving little to the imagination, the exercises saw the three allies fighting a fictional enemy named “Calabania”, which, carrying a red flag and with red arm bands, overtly resembled China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

“We are two countries committed to an idea of a world in which disputes are determined by reference to international laws,” Australian defense chief Richard Marles said following the massive drills while vowing to explore more joint exercises and patrols in the near future.

“A whole lot of damage can be done to Australia before any potential adversary sets foot on our shores, and maintaining the rules-based order in Southeast Asia, maintaining the collective security of Southeast Asia, is fundamental to maintaining the national security of our country,” he added.

China’s Global Times responded to the exercises in tough terms, saying that “Australia’s intention is to assume the role of a ‘small America’ or a ‘minor hegemon’ in the Indo-Pacific region at the cost of being instrumentalized and weaponized by the US, while the reckless provocation to China will only harm its own interests in the long run, experts warned.

The report cited Chinese experts saying “Albanese’s plan to visit the Philippines is a clear indication of Australia’s alignment with the strategic intentions of the US – to further provoke and incite Philippine’s provocations.”

Albanese is set to visit Manila this week, underscoring the upswing in ties. Although the trip is being billed as the first Australian leader “state visit” in decades, it largely builds on efforts by nimble predecessors, most notably former prime minister Malcolm Turnbull, who twice visited Manila to upgrade bilateral ties under both the Aquino and Duterte administrations.

“I think we would be discussing for sure also the continuation of this kind of joint exercise to increase the capabilities again of our (forces),” Marcos Jr said following the recently concluded military drills with Australia.

“It is an important aspect of how we prepare for any eventualities, considering there have been so many events that attest to the volatility of the region,” Marcos Jr said.

Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on X, formerly known as Twitter, at @Richeydarian

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The August 18 summit at the presidential retreat at Camp David was the culmination of decades of American efforts to bring its Japanese and Korean allies closer together. President Joe Biden has been facilitating this process since his time as vice president in the Barack Obama administration.

Given the potential crises on the Korean Peninsula and in Taiwan, the leaders emphasized the necessity of standing together and resolved to exchange information rapidly and coordinate actions in the event of challenges impacting the shared interests and security of the three nations.

The American hosts heavily emphasized the summit’s symbolism. Representatives of Japan and South Korea were the first Biden hosted in Washington after his inauguration. Again, Japan and Korea had primacy as the countries Biden visited first in Asia. The centrality of the two states was underscored when their leaders were the first Biden invited to Camp David during his tenure.

The first standalone summit, which President Biden, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and President Yoon Suk Yeol attended, further highlighted the significance of their trilateral cooperation. 

Summit accomplishments

The summit was preceded by a rapprochement and the resumption of shuttle diplomacy between Japan and South Korea in May after 12 neglected years. It was especially the heavy lifting of the Korean president that helped mend fences with Japan.

Kishida and Yoon agreed during the summit to resume high-level economic and political talks by the end of this year, amid progress in mending ties. The agreement pertains to two engagements: a vice-foreign-ministerial strategic dialogue this autumn and economic talks by year-end.

Two documents came out of the summit: the “Camp David Principles” and the “Spirit of Camp David,” which outlined the scope of future cooperation ranging from holding regular trilateral meetings at various levels involving leaders, foreign and trade ministers and defense chiefs.

They pledged also to hold annual joint drills involving the Japan Self-Defense Forces and US and South Korean forces. To strengthen economic security, the three countries committed to working closely together by launching “early warning system pilots” to enable swift information sharing to avert disruptions in global supply chains.

Beyond security and economics, the scope of collaboration will include sharing cutting-edge technology, joint development, health care and people-to-people exchanges.

Piece of a larger puzzle

The trilateral summit was part of a larger multilayered and multidimensional US strategy for the Indo-Pacific region that emphasizes alliances. Both Japan and South Korea are technologically advanced middle powers and key regional allies of the US.

While Seoul’s defensive strategy is traditionally focused on the Korean Peninsula, Yoon’s administration is adopting a wider regional outlook. Japan, for almost two decades, has been reaching out to India and other partners in South and Southeast Asia to build closer economic and security ties.

These efforts were welcomed by Washington and are further strengthening the US-led regional security architecture. As many pundits predicted, the three leaders discussed regional hotspots including North Korea and the Taiwan Strait while denouncing Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. 

Biden welcomed Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the White House in June, and a visit by Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese is planned for later this year.

The US-JP-ROK cooperation, together with the Quad, US-AU-JP and AUKUS, is part of the American-led effort to uphold the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region through enhanced regional deterrence against revisionist powers.

Push and pull factors

Many factors are pulling Asian states and the US together. For example, despite the repeated Chinese narrative accusing the US of creating “elitist cliques” or even an Asian mini-NATO, and accusing the US and its allies of a Cold War mentality, it is China’s hegemonic and coercive actions that have pushed growing cooperation throughout the Indo-Pacific.

China has engaged in economic coercion against both Japan in 2010 (nationalization of the Senkaku Islands) and South Korea in 2017-2019 (after the THAAD deployment). More recently, China weaponized trade against Australia after it sought an impartial investigation into the origins of Covid-19.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has seemingly forgotten the warning of late patriarch Deng Xiaoping: “If one day China tries to seek hegemony in the world, people of the world should expose, oppose, and overthrow it.”

Only a day prior to the summit, 11 Chinese and Russian naval ships sailed through waters near Japan’s southern islands of Okinawa prefecture in an overt show of force.

The visit of Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Chinese ruling-party official Li Hongzhong to North Korea in light of the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine and the possible trilateral cooperation of Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang is another factor pushing closer trilateral cooperation among Seoul, Tokyo and Washington.

The spillover of the Russian invasion of Ukraine seems to have reached even the Korean Peninsula. There are strong indications within the US intelligence community that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is selling weapons to Russia.

Moreover, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank, the physical characteristics and flight data of the North Korean Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missile are “nearly identical to those of the Russian Topol-M ICBM.”

CSIS asserts that Russia likely provided technical assistance in the development of the North Korean ICBM. Given the North Korean regime’s penchant for threatening its neighbors, this rings alarm bells in both Seoul and Tokyo.

During the Camp David summit, Kishida and Biden agreed to develop a new missile capable of intercepting hypersonic weapons. This joint development plan comes amid China’s, North Korea’s and Russia’s aggressive pursuit of hypersonic capabilities.

Elections ahead

The timing of the Camp David trilateral summit was planned to initiate greater cooperation before the respective leaders face re-election. Yoon is facing parliamentary elections in April, Kishida faces re-election as leader of the Liberal Democratic Party in September, and Biden is likely to run again in November.

For Biden, the summit was not only a way to ensure his political legacy but also an important stepping stone in the election cycle as he strives for a second presidential term. At least for this term, it is politically impossible for the US to return to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) regional trade agreement.

Japan and South Korea are aware that the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), with its missing free-trade element, is a Band-Aid in the absence of greater US economic involvement in the Indo-Pacific region.

Kishida’s government, despite its numerous foreign political successes, is under pressure due to its lackluster economic performance and numerous affairs, most recently the My Number Card issue. Kishida is more respected by his allies abroad than at home. Nevertheless, for now, his position as leader of the LDP is uncontested.

The largest conservative LDP faction, Seiwakai, hurriedly named Abe’s successor in August after more than a year since Abe’s assassination. Abe’s murder caused a shockwave in the LDP. Not only did the Seiwakai lose their leader, but so too did independent conservatives.

The moderate Kishida cannot turn to his conservatives for support any longer and now must face a fractionalized conservative camp. Moreover, with Abe gone, Kishida lost a possible ally who was able to mitigate the worst impulses of former US president Donald Trump, who could conceivably return in 2024.

It remains an open question whether Ryu Shionoya, as the new Seiwakai leader, can unify the conservatives and be an effective counterpart to Kishida.

Yoon faces the most difficult situation. Elected to office by a razor-thin margin, Yoon faces an opposition majority in parliament. In the event that the opposition retains this advantage after the upcoming election in April 2024, Yoon will confront a hostile parliament until the end of his tenure in 2027.

For now, the historical grievances between Japan and South Korea have been put aside in favor of future-oriented cooperation. Nevertheless, significant issues of cultural and historical weight remain.

These include challenges connected with Japan’s colonization from 1910-1945 but also the territorial spat over the Dokdo/Takeshima islands as well as the 2018 incident when a Korean naval vessel illuminated a Japanese patrol plane with its fire control radar.

These issues will not simply disappear. It is likely that the Korean opposition will play the “Japanese card” against Yoon’s conservatives in the legislative election campaign.

Moreover, the upcoming release of treated Fukushima water is, despite International Atomic Energy Agency assurances of safety, another point that Yoon’s opponents vocalize.

What’s next?

Yoon offered to host the next leaders’ summit in Seoul. After their meeting symbolically in Hiroshima on the margins of the Group of Seven summit, the electoral turf of Kishida, and then in Washington, it seems a reasonable proposal.

Many in Tokyo look back to 2015 when the Abe-Park deal was reached with the blessing of the Obama administration on comfort women. The succeeding Moon Jae-In administration dismantled the agreement and his entire tenure was marked by a confrontational attitude toward Japan.

It is important not only to Yoon and Kishida that the positive momentum of the tacit institutionalization of trilateral cooperation take root as early as possible, but also to Biden, who is particularly vested in the budding trilateral alliance’s endurance.

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Indonesia is set to acquire the latest F-15 fighter jets from the US, Jakarta’s latest move to modernize its aging air force and upgrade its defenses, namely against China in the Natuna Islands on the edge of the South China Sea.

This month, Breaking Defense reported that Indonesian and Boeing officials have signed a memorandum of understanding for the supply of 24 F-15EX fighter jets for Jakarta. The report notes that the agreement followed a tour by Indonesian officials of Boeing’s production line in St Louis.

While the deal is still subject to approval by the US State Department, it is seen as an important step for Indonesia’s military as well as the US Air Force (USAF), which is also purchasing the jet to modernize its likewise aging fighter fleet.

The F-15EX is a highly advanced fighter jet developed by Boeing for the USAF. It represents the latest iteration of the F-15 series, featuring improved avionics, structural enhancements and a higher payload capacity. The F-15EX is designed to fulfill various roles, including air superiority, strike missions and multirole operations.

Air Force Technology mentions that the F-15EX has a length of 19.45 meters, a width of 13.05 meters, and a height of 5.64 meters, with an empty weight of 14,500 kilograms and a maximum take-off weight of 37,000 kilograms.

The source notes that the F-15EX can launch hypersonic weapons up to 6.7 meters long and can be operated by a single pilot. It also says the aircraft has new electronic warfare systems, advanced cockpit systems, modern sensors and radars, and advanced mission systems and software capabilities.

Breaking Defense mentions, however, that concerns over the F-15EX program persist, specifically around cost and production issues, noting that the per-unit cost could escalate to US$106 million by fiscal year 2025.

Furthermore, the report says that the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) has noted production problems on the F-15EX line, possibly affecting the USAF’s initial operational capability (IOC) date.

Breaking Defense notes that Boeing must deliver six more F-15EXs, known as the program’s Lot 1B fighters, before the program’s IOC can be officially declared, which was previously expected in June 2023.

The report adds that the delivery of all six F-15EX aircraft is still scheduled for this calendar year, reflecting optimism about the program’s progress.

Indonesia has been struggling to modernize its air force, with mixed results. Asia Times noted in June 2023 that Indonesian Air Force (IDAF) officials have long expressed their desire to modernize, noting that their current fleet of aircraft is insufficient to cover the archipelagic nation’s vast airspace and address constantly evolving security requirements, particularly in regard to China’s presence near the Natuna Islands.

As of April 2023, the IDAF operates a fighter force consisting of 49 jets made in the US and Russia. The force includes 33 F-16s, 11 Su-30s, and five Su-27s, with the Russian-made Su-30 serving is the IDAF’s primary fighter.

However, Western sanctions on Russia have prevented Indonesia from acquiring the more advanced Su-35. At the same time, its older F-16s are less capable, have limited upgrade potential and are only effective when integrated into a wider air defense strategy.

Given its financial and political constraints, Indonesia has tried multiple avenues to modernize its air force, such as co-designing a fighter jet with South Korea, purchasing used fighters from Qatar, considering Japan as a source of used fighter jet engines and buying new-build fighters from France.

In July 2023, Asia Times reported that Indonesia is still committed to South Korea’s KF-21 Boramae advanced jet fighter program despite being late on payments. Indonesia has paid 21% of the cost share through June 2023 but has yet to release a 2024-2026 payment plan timeline.

The South Korean Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) seeks talks with Indonesia regarding payment plans, with Indonesia agreeing to pay 20% of the US$6.2 billion project cost as part of its efforts to modernize the IDAF.

In June 2023, Asia Times reported that Indonesia had acquired a squadron of 26-year-old Qatari Mirage 2000-5 jets with new multirole fighters to fill a hole in frontline air defenses until the government can find the money to buy new-generation multirole fighters.

The Mirages will replace Northrop F5s and will be used as a training and familiarization platform while the air force awaits the first of new Dassault Rafale jets from France. However, that approach has led to Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto having to defend his decision to acquire the old, used jets.

Moreover, Indonesia has made efforts to keep its aging fighters airworthy. Asia Times reported in June 2023 that Indonesia is considering surplus F-15 engines from Japan to power its F-16 fighters, with the two governments having previously signed an agreement regarding the transfer of defense equipment and technologies, thus paving the way for the F-15 engine deal.

Japan can provide 200 Pratt & Whitney turbofan engines from its 100 older F-15s, which will not be used due to modernization difficulties. These engines could be a valuable resource for countries that operate F-15s and F-16s, potentially leading to practical cooperation with Indonesia.

Although Japan has a de facto ban on exporting military hardware, Tokyo has previously exported sensitive military components to the US and exporting F-15 engines to Indonesia may be permitted.

Apart from those efforts, Indonesia has approached France for new-build jet fighters. In February 2022, Asia Times reported that Indonesia signed a purchase agreement for 42 French-made Rafale fighters, making it the first Southeast Asian country to acquire the jets.

The initial order includes six jets, 36 more to be delivered, and munitions and simulators. That move may have forced the US to sweeten its offer of military aircraft to court Indonesia, a crucial partner in Southeast Asia.

In response to Indonesia’s Rafale purchase, the US approved the sale of up to 36 F-15EX fighters, which, if Indonesia finally purchases, would complement its existing F-16 fleet.

Indonesia’s multifaceted fighter jet procurement program involving strategic purchases from various global powers illustrates its commitment to maintaining an independent and active foreign policy, which eschews overreliance on one strategic partner.

However, the complexities of such an approach, such as interoperability concerns and financial difficulties, can raise questions about its sustainability.

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MANILA – The Philippines is leveraging a widening network of alliances to assert its stance in the South China Sea, a strategy that threatens to put it on a steeper collision course with China over contested features in the disputed waters.

Rising tensions over the Second Thomas Shoal have only reinforced the Philippines’ resolve to fortify its position vis-à-vis China.

This week, the Philippine Navy (PN) pressed ahead with another resupply mission to BRP Sierra Madre, a grounded ship that has served as a de facto military base for a detachment of Philippine troops since 1999.

General Romeo Brawner Jr, the newly-promoted chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, said that the resupply mission was unarmed to underscore Manila’s determination to avoid direct clashes with Chinese forces lurking in the area.

Earlier this month, a Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) fired water cannons to disrupt Philippine resupply missions on the Second Thomas Shoal, which the Philippines also refers to as the Ayungin Shoal.

The provocative blast followed on a February 6 incident near the same shoal where the CCG aimed a military-grade laser at a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) ship that temporarily blinded its crew. The PCG claimed China also made “dangerous maneuvers” by passing within 150 meters of its vessel.   

“Yes, they are still unarmed. We are not going there to make war. We’re just going there to simply bring supplies to our troops and to rotate,” the Philippine military chief told reporters while denying speculation that Manila is now bent on building new structures in the area before the rusty, grounded ship gives way to the elements.

Last week, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin spoke by phone with his Philippine counterpart Gilberto Teodoro to affirm that the two sides’ Mutual Defense Treaty “extends to Philippine public vessels, aircraft and armed forces – to include those of its Coast Guard – in the Pacific including in the South China Sea.”

Following their historic meeting in Camp David, the leaders of the United States, Japan and South Korea trilateral alliance also made it clear that “[W]e strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the waters of the Indo-Pacific.”

The three allies also jointly reaffirmed the 2016 South China Sea arbitral tribunal award ruling at The Hague, which “sets out the legal basis for the peaceful resolution of maritime conflicts between the parties to that proceeding,” it added.

“Together, we’re going to stand up for international law, freedom of navigation and the peaceful resolution of disputes in the South China Sea,” US President Joe Biden told his Japanese and South Korean counterparts amid growing alignment over the need for more coordinated action in the disputed maritime areas.

A hallmark of the Ferdinand Marcos Jr administration, however, is also reaching out to so-called “non-traditional partners”, most notably India and Vietnam, which also have their own territorial disputes with China.

The Philippine president is now pursuing a new maritime agreement with Vietnam, likely based on the 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling, as well as expanded defense cooperation with India, which is set to deliver the much-vaunted BrahMos missile defense systems to the Philippines this year.

The Philippines and Vietnam have the most similar threat perception vis-à-vis China among the sea’s various rival claimants, with both embroiled in decades-long maritime disputes with the Asian power.

Both have employed a combination of strategic and diplomatic means to counter China’s expanding footprint in overlapping areas of claim.

Philippine-Vietnam bilateral relations, however, reached new heights in the early 2010s when Manila filed an unprecedented arbitration case against Beijing under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Across Southeast Asia, only one country openly backed the Philippines and even suggested a potential joint legal case against China at some point in the future.

Vietnam’s most important legal intervention came in 2014, when it submitted a highly sympathetic position paper on the Philippines’ efforts to leverage international law to resolve the disputes.

“It is Vietnam’s consistent position to fully reject China’s claim over [Paracels] and [Spratlys] archipelagoes and the adjacent waters, as well as China’s claiming of ‘historic rights’ to the waters, sea-bed and subsoil within the ‘dotted line’ unilaterally stated by China,” the Vietnamese foreign ministry said.

Crucially, then-Vietnamese prime minister Nguyen Tan Dung openly threatened to file a parallel legal case following China’s deployment of a giant oil rig to an area near the disputed Paracel Islands, which sparked massive protests and a temporary diplomatic breakdown between the two communist neighbors.

During this period, the Philippines and Vietnam also expanded maritime security cooperation, including Vietnamese warship goodwill visits to Manila and friendly games among their troops stationed in the Spratly group of islands.

But the burgeoning ties came to an abrupt halt when then-president Rodrigo Duterte largely ignored Vietnam in favor of warmer ties with China.

On multiple occasions, his top officials, including his former foreign affairs secretary, even tried to portray Vietnam as a hostile rival in the South China Sea, partly in an effort to downplay China’s massive reclamation activities in the area.

Since coming to power, however, Marcos Jr has placed Vietnam at the heart of his regional strategy of balancing China. In his first year in office alone, Marcos Jr has held at least three meetings with high-level Vietnamese officials.

The bilateral talks ostensibly covered food security, since Vietnam alone is responsible for 90% of the Philippines’ total rice imports. As acting agriculture secretary, Marcos Jr is intent on expanding cooperation with Vietnam to new heights.

Crucially, however, the Filipino president also sees Hanoi as a key maritime security partner. Recently, the Filipino president admitted that the two sides have been negotiating a new maritime cooperation agreement, which likely aims to enhance defense cooperation but also delineate overlapping claims in the Spratlys based on the UNCLOS.

Last December, Vietnam and Indonesia successfully finalized decade-long negotiations over maritime border delimitation. The Philippines is likely seeking a similar deal with Vietnam based on the 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling at The Hague.

“Now that we are going to start discussions on the agreement that we have between the Philippines and Vietnam, I think it is a very, very important part of our relationship and it will bring an element of stability to the problems that we are seeing now in the South China Sea,” Marcos was quoted as saying following a recent meeting with Vietnamese officials.

Marcos Jr hailed the impending maritime cooperation agreement as “a very big step” toward building a united front to confront “common challenges”, namely China’s expanding footprint in the South China Sea.

Meanwhile, India is emerging as another major “non-traditional” partner. The two sides held their 5th meeting of their Joint Commission on Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC) in New Delhi earlier this year, where Philippine Secretary for Foreign Affairs Enrique Manalo and Indian Minister of External Affairs S Jaishankar discussed ways to accelerate comprehensive strategic cooperation including on maritime security.

In their joint statement, India and the Philippines stressed “the need for peaceful settlement of disputes, and for adherence to international law,” with New Delhi reaffirming the finality and binding nature of the 2016 arbitral tribunal award.

Just a week earlier, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and US President Biden agreed to address “challenges to the maritime rules-based order, including in the East and South China Seas” amid expanding maritime defense cooperation under the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue framework.

Under its “Look East” policy, India is rapidly expanding its economic and strategic footprint in Southeast Asia, with the Philippines emerging as a promising partner. In fact, Manila is India’s first major defense customer following the finalization of the US$375 million BrahMos missile defense deal last year.

The Philippine military is expected to deploy the new missile defense system, which has a top speed of around Mach 2.8 and is capable of carrying warheads weighing 200 to 300 kilograms from aircraft, warships or land to its frontier provinces facing the South China Sea.

The Philippine Marine Corps’ Shore Based Anti-Ship Missile battalion will be operating the Indian anti-ship missile system. To boost bilateral cooperation, India is also set to place a permanent defense attaché in Manila for the first time in recent history.

“We are natural and traditional partners. India and the Philippines have much to offer each other,” Manalo said during his visit to India earlier this year.

“We think this is perhaps only the beginning of further defense cooperation, not only in terms of weapons, but also in training and best practices. This is an important event in our defense cooperation,” he added, referring to the BrahMos missile system.

Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on X, formerly known as Twitter, at @Richeydarian

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