Time for Malaysia to recognize the ‘New’ Delhi

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The visit by Malaysian Foreign Affairs Minister Zambry Abdul Kadir to New Delhi from November 5-8 was a significant milestone in Malaysia-India relations. Zambry met with his counterpart, Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, for the sixth India-Malaysia Joint Commission Meeting.

The JCM reviewed the progress of the Enhanced Strategic Partnership, which covers areas of political, defense, security, economic, trade and investment, health, science and technology, culture, tourism and people-to-people ties, and also discussed regional and multilateral issues of mutual interest. 

Since the start of the year, there has been a flurry of visits by top Indian ministers to Malaysia. In early June, Minister of State for External Affairs V Muraleedharan met with his Malaysian counterparts, followed by Defense Minister Rajnath Singh in July and Minister of State for External Affairs and Education Rajkumar Ranjan Singh in December.

The visits quite clearly signaled a reset in bilateral relations following the diplomatic row in 2019 arising from then-prime minister Mahathir Mohamad’s remarks about Kashmir and India’s Citizenship Amendment Act.

Zambry also mentioned that the visit of Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim to India is imminent, signifying an upswing in ties.

On the people-to-people front, just this week, Anwar announced that Malaysia would allow citizens of India 30-day visa-free entry to the country with effect from December 1. Given how visa requirements have been one of the most potent deterrents for travel between Malaysia and India, this move signals intent for greater connectivity and desire for enhanced bilateral ties.

Trade relations

India is one of the 10 largest trading partners of Malaysia, and Malaysia is the third-largest trading partner for India among the ASEAN countries. Not only dwelling on the cultural and civilizational ties between India and Malaysia, Zambry’s visit gives promise to more sectors of cooperation in the near future, primarily renewable energy, semiconductors and space. 

India is forecast to emerge as the third-largest economy in the world by 2027. This is an opportunity for Malaysia to initiate and capitalize on partnerships with India in digital, fintech and semiconductor fields.

India has been a success story in digital payments and several best practices can be shared with and adopted by Malaysia, such as the Unified Payments Interface system and RuPay payment service, which would boost overall financial engagement between the two countries. 

India now a global player

Beyond technical cooperation, it is of utmost importance that policymakers in Putrajaya, Malaysia’s seat of government, understand that this is a very different India they are dealing with since the last JCM more than a decade ago.

New Delhi is emerging as a regional trend-setter with increasing global influence through its value and visibility in the Indo-Pacific region. For India on the Indo-Pacific multilateralism front, this year could not have been a better one. 

As Group of Twenty and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) chair, New Delhi’s Global South agenda, and pragmatic, balanced and assertive foreign-policy choices took center stage.

Being a leading proponent of Indo-Pacific cooperation and guided by core policies such as the Neighborhood First Policy, Act East Policy, Africa Outreach initiative, and Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), this past year has quite clearly demonstrated how New Delhi’s role in the emerging Indo-Pacific order is taking new forms and gaining fresh momentum.

In the grand scheme of things, what stands out for India as a significant partner for Malaysia and ASEAN member states in the Indo-Pacific is its ability to take a distinct multi-aligned and multi-pronged approach to partnerships in the region. New Delhi has gradually but intently refined its approach, reflecting an adept compartmentalisation of interests, strategic competition, and geopolitical dynamics.

India is clearly able to balance continued commitment to SCO and BRICS (which means constructive engagement with traditional “rivals” such as China and Pakistan), active collaboration within the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the I2U2 Group (India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the US), and finally, advancement of cornerstone mechanisms like the G20 and BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation).

A sincere commitment to multilateralism and regionalism despite existing deep-seated rivalries makes India by far, the most “centered” Indo-Pacific partner – a reality that has not fully dawned on policymakers in Malaysia or ASEAN. 

These recent developments make the much-documented synergies between India’s and ASEAN’s approach to the Indo-Pacific region, specifically the IPOI and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), that much more apparent – and operable.

It is noteworthy that Malaysia’s alignment to the AOIP is the only articulation of its acceptance of the Indo-Pacific concept. Whether in terms of principles or priorities in the Indo-Pacific region, it is undeniable that India is a natural partner for Malaysia and ASEAN that demands more nuanced attention.

The missing cognizance in Putrajaya that it is dealing with a “new” India is perhaps one of the biggest stumbling blocks to tapping on New Delhi for more meaningful means of cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

With Malaysia assuming the role of ASEAN chair in 2025, it must advocate for active recognition and acknowledgement of India’s ability to be a valued “multilateral connector” for Southeast Asia.

There are real opportunities for ASEAN’s enhanced cooperation with other partners in the Indo-Pacific such as Africa, the Middle East and the Pacific Islands to be brokered by India within existing frameworks and initiatives – such as the Africa Outreach initiative, the recently announced India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and through the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation.

For many states in the region, including Malaysia, the rise of “new” India has understandably not been the easiest thing to calibrate or adapt to. Recognizing change and altering perceptions of New Delhi is a necessity but will be a challenge, nonetheless.

Malaysia’s current relations with India are defined by older, outdated and “safer” narratives, so much so that they do not reflect current realities – and this is a missed opportunity on several counts. India on its current geopolitical trajectory is and will remain an important partner to Malaysia. It is time Putrajaya realizes this too.

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Myanmar’s instability deepens as the world watches silently

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Myanmar’s stability has eroded significantly since the 2021 military coup. But the coordinated attack by multiple separatist and pro-democracy groups in October and November 2023 has seen military outposts, villages, border crossings, and other infrastructure overrun.

While the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military, clings to control in central and coastal regions populated by the country’s ethnic majority, much of the country’s border areas are increasingly slipping into anti-government control.

This current turbulence is not an aberration but deeply rooted in Myanmar’s history. Since gaining independence from British rule in 1948, the country has grappled with what is commonly described as the world’s longest-running civil war.

Initial experiments with democracy witnessed limited clashes between Myanmar’s central government and Ethnic Armed Organizations. After a military coup in 1962 that established the junta, more EAOs emerged to challenge government power.

Infighting and splintering among EAOs, coupled with their growing antagonism toward the Burma Communist Party (BCP), itself waging a war on the central government, allowed the junta to implement fragile ceasefires in exchange for limited autonomy. By the end of the Cold War, democratic protests in 1988, the collapse of the BCP in 1989, and free elections in 1990 all suggested Myanmar was cautiously embracing a peaceful future.

Despite losing the elections in 1990, however, the junta did not relinquish power, drawing international condemnation. EAOs and other groups like the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), which split from the BCP, then continued their struggle for two decades until the junta ceded some powers to a civilian administration in 2011.

Elections in 2015 and 2020 saw landslide victories for the National League for Democracy (NLD), as well as some progress toward reconciliation.

But in 2021, the Tatmadaw re-established the junta and plunged the country back into destabilization, culminating in the 2023 autumn offensive by anti-junta forces.

In addition to EOAs and a reorganized BCP, the junta has been forced to contend with People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), loose armed organizations backed by the National Unity Government (NUG), set up by lawmakers and politicians in the aftermath of the coup. Additionally, the role of the Burman ethnic majority and grassroots civil defense forces in opposing the junta has also complicated its response to unrest.

The junta has proved adept at managing its restive elements before, and can also rely on its Border Guard Forces (BGFs) and other pro-government militia groups. But the broad swaths of Myanmar’s society fighting against it have made the junta’s traditional policy of divide and rule far less effective.

Myanmar’s Acting President Myint Swe has said the country could “split into various parts,”prompting Myanmar military officials to retreat to the capital, Naypyidaw, a planned city completed in 2012 that in effect serves as a fortress located near the most restive regions.

Evolving role for China

China’s role in Myanmar has undergone significant shifts since the latter’s independence. Despite Chinese support for the BCP and other communist groups, Myanmar grew closer to China after its isolation from the West in the 1990s. Beijing supported the junta to stabilize Myanmar and prevent adversaries from establishing a foothold on China’s southern border.

Other interests included maintaining access to Myanmar’s raw materials and natural resources, as well as infrastructure development to turn Myanmar into a strategic gateway to the Bay of Bengal through the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

China maintained ties to the junta, democracy advocates, and ethnic groups from 2011 to 2021. However, the 2021 coup disrupted development projects and led to attacks on Chinese-run facilities by rebel groups, and the junta’s inability to protect infrastructure exacerbated historical tension between it and Beijing.

Four Chinese civilians were killed in 2015 after a Myanmar military air strike hit across the border into Yunnan, while the junta burned down a Chinese-owned factory and killed Chinese and Myanmar civilians in 2021.

China’s ongoing support to some militia groups, such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and MNDAA, provides Beijing leverage over the junta and a say in the ceasefire processes.

Chinese firms also often work with armed groups in “special economic zones” near the border, and some of the anti-junta groups regularly cross the border to China to escape the junta and its proxy forces. Beijing’s tacit approval of their activities may also be partially fueled by wariness that rebel groups were becoming closer to the US prior to the new offensive.

Beijing has nonetheless attempted to sustain a balancing act, arresting a UWSA deputy military chief in October and initially ignoring calls for assistance from the rebels after the launch of their offensive. But after the steady string of defeats suffered by the junta, China has since altered its outlook. China’s affiliates now form some of the most powerful groups operating in Myanmar, and its Foreign Ministry has called for a ceasefire.

Organized crime

Myanmar’s porous borders have not only allowed armed groups to flourish but also facilitated the expansion of organized crime networks. Increased cooperation between militant and criminal groups in recent decades, known as the terror-crime nexus, has elevated the power of these groups worldwide.

American efforts to counter communism inadvertently helped develop drug networks in Myanmar during the early Cold War, while transnational organized crime in Southeast Asia burgeoned in the 21st century. The Covid-19 pandemic further established Myanmar as a hub of criminal activity, expanding the funding networks available to the country’s armed groups.

Both local and international criminal networks operate in Myanmar’s special economic zones, engaging in human and wildlife trafficking, slavery, cybercrimes, money-laundering, communication fraud, illegal casinos, and online gambling centers.

The relationships between these entities and governments are intricate, with shifting alliances commonplace. Beijing and transnational Chinese gangs play central roles in Myanmar’s heightened criminal activity. The junta has also had close ties to criminal networks for decades, and since the 2021 coup has become increasingly reliant on criminal activity to finance itself and offset international isolation.

China, while entangled in Myanmar’s criminal underworld, has grown steadily more concerned with rising illicit activity on its border with Myanmar and the willing and unwilling participation of Chinese citizens.

China’s signals to the junta to address the forced-labor networks since May 2023 went unheeded, leading to China issuing arrest warrants for junta allies and the UWSA to raid online scam compounds and trafficked-labor centers in border regions.

However, the resilience of regional criminal groups became evident after the NLD failed to disrupt their activities during the decade of partial democratic rule from 2011 to 2021, and they have only grown financially stronger since.

And despite their interweaving with regional elites, criminal networks and their militant partners have developed newfound agency and an ability to act independently from governments since the 2021 coup.

Militarized ethnic groups

Additionally, while the junta styles its current campaign as a counterinsurgency, Myanmar’s armed groups possess significant military capabilities. Minority groups such as those belonging to the Karen ethnic group were prominent in Myanmar’s armed forces during the British colonial administration, gaining valuable experience.

As in Ethiopia, certain ethnic groups have developed and maintained well-equipped forces capable of both insurgency and conventional warfare.

Like other anti-government forces around the world, Myanmar rebel groups have also embraced new technologies and strategies in recent years. This includes crowdfunding initiatives, which have expanded significantly since 2021, to offset the junta’s control over the central bank and other national economic levers.

Large-scale application of drone warfare has also made a marked difference on the battlefield, even before the current offensive by the rebels.

Myanmar’s militant groups have also worked with European criminal groups to obtain weapons, and groups like the UWSA have proved capable of manufacturing weapons since 2008. The use of 3D-printed guns by Myanmar rebel groups, just 10 years after the first 3D-printed gun was produced, also marks a distinctive feature of the current conflict.

The NUG has meanwhile been busily setting up local civic administration and public services and People’s Administrative Teams (PATs) in PDF-controlled or contested areas, indicative of their state-building capabilities.

Shaky support for junta

Hindered by international isolation, increasingly powerful rebel groups, and a growing dependence on a Chinese leadership willing to support multiple sides, the junta’s outlook appears bleak. But it does maintain some other allies abroad.

Russia grew closer to the junta throughout the 2010s and despite being tied down in Ukraine, Moscow has offered more support for Myanmar since the coup, including the first ever Russia-Myanmar joint naval exercise last month. Bordering states Laos and Thailand also maintain friendly ties to the junta, and Laos, holding the chairmanship of ASEAN since September, has shielded Myanmar from greater institutional isolation.

Myanmar’s other neighbors, India and Bangladesh, are also wary of additional instability and the potential emergence of a failed state on their borders. India has already seen tens of thousands of refugees (as well as soldiers from the junta) cross the border since 2021, while Bangladesh has seen close to a million Rohingya refugees enter the country since 2016, and India has recently shown it is still willing to engage with the junta despite its vulnerability.

Efforts to further unite anti-government forces meanwhile face obstacles due to differences in strategies, objectives, and allegiances. Several organizations have been set up to encourage greater coordination, but infighting is still common.

Some EAOs, such as the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), are still open to adhering to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), while others consider a federal system a viable alternative to complete independence.

Perceived indifference to the Rohingya crisis in 2017 on behalf of the democratic government at the time also reveals the persistent ethnic tensions among Myanmar’s population despite alternative leadership.

Persuading criminal and militant groups to give up their lucrative illicit networks, as well as untangling their links to the junta-dominated economy, will also prove challenging. And with the US diplomatically tied down in Ukraine and Israel and ASEAN’s divided approach to the crisis, China enjoys relative freedom to manipulate the situation on its border.

Yet despite positive relations across Myanmar’s political spectrum, Beijing’s reluctance to intervene more directly only amplifies the persistent uncertainty surrounding Myanmar’s future.

This article was produced by Globetrotter, which provided it to Asia Times.

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Moody’s warns US, China it’s time to change their ways

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Moody’s Investors Service is actively and innocently prodding the two largest bears in the world economy.

Experts at the agency threatened to remove Washington’s final AAA credit score next month. The increase in US 10 time bond yields to 17-year peaks was exacerbated by that volley.

Beijing was the next city to speak Moody growl this week. As Asia’s largest economy struggles with an economic slowdown and a worsening real estate crisis, Moody’S changed its outlook on the Chinese government of debt from” stable” to “negative” on Tuesday ( December 5 ).

A day later, Moody’s went even further by telegraphing potential rating steps against state-owned bank tycoons, numerous Foreign government-backed organizations funding system assignments, and even Hong Kong and Macau.

Threatening downgrades for the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd., China Development Bank, and another behemoths will undoubtedly work if Moody’s is attempting to capture the attention of Chinese leader Xi Jinping. It will also affect international investors who are concerned that Beijing is n’t moving quickly enough to contain contagion risks.

In general, the urge is to respond violently to these instructions. The group of US President Joe Biden carried out that action.

Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen responded to Moody’s risk to drop by saying,” This is a choice I disagree with. Treasury securities continue to be the world’s top safe and liquid asset, and the American market is ultimately strong.

China is also pushing up. Issues of Moody about the aspirations of China’s economic development and fiscal sustainability are unnecessary, the Ministry of Finance of Xi stated on Tuesday, expressing its “dissatisfaction.”

Beijing added that the fallout from financial and property issues is” stable” and that it is working to “deepen measures to tackle risks and challenges.” However, it’s important to take into account the potential benefits of rating agencies like Moody making a timely call for stronger action against the two economical powers.

Janet Yellen, the US Treasury Secretary, disagrees that the country merits a upgrade. Asia Times files / AFP picture

The rules of economic gravity however apply, as Moody’s served as a helpful warning to Biden, Yellen, and Jerome Powell, chairman of the Federal Reserve, in the case of America.

Faith in the money is rapidly eroding as the US federal loan surpasses$ 33 trillion, Biden’s White House raises spending, and the Fed tightens its restrictions with the most vehemence in years.

The price increases in gold and cryptocurrencies are merely the most recent example of how traditional Bretton-Woods economic realities are clashing with contemporary disregard for the ways in which markets you influence perhaps the largest economies.

China, as well. The 24 members of the Communist Party’s Politburo will soon meet to discuss policy priorities and determine rise objectives for the upcoming year. Following that, a course may be charted by the annual Central Economic Work Conference, which will bring up municipal and central government leaders.

A development goal of around 5 % is anticipated for 2024, according to economists at JPMorgan, Standard Chartered, and other major investment bankers.

An optimistic growth target, according to Goldman Sachs economist Maggie Wei,” may help lessen the risk of China falling into a self-fulfilling cycle of melancholy expectations, more depressing growth, and reinforcing negative expectations.”

However, Moody’s is reminding group leaders that economic gravity is more difficult than that.

According to Moody’s, the government and larger public sector may help financially strapped regional and local governments and state-owned enterprises in China, according to its reasoning.

When Moody’s warns of “increased dangers related to functionally and consistently lower medium-term economic growth and the continued reduction of the property sector,” it also speaks for many.

However, it is implied in bold font between the lines that many international investors are n’t buying Xi’s promises to carry out audacious structural reforms. And how new stimulus increases are then “posing wide downside risks to China’s macroeconomic, economic, and institutional strength,” according to Moody.

Chinese President Xi Jinping claims that he now favors more expansion driven by the private sector. Online Screengrab image

China’s finance minister responded by saying that mainland growth is improving in the October–December quarter and that the Chinese economy will account for more than 30 % of global GDP in 2023. That would be consistent with predictions made by the International Monetary Fund ( IMF).

However, there is no timeline for taking action to grow&nbsp, better, rather than just faster, in China’s new rhetoric. According to scholar Lee Lu at Nomura Holdings, more stimulus may become necessary in the short term. We also think it’s too early to say the bottom, he says, “despite the numerous trigger actions announced recently.”

The good news is that Premier Li Qiang is thought to have received Xi’s approval to speed up efforts to reinvigorate the private sector. Li’s team unveiled a 25-point plan package next month to level playing fields and increase funding for private companies.

Eight economic officials and firm tanks are involved in the program, including the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, the People’s Bank of China, National Administration of Financial Regulation, China Securities Regulatory Commission, &nbsp, and National Development and Reform Commission.

The goal is to significantly raise the loan to private enterprise ratio in order to increase innovation and productivity and support more powerful supply chains. According to Li’s group, the goal is to guarantee” ongoing revenue solutions” for private businesses that refrain from “blindly stopping, suppressing, withdrawing or cutting off money.”

The NDRC stated this week that China “is comfortable and more capable of achieving long-term robust growth, and constantly bringing new impetus and options to the earth through China’s accelerated advancement.”

According to scholar Diana Choyleva of Enodo Economics,” Beijing is serious about getting funds flowing to the healthier components of the home field, whether it be personal or state-owned.” &nbsp, They are not satisfied with entrusting the choice to the businesses, which have discriminated against the private market for a number of factors.

Jumpstarting the creation of a high-yield bond market to expand China’s money markets universe is an essential component of the business. Theoretically, a lively and varied range of debt offerings would boost options for private sector financing and boost China’s appeal to investors.

These, Xi’s efforts to make the yuan more popular on international businesses are advantageous. As concerns about the US dollar rise, the battle is gaining momentum. Nothing could hasten that progress more quickly than swiftly and openly putting in place significant reforms.

Here is where Xi and his team needed to win back the confidence of international investors. It is important to note that The Moody’s news did n’t destroy Chinese assets.

The most significant lesson from the Moody’s statement, according to economists at advisory organization China Beige Book, is that their team takes years longer than the majority of China viewers to reach an obvious conclusion. Little brand-new around. Continue.

However, analysts at Citigroup Global Markets predict that in 2024, China’s investment-grade payment issues will be more alluring than those of US counterparts. Following the Moody’s information, Citi experts wrote,” The market has now priced this in to some extent, and China investment-grade has some price.”

In Chongqing, China, a butler is seen strolling along dingy bridges with brand-new residential properties in the distance. Photo: Zhang Peng, LightRocket, CNBC Screengrab, and Getty Images

As Beijing works to regulate real estate markets, Citi experts also cited China’s” stronger, but still fragile micro story.” Chinese money bonds with an investment class are currently up about 5.4 % in 2023.

According to Citi researchers,” China risks are primarily in the price.” The Chinese offshore credit market, which is regarded as an asset and money diversifier for regional investors, tends to do well in times of inland equity-market volatility.

Analysts ‘ concern that China’s time of raising GDP rates solely through stimulus and funding is over, however, is where Moody makes a point.

For starters, “remaining plan room may be limited, as we believe central authorities needs to balance moral liability problems when supporting local governments with substantial debt burdens,” according to scientist Samuel Kwok at Fitch Ratings.

Another is that the quality of mainland growth can only be improved by strong financial retooling that unlocks China’s longer-term growth potential. This trend toward trigger over reform explains why S&amp, P Global Ratings predicts that China will grow below 5 % into 2026.

According to S&amp and P record analyst Eunice Tan, China’s real estate market is still under stress despite stimulus. The cash patterns of property developers and heavily indebted regional government borrowing vehicles are being dented by limited access to credit assistance and higher corporate debt utilize.

As a result, S&amp, P’s Tan claims that the rise website for the Asia-Pacific is moving from China to South and Southeast Asia. Tan notes that this change may limit China’s lenders ‘ medium-term face while enhancing those of India, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

China’s imports decreased by 0.6 %, despite data released on Thursday showing a 0.5 % increase in exports in November year over year. More policy supports are required to promote demand, according to a word from UBS analysts, and the data more dashed hopes of regaining China’s consumption-led economy.

According to OANDA researcher Kelvin Wong, “domestic need has remained weak in China despite continued revival efforts by policymakers via intended monetary and fiscal stimulus steps.”

Therefore, according to Wong,” It seems that the previous one-month treatment of transfer growth recorded in October is probably a “blip” and November’s bad year-on-year growth rate suggests the rolling twelve months of bad growth trend in imports remains intact.”

At the Horgos Port in the autonomous region of north China’s Xinjiang Uighur, business containers can be seen. Image: Xinhua

Global traders are anxiously anticipating the Politburo’s next chamber event as difficulties mount. This once-every-five-year program typically takes place in early December.

The fact that it has n’t been scheduled yet has led to rumors that Xi wants to address a number of pressing issues, such as rising local government debt, deflationary pressures, and real estate to record youth unemployment.

As a madly polarizing 2024 presidential election draws near, the US even faces significant obstacles. The US government’s estimated annualized loan interest payments have increased to the$ 1&nbsp, trillion level, among other things.

Shareholders are free to disregard the financial paths in Washington and Beijing that Moody’s, S&amp, P, and Fitch have to say. However, as payment prospects deteriorate, it is important to keep in mind that some observers, analysts, and investors are n’t buying the party line, despite Biden and Xi’s insistence that they are on top of their individual debt problems.

Following William Pesek on X, previously Twitter, at @WilliamPess

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Woman jailed for getting jobs with forged NTU degree, says she faced economic and parental pressure

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SINGAPORE: On Wednesday, December 6, a person was given an eight-month prison term for forging an architectural degree from Nanyang Technological University (NTU) and using it to land numerous processing jobs over the course of 16 years.

She had forged the amount, according to her attorney, to “placate” her mother, who put emotional strain on her. According to Fonseka Wannerichega Hema Ranjini’s attorney, the criminal also had to work to support herself and her relatives, which put her under financial stress.

44-year-old Malaysian woman Fonseka entered a guilty plea to two counts of fraud and lying last month, with additional two charges being taken into account.

Fonseka had enrolled in electrical and manufacturing architecture at NTU in 1998. She withdrew from the program in 2004 because she struggled with the labor and the costs.

The girl faked a Bachelor of Engineering level from NTU in 2004 with third-class honors, according to her attorney, who afterwards claimed that her mother had reduced funding for her education.

Over the years, she used the forged certificate to land a number of tasks, starting with the position of assistant managing director at Marshall Cavendish Education for S$ 4,200 per month.

She also held assistant managing editor positions at Scholastic Education International ( Singapore ), Cengage Learning Asia, and Oxygen Studio Designs as a result of the certification.

She worked as a learning editor in publishing for the Walt Disney Company ( Southeast Asia ), where her highest monthly salary was S$ 6,800, with an additional transport allowance of S$ 1, 084 per month, until the company found her forged certificate after conducting checks.

Won CONSIDERABLE SALARY: DPP

Melissa Heng, the deputy public attorney, asked for eight to ten months in prison for Fonseka on Wednesday, highlighting her efforts to make the signature look authentic and the fact that she was able to secure five jobs with it over the course of 16 years.

According to Ms. Heng,” With each subsequent application, she was able to legitimize her continue, indicating her academic qualifications, and in doing so continue deceiving employers.”

She claimed that Fonseka received a” significant income” between S$ 47, 000 and S$ 83, 000 for some fees.

When Fonseka’s dishonesty was exposed, her answer revealed her lack of regret, according to Ms. Heng.

Although Ms. Heng did not request a payment order, claiming that it was difficult to quantify the harm done, she asserted that the employers who hired Fonseka did require specific educational requirements for the positions offered.

It would n’t be an exaggeration to say that Fonseka was expected to apply in her jobs training derived from the obtaining of her purported degree, she said, adding that the fact that this was present showed the employers valued educational qualifications.

Instead, defense attorney Foo Cheow Ming requested a great or, in the event that the court did not reach an agreed-upon fine, an extremely small jail sentence.

She responded to her mother’s force by defending herself.

According to Mr. Foo, the” series of cascading events” started as a result of pressure from Fonseka’s family, who stopped providing funding for her education centuries ago.

According to Mr. Foo,” Fonseka took the first step of forging a ( degree ) in order to appease her mother because of the intense psychological pressure ( her ) mother placed on her sense of worth and self-esteem.

” Following that, the financial strain of having to make a living and provide for her own parents caused the use of the forged ( degree )”

He claimed that while Fonseka’s “filial devotion remains unwavering” and she continues to care for her parents, his customer suffered “physical and intellectual abuse” from her mother, who has an undiagnosed personality disorder.

According to Mr. Foo, the circumstance of his client could be distinguished from other instances of cheating where the accused person’s public or legal status changed as a result of deception on government agencies.

Mr. Foo said it was” not as if she did n’t work at all,” despite the fact that Fonseka’s actions helped her land jobs she might not have otherwise been able to.

According to Mr. Foo, it was also not a circumstance in which she caused her employers” a gross full loss,” as in the case of blatant theft, criminal breach of trust, or lying.

According to the attorney, Fonseka’s employers did receive her solutions and the price she provided as a result.

If Fonseka’s work is alleged to have been bad, Mr. Foo argued that “employing a genuine graduate is no guarantee against poor or underpar performance on the part of the employee.”

Importantly, he added that there was no possible chance to the general public, clients, or employers because Fonseka did not practice engineering in her jobs, which were primarily in the language or journal sectors.

He deemed the prosecution’s proposed prison sentence to be “excessive and inappropriate.”

According to District Judge Terence Tay, the basic rule for financial offenses is that the word will become harsher in cases where there is a higher economic value involved.

A judicial phrase is appropriate, according to Judge Tay,” as long as the offense in question forces the sufferer to part with property that has more than minor value.”

Given that Fonseka actually worked for her employers, he claimed that the damage done in this case was the problem.

Nevertheless, he claimed that Fonseka’s employment was based on his education, and that there would have been some pay differentials and expectations for the companies ‘ contributions.

According to the judge, her crimes may have embarrassed her businesses as well as depriving another deserving workers of the work she had obtained through deceit.

According to him, it was challenging to identify the offenses, and if” this becomes a prevalent condition,” all employers may be required to check every certificate issued by their staff.

If Fonseka’s family was the one who stopped paying her fees, Judge Tay said he was confused by her alleged sorrow at leaving NTU.

He said,” I do n’t understand how it would ever justify her lying about her educational background, which persisted for many years.”

The judge expressed sympathy for Fonseka’s community position but asserted that there was no evidence to suggest that the events gave rise to the crimes.

He claimed that while Fonseka did a good job for the majority of the jobs she held—aside from the one at Scholastic, where she was fired—her offenses may have disrupted the pay structures at the companies, which are typically tied to academic qualifications, though this could have been replaced over time by job performance.

The judge added that Fonseka was still relatively young and still had a bright future ahead of her,” I think it’s been well-documented that education is not everything.”

While some careers require certifications, others do not, and some people have been successful in these positions, according to the judge. &nbsp,

The accused ought to look into for another possibilities, he said.

He concurred with the trial that Fonseka should not be compensated because it is difficult to quantify the hurt the offenses caused.

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Hewlett Packard Enterprise appoints new managing director for Singapore to spearhead country operations, drive region’s long-term growth strategy

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Loh may continue to lead SEA as managing director and vice president of HPE.tasked with increasing HPE’s collection, managing accounts, and improving employee effectivenessLoh Khai Peng&nbsp, ( pic ), was appointed managing director of Singapore effective 1 November 2023 by Hewlett Packard Enterprise ( HPE). He may continue to hold the…Continue Reading

Commentary: How will Henry Kissinger be remembered in Southeast Asia?

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HENRY KISSINGER’S WORLDVIEW

In trying to understand the enigma of the man, we have to understand his worldview. Dr Kissinger was the ultimate practitioner of realpolitik pragmatism. For him, morality had little place in the arena of world politics where power served as its prime currency.

If anything, excessive preoccupation with moral arguments were a distraction from – if not an obstacle to – the larger objective of peace, which to him was ultimately about avoiding the kind of great power conflagration that brought about World War II. To achieve this objective, difficult decisions would have to be made which, to Dr Kissinger, left little room for sentimentality.

This leads to a second point: To Dr Kissinger, the chief actors in the script of global politics were the great powers. Throughout his time in office during the terms of US presidents Richard M Nixon and Gerald R Ford, Dr Kissinger was consumed by Cold War competition with the Soviet Union and principally, the question of how to prevent a major nuclear conflict without compromising American interests and security.

It is from this prism that some of the US’ most controversial policies during those years, many attributed to him and that have tainted his legacy, should be viewed, such as the toleration of right-wing dictatorships in Latin America, complicity in violence in Bangladesh and the bombing of Cambodia.

KISSINGER’s IMPACT ON SOUTHEAST ASIA

With these aspects of Dr Kissinger’s worldview in mind, what were his contributions and connections to Southeast Asia? After all, if indeed his preoccupation was with great power politics, how did he view a region that comprised small and medium-sized states?

As national security adviser and later also secretary of state to US presidents Nixon and Ford, Henry Kissinger served during the most turbulent years of recent Southeast Asian history, when Soviet and Chinese-supported communist movements threatened to take over many governments in the region.

While communist insurgencies raged across Southeast Asia, it was in Vietnam where the threat was most urgent. Indeed, as early on as the presidency of Dwight D Eisenhower, the US was already seized by the prospect that the fall of Indochina to communism would allow the ideology to spread across Southeast Asia. This became known as the “domino theory”.

Dr Kissinger was instrumental in crafting and executing American policy at the height of the Vietnam War. He would oversee further escalation of the war, both in terms of the number of US troops deployed and also the expansion of the war to Cambodia, which he thought necessary in order to weaken the Vietcong.

Nevertheless, the ballooning cost of the war, mounting American casualties, and President Nixon’s promise to scale down US involvement, compelled Dr Kissinger to pursue secret negotiations with North Vietnam for the US’ eventual withdrawal.

Both he and his North Vietnamese counterpart, Le Duc Tho, were awarded the 1973 Nobel peace prize for their efforts. Mr Tho declined it, and Dr Kissinger never went to Oslo to collect his for fear of widespread protests given how unpopular the war had become.

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