JAKARTA: Indonesia has ordered the military to help farmers plant rice as severe drought has reduced output of the staple in Southeast Asia’s most populous country, lifting prices, requiring increased imports and threatening food security. With planting behind schedule due to dryness fuelled by the El Nino weather phenomenon, PresidentContinue Reading
“The aggression and provocations perpetrated by [China’s maritime forces] over the weekend have only further steeled our determination to defend and protect our nation’s sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction” in the South China Sea,” declared Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr after yet another major incident in the hotly disputed waters.
According to Philippine authorities, a contingent of Chinese maritime forces “harassed, blocked and executed dangerous maneuvers” against a resupply mission to the Second Thomas Shoal, a contested feature hosting a small Philippine military contingent.
Manila claims that at least two Philippine Coast Guard vessels were damaged after getting water-cannoned by Chinese counterparts. And no less than the Philippine military chief directly witnessed the latest encounter between the two rival claimants.
Meanwhile, a civil-society-led mission to the same area meant to express public support for Filipino troops stationed in the area was called off after four Chinese vessels shadowed them en route to Second Thomas Shoal.
The twin incidents provoked outrage in Manila, with senior legislative leaders openly calling for expulsion of the Chinese envoy to the Philippines.
China has countered by insisting that it was the Philippine vessels that had “illegally intruded” in its waters. It characterized its latest actions as simply part of broader “control measures” in accordance “with [Chinese] law.”
Far from a limited operation over a tiny shoal, however, China is determined is regain the initiative in the South China Sea.
Last week, China dispatched an armada of militia forces to another Philippine-claimed feature in the area, a prelude to likely new reclamation activities in the Spratly Islands. By flexing its massive naval capabilities, the Asian superpower seeks to intimidate Southeast Asian nations as well as test America’s resolve to assist its regional allies.
Since 1999, a small detachment of Filipino troops have been precariously stationed on BRP Sierra Madre, a former US Navy ship the Philippines grounded in 1999 at Second Thomas Shoal. With the rusty, dilapidated vessel expected to give way to the elements in the near future, both Manila and Beijing have ramped up their activities in the area.
China insists that the disputed land feature falls within its nine-dash-line maritime territory, which covers more than 80% of the South China Sea basin and includes the major Pratas, Paracels and Spratlys island chains as well as prized features such as Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal, which fall within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
In 2016, an arbitral tribunal body at The Hague, formed under the aegis of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ruled against China’s expansive claims in the area and, crucially, determined that disputed features such as Second Thomas Shoal are “low-tide” elevations, which can’t be claimed as a territory.
Since the disputed shoal falls within the Philippines’ EEZ, the Southeast Asian nation claims it as part of its continental shelf.
But China has rejected the Philippines’ claims as well as the 2016 arbitral award ruling. Over the past decade, the Asian superpower has dramatically ramped up its efforts to exercise effective control over a whole host of disputed features in the area by, among other things, restricting Philippine resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal.
With the Marcos administration taking an increasingly uncompromising stance in the South China Sea, while doubling down on his country’s defense alliance with the US, China has begun to switch gears. The upshot is multiple encounters in recent months alone, but this time was different.
“It’s pure aggression. I [personally] witnessed how many times the big Chinese coast guard and militia ships cut our path. They water-cannoned us, then bumped us. It’s angering,” exclaimed General Romeo Brawner Jr, chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
“This really needs a diplomatic solution at the higher level,” he added, emphasizing the Philippine military’s commitment to stand its ground in the disputed waters.
“This is a serious escalation on the part of the agents of the People’s Republic of China,” Jonathan Malaya, spokesman of the Philippine National Security Council, warned during a press conference.
Despite harassment by Chinese forces, Philippine authorities have pressed ahead with resupply missions. And with the 2025 midterm elections fast approaching, top politicians have also joined the fray, tapping into rising anti-China sentiment among voters.
House of Representatives Speaker Martin Romualdez, a first cousin of the president and known for his own ambitions for the highest office, called on Beijing to “take immediate and concrete actions to cease these aggressive activities and uphold the principles of international law.” In a statement, he emphasized that his country “stands firm in its sovereignty and jurisdiction over Bajo de Masinloc and its territorial sea.”
Meanwhile, his counterpart in the Philippine Senate, Miguel Zubiri, went so far as to suggest a potential downgrade in bilateral diplomatic relations. “I urge President Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos Jr to send the current Chinese ambassador home,” Zubiri said.
“He has done nothing to address the continued attacks of his government on our troops and on our people,” he added.
In response, Beijing has blamed the Philippines for provoking tensions in the South China Sea. According to the China Coast Guard, their Filipino counterparts ignored numerous warnings and “deliberately swerved and collided in an unprofessional, dangerous manner” with a Chinese boat.
“The responsibility lies entirely with the Philippines,” Chinese authorities added, revealing little appetite for compromise. It remains to be seen how far the Asian superpower is willing to go to prevent Manila from fortifying its position over contested features such as Second Thomas Shoal.
What’s clear is that China is determined to remind the Philippines, and other rival claimants in Southeast Asia, of its massive naval superiority. China is also determined to press the Philippines in the South China Sea in order to dissuade it from granting the Pentagon full access to its northernmost bases near Taiwan’s shores under the expanded Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA).
But aside from intimidating smaller regional states, China is also intent on testing America’s resolve. As in previous incidents, Washington was quick to condemn Beijing’s latest actions.
“Obstructing supply lines to this long-standing outpost and interfering with lawful Philippine maritime operations undermines regional stability,” the US State Department said in statement.
“The United States stands with our Philippine allies in the face of these dangerous and unlawful actions. We reaffirm that Article IV of the 1951 US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty extends to armed attacks on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft – including those of its Coast Guard – anywhere in the South China Sea,” it added.
But employing increasingly aggressive “gray zone” tactics, which fall short of “armed attacks” on rival claimants, China has so far exposed the relative limits of the Philippine-US alliance. As a result, the US is scrambling for a new strategy to prevent a major conflict in the area but also to dissuade China from intimidating rival claimants with relative impunity.
The upshot is an increasingly perilous game of chicken not only between China and rival claimants in the South China Sea, but also between the world’s two superpowers in a vital international body of water.
Ushers in more secure, student-centric approach to credentialing
PFS sets a precedent for other educational institutions to follow suit
Southeast Asia’s oldest English-medium school, Penang Free School (PFS) has entered into a strategic partnership with Crypken Sdn Bhd, a Web3 company, to introduce blockchain-powered certificates for its students. This pioneering collaboration is a…Continue Reading
The Trans-Caspian International Trade Route (TITR), a trade corridor running from China through Central Asia and the South Caucasus to Europe, has received increased attention since Western countries introduced sanctions against Russia in early 2022 for its war of aggression against Ukraine.
Its route goes from China through Kazakhstan, across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and Georgia, and then to Europe via Turkey or the Black Sea.
It is worth noting that this corridor is the broader result of Azerbaijan’s own initiative with Kazakhstan to improve cross-Caspian trade flows, which began on a strictly bilateral basis over six years ago.
The TITR, colloquially called the “Middle Corridor,” has received significant attention from the international financial institutions (IFIs) – notably the Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IBRD) – as well as from such national development organizations as the US Agency for International Development (USAID).
According to the IBRD’s just-published study, the TITR saw a 33% increase in container traffic in 2022. However, this surge also highlighted the corridor’s limitations. These include issues with border crossings, transshipments, and coordination challenges, all leading to long transport delays.
A decline of 37% in container traffic through the first eight months of 2023 compared with the same period in 2022 has underlined the need for improvements.
As a result, with support from the IFIs, countries including Azerbaijan, Georgia and Kazakhstan have initiated upgrades to enhance the corridor’s efficiency. In November 2022, those three countries together with Turkey signed a “roadmap” that outlined priority actions and investments. Azerbaijan, in particular, has committed to significant investments in port and rail infrastructure to facilitate this roadmap.
Azerbaijan’s strategic location and developed infrastructure make it key to bridging Central Asia and Europe. The country has been proactive in collaborating with IFIs, leveraging its geographical advantage to enhance the corridor’s functionality, and extending connectivity and transport ties even to Central Asian countries not formally part of the TITR, such as Uzbekistan.
For Azerbaijan, the TITR not only diversifies trade routes but also positions the country as a key transit hub in the region, potentially boosting its economic growth.
For the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus in particular, which rely significantly on Russia for imports (in the case of Kazakhstan, 39% of all imports), the TITR presents an opportunity to diversify trade routes, reduce dependence on Russia, and open up new markets in the Middle East and North Africa, and eventually in South and Southeast Asia.
In this way, it may stimulate those countries to produce more complex and value-added products, promoting political stability by bolstering economic growth and fostering job creation. Other transcontinental and also maritime routes compete for intercontinental trade, but the TITR aligns with the aspirations of countries in the region for economic development and diversification.
The new IBRD study introduces a novel approach not undertaken by previous studies by the EBRD, ADB, or USAID. In particular, it employs a sophisticated model in order to assess comprehensively the expected trade demand for the TITR. It then examines the actions that are required to meet such increased demands for transport.
The trade model forecasts a 30% increase in trade between China and the European Union by 2030, primarily driven by westbound flows, which are expected to represent 62% of the total trade volume.
Trade from Azerbaijan, Georgia and Kazakhstan is expected to increase by 37% (with Kazakhstan’s exports being a major contributor), and their total trade with the EU is expected to increase by 28%.
Azerbaijan’s strategic location and growing trade capabilities are expected to make a significant contribution to this increased trade volume.
The IBRD study offers three advantages over an EBRD study that was concluded earlier this year and which was presented in Kazakhstan over the summer. The first is that the EBRD focused only on Central Asia and on selecting the optimal corridor there from three possibilities. (The one chosen runs principally through southern Kazakhstan.)
The IBRD study, however, concerns principally the South Caucasus, narrowing its focus to Azerbaijan, Georgia and Kazakhstan. The second is that its trade model permits a more granular examination of specific logistical upgrades that are necessary.
The third, perhaps the most geo-economically significant, is to recalibrate the TITR as an “economic corridor,” meaning that it is not just a “pipeline” for end-to-end solutions but moreover has the vocation of connecting up with the hinterlands of the countries through which it passes.
With a proper policy environment, this would encourage the formation of small and medium-sized enterprises in the countries concerned, leading to the creation of a more numerous middle class capable of guaranteeing political stability and legitimacy.
In addition to re-imagining the TITR as an “economic corridor,” the IBRD study makes four general recommendations for improving efficiency.
First, it insists on offering corridor-length logistical solutions for streamlining operations and reducing route fragmentation. Second, it is necessary to reform and simplify processes and procedures, particularly customs and data exchange.
Third, without requiring a one-size-fits-all end-to-end approach to digitization, it explains the need for real-time visibility and faster information sharing in an environment where the handling of printed paper documents is still sometimes the standard method of operation.
Finally, it points out the need to focus on connectivity and equipment acquisition (particularly railway rolling stock) in undertaking the continuing improvement of infrastructure and equipment.
On the basis of the IBRD model, it is possible to project the potential for the TITR (“Middle Corridor”) to triple its volumes by 2030 while halving transport times, if the recommended improvements are implemented.
While potentially unlocking trade and development growth for Central Asia and the South Caucasus, the corridor also offers economic and geopolitical resilience for transcontinental trade.
The IBRD study’s focus on the South Caucasus underscores Azerbaijan’s significance as a regional conduit for trade in the region. The report noted the need to ameliorate operational inefficiencies so as to maximize corridor use. It is worthwhile to mention that Baku has made significant strides in offering corridor-length logistics solutions.
The modernization of the country’s port and rail systems, under way already for some years, responds to the need imperative for logistical improvements.
Implementation of this development policy includes not only its building-out of the Port of Alat, but also Baku’s contribution to overcoming bottlenecks in the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, a key infrastructure segment that looks now to quintuple its (nevertheless still relatively modest) container flows in the near future.
The main challenge now is to establish platforms where the main stakeholders can work together to address operational challenges and invest in infrastructure. Azerbaijan’s active participation in these platforms is crucial, given its strategic location and investment in corridor infrastructure, to achieve the desired efficiency and transparency.
In order to promote efficiency and transparency, the IBRD concludes that this investment should come from the private sector at least as much as from the state sector of the participating countries. How this is to be accomplished is the subject of current discussions.
PAMPANGA AND TARLAC, the Philippines: A loss and damage fund that attracted millions of dollars in pledges as the world came together for the COP28 summit in Dubai may benefit communities on the brink of being wiped out as sea levels rise.
The fund aims to provide financial assistance to nations most vulnerable and impacted by the effects of climate change.
But as advocates push to make polluters pay and phase out fossil fuel, climate change-induced woes are already lived realities in many Philippine communities, including children there.
In Macabebe town in Pampanga province, a riverside island-community northwest of capital Manila, for instance, families prepare their children for floods during high tide, and classrooms are visibly damaged by recurring floods.
The Philippines tops the 2023 World Risk Index, which ranks 193 countries in terms of their vulnerability to extreme natural events.
The country is also is Southeast Asia’s most typhoon-prone country, hit by a yearly average of 20 typhoons.
To have a direct hand in bringing about change for its people, the Philippines wants to host the fund, hoping to have a seat on the Loss and Damage Fund Board and calling for its immediate operationalisation.
JAKARTA: China’s TikTok has agreed to spend US$840 million to buy most of Indonesian tech conglomerate GoTo’s e-commerce unit – a move that appears to allow it to restart its online shopping business in Southeast Asia’s largest economy. It also said it will invest further in the business, Tokopedia, whichContinue Reading
China is promoting Guanxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, which lies on the border with Vietnam, as a gateway to the mainland for businesses and tourists from the Asean region.
Guanxi’s location in southern China makes it well-suited to become a gateway to Southeast Asia. The region is connected to Vietnam by land, sea and air, and it is served by over 30 international cargo and passenger services which depart from its three international airports and three deep-sea ports.
Local authorities are hoping these facilities will attract more businesses and tourists from Southeast Asia to visit the region, and vice versa, according to Dong Changting, the deputy director of External Publicity and Exchange Department of Guangxi Zhuang Automomous Region.
Guangxi is also known for having one of the highest numbers of education institutions which provide Thai language courses to Chinese students.
A growing number of Chinese students are interested in taking up Thai lessons in Guangxi prior to leaving for Thailand. Similarly, a source said, an increasing number of Thais are also coming to Guangxi to learn Chinese.
The Chinese government is keen to facilitate language exchanges as it expands its reach in the region through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the source said, noting such exchanges also boost the nation’s soft power capacity, which it needs to maintain its influence over its allies.
BRI is a major infrastructure push launched by the Chinese government, which Beijing envisions would ultimately link all major trade routes across Asia, Europe and Africa.
Prime location
Deputy Prime Minister and Commerce Minister, Phumtham Wechayachai, has said Guangxi’s location and proximity to Southeast Asia makes it an ideal gateway for Thai agricultural exports to China, such as jasmine rice, durian, grapefruit and longans.
The reason, he said, is because the autonomous region is well equipped to handle land and marine cargo shipments, allowing Thai products to reach the markets faster than if they had gone through a different gateway.
Recently, authorities in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region hosted a China-Asean expo to boost cooperation between Chinese businesses and their Asean counterparts, in which they showcased the region’s rapid development and modernisation.
The trip was organised by the Propaganda Department of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Guangxi Branch of China News Service.
Known for Guilin
Before Guangxi became a modern and popular trade hub, it was first known for its natural attractions, chief among which is Guilin, which is world-famous for its beguiling limestone karst formations.
The landscape around Guiling is so renowned that it is featured on the 20-yuan banknote, said Ma Tieqiao, chairman of Guilin Junda Transportation Company, which offers leisure cruises along the Li Jiang River.
In the past, he said, most tourists would have to get on bamboo rafts, which are only big enough for about three people, or risk getting crammed into a small boat for larger groups.
As the number of tourists continue to grow, in 1985 the Guilin Sightseeing Shipping Co was founded to provide improved services for local and international visitors.
The move proved to be successful and now scores of leisure boats cruise along the Li Jiang River everyday, he said.
Home to high-tech industry
Now, Guilin is increasingly becoming known as a hub for high-tech industries.
The rapid transformation started in 1988, when Guilin High-Tech Industrial Development Zone was established. It was upgraded into a high-tech special development zone in 1991, becoming the first national-level high-tech zone across China’s five autonomous regions.
In just 30 years, Guilin has become one of the leaders in scientific innovation and industrial development.
One example of a successful company based in the region is Guangxi Guilin Zhishen Information Technology Company, which produces anti-shake tripods for cameras and other equipment for digital photography, as well as mobile phones.
The company has won several awards such as the iF Design Award, the Red Dot Award and the Excellent Design Award, according to the company.
In addition, Guigang, which is located in eastern Guangxi, has been designated as a hub for electric vehicle (EV) manufacturers. The city is home to more than 100 EV-related businesses, including e-bike producers, machine components and vehicle parts manufacturers.
Having an EV production base in Guigang will give China more opportunities to export its EVs to countries in Southeast Asia, said a representative of Guangxi Luyuan Electric Vehicle Company, which manufactures and distributes electric motorbikes and e-bicycles.
He said as the electric vehicle industry has become more popular in the world, the company expects to expand its reach to many countries in Southeast Asia.
EVs will be a solution for the green energy ecosystem, he said.
The Sun and Moon Pagodas are illuminated at night in the Fir Lake, one of popular tourism sites in Guilin. Photos by Penchan Charoensuthipan
The benefits coral reefs provide are vast.
Coral reefs harbour about 25 per cent of ocean biodiversity and provide livelihoods to about one billion people, either directly or indirectly.
Their loss and damage would have major environmental and economic impacts, including in Southeast Asia, home to some of the world’s most precious reef ecosystems.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimated in a major report last year that the degradation of reefs could directly affect the livelihoods of about 4.5 million people in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region alone.
Already, sea temperatures surrounding the coastal areas of the Coral Triangle, a critical ecosystem spanning Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Timor Leste and Solomon Islands, are rising approximately 0.1 degree Celsius every year and could be 1.4 degrees Celsius warmer by the end of the century.
While the challenge to conserve or restore reefs “might seem impossible”, science and technology could “redefine the boundaries of the possible”, said Carlos Duarte, executive director of the Coral Research & Development Accelerator Platform (CORDAP) launched by the G20 to accelerate coral studies.
Professor Duarte has been involved in marine studies for more than four decades and still believes the ocean’s role in the climate discussion is underestimated and its research under-resourced. He estimates funding for ocean research is only 10 per cent of that for terrestrial studies.
“We have plenty of evidence of how we ignore the oceans in every aspect of life and investments in science, technology and conservation,” he said.
He argued that a boost in finance for coral research and technology could result in solutions for thousands of square kilometres of coral.
Instead of sophisticated methods that might work on a small scale, Prof Duarte believes in “pragmatic solutions that are science-based, that are innovative, but that can be applied in every context from developing nations to developed nations”.
South Korea aims to crank up its weaponry shipments with a new type of submarine with the potential to give small and mid-sized navies in the Pacific an asymmetric edge in underwater warfare.
This month, Naval News reported that South Korea’s HD Hyundai Heavy Industries (HD HHI) is developing an indigenous mid-size submarine for export markets. South Korea’s submarine market is mainly divided between HD HHI and Hanwha Ocean (previously DSME).
The report notes that Dr Won-Ho Joo, chief operating officer of HD HHI’s Naval & Special Ship Business Unit, made the announcement. He emphasized the importance of collaboration between HD HHI and Hanwha Ocean to enhance competitiveness in international bidding and shipbuilding, the Naval News report quoted him as saying.
The report also mentions Hanwha Ocean’s commitment to working with over 200 domestic partner companies for submarine procurement and future maintenance projects.
Naval News mentions that HD HHI is planning to participate in the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) and has signed a technical cooperation agreement with Babcock Canada. It has also signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Polish National Defense company PGZ for Poland’s Orka Project, the nation’s submarine program.
South Korea has previously sold submarines to foreign nations. Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) mentions that in 2011, South Korea outbid Russia, France and Germany on a US$1.1 billion contract to supply Indonesia with three Type 209-class submarines.
NTI notes that the first two submarines, the KRI Nagapasa and KRI Ardadedali, were delivered to Indonesia in 2017 and 2018, while the third submarine, KRI Alugoro, was assembled by PT PAL in Indonesia with South Korean support as part of a technology-sharing program.
However, Asia Times noted in March 2022 that Indonesia is reportedly not satisfied with the performance of its South Korean-built submarines, citing power supply problems connected to the batteries, among other technical issues.
Reports indicate South Korea continues to improve its submarines, producing cutting-edge designs that may have already addressed the problems with its earlier models.
In a 2019 article for the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Richard Bitzinger notes that South Korea began building submarines in the 1990s with the KSS-1, which were license-produced German Type 209-class units, producing nine such vessels.
Bitzinger says the KSS-1 was followed by the KSS-2, a licensed German Type 214 class version. He notes that the KSS-2 was a significant upgrade over the KSS-1, which is larger, heavier and, most importantly, runs on air-independent propulsion (AIP) technology. Nine KSS-2s were built between 2006 and 2017.
The KSS-2 was followed up by the KSS-3, one of the biggest conventional submarines at 3,000 tons, making it capable of blue-water operations. Bitzinger notes that the class is heavily armed with traditional torpedo tubes and a six-silo vertical launch system (VLS) for anti-ship, cruise and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).
The KSS-3 is the world’s first AIP submarine capable of launching SLBMs. Bitzinger says later versions of the submarine may have a 10-silo VLS for SLBMs.
Currently, South Korea has 2 KSS-3 submarines, with plans to have nine units. South Korea’s new mid-size export submarine would likely be a variant of the KSS-3, with each unit designed according to technology export restrictions and customer specifications.
South Korea, a major emerging arms exporter, is well-poised to be a major player in emerging submarine markets, most notably in nearby Southeast Asia.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), South Korea was the world’s 9th largest arms exporter in 2022, accounting for 2.4% of global arms exports, with most of its sales going to the Philippines, India, and Thailand.
SIPRI data indicates a massive leap in South Korean arms exports between 2013 and 2017 and between 2018 and 2022, showing a 74% increase between the two five-year periods.
Submarines are high on Southeast Asian nations’ military wish lists, driven largely by fears about China’s increasing naval might in the South China Sea. Regional nations are also engaged in low-level arms races where neighbors seek to keep pace with each other’s arsenals.
In July 2023, Defense News reported that Singapore received the first of four German-built Type 218SG submarines to replace its aging Archer and Challenger-class units. Defense News notes that the Type 218SG is specially designed for tropical waters and possesses state-of-the-art capabilities, significant payload capacity, high levels of automation, enhanced underwater endurance and optimized ergonomics.
Naval News reported in June 2023 that major shipbuilders such as France’s Naval Group, Spain’s Navantia and Hanwha Ocean have offered the Philippines various submarine deals as the latter struggles to modernize its military amidst increased Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea.
However, given its overreliance on the US and limited defense budget, it is unclear if the Philippines has the political will and resources to pursue its longstanding submarine ambitions.
Asia Times reported in May 2023 that Indonesia had selected France over South Korea as its submarine program’s leading partner. Indonesia plans to acquire two Scorpene-class submarines with a preliminary agreement between PT PAL and Naval Group to collaborate on building two units and establish a joint research and development facility.
Indonesia views submarines as an asymmetric power projection asset, as it does not have the resources to build a blue-water navy.
The New Straits Times reported in February 2023 that Malaysia plans to acquire two more submarines in addition to the two Scorpene-class units it already operates.
New Straits Times says that the first submarine will be acquired between 2031 and 2035 and the second between 2036 and 2040. The report notes that Malaysia views submarines as strategic assets as they are involved in the sensitive South China Sea disputes.
As for China, NTI notes that as of March 2023 China had 56 submarines comprised of six nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) and 44 diesel-electric attack submarines (SSK), with 17 of the 44 vessels running on AIP technology.
Indonesia welcomed its first high-speed railway in October 2023, the first of its kind in Southeast Asia and a significant leap for Indonesia’s infrastructural development.
The US$7.3 billion Jakarta-Bandung line, financed by Chinese banks and built with Chinese technology, reflects President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s modernization efforts as well as Beijing’s strategy to tighten relations with Belt and Road (BRI) recipient countries.
PT Kereta Cepat Indonesia China (Indonesia-China High-Speed Railways Limited), a joint venture between four Indonesian and five Chinese state-owned enterprises, built the high-speed line that connects Jakarta to Indonesia’s third-largest city, Bandung, in just 30 minutes.
Its opening comes after a four-year delay and a 44% increase in its initial $5.5-billion price tag due to Covid-19, military opposition and complications in land acquisition.
Indonesia is the biggest economy and the most populous country in Southeast Asia. Jakarta’s decision to apply the “China Standard” in a piece of critical infrastructure and engineering systems reflects well on the BRI. It demonstrates to others in Southeast Asia the alternative development paradigm China can offer and the sort of knowledge transfer available to the Global South.
China describes the BRI as an infrastructure investment initiative that aims to build railways, highways, airports and more to connect Asia, Europe and Africa. But scholars argue there may be more to it. The BRI likely reflects Chinese attempts to integrate neighbors into a hub-and-spoke type physical infrastructure framework.
It also attracted criticisms due to a mix of manufactured delays, fiscal pressure, opacity and disregard for the environment. Nonetheless, the BRI offers many developing countries an alternative for development without much conditionality.
Jokowi has pragmatically capitalized on BRI investment to achieve his ambitions and win support from his electorate. The Jakarta-Bandung high-speed line is no exception and cements his legacy as a leader committed to major infrastructure projects. His job approval rating surpassed 80% in May 2023 according to a poll conducted by Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting.
The Indonesian president has shown unwavering affection towards infrastructure since first coming to power in 2014. He pushed through budgetary and bureaucratic constraints through presidential decree and by expanding the role of state-owned enterprises to make high-speed rail and other projects a reality.
But Jokowi may leave much on the table for his successor next year. It remains unclear whether Indonesia’s new president in 2024 will continue unfinished infrastructure projects such as the extended railway to Surabaya.
Indonesia awarded this project to China over Japan in 2015 even though the latter had already conducted a year-long feasibility study. There were a few reasons behind the decision.
China did not require any Indonesian government financing or a government guarantee and a business-to-business scheme was expected to reduce the financial pressure for the state government.
China also promised a superior transfer of technology, skills and operational know-how over Japan and proposed the completion of the railway by 2019 which ostensibly helped Jokowi win re-election in 2019. Beijing even cut the interest rate from 3.4% to 2% and signaled the project’s salience by sending high-level officials to negotiate.
Jokowi was one of the 23 heads of state or government who attended the Third Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in October 2023. Chinese President Xi Jinping told Jokowi that his country is keen to expand cooperation with Indonesia.
Others in the region like Laos, Thailand and Vietnam may further compete for good quality BRI investment after Indonesia’s successful application of the scheme to its railways. To many Southeast Asian leaders, the BRI remains an easy tool to build legitimacy and economic development despite security concerns.
How much welfare Indonesia’s first high-speed rail line brings to local communities and overall economic development remains to be seen. But this railway proved that the BRI remains relevant for many developing countries. Southeast Asia will continue vying for BRI investment if China offers good deals.
The project marks another win for Jokowi’s legacy and will almost certainly make Indonesia’s next leader more receptive to BRI investment during their presidency, even if they would prefer to hedge economic opportunities against China.
Menghu Xia is a PhD candidate at the University of New South Wales, Canberra.
This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.