China’s surging lead in the EV battery circular economy – Asia Times

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Battery recycling and circular economy initiatives have become crucial to the global green transition as the electric vehicle ( EV ) market expands globally. China, now a powerful person in EV power output, is today expanding its reach into the cell recycling industry, aiming to build a closed-loop supply chain.

China is now a leader in the emerging round business, which involves sharing, rent, reusing, repairing, refurbishing, and recycling existing materials and products as much as possible, thanks to this strategy, which addresses the issue of resource scarcity as well as providing a fresh competitive edge in the international green technology arena.

The essential materials for Volt batteries, such as chromium, potassium, and nickel, are limited in supply and socially expensive to extract. China has a strong foothold in the world battery supply chain thanks to its extensive control over the world’s mineral resources, as well as its substantial stakes in African cobalt mines and Latin American lithium sources.

Yet, China’s ambitions go beyond command over natural elements. China is working to reduce its emphasis on just mined nutrients while simultaneously lowering the economic impact of EV cell production by encouraging a powerful battery recycling business.

Chinese businesses like CATL and GEM Co, Ltd. are positioned in the battery recycling market by utilizing cutting-edge technologies to increase the reuse rate of crucial materials. These businesses use cutting-edge extraction techniques to recover valuable components from outdated batteries, which can then be reintegrated into the production cycle.

This strategy improves resource efficiency and reduces waste, as well as establishing a strong green image for China on the global stage. The Chinese government’s supportive policies, which include setting industry standards, offering financial support, and providing tax incentives, are further strengthening the growth of this sector, making China’s position in the global circular economy increasingly difficult to match.

In contrast, the United States and Europe have yet to create comprehensive battery recycling supply chains, which puts them at a long-term disadvantage. Western countries ‘ battery recycling efforts remain fragmented, with limited large-scale infrastructure in place.

China has the opportunity to set standards and win markets in areas that may eventually rely on China for recycled battery materials, just as they have historically relied on it for raw materials.

China’s recycling network will grow as EV adoption increases and the volume of used batteries rises, potentially making Chinese companies key partners for international companies looking to secure sustainable sources of battery materials.

China has a lot of leverage on the international stage thanks to its expanding knowledge of battery recycling. China has greater influence over the global EV supply chain and is at a disadvantage in negotiations with businesses and nations that depend on these resources because of its control over both new and recycled sources of critical minerals.

China’s emphasis on recycling and sustainable practices also aligns with its goals to be a responsible global player in climate action, a position that is crucial as green technology becomes more politicized on the global stage.

However, Western countries are increasingly wary of China’s closed-loop resource system. Particularly in the United States, concerns have been raised that China might use its influence over the recycling supply chain to increase its position of authority in green technology.

There is also growing concern that China may be able to establish standards for sustainability in ways that serve its own interests as a result of this influence.

These issues are at the crossroads between geopolitics and circular economy initiatives: even in those whose main concern is the environment, there is strong competition between the US and China.

China’s research and development in battery recycling serve as both a wise response to resource shortage and a step-by-step exploration of potential circular economy potential. The ability to close the loop on crucial resources like EV batteries will become an increasingly valuable asset as the global green transition progresses.

How countries balance the need for supply chain independence with their circular economy goals could be a key factor in the US and China’s ongoing green technology battle. The future of green technology and, consequently, the dynamics of the world’s economic power will likely be influenced by China’s involvement in battery recycling.

Lin Qin is visiting PhD students at the Liu Institute for Asia andamp; Asian Studies at the University of Notre Dame, and PhD students at the Shanghai International Studies University’s School of International Relations and& Public Affairs. Follow her on X at @Lyinn_Chin7

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New Indonesia fund rings early alarm bells on Prabowo – Asia Times

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Indonesia’s powerful state-owned enterprise ( SEO ) sector is on the verge of a major shake-up as the new Prabowo Subianto administration attempts to reshape the nation’s economic system.

On November 7, Prabowo’s state is expected to release information about a new super-holding organization for SOEs and another government-controlled finances to become known as the Daya Anagata Nusantara Investment Management Agency, or Danantara.

While the novel company’s specific mandate and work is unclear, the management has promoted the idea it will serve as an Indonesian version of Temasek, Singapore’s effective sovereign wealth fund.

But, feedback from the public and in-the-know sources suggest Danantara could be something entirely different, with some hesitant to accept it as a direct investment in the government’s name projects without going through the customary Ministry of Finance budget arrangement approach.

Fears about the proposed shake-up focus on two key points. First, while Danantara’s scope is unclear, it will likely overlap heavily in numerous areas with Indonesia’s existing sovereign wealth fund, the Indonesian Investment Authority ( INA ), and the Ministry for State-Owned Enterprises helmed by Erick Thorir.

Next, there are concerns that the move may aim to lead State resources toward idealistic political priorities, including his energy security, completely student lunch and food security policies, as well as potential patronage of political allies, given that the new holding company appears to be under the authority of the national office.

However, according to sources with knowledge of the situation, top SOE ministry officials were immediately notified when plans for the new holding company first appeared on October 22.

Burhannudin Abdullah, former chancellor of the Bank of Indonesia and part of the advisory committee for Prabowo, who was then president-elect, made the first proposals to reform the SOE government and create a very keeping company in a speech on September 25.

However, the sudden announcement that this concept would be put into practice still irritated many people. Many assumed that Thorir, a billionaire and influential political operator, would continue to play a significant role in bringing together and rationalizing the SOE sector under Prabowo. He was reappointed to the position he had held under President Joko Widodo.

The announcement of an apparently parallel organization, with scant details about its remit, has thrown all this into doubt. Thorir continued to appear obnoxious on Danantara as of November 4. ” I do n’t know exactly. When reporters inquired about the new holding company’s plans for November 8th, he replied,” I’m just setting up the office.”

In Indonesia, SOE control is a particularly powerful position. In 2023, SOEs controlled US$ 671 billion in assets, equivalent to 48.9 % of the country’s gross domestic product ( GDP ), in sectors spanning energy, mining, finance, agriculture and construction.

In addition to running big businesses in key sectors, Indonesia’s SOEs carry out government policies as varied as distributing subsidized fuel and food, to building new infrastructure projects, to making micro-loans to the poor. They are a potent source of patronage because of their ability to appoint people to fill positions and distribute contracts.

So what’s likely behind Danatara’s creation? Muliaman Hadad, who will head Danantara and formerly served as chair of Indonesia’s financial services authority, invoked both Singapore’s Temasek and Indonesia’s INA as models for the fund in recent comments to the press.

The analogies appear to be intended to reassure markets, even though they use very different strategies: the former focuses heavily on overseas assets plus a few strategic Singaporean companies, and the latter more on co-investing with large foreign funds in Indonesian infrastructure. Both Temasek and INA are reputable institutions that are renowned for having good governance and technocratic management.

However, initial reports and information from a variety of sources point to the possibility that Danantara will turn out to be something quite different. According to reports from Katadata, Danantara will control Indonesia’s seven SOEs, which are currently the biggest dividend-payers.

These include three big state-owned banks, namely Bank Mandiri, Bank Rakyat Indonesia and Bank Negara Indonesia, monopoly electricity distributor PLN, oil and gas giant Pertamina, telecoms conglomerate Telkom Indonesia and mining giant MIND ID.

There are also rumored plans to combine the reputable INA with Danantara, which could cause a potential cultural conflict between bureaucrats and private professionals. The INA has invested in a portfolio of private companies and SOEs with an emphasis on infrastructure, including Bank Mandiri and Bank Rakyat Indonesia.

Some special investment vehicles under the Ministry of Finance’s control, including perhaps Indonesia Infrastructure Guarantee Fund ( IIGF ) and Indonesia Infrastructure Financing ( IIF), may also come under Danantara’s control.

Some investors and analysts worry that the new super-holding company will add yet more bureaucracy and special interests to navigate and placate. Additionally, there are concerns that the new entity might undermine existing relationships that INA has with numerous large international investment, pension, and sovereign funds.

Moreover, Hadad’s appointment to head Danantara has raised certain concerns about the body’s governance.

Hadad served as Burhanuddin’s deputy when the latter oversaw payments of about$ 10 million to members of parliament and paid the legal fees for former central bank officials who were facing corruption charges when they were governor of the Bank of Indonesia.

One of those officials assisted in this way was Sudrajad Dwjiwandono – Prabowo’s brother-in-law. Burhannudin was later found guilty and given a five-year prison sentence for his actions.

There are already several indications that Prabowo wants to appoint loyalists in key positions in the SOE sector.

On November 5, it was announced that Simon Aloysius Mantiri, a member of Prabowo’s Gerindra party and deputy treasurer of his presidential campaign, would be the new CEO of the state-owned oil and gas giant Pertamina.

According to critics, more political appointments of this sort would be made through Danantara, which would increase presidential control over SOEs.

By resigning Indonesia’s trusted finance minister, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, and indicating that he could reduce funding for some of his signature policy promises, Prabowo earlier sought to calm market concerns about his robust spending plans and governance.

That did n’t address concerns about his big boat cabinet, the largest ever since the mid-1960s with some 48 ministers and 56 vice-ministers. The appointees are notably heavy on economic technocrats and heavy on political party leaders. &nbsp, &nbsp,

How markets will react to Nanantara’s creation is still unclear. However, as Prabowo’s vision for the fund becomes clearer, the sudden and, in many ways, suspect move taken so early in his term could well rekindle those market jitters.

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For China, a Harris presidency would be the lesser of two evils – Asia Times

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This content was first published by Pacific Forum. It is republished with authority.

” Are we enemies, or companions”? President Joe Biden and President Xi Jinping had a conversation next November at the Filoli Estate, a magnificent country house and garden set in Woodside, California, at which time President Xi Jinping and President Xi Jinping spoke. ” That”, Xi explained, “is the number one question for us”.

In response to the question five months later in his telephone conversation with Biden, Xi claimed that the two sides needed to “get the issue of corporate perception” right second, just like the first button on a shirt that needs to be fixed.

Get it a Harris management or a subsequent Trump administration, the second option is not likely to be worn as per Xi’s desire. The US-China relations period has come to a ceremonious close. Strategic competitors, including apparently of an extraordinary variant, is here to stay.

The key question is whether the two parties are capable of grimly stabilizing ties by placing guardrails on the relationship as the relationship’s negative tendencies develop, or whether serious competition will turn into direct strategic rivalry with the possibility of the base completely disappearing.

A Harris president’s or a second Trump president’s approach toward China probably would have some popular elements. These include

  • maintaining America’s technology advantage over China,
  • preventing China’s business and industrial plan from stifling world markets and lowering US competitiveness,
  • promoting US principles and reversing Foreign government and influencing operations models,
  • maintaining an intellect benefit over Beijing, and, all,
  • deterring China from the use of military power geographically. In a fight, China must refrain from maintaining its air and sea supremacy, defend Taiwan as one of the first area chains, and impose its own rule over all other areas relating to warfighting. &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp,

The Trump government’s National Security Strategy of December 2017 serves as the theoretical foundation for the popular view to China.

Having declared China a “revisionist energy” that was engaged in “long-term proper competition” with the United States, the administration worked to redesign the region’s hub-and-spokes architecture into a four-cornered network featuring Washington, Tokyo, Canberra, and New Delhi as the “principal hubs” to maintain a positive corporate balance over China.

Tariffs were imposed on$ 370 billion worth of Chinese imports on the geopolitical before, and the US’ technology power program was redesigned following an expansive Internet ( information and communications technology and services ) rule that was initially trained on Huawei’s kneecapping.

The Biden administration’s three-part approach to “invest, align and compete” against China is built on this foundation. Its punitive” small yard, high fence” controls – be they about chips, supercomputing or connected vehicles – derive from the ICTS order. Trump’s Section 301 tariffs have beennot just retained but selectively increased, too, not scaled down.

By introducing landmark legislation like the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act ( IRA ), the Biden administration has also increased domestic product capacity in key strategic and high-value-added manufacturing sectors. Additionally, it has creatively employed several industrial policy authorities, such as the Defense Production Act, Buy American Act, and the Bayh-Dole Act.

Given that the Republican leadership had abandoned these industrial policy initiatives, and the climate change-related initiatives might not be carried out in a second Trump administration.

Geopolitically, the Biden administration’s strategy on China centered on crafting a bespoke “latticework” of trilateral and multilateral coalitions ( rather than simply establishing a four-cornered architecture as was the case with Trump ) to build” situations of strength” and dictate the terms of effective competition with China.

Having assembled these coalitions – AUKUS, Quad, ROK-Japan-US trilateral, the Squad, deepened NATO-Indo-Pacific Partner ( IPP ) relationships – to shape the strategic environment around China, the Biden administration has since the November 2022 G20 Summit in Bali sought to cement a “floor” under its working relations with Beijing.

In a Harrisian or second Trump administration, the Biden and Trump administration brushstrokes are anticipated to continue.

None of this pleases China. In its view, the Trump and Biden administration’s strategies were intended to build it out economically, isolate it diplomatically, encircle it militarily and suppress its development technologically.

In Beijing, the networking of alliances, partnerships, and minilateral groupings is more of a catalyst for major power conflicts than a pillar for stability and deterrence, in Beijing’s opinion. And regardless of who wins on November 5, there are little hopes of positive change going forward.

That said, a Harris presidency is handily the “lesser of two evils” insofar as China is concerned.

Disruption, rather than stability, had been the norm on China during the Trump years and likely would be the case again.

China hopes that the next president will consolidate the fragile stability in ties and institutionalize it to make the bilateral relationship more predictable by building on the slow rehabilitation of ties over the past 18 months.

An essential component of China’s top top national interest is a non-disruptive external environment supported by a rough-and-ready coexisting relationship with the United States, which is its re-emergence and the achievement of its national modernization goals by the middle of the 21st&nbsp. century. Harris is more qualified than Trump to make this point.

Second, as a general principle, China prefers continuity over change in government. With the relevant leader and counterpart senior officials, continuity facilitates more predictable and stable interactions, as well as allowing for the formation of equity.

Given his depth of knowledge of China and his interactions with Xi, Beijing would have preferred that Biden be reelected to office. Harris, nonetheless, represents the next best option. Besides, Harris’s pronouncements on China on the campaign trail have been light on detail. The less said over the public airwaves the better, in Beijing’s view.

Third, as a general principle, in the post-Cold War era, China has tended to prefer Democratic Party presidents over Republican Party presidents. In fact, the Clinton and Obama second terms were extremely fruitful in the bilateral relationship, which is another reason why Beijing would have so much preferred that Biden have stayed in even during this “new normal” era of US-China ties.

Democrats, in Beijing’s view, are more prone to taking a less adversarial approach towards the bilateral relationship and China’s role in the world compared to Republicans. And now that the Republican Party has abandoned its pro-trade stances, the policy axes that China and Republican administrations can rely on to find common ground have fallen dramatically.

Finally, and relatedly, China holds deep reservations not so much about President Trump as much as about a Trump administration. Trump is a known and, up to a point, a manageable quantity, in Beijing’s view. His transactionalism opens him up to opportunistic deals involving US jobs, investments, and exports, and he is not necessarily anti-China in his political outlook.

A second Trump administration, on the other hand, would be filled with freshmen who were unjustifiably hostile to China. Even though the ties would be low, there might be no bottomless if these new Cold Warriors proved to be determined to establish Taiwan as the central hub of the United States ‘ great power rivalry with China. Beijing would prefer that this theory be left unproven.

Over the next four years, the US and China will likely remain tense in a fiercely competitive relationship. The Indo-Pacific region and the world will be greatly affected by whether the two parties are able or willing to incorporate this competitive dynamic into a steadying strategic framework.

Sourabh Gupta&nbsp, ( sourabhgupta@chinaus-icas .org ) is a senior Indo-Pacific international relations policy specialist with two decades of Washington-based experience in a think tank and political risk research and advisory capacity. At the Institute for China-America Studies, he heads the Trade n ‘ Technology Program.

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Razer Gold received in-principle approval from the Monetary Authority of Singapore to be a major payment institution under the Payment Services Act 

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  • Provides safer, trusted payment running for players and designers
  • Approval allows Razer Gold to expand its reach, help the game industry

Razer Gold received in-principle approval from the Monetary Authority of Singapore to be a major payment institution under the Payment Services Act 

The Monetary Authority of Singapore ( MAS ) has granted the company’s founders ‘ approval to operate as a major payment institution, according to Razer Gold, the unified virtual currency used by gamers worldwide. This allows Razer Gold to develop its product range and offerings while offering frictionless payment options for gaming platforms.

Razer Gold has been conducting business as part of a temporary provision as part of the transitory arrangements made since the Payment Services Act’s inception. This initial acceptance represents a significant step in the development of its status as a big pay organization. Once it has obtained the licence, Razer Gold may be authorised to offer restricted payment services, including account issuance, facilitating both private and cross-border money transfers, merchant acquisition, and providing e-money issuance services—all of which are necessary for supporting the dynamic and fast growing gaming industry.

Razer is celebrating a major step by obtaining this in-principle consent from MAS. It reflects our unwavering commitment to upholding the highest standards for conformity and advancing our long-term goals for sustainable development. It strongly positions Razer as a trusted spouse in Singapore’s online economy”, said Adisorn Phonnarut, International Head of Razer Gold.

The thoroughness of the licensing procedure and the initial approval show how dedicated our team was to creating a solid compliance framework. We look forward to improving our techniques and working with MAS, our partners, and the gaming industry to create a safe, trustworthy transaction ecosystem that meets the changing needs of the sector, he continued.

Razer Gold will continue to offer players and game developers faster, safer, and more trustworthy transaction processing as the company continues to innovate and adapt to the changing demands of the gaming industry.

As a member of Razer, the world’s leading global life product for players, Razer Gold provides one-stop access to full coverage of both online and off-line channels in Singapore and emerging markets. It is accessible in more than 50 000 sports and entertainment titles, and players may use Razer Gold to buy in-game items like Razer Silver and unique deal deals.

For more information on Razer Gold, please visit https ://gold .razer.com

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Tariffs likely if Trump wins, warn experts

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US Vice President Kamala Harris in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, US, August 20, 2024 and former US. President Donald Trump in Bedminster, New Jersey, US, August 15, 2024 are seen in a combination of file photographs. (Reuters photos)
US Vice President Kamala Harris in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, US, August 20, 2024 and past US. President Donald Trump in Bedminster, New Jersey, US, August 15, 2024 are seen in a combination of document images. ( Reuters photos )

The political parties ‘ ability to predict cases in which the upcoming US presidential election between Donald Trump and Democratic nominee Kamala Harris could have both risks and advantages.

Sanan Angubolkul, president of the Thai Chamber of Commerce, said changes in United States ‘ trade policies, funding flows, and climate commitments may also affect the Thai business, which is closely linked to international politics.

Buyers worry that American plans will have an impact on global industry, he said, and Thai baht and stock market fluctuations frequently occur in the lead up to US elections.

He argued that Thailand’s state and company sectors must make strategic adjustments in this atmosphere to reduce the risks brought on by US policies and exploit probable advantages brought by changes, such as strengthening ties with Southeast Asia and promoting regional industries.

Two probable cases have been suggested by the Thai Chamber of Commerce:

These measures have the potential to cause prices, adverse effects on Thailand’s imports, and have an impact on the transport and energy sectors. A 10 % global import tax from the US would also lower the need for Thai goods.

Furthermore, levies of up to 60 % on Chinese products may transfer Chinese imports toward Southeast Asia, flooding local businesses with cheaper items and hard Thai manufacturers.

In the following incident, if Ms Harris wins the election, her presidency would likely continue the Biden-era plans, supporting global industry and clean energy investments.

This will increase Thai export to the US and open up new opportunities for Thai companies to work on facilities and clean energy projects.

Despite the risks, Mr Sanan emphasised the importance of maintaining solid Thai-US relationships.

Regardless of the outcome of the election, he hoped Thailand would react to make sure the US would continue to be a significant trading partner and supporter in the future.

More funding

According to Kriengkrai Thiennukul, FTI Chairman, the Federation of Thai Industries (FTI ) believes that Thailand is likely to be able to withstand the impact of US trade barriers and benefit from more foreign direct investment if trade wars grow.

If past president Donald Trump is reelected, nations that import products to the US, including Thailand, may impose substantial taxes on many items.

He said,” We are carefully monitoring whether America may impose tariffs on more products from Thailand, which has a trade deficit with the US,” adding that Thailand already had a trade deficit of about US$ 20 billion in 2020.

Thailand became the 12th-largest current account surplus holder with the US this year thanks to an increase of 11 %.

The US-China trade war erupted during the Trump administration as the previous leader imposed higher tariffs on Chinese goods in response to a years-long trade deficit with China. Mr. Kriengkrai claimed that Mr. Trump had stated that the US would never accept trade deficits with different nations.

According to the Council on Foreign Relations, a think tank based in New York, Mr. Trump wants to “imposition a’universal’ price on most exports while matching higher taxes imposed by different places.”

The US trade barriers, which have also been in place since the Trump government, may proceed but should not be as significant as those that have been imposed by Mr. Trump, according to Mr. Kriengkrai.

He thinks Ms. Harris might impose levies on some goods. Trade disputes may have an impact on Thai imports, but they can help to spur foreign investment there.

If Mr. Trump is elected president, the US-China trade conflict is expected to get worse. This may lead to the growth of businesses into Asean states, including Thailand, said Mr Kriengkrai.

No matter who will succeed Donald Trump as president of the United States, Asst. Prof. Akekalak Chaipumee, a professor from Kasetsart University’s Faculty of Social Sciences, said that the Indo-Pacific region is still a proper area where the United States can use its influence to combat China and Russia.

The nation will continue to compete with China and Russia in its quest to be a tremendous strength. At the same time, both applicants share the similar priority– ‘ America First ‘– although at different levels”, he noted.

He said if Mr Trump becomes the next leader, US multilateralism did decline. Additionally, the Republican Party demands that China’s Most Popular Country status be revoked, that imports of necessities remain phased out, and that China desist from purchasing British businesses and real estate in order to” safe proper independence from China.”

If Ms Harris wins, US international policy will probably be consistent with the Biden administration’s view, he said.

As for Thailand, he said the nation always positions itself as” a friend to all nations” by seeking engagement with various international frameworks, such as Brics, an intergovernmental organisation comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ( OECD ).

Thailand also needs to check if its international policies need to be changed following the US vote.

The business conflict continues

The complement lecturer in social science at Silpakorn University, Anekchai Rueangrattanakorn, said Thailand may have to take sides or face restrictions when it engages in diplomatic relations with some of the nations the US has a conflict with.

He said Mr Trump adopts unilateralism and sees multilateralism, including relationships with other provinces, while Ms Harris very emphasises diplomacy, negotiation, and teamwork and strongly emphasises internationalism.

He furthered that the US foreign policies will continuously affect geopolitics, especially in balancing China’s power. The US is one of the Southeast Asian allies that has made significant investments in the area and established strong military ties.

Mr. Trump’s foreign policies appear to favor stability in Southeast Asia more than Ms. Harris’, he said, adding that the Thai government needs to take into account the potential trade war caused by the possibility of a 10 % tariff wall that would prevent any imports into the US.

Thailand must stay out of international conflicts, keep its stance, take national interests as a top priority, and actively promote peace and shared prosperity in the area, according to Mr. Anekchai.

The government should continue to pursue a diplomatic and economic policy and use soft power to promote trade, investment, and tourism, particularly in emerging markets. Additionally, he recommended that the government consider crafting a suitable foreign policy strategy, especially if Thailand wants to play a leading role in resolving some of Southeast Asia’s issues.

Closer ties

Thailand needs to strengthen relations with the US regardless of the future president, said Panitan Wattanayagorn, an academic in security and international relations.

Regardless of the outcome of the election, he advised active dialogue with both US candidates to ensure favorable relations, stressing that early diplomatic efforts could be beneficial for Thailand over time.

He suggested that a victory for Mr Trump could bring clearer strategies, especially toward the Russia-Ukraine conflict, as he might pursue peace negotiations.

However, Mr Panitan noted that a long-term conflict between the US and Russia remains likely due to China’s support for Russia, along with US conflicts with China. At the same time, Mr Trump’s relations with North Korea might boost the chances of his victory.

Additionally, Mr. Panitan claimed that there might not be much of a difference between the parties ‘ strategies in Middle Eastern and Asian conflicts. However, tensions with China, particularly around trade, will likely remain intense under either administration.

He predicted that the United States would be involved for a while in the Middle East because of its alliance with Israel and Iran. With a proposed defence budget of US$ 800-900 billion, the US would be positioned to counter Iran directly, yet Israel remains a key partner until then.

Regarding Asia, Mr. Panitan noted that Mr. Trump could negotiate with Chinese President Xi Jinping while also supporting Taiwan’s defense. He further explained that the US does not currently have enough military power to deal seriously with China, making his relations with the Philippines a key factor that could win him votes.

Ms Harris, on the other hand, would likely focus more on Myanmar’s internal conflict, with the possibility that she would negotiate with Thailand for access to the region to deal with the matter, he said.

Mr. Trump’s decisive style, which might appeal to Americans given rising inflation and economic concerns, may be more difficult to support than Ms. Harris’s current uncertain policies, according to Mr. Panitan.

Akekalak: US still a great power

Akekalak: US still a great power

Anekchai: May need to take sides

Anekchai: May need to take sides

Kriengkrai: Trade war worries

Kriengkrai: Trade war worries

Panitan: Harris ' policies unclear

Panitan: Harris ‘ policies unclear

Sanan: Thailand can adapt

Sanan: Thailand can adapt

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S Korea’s crucial quest to break tungsten ties with China – Asia Times

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The Sangdong metal plant in South Korea holds one of the nation’s largest single-mine metal resources. The plant is scheduled to begin operations next month after closing in the early 1990s largely due to cheaper Chinese titanium flooding global markets and undermining South Korea’s price competitiveness.

Following Canadian company Almonty Industries ‘ 2015 merger of the Sangdong mining rights, this restoration follows. The organization established a company, Almonty Korea Tungsten Corporation, to move the miners operation, which resurrected the latent webpage. Domestically, this work has been welcomed by local residents, hoping that the mine’s revival may revive the group facing local drop.

Globally, following a&nbsp, visit&nbsp, by US government experts this past summer, the plant is anticipated to safely provide tungsten abroad—primarily to the United States—although China remains the dominant global provider.

Given the government’s extensive dependence on Chinese metal, concerns arise in Seoul as the planet looks beyond China to find metal for manufacturing, including both for chips and batteries as well as weapons.

Sangdong Mine and the US-South Korea Tungsten Agreement

Sangdong is a small village in Yeongwol County in South Korea’s Gangwon Province. It houses the Sangdong metal me, which contains an estimated&nbsp, 7.9 million tonnes&nbsp, of proven and possible resources and boasts the nation’s highest levels of metal.

Almonty&nbsp, claims&nbsp, that the plant may run for” 100-plus times”, comparing Sangdong to its “equal size” me in Portugal, which has been running for 136 centuries and is expected to continue for another 50 to 60 years. The Sangdong mine used to contribute to&nbsp, over half of the country’s exports&nbsp, as one of the largest tungsten producers on the planet.

However, the mine shut down in 1994, mainly due to an influx of cheaper tungsten from China, which&nbsp, resumed exporting to the non-communist world&nbsp, following its&nbsp, economic reforms. &nbsp, Consequently, Sangdong—once the heart of South Korea’s industrialization, generating tungsten dollars —has become nearly a ghost town, with its population dwindling to around 1, 000 residents, one of the least populated towns in the country.

The mine was originally owned by the South Korean state enterprise, Korea Tungsten Mining Company (KTMC), founded in 1952 during the Korean War. Its establishment came after the US-South Korea tungsten agreement, which was signed the same year, as the metal started to become a “pivotal strategic mineral in the 20th century.”

According to a&nbsp, study &nbsp, on South Korea’s tungsten exports and the bilateral tungsten agreement, the United States classified tungsten as a strategic material for weapons production during World War II and sought alternative sources after China’s Communist Revolution, turning to South Korea.

During the Korean War, efforts to export Korean tungsten to the US grew more rapid, which sparked South Korea’s “tungsten mania” and prompted the US Department of the Interior ( DOI ) to send US experts to work with the South Korean government to stockpile tungsten from the Sangdong mine.

The United States&nbsp, agreed to&nbsp, “purchase all the tungsten offered by the ROK” and pay US$ 65 a ton for the first two years, with the contract lasting five years or until 15, 000 short tons of tungsten had been purchased. This agreement established a stable market for Korean tungsten exports and ensured steady and exclusive tungsten supplies for the US during the war.

However, a sharp drop in global tungsten prices, coupled with South Korea’s early meeting of the production target, led to the agreement’s conclusion. The Korean government&nbsp, pushed hard&nbsp, to continue the deal to maintain a steady revenue, which was crucial for its post-war recovery, but the contract was not renewed.

After decades of industry setbacks, influenced by unstable global tungsten prices and, notably, China’s aggressive pricing and exports, KTMC was &nbsp, privatized in 1994&nbsp, under the Kim Yong-sam administration’s policy to divest state-owned enterprises, becoming the first company in the country to undergo this transition.

The company was sold to the South Korean Geopyung Group, but it went&nbsp, bankrupt&nbsp, in 1998 during the Asian Financial Crisis. Before Canadian tungsten mining and processing company Almonty Industries acquired the business in 2015, the ownership of the Sangdong mine had been changed several times.

As of July 2024, the company has invested nearly&nbsp, 130 billion won ( approximately US$ 94 million ) into the mine’s redevelopment.

Reducing Reliance on Chinese Critical Minerals&nbsp,

Tungsten is&nbsp, most notably used in&nbsp, semiconductors, electric vehicle batteries, automobiles, weapons, and industrial cutting machines due to its exceptional hardness and high energy density.

According to the&nbsp, US Geological Survey data, China accounted for over 80 percent of the world’s tungsten production in 2023, reaching 63, 000 metric tons, followed by Vietnam, the second-largest producer, with 3, 500 metric tons. In response to China’s dominance in tungsten production and export, the US DOI&nbsp, designated&nbsp, tungsten as a critical mineral in 2018.

On the legislative front, the Restoring Essential Energy and Security Holdings Onshore for Rare Earths Act of 2022, or the&nbsp, REEshore Act of 2022, was introduced to reduce US dependence on foreign sources, particularly China, for critical minerals like tungsten.

By 2026, the law requires the DOD and DOI to establish a strategic reserve of rare earth metals that have been processed or refined in China in sensitive US Department of Defense ( DOD ) systems. This May, the DOD issued a&nbsp, final rule&nbsp, restricting the acquisition of certain metals and magnets, including tungsten, from China, along with Iran, Russia, and North Korea, effective January 2027.

On tariffs, the United States Trade Representative ( USTR ) announced its plans to impose a&nbsp, 25 % tariff&nbsp, on Chinese minerals, including tungsten, stating that” the concentration of critical minerals mining and refining capacity in China leaves our]US] supply chains vulnerable and puts our]US] national security and clean energy goals at risk”.

Given China’s history of using critical mineral exports as a tactical tool—most recently with export controls on&nbsp, germanium and gallium&nbsp, effective August 2023, followed by&nbsp, antimony starting September 2024—global efforts to diversify critical mineral supply chains, including tungsten, have become increasingly urgent.

In February 2023, Seoul announced a&nbsp, strategic mineral procurement strategy, which selected 33 critical minerals, including tungsten,” for management with regard to economic security” with the goal of “mitigating its reliance on imports from a select few countries”.

In diplomatic relations, Seoul’s commitment to critical minerals was highlighted by the launch of the Korea-Africa Critical Minerals Dialogue during the first&nbsp, Korea-Africa Summit, focusing on cooperation between Korea’s advanced technology and Africa’s mineral resources.

South Korea also signed a&nbsp, memorandum of understanding&nbsp, ( MOU) with Canada to strengthen critical mineral supply chains, aiming to reduce reliance on China by leveraging Canada’s mineral wealth and South Korea’s manufacturing capabilities.

In addition, Seoul assumed the&nbsp, chairmanship&nbsp, of the US-led Minerals Security Partnership ( MSP), and at its first MSP meeting as chair in September, &nbsp, Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul spotlighted the Mahenge Graphite Project in Tanzania, for which Korea leads the Working Group.

South Korea’s Autonomy over Tungsten &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp,

South Korea is confronted by the unfortunate reality of having limited control over a large number of locally mined, high-quality tungsten reserves in spite of this. As the&nbsp, world’s largest tungsten consumer per capita, South Korea ‘s&nbsp, 95 % &nbsp, reliance on Chinese tungsten imports has been a persistent issue.

There are concerns in Seoul that the foreign ownership and operation of the Sangdong mine, which was once the nation’s greatest asset, underscores potential limitations on Korea’s autonomy over its mineral resources. Almonty intends to first allocate 45 % of its annual output to the US market and likely set aside the remaining 55 % for South Korea, which indicates a positive shift for South Korea to significantly reduce its dependence on China.

These concerns about tungsten autonomy and ownership are closely related to broader concerns about economic sovereignty and national security, especially given Seoul’s position as a semiconductor and battery manufacturing powerhouse, combined with the upcoming US presidential election and its potential impact on global trade.

Such concerns clearly demonstrate the need for long-term investment in domestic mineral resource development, extending beyond immediate profitability considerations. This includes constructing processing facilities, such as the Almonty and Yeongwol County MOU signed this year, known as the&nbsp, tungsten oxide plant.

This development is particularly noteworthy because, in 2022 and 2023, Russia and North Korea were ranked as the third and fourth-largest tungsten producers, which presents a challenge for the United States and its key allies, particularly South Korea.

In the face of the growing US-China competition, tungsten is once more crucial for securing technological advancements and strengthening security initiatives, just as it was crucial during World War II, reflecting the geopolitical dynamics of that time. In today’s changing environment, the question of Korea’s ability to exercise control and maintain a stable supply chain for this crucial metal is receiving renewed scrutiny.

Haeyoon Kim is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute. &nbsp, The views expressed here are the author’s alone. Republished with permission, read the original here.

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Who’s afraid of the big bad bond market? – Asia Times

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When interest levels were being cut in the US, a funny thing happened: they ended up being higher.

The US Federal Reserve lowered its benchmark interest rate by half a percentage point in September, &nbsp, raising expectations&nbsp, that another levels may soon start coming along. Otherwise, the US Treasury’s two-year and 10-year information and the common 30-year lease rate have all risen by half a percentage point or more.

What happened? The Fed has limited authority over interest rates, which is the quick reply. The bond market, when well, has a lot to say about rates—the longer-term charges in particular, although no entirely.

The relationship economy’s” say” is a simple representation of supply and demand. The key is to comprehend that bond yields and prices move in the opposite direction: one moves off and the other moves down.

The 30-year mortgage interest rate is one of several other bond market-based rates that was coming down before the Federal Reserve slashed its benchmark rate on Sept. 18 but went up after it. (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis chart)
The 30-year loan attention rate is one of several different bond market-based levels that were decreasing before the Federal Reserve cut its benchmark rate on September 18 but increased after it. Graph: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

For example: If I buy for US$ 100 a bond that yields 5 %, I will receive$ 5 a year in interest. Let’s say I’m selling the bond to you and you only pay$ 90 because the demand is subdued and the supply is strong. You currently receive$ 5 in interest per year, but because you paid$ 90, your yield is 5.55 %. ( If, instead, you had to pay$ 105 for the bond, your yield would be 4.76 %. )

What’s happening, therefore, is that while the Fed is now trying to push prices down, ties are selling off and that’s driving costs higher. The question is: Why is the connection business negative?

There are at least two possible solutions.

Some experts blame what they’re calling the” Trump trade”. Although the surveys are a tossup, the industry think Trump is going to win the presidency. They also believe that a second Trump term will aggravate the trend toward higher inflation and worsen the already bad national debt.

Understand that the markets do n’t have a political agenda. Bond investors may be mistaken about the effects of a Trump success, as well as the success itself, but their predictions do n’t represent anti-Trump discrimination.

Their purchasing and selling of securities is based on what they think will happen in terms of prices. Lenders apprehension about being reimbursed in undervalued currency. Both candidates have pledged to provide tax breaks and freebies that will help with inflation, but academics believe Trump has already made those promises.

The business serves as the other justification for the ties selling off. The Fed’s September 18 price cut reflected an market that was scarcely creating 100, 000 new tasks a month. Some economists were predicting another half-point split at the Fed’s November meet.

But in early October the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported a 254, 000 increase in work in September, well above the 12-month regular, and Census revised some of the earlier times forward. Meanwhile, the inflation rate in September continued its downward march toward the Fed’s 2 % target but did n’t drop as much as analysts expected.

With those studies, a half-point November split by the Fed looked less good. One Fed official also expressed his willingness to avoid a split in November.

The November 1 report that only 12, 000 additional jobs were reported for October seems likely to be dismissed as being distorted by significant storms and the Boeing attack.

Financial businesses are forward-looking, they anticipate activities. In anticipation of the Fed’s September cut, owners had bought securities, which drove bond yields over. In light of the studies showing a stronger market and worse-than-expected prices in September, owners ‘ anticipation changed. If the Fed was n’t going to lower rates as much or as fast as expected, markets had to adjust.

It’s possible, of course, that the true answer is some mix of the Trump deal and expectations of future Fed price movements. The expectations solution is more normal. You’d have to wonder why then if shareholders were selling bonds out of concern for higher imbalances and prices. Bond traders have ignored decades of multi-trillion-dollar national budget deficits.

If those shortfalls are then causing bond traders to feel uneasy, it would represent a return of those who were known as the “bond vigilantes.” Bond investors ‘ concerns about federal spending three decades ago led to 10-year note yields falling from 5.2 % annually to 8 %.

Years later, the administration also managed to generate a budget surplus by working with Congress on plans to control spending. That it had to be pushed by the markets to do so caused a Clinton consultant, James Carville, to say – reportedly – that, if he could be reincarnated as anyone, it would be the relationship industry so he could scare everyone.

For farmers, ranchers and another business loans, the big question is where interest rates are going from below. The most probable course for them to take is, in my opinion, to fall, perhaps more quietly than analysts had predicted in September.

The US economy is robust, according to The Economist, and inflation is essentially under command. The present level of interest rates is much higher than current economic situations warrant, and if the economy continues to grow at this rate, which is very unlikely and if a rebound in inflation is possible but not specially unlikely.

If I’m correct about the economy, the Fed will continue to cut interest rates, perhaps just quarter-point cuts, and perhaps not at every meeting, but it will be closer to 3 % than 5 % over the long run.

The industry will eventually fall in line as the Fed moves in that direction, particularly if whoever wins the presidency is prevented from carrying out their most inflationary campaign promises by Congress, the relationship market, or a return to common sense.

Urban Lehner, a former Wall Street Journal Asia journalist and editor, is DTN/The Progressive Farmer’s editor emeritus. &nbsp, This&nbsp, content, &nbsp, actually published by DTN on November 1, and now&nbsp, republished by Asia Times with authority, is © Copyright 2024 DTN, LLC. All rights reserved. &nbsp, &nbsp, Follow&nbsp, Urban Lehner&nbsp, on X @urbanize

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