Moves (Page 3)

In a less-than-ideal nuclear tone, the US is forced to use outdated nuclear ballistic missile boats and intercontinental ballistic missiles in the face of fierce energy rivalries and uncertainty.

This quarter, Breaking Defense reports&nbsp, that the Pentagon, due to delays in deploying their descendants, is exploring approaches to prolong the lifetime of its ICBMs and of the channels that are called, for small, SSBNs. ( The&nbsp, SS&nbsp, denotes submarine, the&nbsp, B, ballistic missile, while the N tells us the vessel is nuclear- powered. )

The US Department of Defense’s assistant secretary of defense for area policy, John Plumb, stated in a statement to Breaking Defense that while the agency is working on upgrading its atomic triad, it is considering ways to ensure that Minuteman III ICBMs and aging Ohio-class SSBNs stay in the mix for longer than originally anticipated.

Additionally, the release mentions that the DOD is reassessing the US Air Force’s Sentinel program&nbsp, following a 37 % rise in software expenses, an flooded important enough to have qualifed as what is called in Pentagon- talk a Nunn McCurdy breach. It points out that the action required by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to enact the legislation’s terms in order to determine whether the program you continue and, if successful, to confirm its viability.

Breaking Defense says that the US Navy’s manufacturing has been plagued by&nbsp, structural issues in its business center, resulting in significant 12- to- 16- quarter delays for the future Columbia- class SSBN, built by&nbsp, General Dynamics&nbsp, Electric Boat and&nbsp, Huntington Ingalls Industries.

According to the report, the B-21 bomb from the US Air Force is the only nuclear modernization project to have closely followed the planned schedule. Despite the punctuality it notes that, due to inflation, &nbsp, Northrop Grumman&nbsp, has incurred a monetary loss of$ 1 billion on the initial production, a damage that the organization is obligated to eat under the fixed- cost problems of its deal with the Air Force.

A US congressional commission on US nuclear posture, according to Breaking Defense, warned that the Pentagon’s plan for modernizing its nuclear arsenal is based on a” just in time” schedule, which involves eliminating outdated systems at the same time as new platforms. &nbsp,

The commission recommended a number of measures to address capacity issues brought on by delays in modernization, according to the publication. Allocating funds for improvements to Ohio-class SSBNs is a proposed measure. Another is distributing the country’s aging nuclear platforms with existing nuclear warheads.

US ICBMs play a complex role in nuclear deterrence, but vulnerabilities that have sparked debates about their relevance in comparison to those from the air and sea have offended their use. &nbsp,

In terms of the benefits, Asia Times reported in April 2023 that ICBMs serve as a “missile sponge” to draw incoming enemy missiles, thereby requiring an adversary engaged in a preemptive strike to use enough missiles to destroy widely dispersed nuclear silos.

ICBMs also offer a first-strike capability because almost all are on alert and can launch in a matter of seconds. &nbsp,

Further, Steve Fetter and Kingston Reif note&nbsp, in an October 2019 War on the Rocks article&nbsp, that ICBMs act as a tripwire, forcing adversaries to attack the US mainland directly, triggering mutually assured destruction. According to Fetter and Reif, ICBMs serve as a buffer for the country’s ocean-based nuclear deterrent.

They point out weaknesses in the US ICBM arsenal, specifically that the missiles cannot survive a large-scale nuclear attack unless launched within the first 30 minutes of an incoming missile’s trajectory and impact, with the US “launch on attack” nuclear posture requiring a 10-minute response time. &nbsp,

Additionally, they claim that a second strike can be delivered by US bombers and SSBNs, making an ICBM arsenal redundant. In contrast to bombers and SSBNs, Fetter and Reif contend that ICBMs do n’t offer any unique advantages. Indeed, they say, ICBMs are less flexible than bombers and SSBNs. &nbsp,

Further, Toby Dalton and other authors in a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace paper from September 2022 contend that the choice between a nuclear retaliation and a non-nuclear attack on US ICBMs would be a problem. Dalton and others also point out that ICBMs from the US would have to overfly Russia to attack Chinese targets, increasing the chance of a two-front nuclear conflict. &nbsp, &nbsp,

SSBNs are regarded as the most effective nuclear deterrent, but the US’s long-term disarmament strategy, rising costs, and technological advancements may eventually make their relevance questionable. &nbsp,

James Wirtz makes reference to the American commitment to maintaining an underwater nuclear deterrent due to its survivability, second-strike capability, and ability to hold targets in danger after a nuclear or conventional attack in a February 2020 article for the Australian National Security College. &nbsp,

Wirtz points out that the Obama Administration’s pledge to end nuclear weapons as a long-term US objective results in a 40 % fewer ships per ship than the previous one, with only seven units for the next-generation US SSBNs, which would be developed in 2060. &nbsp,

According to Wittz, support for the US SSBN program may be undermined by the high costs associated with deploying a few warheads on an expensive system and a trend toward nuclear disarmament, with the Columbia class possibly being the last US SSBN. He also makes note of the discussions that the US might have to make do with just 10 SSBNs from the Columbia class. &nbsp,

Most tellingly, Wirtz mentions the possibility of technological “black swans” upending the relevance of SSBNs. By 2050, advancements in AI, sensor technology, and underwater communication will make the oceans transparent, which means that all submerged vessels will be able to be identified despite advancements in stealth technology, according to Asia Times in March 2023. &nbsp,

China claims to have developed an ultra-sensitive submarine detector capable of detecting nearly imperceptible bubbles created by a nuclear submarine’s hull as a result of the magnetohydrodynamic effect, according to Asia Times in August 2023.

Additionally, according to Asia Times, China has developed a terahertz device that can detect vibrations made by low-frequency sound sources in the open sea, which was published in September 2023. Those waves reportedly can be used to identify submarines and determine their model. &nbsp,

These problems with US land and sea-based nuclear arsenals may contribute to a bigger issue that could be exacerbated by potential nuclear proliferation and increased power competition. &nbsp,

In an article this month, The Economist notes&nbsp, that the world may be facing a period of nuclear uncertainty – specifically, that the US and its allies may face uncertainty driven by the Ukraine War and China’s expanding nuclear arsenal. &nbsp,

The Trump and Biden administrations ‘ nuclear policies have sharp differences, according to The Economist, with the latter proposing a more robust nuclear posture with the SLCM-N program and the other trying to halt it because it is unneeded by a more restrained US nuclear posture. &nbsp,

The publication notes that this contradiction may raise questions about the validity of the US nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence guarantees.

According to The Economist, uncertainty can result in such a situation.

• the resumption of nuclear weapons tests by the US, China, and Russia,
• the introduction of new nuclear delivery systems, and
• moves by US allies such as Japan, South Korea, and European states toward acquiring their own nuclear weapons.

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The Ukraine conflict is frequently portrayed as enabling intercontinental partners to strengthen their defence cooperation and consolidation. But while this may be true in many ways, the fight has also exposed the different passions among those numerous partners.

Hidden fault lines in the current security architecture, which are mostly drawn on political and economic grounds, may very well result to a number of previously unbounded fissures that are starting to break out in the post-war time as Kiev’s ability to maintain the present line of contact becomes more weak by the day.

The relationship between the United States and its Western allies is the first significant rift. It is possible to create the argument—albeit in a somewhat sarcastic manner—that forcing Ukraine to preserve fighting instead of agreeing to confined concessions at the beginning of the war served to achieve effective returns for Washington.

The US power sector has been instantly benefited by the Russian oil and gas pipeline’s closure, which will make it the world’s largest LNG exporter in 2023, with Europe serving as the main destination.

Europe once more led the way as the top export destination ( 1. 8 million barrels per day, compared to 1.7 million for Asia and Oceania ), and this past year also set new records for US crude oil exports. This was all undergirded by one of the most significant inter- empire developments in the article- Cold War period: the damage and destruction of both Nord Stream pipelines.

The relative competitiveness of the US economy has increased as production costs have soared on the continent as a result of the rising price of energy and supply chain issues in Europe. Germany, Europe’s industrial powerhouse with a highly dependent economy and a market for manufactured goods, has precipitously fallen to become the worst-performing major developed nation in the world.

Unsurprisingly, since the start of the war, the German population has suffered from declining living standards. The International Monetary Fund predicts economic growth in the Eurozone of only .9 % in 2024, particularly measly when compared to 2.6 % predicted in Russia.

Farmers are still protesting in large parts of Europe as a result of the rise in stringent regulations passed under the umbrella of “environmental measures” as well as the flood of cheap agricultural imports from Ukraine.

When the EU decided that free trade with Kiev would start the war, local European populations suddenly saw their share of the market for agricultural goods being cut off by cheap Ukrainian alternatives. Most notably, Polish tractors continue to attempt blockades of the border with their war- torn neighbor, while further west in Brussels farmers hose down the bastions of EU bureaucracy with fresh manure.

Additionally, there have been political repercussions. The Alternative for Germany ( AfD ) party is growing in both popularity and parliamentary power, causing Berlin’s Eurocentric political elite to cling on to a Liberal pretzel. Officials are still talking about banning AfD outright, stamping out any genuine dissent in the name of inclusivity and openness.

And while the displacement of the Law and Order Party ( PiS ) in Poland was undoubtedly a cause for celebration among the champions of European consolidation, there is still evidence of lingering public discontent with the general direction of things.

PiS is actually just as bellicose if not more outright anti-Russian than Donald Tusk’s Europhile Civic Platform Party, despite the fact that the Western media frequently portrays AfD as being pro-Russia and calling for the EU establishment to stop supporting war with Moscow.

In Poland, it was determined that combating “illiberalism” was necessary, much like there was with AfD. When the Tusk administration came back to power, one of the first things they did was to act against political snatchers from PiS.

Of course, there has also been a sharp divergence between the interests of individual European nations. Hungary is frequently criticized in Central Europe for hesitant to support Ukraine without réserve.

At the end of 2023, when it presented the 50 billion euro aid package to Kiev, which was funded by the EU common budget, it was among the sights of Brussels and Berlin.

Budapest had also pushed back against the rubber stamp for Ukraine’s ascension to the EU over issues with the large Hungarian minority that is currently located within the borders of Ukraine.

The group’s efforts to completely alienate Russia have also resulted in sharp divergences between Czechia and Slovakia, one of which even went so far as to refuse a typical joint cabinet meeting with the latter following a meeting with Sergei Lavrov, the top diplomat from Russia.

Further to the southeast, the Bulgarian government has generally backed the EU’s position in Ukraine. And yet, in every round of parliamentary elections that have taken place since the start of the war ( there have been five ), the two most pro- Russian opposition parties have by far made the greatest gains.

Another round of snap elections are expected to take place this summer, which suggests even more potential gains. Bulgaria and Russia have significant cultural ties, but Sofia has been subjected to a number of additional economic challenges as a result of its almost entirely reliance on Moscow for its oil and gas needs.

Meanwhile, France under the leadership of Emmanuel Macron has presented itself as an apparent leader in European security. This is undoubtedly a good thing for the United States, which has a constantly overstretched defense posture.

The current war in Ukraine has also highlighted shortcomings in America’s defense system, particularly in terms of its capacity for industrial production, despite accounting for roughly one-third of all military expenditures worldwide.

The US needs to better concentrate its limited resources abroad, and it needs to focus on refocusing on the domestic dispute’s deteriorating domestic situation.

Most importantly, however, the war has highlighted a number of divergences in national security interests among the various transatlantic partners.

Any political and economic considerations are typically ruled out by the security issue. Although that may be true, it should be made clear that having a shared NATO membership does not necessarily mean having the same kind of strategic interests, threat assessments, or approaches to international relations in general.

This is intuitive, as the variable circumstances of geography, size, population and culture lead to unique considerations of national interest. When that national interest conflicts with those of other coalition members, there is the possibility of dissension.

The Baltic countries, which view Russia as a significant threat and support the most extreme measures in confronting Moscow, are the best illustration of this.

However, ^the bellicosity of a nation such as Estonia ( population of about 2 million, 104^th ranked economy in ^the world ) or Latvia ( whose officials have hinted at ^the need to outright destroy Russia ) raises serious questions about whe^ther ^the US ( or any o^ther country ) will be able to muster ^the public support necessary to send its own citizens to fight and die for foreign borders – unless one distills ^the complex world of geopolitics down to political talking points and moral grandstanding.

But, especially in the US, as more and more people appear to be willing to do it, things seem to be getting worse. Despite official proclamations to the contrary, Western officials are undoubtedly aware that the likelihood of seriously altering the territorial outcome of the conflict in Ukraine’s favor is, at this point, essentially zero. It therefore makes sense for the US specifically to begin seeking peace in Ukraine.

The risk of escalation is currently outweighing any potential benefit, and the more the bloodshed drags on, the worse the outcome will be for Kiev, again in the most cynical sense.

That’s not to mention exposing vulnerabilities in Western weapons systems that could reduce the effectiveness of any potential conflict. Destroyed M1 Abrams Tanks and Patriot Missile systems neither project power abroad nor instill confidence at home.

Sadly, Washington’s willingness to negotiate a deal is still largely dependent on the same ideological biases as its European counterparts.

Those who disagree with a realist assessment of the situation in Europe may cite the ascension of Finland and Sweden to NATO as proof of a strong transatlantic order. However, this still leaves out any of the underlying problems raised above.

Leaders have relied on the consent of their own national populations to carry out their idealist agendas. That quiescence can no longer be counted on as the citizenries of both the US and individual European countries begin to push back against the increasingly disconnected policy positions of their respective governments.

The divide between the two fundamental political parties that are currently in power and those who are ruled is the one that is most likely to grow in the transatlantic order after the Ukrainian war’s eventual conclusion.

A restructured security structure in Europe that allows for greater regional leadership by nations like France and Germany and the potential for even smaller sub-coalitions would increase the effectiveness of working toward shared goals and the unification of interests.

In the future, this would result in greater stability both in Europe and the world. However, such a state of affairs would also inherently be viewed as a threat to the first principles of international politics upon which the current order was erected: the multilateral over the national, the ideal over the concrete.

However, there has been evidence of a growing opposition to that order both in the US and Europe. In many ways, the opposition was at a crossroads during the Ukraine war. As the smoke clears, a period of nationalist renaissance – or nationalist regression, depending on whom one is asking – may be waiting in the breach on both sides of the Atlantic.

At Hillsdale College, Dominick Sansone is a doctoral student of political philosophy. He previously completed a Fulbright grant in Bulgaria while pursuing an education at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies ( SAIS ).

His writings on US- Russia relations have been published at&nbsp, The American Conservative, &nbsp, National Interest and the&nbsp, American Mind, among others.

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President George W Bush once described himself as “a uniter, not a divider.”
China’s leader, Xi Jinping is a uniter as well – though in a different sort of way.

On April 11, US President Joe Biden, Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr will meet in Washington, DC. This is the first such joint meeting.

And it’s Chinese pressure on both the Philippines’ and Japan’s maritime territory that is bringing everyone together. Some meetings are more important than others. And this one’s important.

Back to the future

The Philippines is fighting off aggressive Chinese encroachment on its maritime territory in the South China Sea. It isn’t the first time and last time it ended badly for the Philippines, in part because the country didn’t get effective backing from the US.

In 2012, the Chinese grabbed Scarborough Shoal, which had long been claimed by the Philippines.

The US did nothing when the Chinese broke their promise to then-Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell to withdraw its ships and instead remained to occupy Scarborough Shoal.

State Department lawyers presumably worked overtime to come up with excuses for why the mutual defense treaty didn’t apply. The Filipinos were dismayed.

Then, in 2016 the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in favor of Philippine claims and largely demolished Beijing’s wide-reaching claims in the South China Sea. The Obama administration remained mostly mute – expecting the PRC would reciprocate the restraint.

It didn’t. Instead, it dismissed the ruling as a piece of “scrap paper.” Even worse, the Americans had encouraged the Philippines to bring the suit. The Americans now have two strikes on them as far as many Filipinos are concerned.

China is still on Scarborough Shoal. Now it is trying to make it difficult, if not impossible, for the Philippines to resupply its men who are stationed on a deliberately grounded Philippine Navy ship on the Second Thomas Shoal, a location that is, as determined by the Court of Arbitration, well inside Philippine waters.

Besides bumping and blocking, the Chinese have blasted Philippine ships with high-power water hoses – causing structural damage and serious injury to crewmen, some of whom are Philippine military personnel.

The Chinese – including a PLA Navy helicopter – are also interfering with Philippine ocean research efforts elsewhere in Philippine waters. The Filipinos gamely resist, but the Chinese are gradually tightening things up and anytime they want they can keep the Philippines from their own territory.

President Marcos has stuck his neck out since taking office two years ago. He’s shifted his country away from China and given new life to the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which allows US military access to a number of facilities in the Philippines. Military exercises with the Americans and others have also ramped up, and the country has bought BrahMos anti-ship missiles from India.

The Americans have done joint naval and air patrols elsewhere in the South China Sea. But US ships and planes haven’t accompanied the Filipinos to where the Chinese get rough with Philippine ships or when the Philippines asserts its rights by, for example, removing China-installed barriers at the entrance to Scarborough Shoal.

Bottom line? What’s this upcoming meeting in Washington about? Philippine President Marcos is looking for help but are his and the Philippines’ hopes misplaced? They may find out sooner rather than later.

Beyond pushing the Filipinos around, Beijing has thrown down the gauntlet to the United States. Marcos must be praying their mutual defense treaty ally won’t leave the Philippines in the lurch as it did in 2012 and 2016.

So the stakes are high, as are Filipino expectations.

The Americans are talking a good game. “We stand with the Philippines and stand by our ironclad defense commitments, including under the mutual defense treaty,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in Manila recently.

And following the most recent water-cannoning attack and blocking moves by China Coast Guard and maritime militia against Philippine Coast Guard and resupply boats at Second Thomas Shoal, the US State Department declared:

The United States stands with its ally the Philippines and condemns the dangerous actions by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) against lawful Philippine maritime operations in the South China Sea on March 23.

The United States reaffirms that Article IV of the 1951 US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty extends to armed attacks on Philippine armed forces, public vessels or aircraft – including those of its Coast Guard – anywhere in the South China Sea.

All good, but US spokespersons always seem at pains to stress that it is “armed” attacks that trigger American support. And people in Manila (and Beijing) notice this.

The Philippines might worry that the Americans are once again looking for a way out. They’ve heard empty pronouncements before – apparently made in hopes of not having to do anything.

And the Chinese might reckon that as long as they don’t shoot, the Americans won’t do much.

A Filipino friend noted the other day, “We can take only so much. People feel the Chinese push us to the point where Washington will have to step up and do more.”

Washington might or might not. It can take the “legal” escape route, or it can keep its promises.

You see, there’s precise wording of a treaty – but there’s also the spirit of a treaty. And that’s as important – at least when dealing with honest people.

The US-Philippine security treaty presumably did not intend to allow an enemy (the PRC) to use water cannons and a swarm of ships to occupy and seize Philippine territory. Otherwise, what’s the point of a treaty?

The Biden administration either gives the Philippines the help it needs and was promised at the very least under the spirit of the treaty – and runs the risk of a fight with China – or it accepts humiliation at the hands of the Chinese and retreats.

And it’s not just the Filipinos watching what Washington will do next. Everyone else in Asia (and beyond) will make up their own minds about US promises of protection – explicit or implicit. And if it fails, that will be strike three for the United States. It might as well go home at that point.

What about the Japanese? They know that the Chinese won’t stop at Second Thomas Shoal. There’s a whole series of Japanese islands on Beijing’s menu as well. They are quietly doing a lot for the Philippines – and they should keep it up. It would be nice if Japan Coast Guard ships helped out, but that’s unlikely.

By showing up to the meeting, Japan is letting the Philippines know it is involved and letting Washington (and Japan’s neighbors) know that this is a regional issue. And Tokyo may also be hinting that it expects the US military to pitch in when it needs help protecting Japanese maritime territory.

Indian External Affairs Minister, S Jaishankar was in Manila the other day and reiterated India’s support for the Philippines upholding its national sovereignty, in a statement clearly referring to the nation’s South China Sea dispute with China. That’s helpful.

But, ultimately, it’s the Americans who have the treaty with the Philippines and whose word is on the line.

As it happens, Kurt Campbell, who was bamboozled at the time of the Scarborough Shoal retreat, is the current deputy secretary of state. Jake Sullivan, the current national security advisor, was during that previous time State’s director of policy planning and then national security advisor to the vice president. And the then-vice president, Joseph Biden, is now the president.

This team has been here before. They should know what happens if you give Beijing maneuvering room – it drives right over international law and right over you. The question is: Will history repeat itself or have they learned from their mistakes? One wonders.

Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine Colonel and the author of When China Attacks.

This article was first published by India’s The Sunday Guardian and is republished with permission.

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