Achieving SDGs amid global disruptions

The world finds itself at a crossroads, facing a multitude of formidable challenges – repercussions from the Covid-19 pandemic, geopolitical turmoil across the globe, and climate emergencies. The urgency of addressing these issues cannot be overstated.

Governments worldwide stand at a unique juncture where they must chart a course toward sustainable development, simultaneously fostering economic opportunity, averting an ecological collapse, and global well-being improvement. This convergence of priorities brings into sharp focus the 2030 agenda for sustainable development, encapsulating the collective ambition to create a better world.

The UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) consist of 17 interlinked objectives established by the United Nations in 2015. They provide a universal framework for all countries, irrespective of their development status, to address global challenges, enhance well-being, and protect the environment.

These goals serve as a shared blueprint for international peace and prosperity, guiding efforts toward a more equitable and sustainable world by 2030, while encouraging collaboration among governments, organizations and individuals to combat poverty, inequality, environmental degradation, and other pressing global issues.

However, the journey toward realizing these SDGs has been met with unforeseen turbulence, primarily due to the profound impact of the Covid-19 pandemic.

The progress achieved thus far has been dealt a setback of historic proportions, with the COV SARS-2 virus reverberating through global health-care systems and international markets, development finance, undoing breakthroughs and stifling advancements that had been painstakingly forged.

Correlation between Covid-19 Infection Rates (2020) and SDG Index Score Growth Rates (2020 compared with 2019) – for High-Income, Upper-Middle Income, Lower-Middle Income and Low-Income Economies. Source: Sustainable Development Report 2020, Sustainable Development Solutions Network

The Covid-19 pandemic emerged as an unprecedented disruptor, severely damaging the SDG agenda. The effects have been felt across the board, with significant declines in global SDG index scores and a concerning increase in poverty, marking the first instance of such regression in decades – an additional 119 million to 124 million people had been pushed into extreme poverty, where South Asia accounts for 60% of this figure.

One of the most pronounced impacts has been on public health and quality of life. The pandemic’s diversion of medical services and the strain on health-care systems have undone decades of progress toward SDG 3 (Good Health and Well-Being). As a result, achieving improved health and well-being for all is now a more formidable challenge than ever before.

Education suffers

SDG 4 (Quality Education), a fundamental pillar of the sustainable development agenda, has suffered significantly.

In 2020, efforts (which some critics found highly questionable) to slow the spread of the respiratory ailment disrupted the educational journeys of more than 1.52 billion adolescents and children worldwide, erasing nearly two decades of academic progress. The repercussions of this setback will likely be felt for generations.

The economic fallout has been equally severe, with the world grappling with its most significant financial crisis since that of 2007-08. During 2020 the world’s collective GDP fall by 3.4%, indicating a substantial decline in economic output. The second wave of Covid-19 resulted in the loss of about 7.5 million jobs, hitting various sectors hard, and severely threatening SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth).

Ukraine war

Adding to this conundrum, the already complex geopolitical landscape across the globe has only intensified these challenges. The war between Ukraine and Russia is a stark reminder that conflicts in one corner of the world have far-reaching, global ramifications.

It underscores the inextricable link among peace, territorial harmony, and economic prosperity. Armed conflicts have consequences beyond immediate violence; they often result in widespread agricultural abandonment, severely compromising food security.

To be sure, the conflict has disrupted global energy markets, causing fluctuations in energy prices and supply – household energy costs have nearly doubled due to disruptions in the global energy supply chain.

This disruption has been particularly felt in South Asia, where energy markets have been thrown into crisis due to uncertainty in energy supply and increased prices. The collapse of piped gas supplies from Russia has forced countries, including Europe, to seek energy alternatives, often turning to Asia for energy sourcing.

The impact of such conflicts extends beyond the devastation wrought by war itself. Trade wars between significant economies have inadvertently triggered ecological crises, with instances of deforestation and overuse of agricultural land.

The Ukraine-Russia war, for example, has already caused severe damage and loss of life, expanding its reach from population centres to rural areas, and resulting in massive displacement and loss of livelihoods.

According to the UN Security Council, about 14 million people were displaced by the conflict in Europe. This global issue of migration cuts across the entire spectrum of the 2030 Agenda, influencing all 17 SDGs.

Migration-related targets span labor migration, international student mobility, human trafficking, remittances, etc. Recognizing and addressing these complex interlinkages between migration and each SDG is essential for a comprehensive approach to these challenges.

Governments face a pressing need to enhance the accomplishment of the UN SDGs in the face of complex geopolitical and macroeconomic challenges. In the short term, immediate actions are crucial.

Strengthening health-care infrastructure is vital to withstand future health crises, while restoring lost incomes, especially among vulnerable groups, is essential. Ensuring resource security is paramount, particularly for food, water and energy.

Looking ahead, governments must adopt systematic, long-term strategies for inter-departmental cooperation to address the interconnected nature of the SDGs. Identifying and tackling immediate challenges such as poverty, food security, and resource supply is vital. Simultaneously, fostering scientific progress and communication is essential in the longer horizon.

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Unmasking Russia’s military soft spots in Asia

Russia faces four potential military problems in the Indo-Pacific:

  1. Vulnerability of the sea leg of its nuclear triad as part of the Pacific Fleet;
  2. Escalation of tensions around Japan’s territorial claims to the Kuril Islands;
  3. Large-scale regional armed conflicts, primarily on the Korean Peninsula, but also around Taiwan or in the South China Sea, and between India and China;
  4. Shifts in strategic trends between Russia and China, and between Russia and India.

Russia’s regional security outlook revolves around these four problems.

The future deployment of intermediate-range missiles in the region by the United States and its allies (especially Japan and the Republic of Korea) is a direct threat to Russian strategic nuclear forces. These missiles could also lead to a clash in the Kuril Islands due to aggressive actions by Japan.

The US Army and US Marine Corps both have programs nearing completion (LRHW Dark Eagle and SMRF Typhon for the former, and uncrewed Long Range Fires launchers for the latter).

Japan is also actively developing such capabilities (including in the hypersonic domain), and the Republic of Korea has already fielded such weapons, namely the advanced missiles of the Hyunmoo family.

The integration of early warning and space situational awareness systems by the United States, Republic of Korea, and Japan should be considered in the same context. In the long term, this will likely result in the buildup of joint and integrated air and missile defense, as well as counterspace capabilities, including through the development and forward deployment of new land- and sea-based missile defense capabilities by those countries.

Meanwhile, the Australia-United Kingdom-United States trilateral partnership (dubbed AUKUS) – which will equip the Australian Defense Force with nuclear-powered submarines and long-range precision weapons and strengthen Australian anti-submarine warfare capabilities – will further increase threats to both the submarine and surface forces of the Russian Pacific Fleet.

Artist rendering of possible design for SSN-AUKUS submarines. Image: Wikimedia Commons

Australian submarines will free up US Navy forces and assets to counter the Russian Navy and, possibly, patrol in the Northern Pacific themselves. The fielding of increasingly capable anti-submarine warfare patrol aircraft also contributes to increasing vulnerabilities for Russia.

None of these developments has been explicitly labeled “anti-Russian,” but capability matters more than policy.

Adversary pressure in the immediate vicinity of the Russian sea, air and land borders in the Indo-Pacific is also maintained by freedom-of-navigation operations, flights of bomber aircraft (within the so-called Dynamic Force Employment doctrine) and reconnaissance flights by the United States and its allies – including during exercises and tests of Russian strategic nuclear forces.

The United States’ and allies’ interests in establishing and enforcing so-called “air defense identification zones” – a fictional concept that often leads to media headlines about “airspace violations” – create additional pressure.

The “materialization” of US extended nuclear deterrence, expressed not only in a declarative “nuclear umbrella” for allies, but also in the possible forward deployment of nuclear warheads, adds another dimension to these problems.

Moreover, there seem to be changes to the way extended deterrence operates. US nuclear capabilities protect “US allies and partners,” but the latter’s conventional forces are developing a role in facilitating and supporting US missions involving nuclear weapons.

To put it more bluntly: enhanced and expanded allied non-nuclear capabilities now enable US nuclear missions, aligning with the new US concept of integrated deterrence.

As for possible armed conflicts in the region, be it in the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait, South China Sea or South Asia, each would have a direct effect on Russia as a Pacific country.

The consequences of such conflicts would lead to dramatic changes in supply chains (which already face immense pressure due to the breakdown of relations between Russia and “the West”), the shake-up of the regional markets (which are increasingly important for Russian exports and imports) and migration waves.

The result would have direct effects on the Russian economy. The effects would be even greater because of the inevitable involvement of China, Russia’s strategic partner.

So far, Russia has managed to maintain relatively stable and even fruitful relations with both China and India. Its relationship with Japan suffers, however, and the relationship with the Republic of Korea will probably follow suit – due both to Seoul’s ever-growing involvement in providing military industrial support to Western countries and to Moscow’s possible cooperation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

To be sure, the future of Russia-China and Russia-India relations will depend not only on Moscow, but also on Beijing and New Delhi. Given increasing strategic tensions – augmented by the United States’ interest in rallying India to the US side against China as well as in limiting Russia-India cooperation – established strategic relations might evolve.

These changes might not lead to direct military conflicts but could well drive Moscow to greatly re-prioritize Russian military development.

Russia’s military security depends squarely on the Russian Far East. The Pacific Fleet has the most advanced SSBNs of the Borei family. New surface ships and submarines with Kalibr cruise missiles are entering service.

Anti-ship and air/missile defense missile batteries are deployed to the Kuril Islands and throughout the region. And even a new heavy bomber regiment might be established. The Russian Navy and Long-Range Aviation also routinely hold joint patrols with their Chinese counterparts.

Chinese troops under a Russian flag in a file photo. Image: RT

Furthermore, the deployment of US-made intermediate-range, ground-launched missiles in the region (which seems inevitable) would mean the so-called “moratorium” on such weapons no longer stands, and Russia will likely deploy similar capabilities as well, with everyone’s security undermined.

But Russia has bigger vulnerabilities, in that it lacks general-purpose naval forces: submarines, surface ships, and aviation. At this point, it is unclear if the Russian defense industry can address this problem in view of the priority it gives to the Western front. Growing military-technical cooperation with China might offer a solution, however.

Still, if Russia wants to remain a relevant military power both in the region and globally, Moscow must do more. Otherwise, even the ability to sustain the regionally deployed elements of its nuclear triad will be questioned – both by adversaries and partners.

Dmitry Stefanovich ([email protected]) is a research fellow at the Center for International Security, IMEMO Russian Academy of Sciences.

This article was first publishled by Pacific Forum. Asia Times is republishing it with permission.

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Is India exporting food inflation to the world?

A woman sorts out onions at a vegetable market in Delhi on May 30, 2023Getty Images

Erratic climate conditions – including the driest August in more than a century – have sent food prices spiralling above 11% in India, which is a major player in global agri-trade.

Just as tomato prices begin cooling down, onions have gotten dearer by a quarter since June in the domestic market. And pulses which go into making the humble dal (lentil soup) are now around 20% more expensive than at the beginning of the year.

India’s got a “curry problem”, some economists say, as the cost of a regular vegetarian meal jumped by a third in the month of July alone.

With some key state elections this year and a big general election looming next summer, the Indian government has swung into action, unleashing a number of measures to tame food inflation.

Following a ban on wheat in May 2022, India announced an abrupt stop to non-basmati white rice exports last month. More recently, the finance ministry imposed a duty of 40% on onions to discourage exports and improve domestic supplies.

With sugar production expected to be lower this year, “the likelihood of a ban on sugar exports has also increased”, according to Rajni Sinha, chief economist at CareEdge Group.

The government could step up its response with further measures going ahead, analysts say. For instance, since the consecutive export restrictions on rice have not yet lowered domestic rice price inflation, “the government could seek a more comprehensive ban”, global brokerage Nomura said in a recent note.

So does India, with its aggressive defence of domestic prices, run the risk of exporting food inflation to the world?

Purchase limits imposed bags or rice of at an Indian grocery store in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, on July 27, 2023. Shortages of non-basmati rice caused by rains and drought in rice-producing regions of India have sent prices soaring in the country.

Getty Images

The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) believes it does, particularly with rice, sugar and onions. Over the past decade, India has emerged as the world’s largest exporter of rice – it holds a 40% market share – and second largest exporter of sugar and onions.

The United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) Rice Price Index jumped by 2.8% in July – its highest level since September 2011 – driven mostly by price increases in the Indica variety of rice whose exports India banned. This has amplified the “upward pressure” on the prices of rice from other regions, the FAO said.

“Since the ban was announced late last month, Thai rice prices have increased 20%,” Joseph W Glauber, senior research fellow at IFPRI, told the BBC.

The impact of this – particularly on the world’s poor – could be devastating with food insecurity deteriorating in 18 “hunger hotspots” identified by the FAO and UN’s World Food Programme.

Rice is part of the staple diet accounting for a large share of the caloric consumption of millions across Asia and Africa. And India is a major supplier to these markets.

Forty-two countries in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa get 50% of their total imports from India, going up to 80% in some countries according to IFPRI, and its share cannot be “easily substituted with imports from other large exporting countries such as Vietnam, Thailand or Pakistan”.

Elevated global food prices could also have other implications in these countries such as keeping food import bills high, leading to the use of precious foreign exchange, “thus worsening balance of payment problems and contributing to inflation”, says Upali Galketi, senior economist at the markets and trade division of the FAO.

But the increase in global food prices cannot be blamed singularly on India’s actions. The termination of the Black Sea Grain Initiative after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and extreme climate conditions across the world are other major contributing factors.

Consumers and sellers as seen at a vegetable market in Kolkata , India , on 12 July 2023 . Spiraling prices of tomato, onion and pulses are emerging as new risks that is fueling India's retail inflation to 4.6 % in June ,The El Nino influence paired with reducing WPI on retail inflation has made the situation worse for consumers according to finance ministry reports.

Getty Images

The coming together of these market dynamics, however, has “resulted in reversing the declining trend in international food prices observed since the middle of last year”, Mr Galketi told the BBC.

Global food prices are at historical highs despite a slowdown in many parts of the world such as China. This is weighing on international food prices because of muted demand from these places.

The World Bank expects its food price index to average lower in 2023 compared with 2022, driven by lower oil and grain prices. But analysts say the future price trajectory will depend on the impact of El Niño weather phenomena – something that could have far-reaching implications, and put further pressure on food markets.

Amid the uncertainty, calls for India to reverse its ban on the export of key commodities have come from various quarters, including the International Monetary Fund.

Besides contributing to global food inflation, “export bans have other negative externalities, such as denting India’s reputation as a dependable supplier and preventing farmers from benefiting from remunerative prices globally”, say analysts at Nomura.

“Trade restrictions could also exaggerate boom-bust price cycles. For instance, higher inflation in pulses in 2015-16 led India to significantly increase imports, but normal monsoons and stronger domestic production in subsequent years led to a supply glut and prices crashed into deflationary territory through 2017-18.”

A sandwich without the usual slices of tomatoes is pictured at a Burger King outlet in New Delhi on August 17, 2023. Soaring vegetable prices after a bad harvest have prompted Burger King's Indian outlets to take tomatoes off their menu items, following in the footsteps of other fast food giants. (Photo by Arun SANKAR / AFP) (Photo by ARUN SANKAR/AFP via Getty Images)

Getty Images

Others like Mr Glauber warn that “importers may choose to find other more reliable partners if the benefits of diversifying suppliers outweigh price considerations”.

But according to the FAO, the most significant threat comes from the likelihood of more countries resorting to export restrictions, which would “undermine trust in the global trading system”.

However, some say realpolitik and a resolve to increase food self-sufficiency will outweigh these other considerations in India, especially during a politically sensitive period.

In the past, high prices of crops such as onions have led to electoral defeats in India; add to that an already wobbly consumption recovery. Higher cost of food, which makes for a big chunk of an average Indian’s expenses, can eat into discretionary incomes ahead of the upcoming festive season, and derail this recovery further.

India’s central bank has already raised interest rates six times, and can do little more to control food inflation given that it is a supply-side problem.

So the government is left with little ammunition apart from imposing trade restrictions.

“All countries right now are focused on controlling inflation in their own economies. I would say India also has to take care of its own interests before it starts worrying about global inflation,” says Ms Sinha.

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Japan plus South Korea equals AUKUS+2

The AUKUS security agreement, cemented between Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom in September 2021, enhances regional partnership in the Indo-Pacific by facilitating technology sharing, strengthened supply chains, and the acquisition of nuclear powered, conventionally armed submarines for Australia.

The pact also creates a pathway to establish engagements focused on renewing, strengthening, and expanding military cooperation between AUKUS, South Korea, and Japan.

For the region’s security, stability, and protection, American practitioners should seek to expand Japan, South Korea and AUKUS relationships by developing a framework engaged in combined defense efforts that build interoperability and trust in environments where China’s assertiveness remains ever-present.

AUKUS-Japan-ROK engagement would allow stakeholders to work toward shared goals against threats in the region by providing opportunities to use technology as a deterrent to aggressors.

To streamline defense frameworks currently in the region, this new engagement would create an opportunity to develop an integrated deterrence posture that changes the security landscape of the Indo-Pacific. In doing so, the framework could also develop the Indo-Pacific’s premier advanced technology incubator.

Like US Central Command’s Task Force 59, US Indo-Pacific Command can work with the ROK, Japan, and other AUKUS members to establish multilateral exercises that allow nations to test, develop, and iterate upon technologies that support a more robust maritime partnership – a key tenet of the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness.

There is an interest from all parties to increase the use of advanced technologies in the region. First, the AUKUS pact includes projects on undersea autonomous vehicles, artificial intelligence (AI) systems, and the rapid integration of commercial technologies.

Moreover, both the ROK and Japan have expressed interest in AI and autonomous projects and could help test and develop these platforms to solve warfighting needs.

Further, these efforts directly tie into parallel objectives outlined by the Phnom Penh statement on the US-Japan-ROK trilateral partnership. The November 2022 statement emphasized the importance of technology leadership, security, and regional partnership.

The US, Japan and South Korea are drawing closer together in a trilateral partnership. Image: Pac-Net

With Japan presiding over the G7 this year, the country could likely seek to tie in efforts from several of their priorities: resistance to economic coercion, the promotion and protection of emerging technologies, and the increased cooperation between like-minded countries.

Regional defense efforts under this framework could improve maritime domain awareness and facilitate closer postures that reiterate Japan and the ROK’s place as leaders at the forefront of a harmonized Indo-Pacific strategy.

The integration and placement of these tech platforms in the region could accomplish two tasks: develop new defense capabilities for the ROK, Japan, and AUKUS, while also testing and embedding technologies that rely on rapid data transfer and information sharing.

Both outcomes work towards a shared goal of deterring aggressive actors in the region and allow like-minded nations to develop technologies without the concern of malicious proliferation. This joint framework would reinforce confidence-building measures at a time when discussions of weapons and warfare tend to threaten stability.

AUKUS members, however, should remain cognizant of the implications their security pact may have on perceptions of security in the region. At its inception, the AUKUS security pact brought together three nations looking to build new opportunities to support and champion a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Now, the pact must acknowledge sentiments that key Asian allies like the ROK and Japan may harbor. During Japan’s 2021 Liberal Democratic Party leadership contest, current prime minister Fumio Kishida expressed skepticism with the AUKUS deal. Likewise, many in the ROK are concerned with China’s views of the AUKUS deal.

South Koreans want to avoid another ream of punishment from China, like the sanctions dealt after the 2017 installation of the THAAD missile defense system. Another round of cyber attacks or missiles are also options China and the DPRK can choose to illicit a swift and painful response to deeper collaboration with the Americans.

Negative sentiments alongside potential retaliation could make the case for either country’s disinterest in a tech-heavy force laydown with AUKUS. For Japan and the ROK, participation further feeds into the narrative that US-led defense postures aren’t inclusive of all Asian nations, regardless of democratic status or wealth.

With such a large presence in the region, it is natural for Japan and the ROK to ask themselves where they fit into the security aperture as treaty allies and how their capabilities integrate with the pact’s.

Employing these technologies is not just signaling – it’s a dangerous reality to many that stronger, more powerful militaries intend to change the way they engage in global relationships, markets, multilateral institutions, and more. The AUKUS pact should be fully ready to come across a similar or commensurate response from any actor in the Indo-Pacific.

However, a closer examination would reveal what both nations truly seek from alliances and defense posturing. First, the ROK wishes to protect its interests and sovereignty in a changing security environment. In the past, this sentiment was lost on many Western policymakers, but it seems that the latest trilateral ballistic missile exercise held on February 22 between the ROK, US, and Japan is working to mitigate many of the ROK’s security concerns.

Second, Japan’s recently released National Defense Strategy makes clear that Japan seeks to develop counter-strike capabilities and heavily participate in the initial phases of the kill chain. In conjunction with the 2015 legislation, meant to expand the mission sets of the Self-Defense Forces, Japan is clearly serious about transforming their defense posture.

Lastly, both countries also seek greater assurances or information regarding the commitment of America’s extended deterrent. As evident by the establishment of the trilateral US-Japan-ROK Extended Deterrence Dialogue this June, both allies see conversations regarding integrated deterrence and their place under America’s “nuclear umbrella” as the priority.

At the root of this relationship, stakeholders must remember that this framework would be focused on deterring threats through tech-centric defense efforts—not at power balancing amongst themselves.

American defense strategy should capitalize on the growing desire within Japan and South Korea to pursue more advanced warfighting techniques, increased defense spending, and an ameliorated posture in the region in tandem with regional allies and partners.

Though many partnerships and information sharing agreements of some form already exist bilaterally between these nations, such as GSOMIA, none currently integrate and streamline many of the existing efforts surrounding defense and security. The AUKUS-Japan-ROK connection could be a natural extension of these relationships.

To be clear, AUKUS-Japan-ROK is a framework for engagement with Japan and the ROK that does not rely on nuclear technology-sharing. Instead, the AUKUS-Japan-ROK relationship could build a broader, more cohesive engagement of actors united in deterring regional threats by using advanced emerging technologies, like those previously mentioned.

America’s new nuclear attack nuclear submarine could eventually be headed to Australia under the AUKUS pact. Image: Facebook

Engagements of this nature could also supplement AUKUS’ military aperture and provide a shared framework that uses soft power tools to project stability in the region.

An AUKUS-Japan-ROK relationship will become ever more important as China continues to threaten rules-based norms out to sea. Capitalizing on the momentum between warming Japan-Korea relations, AUKUS’ progress, and an increased appetite in tech needs to be a priority of the Biden administration.

Although AUKUS is still years away from this kind of development, early dialogue on the future of the region is of the utmost importance. Other regional allies and partners will be watching closely to see how the US and Asian allies cooperate in the coming years as tensions rise in the Indo-Pacific.

Alliance projection, though largely overlooked during peacetime, is a tool of benefit, not of burden. As the regional demand for multilateral leadership grows, acknowledging the defensive, diplomatic, and capacity concerns of such an alliance will be key to the success of an AUKUS+2 relationship.

Jasmin Alsaied ([email protected]) is a US Navy Surface Warfare Officer and a 2023 YPFP Security and Defense Rising Expert. 

This PacNet was developed as a part of the United States-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Next-Generation Leaders Dialogue to encourage creative thinking about this vital partnership can be fostered. For previous entries please click here and here.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Navy, or the US government.

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Setting sights on Southeast Asia | FinanceAsia

Global investors have always been drawn to Southeast Asia’s growth story, as one of the world’s fastest developing economies and home to a relatively youthful population of 600 million.

This year’s Asean Summit chair, Indonesia, pitched that the region would continue its role as an epicentre for expansion. Even amid the backdrop of a challenging external environment – from the Russia-Ukraine war, to rising inflation and interest rate escalation – there is still substance behind the Southeast Asian story.

East Ventures, a venture capital (VC) firm based in the region, raised a total of $835 million in the past year across various strategies, achieving in May the first and final close of its debut Growth Plus fund, at $250 million. The vehicle aims to support innovators within the company’s ecosystem of portfolio companies that demonstrate strong potential.

“The successful fundraise shows that with the right strategy, management team and mandate, capital is still available,” Roderick Purwana, managing partner at East Ventures, told FinanceAsia.

The East Ventures team is experiencing promising traction across its portfolio – 60% of its growth-stage start-ups have delivered a positive earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (Ebitda) or are in the process of doing so; and more than 40% have a secured a cash runway beyond 2025. At the end of May, the company had invested in more than 20 start-ups so far this year, across sectors ranging from waste management and mental health, to digital mortgages.

In total, the firm has $1.5 billion in assets under management (AUM) across 12 funds that are active across Japan and Southeast Asia. In the latter, it has invested in over 300 companies and was an early backer of Indonesian start-ups, Traveloka and Tokopedia, which merged with GoJek, in 2021.

The firm sees particular opportunity in Indonesia and is among the most active in the market, even though Purwana admits that pace of activity has slowed due to market sentiment.

Money continues to flow into Southeast Asia, as evidenced by the accumulation of $10.4 billion in the region’s start-up ecosystem, in 2022. According to Cento Ventures’ recent Tech Investment report, last year marked the strongest performance of the market for three years on record. In spite of a global slowdown, it finished up on par with pre-pandemic investment levels.

“Southeast Asia will face or is already facing a correction, but the ramifications of this are not as profound as those being experienced by other emerging regions like Latin America and India,” Dmitry Levit, partner at Cento Ventures, told FA from Singapore.

“It remains to be seen whether this contraction is justified by the return to a pre-2022 baseline, or overdone, as a result of investor panic; but as a firm, we take the view that when valuations are low enough, we should invest in such a market.”

Financing the future

Levit and his VC peers remain focussed on digital financial services. It is the fintech sector that they view as key for Southeast Asia, having accounted for 46% of overall liquidity in 2022, according to the firm’s report. 

The Cento Ventures team has capitalised on this opportunity through recent investment in Indonesia’s Finfra, which provides embedded finance solutions; and Philippine cross-border payments start-up, Aqwire.

In May, Singapore-based fintech start-up, Jenfi, secured one of the highest fundraising milestones across the region to date, raising $6.6 million in a pre-series B round led by Japan-headquartered Headline Asia. The round also saw participation from existing investors, such as Monk’s Hill Ventures.

“The opportunity in Southeast Asia – especially across traditional working capital and SME loans – is huge. Banks tend to deprioritise this segment as it is riskier, so participation opens up to technology companies like Jenfi, to act as alternative lenders and to offer something that is differentiated but also commercially viable,” said Susli Lie, partner at Monk’s Hill Ventures. She is also the co-founder of ErudiFi, a tech-enabled education financing company.

Jenfi co-founder and CEO, Jeffrey Liu, attributes the firm’s recent successful fundraise to experience. With a background in finance, he founded GuavaPass in 2015, before setting up Jenfi in 2019, alongside Justin Louie. His endeavours in the start-up segment have seen him replicate the process every one to two years.

“I always thought it was a numbers game, but as I’ve built track-record, I’ve realised that it’s more important to focus on quality conversations and connections,” Liu said.

“From start to finish, Jenfi’s pre-Series B capital raise took six months. We had a shortlist of funds that we wanted to talk to from day one, and the fact that investors were already aware of us supported entry into real deal conversations,” he added.

To date, Liu’s firm has raised $40.2 million, which includes $15.2 million in equity, but he thinks it is unlikely that the Jenfi team will fundraise again, before 2024. While he shared that the firm had managed to shield from some of the market challenges during this recent round, unfortunately, this is not the case for the majority of other start-up peers.

Jenfi’s business enables digital native companies – including e-commerce or software-as-a-service (Saas) firms – to scale their ambitions by funding their growth and marketing expansion plans. So far, they have deployed $30 million across 600-plus companies.

“We’ve noticed in the last six months that the VC-backed companies we aim to support are in more challenging positions, in the sense that they have less of a cash runway. We’re hearing that it’s a lot harder for them to secure capital and that there are delays in their overall fundraising processes,” he explained.

Going for growth or pursuing profitability?

This perspective is shared by Lie, whose Southeast Asian VC firm has invested in early-stage technology companies since its foundation in 2014. Reports indicate that Monk’s Hill Ventures has raised at least $380 million across three funds and it has invested in over 40 fast-growing technology companies in Southeast Asia, including Singapore logistics company, NinjaVan; and Indonesian rural e-commerce start-up, Dagangan.

“In this market environment, we see that later-stage deals are taking longer to complete, which means that there is even more of an imperative to ensure as long a cash runway as possible,” she shared.

Before the current cycle, Lie saw deals close in as little as a couple of weeks to a month, but she cautions that this is not the norm. In this environment, she believes that start-ups need cash on balance sheet to support funding for at least 12-months of activity.

“Where our portfolio companies are concerned, the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) made indirect impact by way of sentiment. The bank had always been a pioneer in terms of its product offerings and for its activity to be curtailed without anyone else stepping in to take on the whole business, this will alter the flow of capital throughout the entire ecosystem,” said Lie.

“There are fewer investors that are actively deploying compared to the past. For those that are, they want to take a bit more time to conduct due diligence and get to know prospective investments better. Fewer months of runway translates to weaker negotiation power,” she added.

A clear path to profitability is also imperative in this part of a cycle. With it, access to capital remains open; without it, Cento Ventures’ Levit believes that start-ups are exposed to very steep valuation discounts.

Southeast Asia’s top tech companies, Grab and GoTo, which listed in 2021 and 2022 respectively, have yet to show investors that they can stem the red ink. However, this factor is not unique to the region.

“This isn’t a Southeast Asia-specific problem; we see it happening globally, as well. For high-growth tech companies, the path to profitability is a long one,” said Niklas Amundsson, partner at the Hong Kong office of placement agent, Monument Group.

Levit’s perspective indicates that by going for growth, a start-up downplays its push for profitability. However, Purwana believes that both elements are of equal importance and can progress in tandem.

“Sometimes, people think that it’s a question of deciding on growth or profitability, but it shouldn’t be either-or. Ultimately, any company must work to ensure profitability –  whether one year, five years or 10 years into existence. They have to be able to turn a profit eventually,” he shared.

Curiosity and caution

As investors seek exposure to start-ups that can sustain growth momentum and pursue profitability, they are keeping an eye on developments in the generative artificial intelligence (AI) space.

KPMG’s 1Q23 Venture Pulse report highlighted investor interest in AI as being relatively robust in Asia. In particular, the sector drew attention during the first quarter of 2023 on the back of the global buzz generated by ChatGPT.

“AI start-ups that can demonstrate potential at industrial scale or in terms of commercial application and adoption – especially in the areas of advanced manufacturing, transportation, energy management, health tech and process optimisation and productivity – will attract investment dollars,” said Irene Chu, partner and head of the New Economy and Life Sciences division at the Hong Kong base of KPMG China.

She underlined that in light of the current tech talent shortage across Asia, the use of AI to improve productivity is more relevant and encouraged, than ever. But with curiosity, comes caution.

“We are excited about the prospect of generative AI as a transformative technology, but we are also cautious around its capabilities and potential negative ramifications,” said Purwana.

East Ventures has been active in the AI space since August last year, when it invested in the seed round of Bahasa.ai, which aspires to build a natural language processing and understanding engine for the Indonesian language. Since ChatGPT has come onto the scene, it has not completed any new investments in the generative AI space, but the segment is one that remains closely watched.

Levit views the space as the “next wave” – an area of tech that every company will need to consider moving forwards: “I have a feeling we will have to fight long and hard against the false dichotomy around AI-based versus non-AI-based businesses, similar to what we first saw with mobile phones; the offline to online transition; and B2B and B2C. The narrative will be stronger than substance in the short-term, but substance will be stronger than narrative in the long-run.”

To unlock its full potential, the region’s tech industry will need to find a new route to innovation, Purwana suggested.

While some view Southeast Asia as a pioneer in the tech space, he feels that “Southeast Asia will have to grow beyond being a ‘copycat market’ for tech, which is a significant gap to address”. 

However, he shared that it is reassuring to look at China.

“In the early days of its developing tech sector, China turned to the US for inspiration and duplication. But today, this is no longer the case, especially in fintech sector. In this arena, China is probably more advanced than the US,” Purwana added.

Perhaps one of the best illustrations of this point, is China’s success in leapfrogging the use of credit and debit cards to drive a digital payments revolution, via digital wallets and QR codes. Alibaba (through Alipay) and Tencent (through WeChat Pay) are two of the first-movers to gain status in one of the world’s largest and truly digital economies.

Hong Kong’s offer of the missing puzzle piece

The prospects for Southeast Asia’s start-up scene remain bullish. However, the money being deployed into VC funds largely comes from high-net-worth individuals (HNWIs) and family offices. Asia’s deepest pockets – the institutional investor community – have yet to dip their toes in the start-up scene in a meaningful way, Amundsson noted.

For him, the vital, missing component is: the exit. Many of the region’s top tech companies prefer a US versus domestic listing, as the region lacks an obvious, successful IPO route for up-and-coming technology companies. However, Amundsson does see some opportunity in Hong Kong, which he considers to be further ahead of its Southeast Asian peers in this regard, and continues to advance the development of an attractive and liquid capital market.

On March 31st, new listing rules for specialist technology companies came into play in the special administrative region (SAR). The Chapter 18C regime extends to start-ups active in new economy industries such as AI, alternative energy and agritech. While this is set to attract more listings from outside the China region, analysts expect this only to materialise in the next three to five years.

“I am excited about the new 18C regime launched in Hong Kong because it covers sectors that are going to be transformative, with the potential to solve some of the most challenging problems we face, around climate change, food security and clean energy.  Despite the slowdown in IPO activity globally, the new regime offers an attractive platform for those innovative Southeast Asian start-ups that aspire to solve these global issues,” Chu said.

However, while the market capitalisation threshold remains high, it might be some time before these companies list. It also remains to be seen whether Hong Kong’s bourse provides a  realistic and viable route for Southeast Asia’s start-up community.

As Asean focusses on finding its next epicentre of growth, the region’s technology sector offers perhaps the greatest opportunity for investors, as it continues to navigate short-term challenges like the collapse of SVB and works to address concerns around the development of next-generation AI.

Reviewing the region’s potential, Lie concluded, “Most of emerging Southeast Asia is moving away from manufacturing towards the service industries, and this is where we’re going to see the adoption of technology that really drives growt

¬ Haymarket Media Limited. All rights reserved.

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New-gen ransomware gangs have crypto in their sights

In May 2023, the Dallas City Government was hugely disrupted by a ransomware attack. Ransomware attacks are so-called because the hackers behind them encrypt vital data and demand a ransom in order to get the information decrypted.

The attack in Dallas put a halt to hearings, trials and jury duty, and the eventual closure of the Dallas Municipal Court Building. It also had an indirect effect on wider police activities, with stretched resources affecting the ability to deliver, for example, summer youth programmes. The criminals threatened to publish sensitive data, including personal information, court cases, prisoner identities and government documents.

One might imagine an attack on a city government and police force causing widespread and lengthy disruption would be headline news. But ransomware attacks are now so common and routine that most pass with barely a ripple of attention.

One notable exception happened in May and June 2023 when hackers exploited a vulnerability in the Moveit file transfer app which led to data theft from hundreds of organizations around the world. That attack grabbed headlines, perhaps because of the high-profile victims, reported to include British Airways, the BBC and the chemist chain Boots.

According to one recent survey, ransomware payments have nearly doubled to US$1.5 million over the past year, with the highest-earning organizations the most likely to pay attackers. Sophos, a British cybersecurity firm, found that the average ransomware payment rose from $812,000 the previous year. The average payment by UK organizations in 2023 was even higher than the global average, at $2.1 million.

Meanwhile, in 2022 The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) issued new guidance urging organizations to bolster their defenses amid fears of more state-sponsored cyber attacks linked to the conflict in Ukraine. It follows a series of cyber attacks in Ukraine which are suspected to have involved Russia, which Moscow denies.

In reality, not a week goes by without attacks affecting governments, schools, hospitals, businesses and charities, all over the world. These attacks have significant financial and societal costs. They can affect small businesses, as well as huge corporations, and can be particularly devastating for those involved.

Ransomware is now widely acknowledged as a major threat and challenge to modern society.

Yet ten years ago it was nothing more than a theoretical possibility and niche threat. The way in which it has quickly evolved, fuelling criminality and causing untold damage should be of major concern. The ransomware “business model” has become increasingly sophisticated with, for instance, advances in malware attack vectors, negotiation strategies and the structure of criminal enterprise itself.

There is every expectation that criminals will continue to adapt their strategies and cause widespread damage for many years to come. That’s why it is vital that we study the ransomware threat and preempt these tactics so as to mitigate the long-term threat – and that is exactly what our research team is doing.

Prediction of global ransomware damage costs – source: Cyber Security Ventures

A graph showing the damges related to ransomware
Alpesh Bhudia, CC BY-ND

For many years our research has looked to preempt this evolving threat by exploring new strategies that ransomware criminals can use to extort victims. The aim is to forewarn, and be ahead of the game, without identifying specifics that could be used by criminals.

In our latest research, which has been peer-reviewed and will be published as part of the International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES), we have identified a novel threat that exploits vulnerabilities in cryptocurrencies.

What is ransomware?

Ransomware can mean subtly different things in different contexts. In 1996, Adam Young and Mordechai “Moti” Yung at Columbia University described the basic form of a ransomware attack as follows:

Criminals breach the cybersecurity defenses of the victim (either through tactics like phishing emails or using an insider/rogue employee). Once the criminals have breached the victim’s defences they deploy the ransomware.

The main function of which is to encrypt the victim’s files with a private key (which can be thought of as a long string of characters) to lock the victim out of their files. The third stage of an attack now begins with the criminal demanding a ransom for the private key.

The simple reality is that many victims pay the ransom, with ransoms potentially into the millions of dollars.

Using this basic characterisation of ransomware it is possible to distinguish different types of attack. At one extreme we there are the “low level” attacks where files are not encrypted or criminals do not attempt to extract ransoms. But at the other extreme attackers make considerable efforts to maximize disruption and extract a ransom.

The WannaCry ransomware attack in May 2017 is such an example. The attack, linked to the North Korean government, made no real attempt to extract ransoms from victims. Nevertheless, it led to widespread disruption across the world, including to the UK’s NHS, with some cybersecurity risk-modelling organizations even saying the global economic losses are going into the billions.

It is difficult to discern motive in this case, but, generally speaking, political intent, or simple error on the part of the attackers may contribute to the lack of coherent value-extraction through extortion.

Our research focuses on the second extreme of ransomware attacks in which criminals look to coerce money from their victims. This does not preclude a political motive. Indeed, there is evidence of links between major ransomware groups and the Russian state.

We can distinguish the degree to which ransomware attacks are motivated by financial gain by observing the effort invested in negotiation, a willingness to support or facilitate payment of the ransom, and the presence of money laundering services.

By investing in tools and services which facilitate payment of the ransom, and its conversion to fiat currency, the attackers signal their financial motives.

The impact of attacks

As the attack on the Dallas City Government shows, the financial and social impacts of ransomware attacks can be diverse and severe.

High-impact ransomware attacks, such as the one which targeted Colonial Oil in May 2021 and took a major US fuel pipeline offline, are obviously dangerous to the continuity of vital services.

In January 2023, there was a ransomware attack on the Royal Mail in the UK that led to the suspension of international deliveries. It took over a month for service levels to get back to normal. This attack would have had a significant direct impact on the Royal Mail’s revenue and reputation. But, perhaps more importantly, it impacted all the small businesses and people who rely on it.

In May 2021, the Irish NHS was hit by a ransomware attack. This affected every aspect of patient care with widespread cancellation of appointments. The Taoiseach Micheál Martin said: “It’s a shocking attack on a health service, but fundamentally on the patients and the Irish public.”

Sensitive data was also reportedly leaked. The financial impact of the attack could be as high as 100 million euros. This, however, does not account for the health and psychological impact on patients and medics affected by the disruption.

As well as health services, education has also been a prime target. For instance, in January 2023 a school in Guilford, UK, suffered an attack with the criminals threatening to publish sensitive data including safeguarding reports and information about vulnerable children.

Attacks are also timed to maximize disruption. For instance, an attack in June 2023 on a school in Dorchester, UK, left the school unable to use email or access services during the main exam period. This can have a profound impact on children’s well-being and educational achievement.

These examples are by no means exhaustive. Many attacks, for instance, directly target businesses and charities that are too small to attract attention. The impact on a small business, in terms of business disruption, lost reputation and the psychological cost of facing the consequences of an attack can be devastating.

As an example, a survey in 2021 found that 34% of UK businesses that suffered a ransomware attack subsequently closed down. And, many of the businesses that continued operation still had to lay off staff.

It began with floppy disks

The origins of ransomware are usually traced back to the AIDS or PC Cyborg Trojan virus in the 1980s. In this case, victims who inserted a floppy disk in their computer would find their files subsequently encrypted and a payment requested.

Disks were distributed to attendees and people interested in specific conferences, who would then attempt to access the disk to complete a survey – instead becoming infected with the trojan.

Files on affected computers were encrypted using a key stored locally on each target machine. A victim could, in principle, have restored access to their files by using this key. The victim, though, may not have known that they could do this, as even now, technical knowledge of cryptography is not common among most PC users.

Eventually, law enforcement traced the floppy disks to a Harvard-taught evolutionary biologist named Joseph Popp, who was conducting AIDS research at the time. He was arrested and charged with multiple counts of blackmail, and has been credited by some with being the inventor of ransomware.

No one knows exactly what provoked Popp to do what he did.

Early form of white computer text on red background
The on-screen message after the AIDS Trojan Horse ransomware was activated. Wikipedia

Many early versions of ransomware were quite basic cryptographic systems which suffered from various issues surrounding how easy it was to find the key information the criminal was trying to hide from the victim. This is one reason why ransomware really came of age with the CryptoLocker attack in 2013 and 2014.

CryptoLocker was the first technically sound ransomware attack virus to be distributed en masse. Thousands of victims saw their files encrypted by ransomware that could not be reverse-engineered. The private keys, used in encryption, were held by the attacker and victims could not restore access to their files without them.

Ransoms of around $300-600 were demanded and it is estimated the criminals got away with around $3 million. Cryptolocker was eventually shut down in 2014 following an operation involving multiple, international law enforcement agencies.

CryptoLocker was pivotal in showing proof of concept that criminals could earn large amounts of money from ransomware. Subsequently, there was an explosion of new variants and new types. There was also significant evolution in the strategies used by criminals.

Off-the-shelf and double extortion

One important development was the emergence of ransomware-as-a-service. This is a term for markets on the dark web through which criminals can obtain and use “off-the-shelf” ransomware without the need for advanced computing skills while the ransomware providers take a cut of the profits.

Research has shown how the dark web is the “unregulated Wild West of the internet” and a safe haven for criminals to communicate and exchange of illegal goods and services. It is easily accessible and with the help of anonymization technology and digital currencies, there is a global black economy thriving there. An estimated $1 billion was spent there during the first nine months of 2019 alone, according to the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement.

With ransomware as a service (Raas) the barrier to entry for aspiring cyber criminals, in terms of both cost and skill, was lowered.

Under the Raas model, expertise is provided by vendors who develop the malware while the attackers themselves may be relatively unskilled. This also has the effect of compartmentalizing risk – the arrest of cyber criminals using ransomware no longer threatens the entire supply chain, allowing attacks launched by other groups to continue.

We have also seen a movement away from mass phishing attacks, like CryptoLocker, which reached more than 250,000 systems, to more targeted attacks. That has meant an increasing focus on organizations with the revenue to pay large ransoms. Multinational organizations, legal firms, schools, universities, hospitals and healthcare providers have all become prime targets, as well as many small and micro businesses and charities.

A more recent development in ransomware, such as Netwalker, REvil/Sodinokibi, has been the threat of double extortion. This is where the criminals not only encrypt files but also exfiltrate data by copying the files. They then have the potential to leak or post potentially sensitive and important information.

An example of this occurred in 2020, when one of the largest software companies, Software AG, was hit with a double extortion ransomware called Clop. It was reported that the attackers had requested an exceptionally high ransom payment of $20 million, which Software AG refused to pay.

This led to attackers releasing confidential company data on the dark web. This provides criminals with two sources of leverage: they can ransom for the private key to decrypt files and they can ransom to stop publication of sensitive data.

Double extortion changes the business model of ransomware in interesting ways. In particular, with standard ransomware, there is a relatively straightforward incentive for a victim to pay a ransom for access to the private key if that would allow decryption of the files, and they cannot access the files through any other means.

The victim “only” needs to trust the cybercriminal will give them the key and that the key will work.

‘Honor’ among thieves?

But with data exfiltration, by contrast, it is not obvious what the victim gets in return for paying the ransom. The criminals still have the sensitive data and could still publish it any time they want. They could, indeed, ask for subsequent ransoms to not publish the files.

Therefore, for data exfiltration to be a viable business strategy the criminals need to build a credible reputation of “honoring” ransom payments. This has arguably led to a normalized ransomware ecosystem.

For instance, ransom negotiators are private contractors and in some cases are required as part of a cyber insurance agreement to provide expertise in the managing of crisis situations involving ransomware. Where instructed, they will facilitate negotiated ransom payments. Within this ecosystem, some ransomware criminal gangs have developed a reputation for not publishing data (or at least delaying publication) if a ransom is paid.

More generally, the encryption, decryption or exfiltration of files is typically a difficult and costly task for criminals to pull off. It is far simpler to delete the files and then claim they have been encrypted or exfiltrated and demand a ransom.

However, if the victims suspect that they won’t be getting the decryption key or encrypted data back then they won’t pay the ransom.

And those that do pay a ransom and get nothing in return may disclose that fact. This is likely to impact the attacker’s “reputation” and the likelihood of future ransom payments. Simply put, it pays to play “fair” in the world of extortion and ransom attacks.

So in less than ten years we have seen the ransomware threat evolve enormously from the relatively low-scale CryptoLocker, to a multi-million dollar business involving organized criminal gangs and sophisticated strategies.

From 2020 onwards the incidents of ransomware, and consequent losses, have seemingly increased by another order of magnitude. Ransomware has become too big to ignore and is now a major concern for governments and law enforcement.

Crypto extortion threats

Devastating though ransomware has become, the threat will inevitably evolve further, as criminals develop new techniques for extortion. As mentioned already, a key theme in our collective research over the last ten years has been to try and preempt the likely strategies that criminals can employ so as to be ahead of the game.

Our research is now focused on the next generation of ransomware, which we believe will include variants focused on cryptocurrency, and the “consensus mechanisms” used within them.

A consensus mechanism is any method (usually algorithmic) used to achieve agreement, trust and security across a decentralized computer network.

Financial business concept, bitcoin, etheruem, litecoin
The next target could by crypto. Photo: Shutterstock via The Conversation / sundaemorning

Specifically, cryptocurrencies are increasingly using a so-called “proof-of-stake” consensus mechanism, in which investors stake significant sums of currency to validate crypto transactions. These stakes are vulnerable to extortion by ransomware criminals.

Cryptocurrencies rely on a decentralized blockchain that provides a transparent record of all the transactions that have taken place using that currency. The blockchain is maintained by a peer-to-peer network rather than a central authority (as with conventional currency).

In principle, the transaction records included in the blockchain are immutable, verifiable and securely distributed across the network, giving users full ownership and visibility into the transaction data.

These properties of blockchain rely on a secure and non-manipulable “consensus mechanism” in which the independent nodes in the network “approve” or “agree” which transactions to add to the blockchain.

Until now, cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin have relied on a so-called “proof-of-work” consensus mechanism in which the authorization of transactions involves the solving of complex mathematical problems (the work). In the long term, this approach is unsustainable because it results in duplication of effort and avoidable large-scale energy use.

The alternative, which is now becoming a reality, is a “proof-of-stake” consensus mechanism. Here, transactions are approved by validators who have staked money and are financially rewarded for validating transactions. The role of inefficient work is replaced by a financial stake. While this addresses the energy problem, it means that large amounts of staked money becomes involved in validating crypto transactions.

Ethereum

The existence of this staked money provides a novel threat to some proof-of-stake cryptocurrencies. We have focussed our attention on Ethereum, a decentralized cryptocurrency that establishes a peer-to-peer network to securely execute and verify application code, known as a smart contract.

Ethereum is powered by the Ether (ETH) token that allows users to transact with each other through the use of these smart contracts. The Ethereum project was co-founded by Vitalik Buterin in 2013 to overcome shortcomings with Bitcoin. On September 15, 2022, The Merge, moved the Ethereum network from proof-of-work to proof-of-stake, making it one of the first prominent proof-of-stake cryptocurrencies.

The proof-of-stake consensus mechanism in Ethereum relies on “validators” to approve transactions. To set up a validator there needs to be a minimum stake of 32ETH, which is currently around $60,000. Validators can then earn a financial return on their stake from operating a validator in accordance with Ethereum rules. At the time of writing there are around 850,000 validators.

A lot of hope is being pinned on the “stake” solution of validation – but hackers are sure to be looking into how they can infiltrate the system.

In our project, which was funded by the Ethereum Foundation, we identified ways in which ransomware groups could exploit the new proof-of-stake mechanism for extortion.

Slashing

We found that attackers could exploit validators through a process called “slashing”. While validators receive rewards for obeying the rules, there are financial penalties for validators that are seen to act maliciously. The basic objective of penalties is to prevent exploitation of the decentralized blockchain.

There are two forms of penalties, the most severe of which is slashing. Slashing occurs for actions that should not happen by accident and could jeopardize the blockchain, such as proposing conflicting blocks are added to the blockchain, or trying to change history.

Slashing penalties are relatively severe with the validator losing a significant share of their stake, at least 1ETH. Indeed, in the most extreme case the validator could lose all of their stake (32ETH). The validator will also be forced to exit and no longer act as a validator. In short, if a validator is slashed there are big financial consequences.

To perform actions, validators are assigned unique signing keys, that, in essence, prove who they are to the network. Suppose that a criminal got hold of the signing key? Then, they could blackmail the victim into paying a ransom.

Flow diagram showing just how complicated it gets when there is an extortion attack against proof-of-stake validators, such as Ethereum

Flow chart showing what happens when ransomware attacks infiltrate crypto.
Alpesh Bhudia, CC BY-ND

A ‘smart contract’

The victim may be reluctant to pay the ransom unless there is a guarantee that the criminals will not take their money and fail to return/release the key. After all, what is to stop the criminals asking for another ransom?

One solution we have found – which harks back to the fact that ransomware has in fact become a kind of business operated by criminals who want proof they have an “honest” reputation – is a smart contract.

This automated contract can be written so that the process only works if both sides “honor” their side of the bargain. So, the victim could pay the ransom and be confident that this will resolve the direct extortion threat. This is possible through Ethereum because all the steps required are publicly observable on the blockchain – the deposit, the sign to exit, the absence of slashing and the return of the stake.

Functionally, these smart contracts are an escrow system in which money may be held until pre-agreed conditions are met. For instance, if the criminals force slashing before the validator has fully exited, then the contract will ensure that the ransom amount is returned to the victim.

Such contracts are, however, open to abuse, and there’s no guarantee that an attacker-authored contract can be trusted. There is potential for the contract to be automated in a fully trusted way, but we have yet to observe such behavior and systems emerge.

The staking pools threat

This type of “pay and exit” strategy is an effective way for criminals to extort victims if they can obtain the validator signing keys.

So how much damage would a ransomware attack like this do to Ethereum? If a single validator is compromised then the slashing penalty – and so maximum ransom demand – would be in the region of 1ETH, which is around $1,800. To leverage larger amounts of money the criminals, therefore, need to target organizations or staking pools that are responsible for managing large numbers of validators.

Remember, that given the high entry costs for individual investors, most of the validating on Ethereum will be run under “staking pools” in which multiple investors can collectively stake money.

To put this in perspective, Lido is the largest staking pool in Ethereum with around 127,000 validators and 18% of the total stake; Coinbase is the second largest with 40,000 validators and 6% of the total stake. In total, there are 21 staking pools operating more than a 1,000 validators. Any one of these staking pools is responsible for tens of millions of dollars of stake and so viable ransom demands could also be in the millions of dollars.

Proof-of-stake consensus mechanisms are too young for us to know whether extortion of staking pools will become an active reality. But the general lesson of ransomware’s evolution is that the criminals tend to gravitate towards strategies that incentivize payment and increase their illicit gains.

The most straightforward way that investors and staking pool operators can mitigate the extortion threat we have identified is by protecting their signing keys. If the criminals cannot access the signing keys then there is no threat. If the criminals can only access some of the keys (for operators with multiple validators) then the threat may fail to be lucrative.

So staking pools need to take measures to secure signing keys. This would involve a range of actions including: partitioning validators so that a breach only impacts a small subset; step up cyber security to prevent intrusion, and robust internal processes to limit the insider threat of an employee divulging signing keys.

Concept using blocks with locks and keys printed on them to show encryption keys being compromised.
What happens when hackers gain access to secret keys? Photo: Shutterstock via The Conversation / Andrii Yalanskyi

The staking pool market for cryptocurrencies like Ethereum is competitive. There are many staking pools, all offering relatively similar services, and competing on price to attract investors. These competitive forces, and the need to cut costs, may lead to relatively lax security measures. Some staking pools may, therefore, prove a relatively easy target for criminals.

Ultimately, this can only be solved with regulation, greater awareness and for investors in staking pools to demand high levels of security to protect their stake.

Unfortunately, the history of ransomware suggests that high-profile attacks will need to be seen before the threat is taken seriously enough. It is interesting to contemplate the consequences of a significant breach of a staking pool.

The reputation of the staking pool would presumably be badly affected and so the staking pool’s viability in a competitive market is questionable. An attack may also have implications for the reputation of the currency.

At the most serious, it could lead to a currency collapsing. When that happens – as it did with FTX in 2022 following another hacking attack, there are knock-on effects to the global economy.

Here to stay

Ransomware will be a challenge for years, if not decades, to come.

One potential vision of the future is that ransomware just becomes part of normal economic life with organizations facing the constant threat of attack, with few consequences for the largely anonymous gangs of cyber criminals behind the scams.

To preempt such negative consequences we need greater awareness of the threat. Then investors can make more informed decisions over which staking pools and currencies to invest in. It also makes sense to have a market with many staking pools, rather than a market dominated by just a few large ones, as this could insulate the currency from possible attacks.

Beyond crypto, preemption involves investment in cyber security across a range of forms – from staff training and an organizational culture that supports reporting of incidents. It also involves investment in recovery options, such as effective back-ups, in-house expertise, insurance and tried and tested contingency plans.

Unfortunately, cyber security practices are not improving as one might hope in many organizations and this is leaving the door open for cyber criminals. Essentially, everyone needs to get better at hiding, and protecting, their digital keys and sensitive information if we are to stand a chance against the next generation of ransomware attackers.

Alpesh Bhudia is Doctoral Researcher in Cyber Security, Royal Holloway University of London; Anna Cartwright is Principal Lecturer in Accounting, Finance and Economics, Oxford Brookes University; Darren Hurley-Smith is Senior Lecturer in Information Security, Royal Holloway University of London, and Edward Cartwright is Professor of Economics, De Montfort University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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US has largely abandoned its APEC vision

On November 15-17 2023, US President Joe Biden will host 21 APEC leaders in San Francisco. But not all invited heads of state will attend the gala event. 

Facing criminal charges, Russian President Vladimir Putin will almost certainly stay home in Moscow. Other presidents and prime ministers may be compelled to tend to urgent domestic business.

Both Biden and Putin skipped the November 2022 APEC meeting in Bangkok, enabling Chinese President Xi Jinping to steal the show. One headline event in San Francisco could be the Biden–Xi bilateral meeting, unless a fresh eruption of US-China disputes keeps Xi in Beijing.

Another headline could be a Biden meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. India has been trying to join APEC since the institution was founded in 1989, but has been blocked first by its own protectionist policies and more recently by China

Now that the United States and India are steady geopolitical compatriots, Biden might invite Modi to side meetings in San Francisco that coincide with the APEC agenda.

Apart from these headline meetings, what accomplishments might leaders announce? Last year as host, Thailand revived the bold concept of a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP). The US agenda for APEC 2023 has nothing so ambitious. 

The theme announced in December 2022 is “Creating a Resilient and Sustainable Future for All” — noble words but devoid of concrete goals and measurable mileposts.

The US State Department serves as the United States’ lead agency for APEC matters, but other departments exert greater control over trade and investment policies. 

US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo has been at the protectionist forefront vis-a-vis China. Photo: Wikimedia Commons / DoD photo by Chad J. McNeeley, CC BY 2.0

The US Trade Representative and the Commerce Department share the trade turf, while the Secretary of the Treasury chairs the powerful Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States which monitors inward investment. 

The Treasury is in the process of acquiring new authority to prohibit outward investment to China and may use CFIUS to carry out that role.

Under the Biden administration, the US Trade Representative, Secretary of Commerce and Secretary of the Treasury have spent more time restricting commerce than removing barriers. Indeed, the strongest point of continuity between the Biden and Trump administrations is trade and investment policy.

Former president Donald Trump loudly, and Biden softly, both regard globalization as bad for the United States. They see no benefit in lowering tariff and non-tariff barriers that keep foreign products out of US markets. Nor do they applaud US firms that invest abroad. For Trump, tariffs are a beautiful thing. His campaign for a second term promises higher tariffs. 

For Biden, “Buy America”, reinforced by generous subsidies, paves the path to prosperity. As well, Biden has amplified Trump’s policy of making trade policy the junior partner of security policy in the geopolitical contest with China.

The current US policy posture doesn’t leave much room for constructive engagement in APEC. But there has been no lack of APEC meetings during 2023. Starting with the December 2022 kick-off, the United States has hosted 15 meetings with ministers and senior officials to prepare for the heads of state meeting in San Francisco. 

Topics covered include finance, central banking, transportation, food security, disaster management, health, energy, women and the economy and trade. No doubt a great deal of useful information has been shared on national practices and policies.

But none of the preparatory meetings during 2023 laid the groundwork for fresh national commitments to promote closer economic ties within APEC. The landmark 1994 APEC meeting in Indonesia declared the famous Bogor Goals – “the long-term goal of free and open trade and investment in the Asia Pacific … no later than the year 2020.” 

At the time, US president Bill Clinton enthusiastically praised the Bogor Goals. Times have now changed. With the onset of US-China geopolitical conflict, and with US doubts about globalization, the Bogor Goals no longer feature as the APEC centerpiece.

For those APEC members that still welcome global engagement, trade and investment negotiations have long migrated to other forums. Indeed, many APEC members have come to see its role as a “sandbox” to float proposals, leaving actual negotiations to other bodies. Multiple bilateral free trade agreements have entered into force between APEC members. 

Fresh regional agreements have been forged between ASEAN members, between China, Japan and South Korea and in North America, where the North America Free Trade Agreement has been updated and renamed the United States–Mexico–Canada–Agreement.

In addition to these bilateral and regional agreements, mega-regional groupings such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) have emerged. In short, policy action on the underlying principles of the Bogor Goals has decisively moved from APEC to the CPTPP and RCEP.

Instead of joining the CPTPP (as intended by president Obama), the Biden administration has launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, largely focused on social goals, with a hint of US security guarantees, rather than trade and investment liberalization. IPEF is no substitute for CPTPP.

If the next administration in Washington reverses the misguided Trump/Biden agenda of trade and investment restrictions, the world could end up with two FTAAPs — one centered on China within the RCEP framework, the other on the United States within the CPTPP framework. 

Representatives of members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal in March. Photo: Reuters / Ivan Alvarado
Representatives of members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal in March. Photo: Asia Times Files / Agencies

In their own spheres, each mega-regional could implement the Bogor Goals. The majority of APEC countries would, of course, want to join both the China-centred RCEP and the United States-centred CPTPP. Business leaders would welcome that outcome as the best possible solution to the prolonged US-China geopolitical conflict.

But more likely than not the next administration in Washington will follow the restrictive Trump/Biden agenda on trade and investment. While China is pursuing a regional trade policy, the US has shown at APEC that it has no competing vision. 

The unfolding scenario will likely lead to a single mega-regional group within the RCEP framework – centered on China, joined by most APEC countries. That would be a major diplomatic and economic loss to the United States, and an almost fatal blow to the liberal international economic order.

Gary Clyde Hufbauer is Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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PM Srettha, airlines discuss high season plans

PM Srettha, airlines discuss high season plans
Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin meets with leaders of eight major airlines — Thai Airways, Thai Vietjet Air, Thai AirAsia, Thai AirAsia X, THAI Smile Airways, Bangkok Airways, Thai Lion Air and Nok Air. (Photo: Wichan Charoenkiatpakul)

Newly-appointed Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin on Monday met representatives of eight airlines to discuss preparations to cash in on a surge in tourists during the high season.

They were: Chai Eamsiri, CEO of Thai Airways International; Woranate Laprabang, CEO of Thai VietJet Air; Santisuk Klongchaiya, CEO of Thai AirAsia; Tassapon Bijleveld, CEO of Thai AirAsia X; Chaiyong Rattanapaisansuk, acting CEO of Thai Smile Airways; Puttipong Prasarttong-Osoth, CEO of Bangkok Airways; Aswin Yangkirativorn, CEO of Thai Lion Air; and Wutthiphum Jurangkool, CEO of Nok Air.

Kerati Kijmanawat, director of the Airports of Thailand (AOT), and Suttipong Kongpool, director of the Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand (CAAT), also attended the meeting.

There, Mr Srettha was updated on the domestic and global air transport situation. Meeting attendees also discussed issues restricting air travel, with the airlines’ top managers seeking wider state involvement in spurring tourism during the upcoming high season from November to March.

The meeting also highlighted problems experienced by tourism and airline business operators to the PM and the ruling Pheu Thai Party following the issuance of the free visa policy for high-potential countries, such as China.

The policy is meant to lift tourist arrivals. However, for that to work, the government must increase flight frequency by at least 20% during the high season. A solution lies in deploying more aircraft to meet flight expansion as well as promote Thai tourism in large markets, such as China and India.

Mr Srettha said Pheu Thai will proceed right after it has been sworn into office with plans to intensify tourism promotion and implement necessary measures. 

The party viewed the fourth quarter of this year as a vital period for stimulating the economy and tourism, he said.

Mr Srettha also thanked the AoT for its cooperation in driving the tourism promotion policy during the peak season. The agency has done its part in ensuring smooth airport management, augmenting flight frequency and launching runway expansion.

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Singapore exploring ‘new tools’ to ‘manage significant investments into critical entities’: Gan Kim Yong

Earlier at the dialogue session, Mr Gan delivered a speech where he touched on the global challenges confronting Singapore.

“We exited the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic earlier this year, but we have stepped into a rather unstable and unpredictable environment. New challenges have emerged and in some instances, are intensifying,” he said.

These include slower global growth amid monetary policy tightening worldwide to combat inflation, the multilateral open trading system coming under pressure, the rise of new technology such as generative artificial intelligence (AI) that has disrupted industries and businesses, as well as climate change.

However, these “daunting” challenges can also present opportunities for Singapore, the minister said.

Singapore, for one, can continue to distinguish itself as “a trusted and reliable trading partner”. The emergence of new technologies and the net zero transition also serve up opportunities to grow the country’s digital and green economy, respectively.

Efforts to capitalise on these opportunities are underway, said Mr Gan, pointing to the Singapore Economy 2023 vision announced last year. This vision comprises strategies to achieve long-term growth by expanding trade, growing the manufacturing and services industries, as well as uplifting enterprises and workers.

More can be done and these include having an agile workforce and strengthening Singapore’s economic connectivity to new markets and appeal as a business hub, the minister said.

“Singapore must resist the pressure to turn inward and become more protectionist,” Mr Gan said. “We have always earned our living by remaining open, expanding our economic space, and staying connected to the world.”

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China stock reforms lend falling markets a helping hand

Whether by coincidence or design, Beijing is unveiling new stock market reforms just as China Evergrande Group’s spectacular plunge reminds investors why just such reforms are so badly needed.

On August 27, futures markets telegraphed a surge in the CSI 300 Index on reports that Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s team is rolling out a series of measures to cheer equity investors, including cuts in stamp duties on trades, lower deposit ratios for margin financing and a more selective process for executing initial public offerings (IPOs).

After opening 5.5% higher on the weekend news while markets were closed, the CSI 300 Index of mainland stocks yielded its gains to close just 1.2% higher on Monday (August 28) as foreign funds accelerated their selling over the day. 

Beijing’s levy on trades is dropping to 0.05% from 0.1% effective August 28, the first such reduction since 2008. The step is meant, as the Chinese Ministry of Finance explains, to “invigorate capital markets and boost investor confidence.”

So, too, is the China Securities Regulatory Commission’s decision to slow the pace of IPOs amid “recent market conditions” characterized by extreme price volatility. Moreover, Xi’s regulators are moving to limit share sales by top stakeholders when prices drop below IPO levels or net asset levels. They will also cut margin ratios for leveraged trades.

“The increasing force of the policy tools will lift market confidence, amplifying the positive signal for the market,” opines analyst Pu Han at China International Capital Corp. It helps, too, that “the scale, force and speed of the measures all beat expectations.”

And all not a moment too soon as China’s property crisis and rising critiques of the sustainability of Beijing’s growth-at-all-costs development model come to dominate global headlines.

The August 17 bankruptcy filing by China Evergrande put an even harsher spotlight on a troubled sector that in the recent past has generated as much as 30% of China’s gross domestic product (GDP).

In the 17 months since trading in China Evergrande’s shares was halted, and in the days since its bankruptcy filing in the United States, the nation’s most indebted property developer disclosed more losses.

On Sunday, disclosures to the Hong Kong stock exchange showed another loss to shareholders of more than US$4.5 billion between January and June. That’s on top of an earlier $80 billion loss in the previous two years.

Of course, China Evergrande’s 2021 default has been the tip of the proverbial iceberg. Since then, other large Chinese developers have made global headlines for missing bond payments. More recently, Country Garden’s missed payments put China’s default risks back at the center of global market discourse.

In some ways, Country Garden’s stumble was even more damning to investor sentiment than Evergrande’s.

China’s Country Garden is the latest property developer that can’t pay its debts. Image: Screengrab / CNN

“In contrast to troubled peers such as Evergrande, Country Garden had been a relatively compliant player in Beijing’s deleveraging campaign, effectively reducing its debt ratio and adhering to deleveraging requirements,” observes analyst Anna Ashton at Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy. “Nonetheless, an ongoing debate rages in China about potential government intervention to stabilize investor confidence.”

Hence the importance of the timing of the new stock trading reforms. In short order, estimates analyst Wang Yi at Huatai Securities, the reforms will pull at least $100 billion in new funds into mainland equity bourses.

At the same time, Yi says the “new restrictions on share sales in effect keep around 250 billion yuan ($35 billion) of funds from selling and bring the strongest benefit to liquidity.”

The key, though, will be meticulous and transparent implementation. As property investment loses its appeal in Asia’s biggest economy, the argument for building deeper and trusted capital markets is strengthening by the day.

There are well-understood reasons why Chinese stocks are as cheap today from a valuation perspective, as they’ve been in the last decade of relative underperformance.

All of the risks global funds try to avoid when betting on developing markets, namely questions about economic growth, regulatory certainty, exchange-rate mechanics and the potential for political turbulence, are present in spades in Shanghai and Shenzhen shares.

It was 10 years ago, after all, that Xi took power pledging to let market forces play the “decisive” role in financial reform decisions. For all those promises, China is more of a buyer-beware market in 2023 than many investors expected.

The clampdown on Big Tech that Xi’s regulators launched in late 2020 only added to the reasons why foreign investors have throttled back on entrusting capital to China.

Economist Jimmy Jean at Desjardins Group speaks for many when he says regulatory uncertainty, along with trade tensions with the US, have complicated China’s post-pandemic recovery.

“We were always skeptical of the narrative that China’s reopening would save the global economy this year,” Jean says. “So far, there isn’t much proving us wrong.”

The external environment sure isn’t helping, either. Yet this works both ways, as China’s troubles reverberate around the globe, dampening growth prospects everywhere.

“It doesn’t necessarily help things, but I don’t think it’s a major factor in determining the outlook in the next six months,” says economist Neil Shearing at Capital Economics. Things could darken further, Shearing notes, if “the outlook for China becomes substantially worse.”

Yet the most recent stock reforms could be a boon for Premier Li Qiang’s standing in market circles. Just five months into the job, Li has had something of a baptism by fire as new challenges seemingly emerge daily.

Chinese Premier Li Qiang takes an oath after being elected during the fourth plenary session of the National People’s Congress (NPC) at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on March 11, 2023. Photo: Pool

Last month, Li proclaimed that Xi’s government is stepping up efforts to normalize China’s regulatory environment. The goal, Li said, is to “reduce the costs of compliance and promote the healthy development of industry.”

Li explained that “on the journey of building a modern socialist country, the platform economy has great potential.” He told tech chieftains in the audience, including officials from Alibaba Group, TikTok owner ByteDance and food delivery group Meituan, to “push to increase their international competitiveness and dare to compete on the global stage.”

Analyst Kelvin Wong at OANDA isn’t alone in believing that such rhetoric “is likely to boost positive animal spirits in the short-term at least.”

But credible reform is needed to ensure those innovative, entrepreneurial spirits are facilitated and unleashed by deep and vibrant capital markets. In that direction, Li’s reform team has been stepping up efforts to build a world-class bond market

Generally, China’s market infrastructure hasn’t kept pace with the tidal waves of capital racing its way. Chinese government bonds being added to top indexes, including the FTSE Russell benchmark, has been a game changer.

FTSE inclusion has increased financing options for China Inc and offered myriad opportunities to build diversified and resilient portfolios via new asset classes to drive the economy’s growth and development.

The problem, though, is that China’s bond market is underpinned by a financial architecture with limited liquidity and hedging tools, a giant and opaque state sector, and a rudimentary credit-rating system that often obscures risk and thus enables the misallocation of capital.

China has long had a financial sequencing challenge. During the Xi era that began in 2013, as before it, China has too often seemed to believe that attracting more foreign capital is a reform in and of itself. However, regulators have been slower to strengthen China’s financial system ahead of the arrival of those waves of foreign capital.

In 2001, many top Communist Party assumed inclusion in the World Trade Organization alone would increase Chinese competitiveness and recalibrate its growth engines. Nor did the yuan’s 2016 inclusion in the International Monetary Fund’s “special drawing rights” program hasten Beijing’s capital account liberalization nearly as much as hoped. The yuan still isn’t fully convertible.

A-share stocks’ addition to the MSCI index in 2019 didn’t magically make China’s financial system sounder, the government more transparent, companies more shareholder-friendly or the shadow-banking industry more productive and resilient.

Raising China’s economic game requires significant heavy lifting to curb the dominance of state-owned enterprises, increase economic space for the private sector and eliminate the risk of dueling bubbles in debt, credit, assets and pollution. Li’s reform team insists it’s on top of things.

The stock reforms unveiled this past weekend were well-timed. In the interim, odds are the People’s Bank of China will come under greater pressure to support growth, exactly what new Governor Pan Gongsheng wants to avoid. Prior to the stock trading reform announcement, the MSCI China index had plunged 11% so far in August, its worst run since October.

People’s Bank of China Governor Pan Gongsheng has markets dissecting his every move on rates. Image: BBC Screengrab

Economist Maggie Wei at Goldman Sachs speaks for many when she says the PBOC’s recent 15 basis-point cut in the loan prime rate was “disappointing” and “would not help with building confidence” as Xi’s government tries to revive economic confidence.

In place of fresh stimulus, bursts of the kind China has served up time and time again over the last 15 years, Xi and Li seem determined to boost investor confidence through accelerated reforms rather than aggressively pulling fiscal and/or monetary policy levers.

And any progress China makes to ensure its stock market is more open, dynamic and ready for the global prime time will be crucial to reversing the loss of confidence in China’s prospects that seem to be gathering by the day.  

Follow William Pesek on X, formerly known as Twitter, at @WilliamPesek

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