RTAF tells of PM2.5 action

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PUBLISHED: 15 September 2023 at 4:00 p.m.

To combat air pollution, particularly the issue of fine particulate matter 2.5, the Royal Thai Air Force ( RTAF) will collaborate with its Asean counterparts.

The annual four-day Asean Air Chiefs Conference, which concludes now in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, was attended by ACM Alongkorn Wannarot, the commander-in-chief of the RTAF.

The event brings together air army commanders from the 10-nation alliance to talk about cooperation in defense, fighting extremism, and disaster relief. It has also concentrated on environmental assistance initiatives this time.

ACM Alongkorn discussed RTAF’s efforts to combat the PM2.5 problem brought on by popular produce burning in Southeast Asia at the conference.

In order to put out fires, reduce PM2.5 waste, and increase water degrees in Thailand’s dam systems, he claimed that the RTAF and Department of Royal Rainmaking and Agricultural Aviation had established the imperial allows operation system in 2015.

In addition, the RTAF is creating related technologies, such as alternatives for foam use and a mobile waste management app.

ACM Alongkorn added that the RTAF has a center for teaching about renewable energy, including solar, wind, and diesel fuel.

Additionally, the RTAF is collaborating with the Provincial Electricity Authority to build renewable roofs and floating solar panel in air bag all over the nation.

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Rush for rare earth minerals in Southeast Asia compounding dangers for region’s environmental defenders: Report

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TURNING Goals

Without solutions or safeguards, soldiers may consider themselves the victims of” lawfare” implemented by governments, who have the power to use legislation to intimidate critics. & nbsp,

For instance, in the Philippines, activists can be” red-tagged” by security forces, the federal police, or state officials in an effort to quell their opposition to projects. This is essentially the same as accusing activists of communist rebellion.

According to Mr. Bonifacio, it is important to hold government agencies, businesses, and social media tycoons accountable for their involvement in inciting or facilitating assault against people.

He cited the continued troubling incident of two young adult activists who were kidnapped by unidentified men on September 2 while visiting a neighborhood in Manila Bay for land reclamation. If the two were in prison, authorities had not yet provided confirmation.

” People are working on the front lines and doing amazing things.” And their job undoubtedly inspires you. However, he claimed that they are also the ones who are being killed, attacked, harassed, and arrested.

” To defend our climate defenders and actively acknowledge the problems at hand, it starts with trying to break that tradition of violence, holding people guilty, and really taking these concrete actions, policy or whatever.”

At the council level in the House of Representatives in February, a bill from the Philippines that aims to defend human rights defenders and condemn harassment or violence against them was approved. & nbsp,

The possible bill has not yet been passed into law, according to a government committee, which described it as” grave, cruel, and insidious threat against the Philippines’ democratic way of life.”

Experts and activists in Indonesia, where 17 defenders have reportedly been killed since 2012, criticized next year’s Criminal Code amendments for having the potential to erode environmental protections while allowing for the oppression of property protectors.

According to the rules, businesses must be shown to be breaking specific regulations before they can be charged with economic crimes, which places a heavier burden of proof on those who take action against polluters.

The code also lessens penalties for economic crimes and makes it a crime to criticize the chairman, making public works projects probably illegal. It is not expected to be completely enacted until 2025 and can be legitimately challenged.

Five well-known climate activists in Vietnam have spent the last two years in prison for tax evasion, claims that their supporters have claimed are politically motivated. & nbsp,

There are grave worries that civil society is being effectively excluded from discussions about the energy transition given the criminalization of climate defenders and rights activists in Vietnam, according to the report.

Another potential solutions are being considered in different parts of the world, such as the nomination of a second United Nations Special Rapporteur on Environmental Defenders, to whom the general public may file complaints. It is the first global device created to safeguard defenders from harm’s way.

Furthermore, the European Union is now negotiating legislation that would mandate global enterprise application on the part of large corporations.

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Commentary: Time for ASEAN to walk its talk of regional leadership

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But, ASEAN has been unable to take the current ruling junta in line with the Five-Point Consensus agreed upon in April 2021 by associating with Naypyidaw’s obstinate leadership today and being hindered by divisiveness within its own ranks. & nbsp,

Externally, the US-China competition has gotten so bad that East Asian countries feel obliged to pick edges— something they would quite avoid— despite claims made at the ASEAN Summit by US Vice President Kamala Harris and Chinese Premier Li Qiang about their individual countries’ support for the organization.

Additionally, ASEAN has made a point of arguing its validity to the Indo-Pacific, which is how international policymakers currently view Asia.

Plan structures like China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the US-backed Quad, AUKUS, and Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity have proliferated in recent years. Some people view these arrangements as competing structures to ASEAN-led ones, which pose a threat to the organization’s lauded” centrality” in regional affairs. & nbsp,

TIME TO GET STARTED

ASEAN must act now or risk losing everything in the face of that challenging situation. & nbsp, The Indo-Pacific offers opportunities that ASEAN could take advantage of as a region in flux.

Granted, relationships between the US and China are probably going to deteriorate. With its most recent federal image, which stakes statements from the Himalayas to the South China Sea, China even infuriated the area once more. India, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam, all of which have regional issues with China, have voiced their opposition to the offensive image.

However, it is still unclear whether a weaker China will continue to rule the ASEAN area with its divide-and-conquer strategies given its current financial problems. Furthermore, it is unclear whether China’s decline, which is anticipated to have a negative impact on Southeast Asia, will loosen Beijing much in terms of its economic hold on the region to persuade nations like Cambodia and Laos to soften their staunch pro-China stances. In addition, & nbsp,

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Exclusive interview with Paul Yang, BNP Paribas CEO for Asia Pacific | FinanceAsia

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Paris-headquartered BNP Paribas boasts a history of over 160 years in Asia and today, it draws upon a 20,000-strong team that is active in thirteen markets across the continent.

The regional effort is led by Paul Yang, who ascended to role of CEO for Asia Pacific in December 2020, as the world succumbed to the full throes of the beginnings of a three-year pandemic. As society grappled with widespread affliction, Asia’s key economies responded to rapidly evolving government direction with fervour: leaving borders closed and markets shaken.

However, as you will discover through this exclusive interview, Yang was defiant in his refusal to be beset by external challenges. Proving himself an astute leader at the regional helm, he navigated the uncertain scenario deftly, and would go on to secure solid returns for both full-year 2021 and 2022; as well as robust revenue for the first quarter of 2023.

With a view to steering the bank’s business in support of the group’s Growth, Technology and Sustainability (GTS) strategy for 2025, FinanceAsia sought Yang’s take on Asia as a key international powerhouse, and learned about the milestones of his international career to date.

Entering Asia

BNP Paribas’ forerunner, the Comptoir National d’Escompte de Paris (CNEP), was set up by France’s finance minister following the hardships endured during the French Revolution; to curb mass bankruptcy in the financial markets; and to stimulate the economy. 

Following signature of a free trade agreement with the British, the Comptoir sought to develop an international strategy to source the raw materials required to support the flourishment of European industry. To do so, it extended beyond its French national borders for the first time; establishing offices in Calcutta and Shanghai in 1860, independent of foreign partnership.

Later, CNEP merged with the Banque Nationale pour le commerce et l’industrie (BNCI) to form the Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP). Capitalising on these regional capabilities, the bank made Hong Kong the centre of its Asian platform.

Q: Paul, you’ve been based in Asia Pacific for the majority of your career with BNP Paribas. Can you share what has defined BNP’s corporate journey in Asia so far?

A: Well, I wasn’t there in the 1860s, but it’s true that we have had a very long presence in the region. However, I consider “modern” BNP’s presence to be quite recent. It was really the bank’s merger in 2000 that created who we are today, elevating us as France – and then Europe’s – leading financial group and the most profitable bank in the eurozone.

But regarding Asia, we’re proud to be able to say that we’ve been here for a long time, which demonstrates our commitment to the region.

In Hong Kong, for instance, we often deal with multiple family generations of entrepreneurs and tycoons. The same is the case for some of our mid-cap clients – we have dealt with their fathers. We have built a sufficient network in the region to be able to play a key role in executing succession plans and building businesses for the future.  It really means something that we’ve been here for so long and to be profitable in all of the 13 markets where we operate.

These days, being relevant to your clients counts. You need a strong balance sheet, presence and scale to guide key them from their home markets into new areas. This is how we started, building our financial institutions group (FIG), then multinational and corporate (MNC) franchises,before further progressing to build scale, solutions, products and platforms.

We have developed a strong Asian presence and over the last three years, we’ve built on connectivity to improve the flows between the various corridors we participate in. We are relevant to key local participants and accompany international clients in reverse, also.

This goes for all facets of our business: whether in the corporate and institutional world, or in consumer finance. We are bigger than the sum of our parts and many things we do have relevant purpose for our clients.

Q: How does the bank’s business in Asia compare to that of the European markets (e.g. France, Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg)?

A: Understandably, our stronghold is Europe and we are significant as well in America. But overall, Asia represents a sizable portion of group business.

The bank’s longevity and strong heritage in Asia Pacific, coupled with our integrated business model places us in good stead to extend and reinforce our presence in this growth region.

In this regard, BNP Paribas’ Asia Pacific revenue contribution to the group’s corporate and institutional business is about 20%; and it will continue to grow.

Ultimately, the bank is emerging as a leading player in the region – and this brings us to a better position to aim for larger deals and more ambitious goals.

In this respect, we have grown our market share in our regions – for example, we hold dominance in markets such as Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong in the wealth management space, and we have recently launched an onshore wealth capability in Thailand. Asset management is developing; and our insurance business – Compagnie d’Assurance et d’Investissement de France (Cardif), has also been successful.

Where we do not have underlying domestic market strength, we choose to partner. We are humble enough to realise that sometimes it is better to do so. For example, in Asia, on the insurance side of the business we have partnered with local banking distributors. We started exploring this type of partnership around 25 years ago in markets such as Taiwan, Japan and Korea, and we are building up our strength in China, India and Southeast Asia.

The same goes for the retail side – personal finance. In 2005, we became a strategic shareholder of Bank of Nanjing in China and we are now their single largest shareholder with a 15.7% stake. 

We have built core business through partnerships, but where we think that we can control the entire business because it’s part of our DNA, is on the wealth management and corporate institutional banking (CIB) sides.

Q: What are the bank’s strategic priorities across Asia over the short and long term?

A: We are a bank that tries to deliver short-term results alongside long-term goals. Long-term relationships are part of our nature from a strategy perspective, and we are not in the business of pursuing rash opportunities when things look great and then making drastic cuts in a down cycle. We have a long-term vision and try to cultivate trust and relationships with this timeframe in mind.

From a short-term perspective, we have targets around our top line to maintain cost discipline and ensure that we invest for the future. We are intrinsically risk-aware and we insist on having a good mix of new blood and older experience, to move forward prudently.

Diversification is key. When you pursue disciplined growth, you avoid temptation, fashion and fad and consequentially, mistakes. Across all markets and products, we want to be positioned as the number one European bank for CIB, the preferred partner for wealth management, insurance and asset management – and we are not far from achieving this goal. 

Asia comprises a mix of developed and developing markets. Whether you look at the position we have in Japan, Australia, or Korea – or across more emerging business hubs such as Southeast Asia or China, we are well positioned there for our clients and we generate good returns.

Some of our peers will concentrate their presence at a particular local base, say in hubs. But we do not believe in guaranteeing strong, underlying growth simply by sitting in Hong Kong and Singapore and flying bankers all over the place.

The creation of local platforms is important. We have been building these in a considered manner across Southeast Asia, Taiwan, mainland China and elsewhere for the past decade and we are able to see the results. For example, we recently complemented our business mix with a securities licence in China. Once we have completed the takeover of several prime brokerage businesses from our competitors, we will see an increase in the equity cash portion of our business mix. Then there’s the joint venture (JV) we secured with the Agricultural Bank of China, which is the largest bank in the market by network and with whom we’ll be structuring investment products for retail clients.

Q: Diversification is a theme that has emerged from the pandemic to build business resilience. But are there any particular geographies or sectors that stand out as offering growth opportunity?

A: We’ve seen some volatility in the banking sector, but as a group, our corporate culture has focussed on development in a very diversified way. In terms of resilience, this sets us apart.

If you look at our group results, you will see that around 50% of our business is in the domestic retail and consumer finance market;

a third is in CIB; and over 15% is concentrated on activities such as asset gathering – from private banking to asset management and insurance. Within CIB, there’s also security services, which might not have a great cost income, but involves limited capital consumption and brings recurrent fees.

This percentage mix has been kept stable as we’ve grown across all areas and however you slice and dice our business, you will always see diversification. It’s the same for our client base – we not only serve financial institution clients but also corporates and high net worth individuals (HNWI). These three pillars are quite well balanced and offer us the means to build a sufficient product platform.

Capital market activities, including equity capital markets (ECM), debt capital markets (DCM), fundraising and advisory services can be volatile and event-driven; while another big portion of our business and effort is in transaction banking: following the flow of finance, supply chains, trade finance and cash management activities.

The interest rate surge of the last 12 -18 months has been very much beneficial to the cash management business, while monoliners who rely only on investment banking, have suffered. We have benefitted. Whatever way the world or region goes, we are naturally hedged.

Across the Asian region, our presence differentiates us from the rest. We are more than 2,500 in Hong Kong, have 2,200 in Singapore, plus a solid foothold in Japan where we’ve ranked consistently within the top five thanks to our leadership in the global macro environment, both in fixed income currencies and commodities (FICC) and across equity and credit.

In Australia, we have a dominant position in the custodian business that we started 20 years ago; we do well in China, and then we have strong ambition in India and Southeast Asia. I cannot see any market where there isn’t potential.

Q: How do you aim to grow the Asian business?

A: In the past, we have grown organically – even when we looked to secure Deutsche Bank’s prime brokerage business in 2019, it was not a typical acquisition. They were trying to expand in terms of platforms and wanted to lighten up their equity business. Meanwhile, in July 2021, we acquired another 51% of Exane, the top-rated equity research business, following a successful 17-year partnership where we had held 49%.

Both deals demonstrated ambition and keenness to complement the building blocks of our equity business.

So yes, our focus is organic over external growth. We feel it’s better to rely on organic opportunity.

Q: Which developments excite you across sustainability?

A: We’ve been involved in sustainability for over a decade, having started our sustainable finance forum (SFF) in Singapore seven years ago. I’m happy to see that what was a niche market is now very much mainstream.

I would say we have been dominating the ESG thematic, especially when it comes to corporate social responsibility (CSR). We’ve exited from carbon-heavy energy, have moved towards renewables, and we are working to lighten up our upstream exposure. It’s pleasing that every year we do more, whether green bonds, sustainable loans or other structures. We are among the top three banks in the space and even if we cannot manage to stay number one, our efforts make a positive impact across society.

Last year, we created a group of more than 150 bankers, the Low Carbon Transition Group (LCTG), to support our clients’ energy transitions. We’re experienced, so are not having to start from scratch and can support those corporates who might not know where to begin.

We recently held an electric vehicle (EV) conference where we gathered more than 300 clients, corporates and investors in Hong Kong. The topic sits well with what we want to do in the sector around mobility as an engine for growth and we think we can bring value-add to our clients.

EV adoption figures are impressive. In 2019, they accounted for 2.2% of the global total in cars sold, and rose to 13% last year. In China, the penetration figures are double. We’ve seen how this market can surprise everybody regarding adoption of new technologies. China did it with internet access, the smartphone, payments, and now EV. It’s exciting.

Q: You started in the IT department, held positions in Paris, Taipei and Hong Kong, before taking on Asia Pacific leadership at the height of the pandemic. What has shaped your career?

A: You’re right, I took the helm of the region in the middle of the pandemic. I was very fortunate to have been based in Asia for more than 20 years, so I knew the people, the teams, key clients and our platforms, which helped tremendously. During the pandemic, we adopted new technologies and forms of digital communication to stay close to our clients. We succeeded and the vast majority of our clients did also.

I think I’ve been lucky. I started in IT – I’m not sure I was good enough to stay in it, but my first business trip was to Hong Kong. I loved the place and dreamed of how amazing it would be to be based there. Thirty years later, here I am.

Like everybody, I’ve worked hard, but I was very fortunate, and at times, daring. When I wanted to switch from IT to credit, people said “No, Paul. We like you very much, but please don’t do something stupid. You already have a promising future.”

My response was to ask for a chance. I was curious to learn and probably would have gone elsewhere if I hadn’t been given opportunity. Fear around not succeeding makes you try harder and you don’t want to disappoint the people who see something in you.

A few years in, I moved from credit to corporate banking, where I was offered a great job in China – everybody wanted to be in China, but interestingly, it was a bit early – nobody was ready to do much there. So, I transferred to Taiwan to lead the corporate banking team and learned management on the ground. Doing quite well, I was later promoted to head of the territory and then after, moved to Hong Kong. That was 18 years ago!

For me, it’s been a combination of hard work, opportunity, luck and meeting the right senior people to support my development.

One memory that stands out was when the bank appointed a Hong Kong local to lead Greater China. It was a big move, as previously, the standard was someone French and male, but a Hong Kong woman took on the role and I worked for her for many years, learning from her insights. She believed in me and offered me the support to grow.

Q: What’s been the biggest highlight of your career to date?

A: This is difficult! But a key milestone was being given the opportunity to move from IT to banking. I’ve always liked a challenge – from coding, to implementing new tech systems and platforms, to what I do today.

I’ve seen many different things in my career and I have always been very curious. I’ve really cherished every opportunity I’ve had.

I’ve been very happy in the organisation and even today, it’s meaningful to partner with faces old and new. Back in 2004-2005, I had the opportunity to build a partnership in China. After much research, we invested in the Bank of Nanjing, which, two years later, was the first City Commercial Bank to list. There are many board members who I know well. It’s great for both them and me – it’s nice that our professional focus involves making core connections. It’s meaningful.

Q : If you weren’t in banking, what do you think you’d be doing?  

A : Very early on, I think we all wanted to be football players! For France or Argentina – the recent World Cup rivals!

Sometimes I reflect and think I would have been pretty good at teaching. But whatever alternate path I would have taken, it would have involved international opportunity.

I grew up first in Taiwan before moving to France and it was at that point that I knew that I wanted to see the world and find opportunity to do so.

Of course, these days, when I look at my daughter evolving, I can see that there is a lot of opportunity ahead for her, more so than when I was young.  

¬ Haymarket Media Limited. All rights reserved.

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Singapore tops Southeast Asia in seeing different religions as compatible with society: Survey

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According to the Pew review,” this” spiritual switching” has resulted in a decline in the proportion of Singaporeans who identify as Buddhists or adherents of Chinese traditional religions and an increase in that number of Christians or atheists.

Only 26 % of respondents currently identify as Buddhist, despite the fact that 32 % said they were raised as such. And while 15 % of respondents claimed to have grown up adhering to Chinese traditional religions, only 6 % do so today.

In contrast, while 11 % of those who are currently practicing are raised as Christians, 17 % are not. 13 percent of those who were raised without religion, but 22 % of the respondents do not currently practice any religion.

Federal Identification Signs

Pew also examined how federal pertaining intersected with religion and various markers of identity.

In Singapore, respondents were questioned about the significance of different identification markers for being a part of the country.

These included having been born in Singapore, belonging to the majority ethnic group( Chinese ), and practicing the predominant religion( Buddhism ).

According to the study, Singaporeans are much less likely than other people in the area to emphasize these nationalist aspects of national belonging.

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Australia-Philippines pact takes hard new aim at China

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When Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese signed a new strategic partnership with the Philippines on Friday (September 8) in Manila, the ceremony marked the culmination of a year-long charm offensive to win over Ferdinand Marcos Jr’s Western-friendly administration.

Albanese described the new partnership as “historic” and a “watershed moment” that will “contribute to an open, stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.” Marcos Jr said the new bilateral deal was “very gratifying” and “terribly important” amid growing geopolitical uncertainty in the region.  

The pact underscores the growing convergence between the two US allies on the need to enhance maritime security cooperation in the face of China’s expanding footprint and rising assertiveness in adjacent waters including the South China Sea.

Bilateral defense relations have become increasingly robust in recent years through the two sides’ Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA), which was first signed in 2007 likewise with an eye on China and facilitates joint exercises and training and allows for temporary use of bases and facilities.

Last month, Australia conducted joint patrols as well as major bilateral military drills with the Philippines shortly after Chinese vessels used water cannons against Philippine resupply vessels near the contested Second Thomas Shoal.

At the strategic partnership’s signing ceremony, Albanese promised to upgrade bilateral relations “to an even higher level” with a focus on enhancing people-to-people exchanges as well as trade and investment ties.

Australia’s trade with Manila is relatively small compared to other Southeast Asian nations such as Vietnam, Thailand and Singapore.

Despite their deep historical ties, with Australian troops playing a crucial role in the liberation of the Philippines from Imperial Japan during World War II, bilateral relations were relatively limited throughout the Cold War period.

By and large, the Philippines served as America’s forward deployment base for military operations across East Asia, including in the Korean Peninsula and during the Vietnam War.

Meanwhile, the so-called “White Australia Policy” largely hampered meaningful interaction with the Philippines, which experienced massive emigration to the US but not Australia in the second half of the 20th century.

Philippine-Australia relations, however, got a boost following the departure of US bases from Subic and Clark in the early 1990s. In particular, growing threats from a rising China that culminated in its coercive seizure of the Mischief Reef in the South China Sea, driving Manila to seek new defense partnerships.

China has militarized Mischief Reef since seizing it from the Philippines. Photo: Asia Times files / EyePress / Digital Globe

The upshot was the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cooperative Defense Activities and the Joint Defense Cooperation Committee (JDCC) with Canberra, both of which provided frameworks for closer defense cooperation.

The two sides then negotiated SOFVA to institutionalize military cooperation. After its initial hesitation, the Philippine Senate ratified the defense pact following Beijing’s occupation of the Scarborough Shoal in mid-2012 after a months-long naval standoff Manila ultimately lost.

Though China was a major driver for SOVFA, the defense pact proved crucial for the delivery of emergency assistance during recent Philippine natural disasters, including the Haiyan superstorm disaster in 2013.

Soon thereafter Australia also began to join large-scale Philippine-US military drills, most notably the annual Balikatan exercises.

It didn’t take long before Australia began providing defense aid, including notably the transfer of three former Royal Australian Navy (RAN) Balikpapan-class heavy landing craft (LCH) to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in the mid-2010s.

Eager to enhance Australia’s strategic ties with Southeast Asia, then-Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull visited Manila on multiple occasions and hosted the inaugural Australia-ASEAN Summit. In 2015, he signed the Joint Declaration on Australia-Philippine Comprehensive Partnership (DCP), which laid down the foundation for an even more comprehensive partnership. 

Bilateral ties entered a new phase when Australia offered special forces training and deployed surveillance aircraft to assist the AFP during 2017 the Marawi crisis in the southern Philippines, which saw militant groups aligned with Islamic State lay siege to the city.

The episode left a deep impression on the Philippine political elite, most notably President Rodrigo Duterte, who publicly thanked Australia for “showing solidarity” during the crisis on his home island of Mindanao.

Although he boycotted Western capitals throughout his six-year term in office, Duterte personally boarded the HMAS Adelaide during the Royal Australian Navy’s goodwill visit to Manila in 2017.

Duterte’s successor, however, has wasted no time in winning back traditional allies amid escalating tensions with Beijing over their South China Sea disputes. In that direction, Marcos Jr decided earlier this year to expand the country’s Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the US.

The expanded agreement will allow US forces access to five new Philippine bases, including a facility that is geographically close to Taiwan. Shortly after, top Australian officials were in Manila to enhance their defense partnership with Manila as part of a broader network of likeminded actors in the region.  

The Philippines also became the only Southeast Asian nation to openly back the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) nuclear-powered submarine deal, which drew criticism from both Beijing-friendly and non-aligned nations in the region such as Malaysia and Indonesia.

Last month, Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles visited Manila for the second time to observe the Philippine-Australia  Amphibious and Land Operations of the Indo-Pacific Endeavor 2023 (ALON) exercises near the South China Sea. This coincided with Australia, Philippine and Japan trilateral patrols in the sea, with Canberra dangling more joint patrols in the near future.

Against this backdrop, the newly signed strategic partnership aims to seal the deal of expanded relations between the two fellow US allies.

“Australia is working with our partners including the Philippines to shape a region where sovereignty is upheld,” Albanese said during a press conference, emphasizing Canberra’s commitment to managing South China Sea disputes in accordance with international law.

“Australia supports the 2016 South China Sea arbitral award. That is final and binding. And it is important that it be upheld going forward,” he added, referring to the Philippine-initiated legal proceedings, which culminated in an arbitral ruling at The Hague against China’s expansive claims over the South China Sea.

Philippine and Australian troops are poised to train more together under their new strategic partnership. Image: Twitter

During his visit, Albanese also spoke of developing an even more comprehensive relationship “based on close cooperation and enriched by the 400,000 Australians with Filipino heritage.”

In particular, Albanese promised to enhance people-to-people relations by doubling Australia Awards Scholarships to the Philippines, re-establishing the Philippines Institute at the Australian National University, establishing a new reciprocal Work and Holiday visa for Australians and Filipinos and providing up to $64.5 million in additional aid for the peace process in Mindanao.

To date, bilateral relations remain lopsided. Philippine-Australia bilateral trade ($6.2 billion in 2021) is relatively small compared to Canberra’s trade with similarly sized nations in Southeast Asia such as Vietnam ($18 billion) and Thailand ($25 billion).

Albanese hopes to boost trade and investment ties with Southeast Asian nations under the newly-launched Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040, though it’s not clear how much the policy will emphasize the Philippines.

Australia’s charm offensive toward the Philippines has also come under criticism for potentially overlooking Manila’s troubling human rights and corruption record during the Duterte administration.

“The Australian government should recognize that it would be a mistake to deepen defense and security ties with the Philippines while ignoring human rights concerns,” said Australia director for Human Rights Watch (HRW) Daniela Gavshon ahead of the Albanese-Marcos meeting.

“A security partner that routinely violates basic human rights will ultimately provide little safety and security for anyone,” Gavshon said.

Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on X at @Richeydarian

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The real significance of Biden’s SE Asia trip

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After reading provincial remark, one concludes that US President Joe Biden’s decision to skip the ASEAN Summit this year constitutes political malpractice.

One such article states that” Biden’s choice to ignore Jakarta is equivalent to Washington taking a leave of absence from the US-ASEAN marriage.”

While regrettable, Mr. Biden’s choice to have his own evil leader represent him at the ASEAN-US Summit and EAS isn’t catastrophic. Another person mentions the East Asia Summit and says,” ASEAN will likely react with a collective’ know it all along’ frown.”

One may look at the compound rather than the magnification.

As Greg Poling, senior colleague and director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Southeast Asia Program, put it to me:

Of course, we all want the leader to go to every mountain, but he is unable to. More significant and influential than the ASEAN Summit this year are the G20 in Delhi and the diplomatic visit to Vietnam, which may offer a complete corporate partnership.

Vice President Kamala Harris is a completely acceptable replacement for the leader and in line with China’s customary level of representation( which is higher than what Russia typically sends )

Despite Biden’s absence from Jakarta from his vacation plans, the US keeps increasing its local wedding. & nbsp,

to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership improve

Vietnam and the United States will strengthen their relationship during Biden’s attend to the area by forming a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which considerably strengthens their diplomatic relations and emphasizes the significance of Vietnam in the Indo-Pacific area. & nbsp,

Going to Hanoi is important.

The US-Vietnam diplomatic improves its ten-year-old previous framework for economic and geo-strategic reasons at a time when the macro-economic environment deteriorates, Hanoi finds itself without an agreement for free trade with the United States, the Taiwanese economy degenerates and its government becomes more extreme, and the US needs to strengthen its regional ties.

Vietnam has become a major economic player in the Indo-Pacific place. Being one of the few participants in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement ( CPTPP ), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership ( RCEP ), and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework( IPEF ), it has a rapidly expanding economy that integrates with its regional neighbors. & nbsp,

Vietnam’s significance as a crucial entry point for American businesses to enter the Southeast Asia sector and beyond will therefore merely grow.

Biden’s visit offers a chance for high-level political and economic speech even though there are still issues that need to be resolved. & nbsp,

The amazing journey of reconciliation between the two former rivals is highlighted by the US president’s visit. Both the Vietnam War and the National War left both countries with severe physical and psychological scars.

General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Biden and Nguyen Phu Trong’s gathering to reveal a new level of US-Vietnam cooperation attests to years of deft politics and the current geopolitical requirements for both sides.

IPEF takes the initial actionable ways.

The text of the Supply Chains Pillar( Pillar II ) of IPEF was released on Thursday by the US Commerce Department. & nbsp,

Since the US launched the IPEF, the foundation of the Biden administration’s regional trade and investment engagement strategy for the region, an impressive 13 nations— Bunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam — have joined.

putting IPEF into practice.

The platform will provide a new way to tackle distinct issues for profitability, as an individual country and as grouping, according to senior US Commerce Department official who spoke with me about it. This will increase economic engagement for the US in this crucial region.

The US’s goals for IPEF are symbolically represented by the supply chain contract. & nbsp,

In this case, the platform aims to create a team of preferred providers who share the same values in order to achieve supply chain resilience.

The words, among other things, calls for the creation of a Supply Chain Council that would convene every year to evaluate supply chain bottlenecks and growth efforts, as well as an emergency communications system for emergency communication channels and an advisory board for labor rights across IPEF companion supply chains. & nbsp,

Businesses expect this team to consult with them first and work quickly, especially when making plans involving crisis response.

These new IPEF offer – network systems, while embrace, will merely succeed to the extent people and partners are committed to putting the time and resources into making them work, Wendy Cutler, vice president at the Asia Society Policy Institute and former acting assistant US Trade Representative, wrote to me.

Jackson Cox, the American Association of the Indo-Pacific’s chairman and based in Bangkok,” noting that” the” IPEF Supply Chain Council and IPEF Crisis Response Network were created to address future vulnerabilities, including through cooperation, information sharing, and the development of action plans ,” applauds the finalization and publication of” the supply chain resilience text.”

Companies expect the new Supply Chain Council to properly engage with them, determine vital interests, and generate realistic options, according to Russell Scoular, president of Australia’s Chatto Creek Advisory. “& nbsp,

IPEF won’t really matter until next.

China’s counter

This week, the Biden administration accomplished two key goals of its Indo-Pacific plan: boosting bilateral ties with Vietnam and setting up a membership and rules for preferred buying partners to balance China with the US.

Robert Blake, older managing director of McLarty Associates and a former US ambassador to Indonesia, noted that this year’s actions build on the accomplishments of 2022. In addition, & nbsp,

The US, Japan, and other partners announced a$ 20 billion Just Energy Transition Partnership during President Biden’s highly successful and significant trip to Jakarta last year for the G20 summit, where the president also announced the$ 698 million Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact, he told me. In addition, & nbsp,

The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Vietnam accomplishes the US’s overall goal for the Indo-Pacific place. Like many other East Asian countries, Vietnam is worried about China’s aggressiveness in the South China Sea. By establishing closer ties with Vietnam, the US strengthens a crucial local ally who can balance China’s effect without having to choose between the two.

Benefits from increased cooperation movement from IPEF, and the negotiations have now produced positive results by bringing attention to how Covid measures have harmed the world business and businesses of all sizes. In addition, & nbsp,

Although some source chain forces have decreased recently, businesses will still experience uncertainty due to deteriorating macroeconomic problems, inflation, interest rate increases, the possibility of pandemic shutdowns, and the climate crisis.

However more is required.

While the Biden administration accomplished two key goals of its Indo-Pacific technique this year, more work needs to be done if the US wants to balance China and provide the region’s nations with a framework they can choose from.

Despite attempts by the Biden administration to improve relations with its IPEF lovers and wean them away from Beijing, these nations are becoming more and more dependent on financial ties with China, according to a recent study from the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

The steps being taken to employ the IPEF’s supply chain words and the future negotiation circular in Thailand should therefore be the focus rather than Biden not attending a summit in Jakarta now that it has been released. & nbsp,

Blake concludes that the US has a strong dedication to ASEAN. The events of this week demonstrate that this is still the case.

While there is still much work to be done, skipping the ASEAN Summit does no demonstrate this.

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Amid multilateralism challenges, Singapore will do its best to make friends with like-minded partners: PM Lee

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Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, public Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, director-general of World Trade Organization, and Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan of United Arab Emirates were among the various rulers Mr. Lee met on the event’s outside.

The intergovernmental meetings offered the chance to discuss current events in addition to expressions of interest in working with Singapore on particular projects.

Understanding their ideas on our territory and their desire for our view on what’s happening in the world, how we view our relations with China, the conflicts affecting Southeast Asia, and, consequently, How we can keep our connection with the other countries in this atmosphere, according to Mr. Lee.

These contacts, in my opinion, are extremely useful.

” COMPREHENSIVE” G20 COMMUNIQUE

Joe Biden, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Flemish President Emmanuel Macron, and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida all attended the annual summit of the G20 markets.

The two-day celebration, which was presided over by Premier Li Qiang and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, was hardly attended by Chinese President Xi Jinping or Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Mr. Lee responded,” I don’t know the reasons why President Xi or President Putin were not able to come, but obviously it would have been better if they were here ,” when asked how important the absence of the Russian and Chinese leaders was for discussions on important global issues.

However, the conversations continued.

A mutual declaration was made on the first day of the trip summit, according to India, which is currently serving as the G20’s rotating president.

In the midst of severe divisions within the axis over the Ukraine war, this first agreement was unexpected. In the announcement, European nations had earlier pushed for a harsh condemnation of Russia, while other nations insisted on concentrating on more general financial issues.

The consensus statement refrained from denouncing Russia for its involvement in the fight in Ukraine, but it did draw attention to the suffering it had inflicted on people and urged all nations to refrain from using push to seize territory.

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Unwilling to choose, Southeast Asia is spoiled for choice

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BANGKOK – A century ago, American humorist Robert Benchley quipped that there are “two classes of people in the world; those who constantly divide the people of the world into two classes, and those who do not.” Thomas Parks does not. 

In a new book, “Southeast Asia’s Multipolar Future: Averting a New Cold War” (Bloomsbury), Parks challenges those who divide the Indo-Pacific into two poles – one Chinese, the other American – and who argue, therefore, that Southeast Asia must divide the bulk of its attention between them. Instead of two poles, he sees many. 

Parks also implies frustration with Southeast Asian countries themselves, which, by continually imploring China and the US not to pressure them into choosing one over the other, unwittingly contribute to the bipolar conception. If there are more than two poles, then there are more than two choices.

While conceding that China and the US are the heavyweights, Parks contends that they are trending toward “strategic parity”, such that neither is likely to establish hegemony in the region. 

Far from resulting in gridlock or geopolitical inertia, however, he argues the opposite: an “opening for the second tier of actors in the region to have outsized influence” – for middle and regional powers to act as additional poles. 

Moreover, among the key causes of great power parity in the region is Southeast Asia itself, whose collective voice speaks for even its smallest members and is increasingly heard in Beijing, Washington and elsewhere. 

This is done via the ten-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Home to the world’s fifth-largest economy and third-largest population, the region has proven a pole in its own right by keeping China and the US on either side of an open door.

These auxiliary poles – principally Australia, the EU, France, India, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the UK – vary greatly in size, strength and geopolitical magnetism vis-à-vis ASEAN and its member states. But the point is their sheer number and the options they represent for, and present to, the region. And they are here to stay.    

The framework thus laid, Parks immediately sets about the foundation of his argument with a chapter on Southeast Asia’s “Unseen Agency”, whose title acknowledges the idea’s many skeptics.  

Expertly linking relevant concepts such as balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging to recent examples, Parks details the ways in which regional states are playing “defense” against the sometimes heavy-handed tactics of China and the US. 

He also does this by referencing history, showing that the Cold War’s near-total alignment of regional states with one side or the other was actually a short-lived departure from centuries of negotiating great power pressure. Southeast Asia was making use of these concepts before they were concepts.

US President Joe Biden speaks during the ASEAN-US summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, November 12, 2022. Photo: Twitter / Pool

Among the book’s major insights is its illustration of the region’s recent “offensive” moves, the most effective of which is the focus of a chapter on “Diversifying Partners.” 

Both individually and as a regional pole/bloc, Southeast Asian countries are doubling down on the “multipolarity” they have helped create by reapportioning their foreign policies to include more middle and regional powers. 

And as with any portfolio whose diversification exceeds new resources, this has mitigated risk against a day of reckoning between China and the US while enabling new opportunities for expanding relations elsewhere.

Fortunately for his assertions, which run contrary to prevailing talk of a “new Cold War”, Parks is an empiricist.  Focusing on four areas – trade and FDI, foreign aid, travel and study abroad, and military cooperation and procurement – he contrasts Southeast Asia’s relations with the dominant and non-dominant states during the Cold War with the same since the war’s conclusion. 

While narrow vestiges remain (Laos’s economic dependence on China, heavy Philippine weapons procurement from the US), the level of reliance on a dominant power in any of the four areas by Southeast Asian countries has diminished significantly over the past three decades. “This reliance,” he rightly notes, “made them vulnerable to foreign influence and leverage.” 

At the same time, and even more to his point, Parks reveals that reliance overall has not diminished but instead has been diluted in favor of middle and regional powers. Fundamental changes – the Mekong’s “battlefields to marketplaces”, China’s economic rise, America’s “forever wars” – have of course played more than passive backdrop to this, but Southeast Asia has clearly been making deals and decisions on its own. 

After being the top study-abroad destination for decades, for example, the US is no longer number one for any Southeast Asian country, while (at least before the pandemic) China led the list for only Thai and Indonesian students. Australia and the UK, meanwhile, have surged in popularity with the region’s outward-bound students.

Even as China and Russia have essentially swapped their levels of global power since the end of the Cold War, Russia’s arms sales to the region exceeded China’s four-fold between 1999-2018.

Interestingly, among the main factors enabling countries to diversify have been the “multiple competing factions and voices” within them that push for greater or lesser alignment with China or the US. 

These range from camps within the communist party structures of Laos and Vietnam, to powerful ethnic Chinese minorities in Malaysia and Thailand, to partially democratic constituencies in Indonesia and the Philippines.

Parks’s prose, reflective of his long experience writing for diplomats and policymakers, is a study in measure and modulation, but he is subtly provocative in his chapters on ASEAN and “The Normative Divide.”

The former adopts a decidedly minority view among Western commentators in defending the regional body as (per its subtitle) “indispensable and misunderstood.” “Fundamentally,” Parks asserts, “whether you agree with it or not, ASEAN functions the way it was intended to function.”

China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi (C on screen) addresses ASEAN counterparts in a live video conference during the ASEAN-China Ministerial Meeting held online due to the COVID-19 novel coronavirus pandemic, in Hanoi on September 9, 2020. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP / Nhac Nguyen

That way is as “the primary vehicle for countries in Southeast Asia to shape external power engagement in the region.”  Founded at the height of the Cold War in 1967, ASEAN was designed to manage disputes and conflicts among its five original members so that external powers could not in the future interfere as they were doing then. 

Accordingly, once those powers and their proxy armies retreated in the 1990s, ASEAN absorbed its final four members and “it is remarkable that not a single armed conflict has occurred between ASEAN members since they joined the group,” Parks writes. 

More than that, ASEAN has succeeded in establishing its own vaunted “centrality” to regional security by ensuring that its ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) – also founded in the 1990s – contains the largest (27 states) and most inclusive (North Korea) membership of any such group. 

It is true that this centrality is purely procedural and that ASEAN, despite its collective heft, seldom advances its own agenda.  But Parks’s point is that the power to convene is the power ASEAN itself has chosen to claim and exercise.

What ASEAN was not mandated to do – the main misunderstanding among Western observers – is to manage disputes and conflicts within its member states. Its actions to preempt external involvement only apply when conflicts involve at least two ASEAN members. 

The rub lay in instances (several of which have been offered by Myanmar in recent years) where the distinction is hardly clear, and thus where ASEAN has struggled to reach and maintain its all-important consensus. 

Parks acknowledges that “ASEAN’s response to the Myanmar crisis seems to be leading the organization into uncharted territory” and that changes to its mandate are almost inevitable. In the meantime, his unique chapter does a service to readers and the regional body alike.

Parks continues his stride into “The Normative Divide”, concerning the promotion of democracy and human rights in Southeast Asia by external powers, but finds himself on less steady footing. 

He is correct to call for the right “balance” between promoting these “values” against more traditional national interests, and to claim that US and EU sometimes error “by emphasizing values at the expense of all other areas of cooperation.” 

He also accurately notes that Southeast Asia’s governments have substantially regressed in democratic governance and respect for human rights since the end of the Cold War and have, as a result, “developed a strong preference for external partners who avoid, or delicately handle, these confrontational issues.” 

But his disquieting conclusion is essentially that – ergo – the right “balance” is to simply minimize values promotion toward maximizing receptiveness to regional governments.

This implies that rights and governance inherently “weigh less” on the scale, in both their abstract importance and application, than do more traditional interests. It is hardly conceivable that Parks would sacrifice, say, global trade rules or diplomatic security the same way.

Further, in asking whether admittedly legitimate criticism of regional governments “is worth the cost in bilateral relations over the long term”, he implies that values are ancillary or additional, rather than integral, to such relations.

And while he cites Australia, India, Japan and South Korea as striking the balance varyingly well in Southeast Asia, his less-is-more logic is a slippery slope to China—which, “by not allowing values to dominate bilateral relations”, has advanced its influence and interests among regional governments more than any other country has in a quarter-century.

Promoting values less, as opposed to better, will not help Southeast Asia “avert a new cold war”; it will only usher it to the wrong side.

ASEAN foreign ministers in a handy embrace at this year’s summit in Jakarta. Image: Twitter

The book concludes with detailed chapters on four of the region’s new or, in the case of Japan, newly recognized poles.  As with all of its chapters, these begin with vignettes dating back a few years to a few centuries that not only illustrate a key point but provide welcome context and color. Their content follows suit. 

Japan’s development assistance to Southeast Asia was nearly twice that of the US in 1973 and nearly nine times greater by 2003, a disparity that has barely lessened since. Who knew that 13 of the 17 bridges over Bangkok’s Chao Phraya River were built by the Japanese? 

In 2021, Australia – not China, the US, or Japan – became ASEAN’s first Comprehensive Strategic Partner, and the maritime border it shares with the region’s largest member, Indonesia, is the longest maritime border in the world. 

As India was making Southeast Asia the main focus of its 1990s “Look East” policy, the region was busy looking north.  By 2019, China and ASEAN were a decade into free trade and investment agreements, while India accounted for less than 4% of ASEAN exports and less than 1% of its FDI. 

And from 2011 to 2021, the six formal partnerships established between European governments and ASEAN were more than the rest of the world combined. The UK became its first new dialogue partner in more than a quarter century.

So much of what has been written on geopolitics in Southeast Asia over the past half-dozen years is essentially the same, having become the “accepted discourse” to the exclusion of alternative views from different vantage points. There is China and the US, and there is everyone else. 

Parks’s view of the region is one from the region, where he has lived and worked for 16 years. It poses a credible and necessary challenge to this new “Washington Consensus”, introducing a far more crowded and complex environment.  

For this reason alone – among many others – his book should feature not only in the briefing packets of those deployed to the region, but on the desks of their many minders back home.

Benjamin Zawacki is a Senior Program Specialist at the Asia Foundation in Bangkok, a 2022-23 Mansfield-Luce Asia Scholar and the author of Thailand: Shifting Ground Between the US and a Rising China. He works alongside Parks at the Asia Foundation in Thailand.

Thomas Parks’s Southeast Asia’s Multipolar Future: Averting a New Cold War (Bloomsbury) may be purchased on Amazon here.

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