Kazakhstan eyes foreign investors

Promotes vision of Central Asian hub

Kazakhstan eyes foreign investors
Kazakh Prime Minister Alikhan Smailov delivers his keynote speech at the 6th Kazakhstan Global Investment Roundtable in Astana. Apinya Wipatayotin

Astana, Kazakhstan: The Kazakh government is calling for foreign investors especially those from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) to invest to help make Kazakhstan an investment hub in the Central Asia Region.

The Southeast Asian region could explore mutual economic development with Kazakhstan, its Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Roman Vassilenko told the 6th Kazakhstan Global Investment Roundtable on Friday.

Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister Alikhan Smailov visited Vietnam and Thailand recently to strengthen economic cooperation. He called for businesses to invest in Kazakhstan and invited tourists from both Asean countries to visit.

The number of Kazakh tourists visiting Thailand has risen and Thais were welcome to try the Kazakh experience, he said. “This is a positive sign for people-to-people relations that could pave the way to further economic development,” Mr Vassilenko said.

Investment hub

Mr Vassilenko said the Kazakh government is keen on promoting foreign investment to boost growth.

It wants to create a better public infrastructure system for foreign investors, especially logistics to link the country with other regions like Europe, the United States, and the Middle East.

The investment roundtable in Astana, the capital, drew 500 guests from local and international companies, authorities, and opinion leaders. It focused on investments in regional sustainable growth in key sectors such as transport, logistics, agriculture, and innovative technologies.

Prime Minister Alikhan Smailov presided over the event and delivered a keynote speech to boost investors’ confidence in the government’s efforts to ensure they can do business easily.

“All efforts will be made to achieve our target of $150 billion in foreign investment by 2029,” he said.

Over the past 10 months, GDP climbed 4.9%. Investments in fixed capital grew 12.6%, reaching 13.3 trillion Kazakhstani Tenge (US$28.8 billion).

At the regional level, 70% of foreign investment in Central Asia is concentrated in Kazakhstan. Last year, total FDI increased by 18%, reaching $28 billion. In the first half year, foreign investors sank $14 billion.

The Kazakh government, he said, would scrap unnecessary regulations for trade and investment. It has axed 11,000 such rules, and another 9,000 would go by year’s end.

The government has also offered special tax packages to investors, including a tax code to foster manufacturing industries that exempts investors from tax for the first three years, part of a programme to support SMEs enterprises.

It has also developed a tariff-for-investment exchange programme, to attract investments in complex oil and gas projects, he said.

Mr Smailov said agreements on investment promotion and mutual protection have been signed with 53 countries. More than 20 commercial agreements would be signed at the roundtable event, worth over $1.6 billion.

“The government of Kazakhstan is ready to deepen investment ties and jointly explore new markets,” he said.

Business viewpoints

Kit Matthew Simmons, a member of the board of Astana Motors in Kazakhstan, who spoke at a session on “Regional clusters as a point of attraction for investors in the regions”, praised the Kazakh government’s efforts to embrace foreign partners in business.

Business, he said, needs the government’s support, including investment in infrastructure and transboundary development.

Kazakhstan is the 6th-largest country by agricultural land area, and 80% of its land is used for agricultural production. It is rich in natural resources, including rare earth metals.

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Crime movie, mall shooting, slowing economy: Why Chinese tourists are staying away from Thailand

Chinese viewership for the film exceeded 90 million as of late-September, according to film data platform Beacon, while revenue was at around 3.8 billion yuan (US$525 million). 

Following the movie’s release, Thailand saw a drop in Chinese tourists. From 410,311 visitors in July, the figure dipped to 355,146 in August and 284,989 in September.

“Chinese people feel scared. They’re afraid of human trafficking and worried they wouldn’t be safe if they travel here,” said Mr Ratasak.

During his official visit to China last month, Mr Srettha had a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping and emphasised his government’s commitment to ensure foreign tourists’ safety following the Siam Paragon shooting incident. 

The two leaders also discussed intensifying efforts to crack down on cross-border crimes such as wire fraud and online gambling.

LIMITED FLIGHTS, DOMESTIC FACTORS

Domestic factors have also hampered the return of Chinese tourists to Thailand. 

Analysts say sluggishness in the world’s second-largest economy has reduced people’s spending power, especially those outside big Chinese cities. China’s second-quarter gross domestic product growth of 6.3 per cent on-year was below expectations. But its third-quarter growth of 4.9 per cent year-on-year exceeded forecasts.

Meanwhile, limited international flights have affected outbound travel. “The frequency of flights from China to Thailand is still below pre-COVID numbers,” explained Mr Pruangkarn.

Online flight data provider OAG reported that out of China’s top 20 international markets since 2019, Thailand is the least recovered this month.   

“Seats are still 57 per cent below 2019, despite the recent visa relaxation for Chinese visitors to Thailand,” it said on its website.

Still, market observers believe the Thai tourism sector could rebound in the near to medium term, given the right conditions and strategies.

“Thailand can boost Chinese arrivals by promoting Thailand as a safe destination that offers a variety of activities for all types of travellers, and by working with the airlines to increase flights from China,” said Mr Pruangkarn.

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Korea bills itself as FDI drawcard

Firms keen on EEC in Rayong

Korea bills itself as FDI drawcard
Potential abounds: Participants visit the Invest Korea Summit 2023 held recently in Busan. This year’s event venue, Busan, is a candidate city for the 2030 World Expo, a hub for logistics in Asia, and a place that has laid the foundations for Korean industry.

Busan: South Korea is ready to be the global hub for advanced technology industry under strong support from international alliances which will invest more in its economic growth and competitiveness capacity.

The country also pledged to strengthen cooperation with its Asean partners for further trade and investment development and is interested in investing in the automobile industry in Thailand’s Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC) in Rayong province.

The Investment Korea Summit 2023 was held recently by the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), and drew hundreds of participants from the United States, Europe, China and Japan.

KOTRA, Korea’s national investment promotion agency, supports foreign businesses in Korea. It also promotes Korea’s investment environment and provides services such as consultations on topics ranging from investment notification to setting up businesses.

Jang Young Jin, 1st vice minister of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, said US-China competition is likely to lead to slow economic growth this year.

South Korea is trying to build a friendly investment environment through bilateral free trade agreements with 20 countries, including tax benefits and other privileges. With those efforts, the country has enjoyed a leap in foreign direct investment (FDI) now worth over US$23.9 billion, mainly in semiconductors.

“We have been seeking further international trade investment, exploring new markets and enhancing the supply chain,” Mr Jin said.

Asean investment

Regarding trade and investment cooperation in Asean, he said Asean still has big potential to draw trade and investment, affirmed by the rapid growth in trade between Korea and Asean countries.

Also, rising production costs in China and the enhanced competitiveness of Chinese companies have prompted Korea and other nations to shift their investment strategies, turning to the Asean region as a trade and investment hub.

Meanwhile, a source from the ministry said Korea was keen on investing in the automobile industry in the EEC in Rayong. “Korea is keen on developing advanced technology and believes the EEC has the potential for automobile industry investment,” he said.

The EEC Development Plan is part of the Thailand 4.0 scheme aiming to revitalise the Eastern Seaboard, a powerhouse of industrial production in Thailand for over 30 years.

The EEC Development Plan will lead a significant development and transformation of Thailand’s investment in physical and social infrastructure in the area. The EEC project will, initially, be focused in 3 eastern provinces namely Chachoengsao, Chon Buri and Rayong.

FDI success

According to the ministry, Korea has achieved record-high foreign direct investment as a global investment hub. It will continue to spearhead innovation in high-tech industries together with partners from across the globe.

Based on FDI figures in 2022, 2.93% of FDI went to advanced industry investment, 45.2% to material components and equipment, and 51.85% to other categories.

Greenfield investments account for $17 billion of total FDI, and investments in future high-tech industries drew $7 billion. There are also 22 cases of increases in large-scale investments.

Presiding over the meeting, Korean Prime Minister Han Duck-soo said the government would do its best to promote investment, turning it into a global hub for high-tech.

“We would like to create trust among investors that we will do the best to support them, including better regulations to help the investors by eliminating unnecessary red tape.

“We will do more to encourage a stable supply chain. Importantly, we have the number one digital powerhouse in the world, making it possible to be the global hub for high-tech industry,” he said.

Four foreign companies has asked to invest more than $900 million in energy, future mobility, semiconductors and ICT. They come from Japan, the US, Spain and B.Grimm Power, which invested in wind energy.

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How Bulgarian yogurt became a dietary sensation in Japan

Japan is currently swept up in a yogurt frenzy. Yogurt has become one of the trendiest and most sought-after foods in the country, enjoying a surge in popularity.

This rising demand for yogurt in Japan has given rise to a thriving market spearheaded by Meiji Holdings, a prominent Japanese company with a subsidiary specializing in dairy products and an evangelist of yogurt consumption in Japan. It stands as the foremost domestic producer in an industry valued at US$8.42 billion and growing rapidly.

However, yogurt hadn’t always sat so well on the Japanese palate.

The dairy item, particularly its renowned Bulgarian variety, was perceived poorly by the populace, who were put off by its supposedly unappealing look and smell that gave them an impression of it having gone rancid.

Meiji’s efforts to introduce the Balkan staple to the country seemed naive with bleak possibilities of adoption. However, the company managed to engineer its consumption in the gastronomically conservative country through clever marketing that focused on culturally pertinent value propositions.

The transformation of yogurt in Japan from an unfamiliar and often unpalatable substance just four decades ago to a daily dietary essential and a symbol of health and well-being is an intriguing tale.

When King Francis I of France fell ill with a stomach ailment, a renowned physician was summoned all the way from Constantinople. To everyone’s surprise, he arrived in Paris accompanied by an unusual entourage of about 40 sheep. This extraordinary doctor set to work, fermenting the milk from these sheep and offering it as a remedy.

Much to everyone’s amazement, the king made a rapid recovery. According to certain historical accounts, this intriguing incident marked the international debut of Bulgarian yogurt, celebrated for its medicinal properties, during the 16th century.

Yogurt consumption was already a well-established tradition in this region, particularly as a key component of the Mediterranean diet, known for its anti-aging effects. However, it was in 1905, in Geneva, when the 27-year-old Bulgarian-born microbiologist Stamen Grigorov conducted in-depth research on Bulgarian yogurt.

His findings revealed that the fermentation process was attributed to a specific rod-shaped bacterium, a particular subspecies of Lactobacillus delbrueckii, and Streptococcus thermophilus, another spherical bacterium. In acknowledgment of this discovery, the scientific community christened the former strain as Lactobacillus bulgaricus.

Around the same time, renowned Nobel Prize-winning Russian scientist Elie Metchnikoff, known as the father of cell-mediated immunity, introduced the theory that aging was linked to toxic bacteria in the gut. He singled out lactic-acid bacteria, especially L bulgaricus derived from home-made Bulgarian yogurt, for its capacity to neutralize toxins produced by such bacteria and thereby slow down the aging process.

Metchnikoff highly recommended daily consumption of this bacterium, proposing it as both a preventive and a curative for various conditions.

Subsequently, in the 1950s, Bulgaria patented a distinct blend of bacterial strains in an endeavor to promote what became known as “official Bulgarian yogurt.” Sold in simple mason jars, without any brand name or labels, it was referred to as kiselo mliako, or sour milk. For Bulgarians accustomed to incorporating yogurt into a multitude of dishes, such branding was unnecessary.

Bulgarian yogurt’s most significant international venture commenced in the 1970s when the Japanese company Meiji decided to utilize L bulgaricus in its products. Initially, Meiji’s Plain Yogurt met with some skepticism among consumers.

However, after numerous refinements, Meiji has now become the largest producer of Bulgarian yogurt in Japan, holding two-fifths of the yogurt market and distributing its products in such countries as Thailand, Singapore and China.

Bulgarian yogurt is known for its probiotic properties and potential health benefits, being viewed as a veritable superfood. It is often associated with promoting digestive health, slowing aging, and overall well-being, which has contributed to its popularity among health-conscious Japanese consumers.

Meiji played a significant role in popularizing Bulgarian yogurt. It not only introduced it but also imbued it with new meanings, images, and values, effectively branding it for Japanese consumers. 

Meiji’s advertising campaigns for its yogurt product celebrate its Bulgarian origins, portraying the Eastern European nation as the hallowed birthplace of yogurt. According to these campaigns, Bulgaria boasts an age-old tradition of dairy production, where the very air, water, and light differ from the rest of the world.

So, what inspired the Japanese Meiji Bulgaria Yogurt company, which commands more than 40% market share and boasts more than 99% brand awareness, to invest in this venture?

The journey began in the late 1960s when Meiji initiated efforts to develop Bulgarian-style yogurt tailored for the Japanese market. At the time, the sole yogurt available in Japan was a sweetened, heat-treated fermented milk with a gel-like texture, often consumed in little jars as a snack or dessert.

The concept of plain yogurt with live Lactobacillus bulgaricus, akin to what is commonly enjoyed in Bulgaria, was entirely foreign to the Far East. One member of Meiji’s Bulgaria yogurt project recalled the shock of trying plain yogurt at the Bulgarian pavilion during the 1970 World Fair in Osaka, describing it as peculiar and exceptionally tart. However, plain yogurt held an irresistible allure – the promise of extended longevity.

Meiji recognized that, from a technological standpoint, producing plain yogurt with live L bulgaricus wouldn’t be a formidable task. In 1971, the company launched this innovative product in Japan, simply naming it “Plain Yogurt.” Initial consumer reactions were unfavorable, with some interpreting its sourness as spoilage or doubting its edibility.

Nonetheless, Meiji persisted. In 1973, after an agreement with the Bulgarian state-owned dairy enterprise to import yogurt starter cultures, the company gained permission to rebrand its product as Meiji Bulgaria yogurt. The strategy was to emphasize authenticity, leveraging the Bulgarian countryside with its pastoral landscapes, herds of sheep and cows, traditional bagpipers, and the image of elderly individuals living in harmony with nature.

In the 1980s, Meiji combined this approach with additional microbiological research and closer collaboration with the Bulgarian side. By 1984, Japanese consumers were introduced to a new, sleeker packaging for Meiji Bulgaria yogurt, further solidifying its presence in the market.

Meiji received another boost when it secured the right to display the government-issued Food for Specified Health Use (FOSHU) seal on the label of its Bulgarian yogurt in 1996. Health benefits became the central focus of its yogurt branding and marketing. This communication culturally resonates with Japan, one of the world’s highest-longevity countries with a culture that places a strong emphasis on meticulous dietary planning to enhance youthfulness and well-being.

Japan has an extensive tradition of consuming fermented foods which are often ascribed vitality-boosting properties. Further, the Japanese generally place great emphasis on heritage, pristineness, ambient qualities, and habitat-essentialism in culinary choices, highly valuing traditional agricraft, local and organic sourcing, and natural and human environmental conditions of food origins.

By infusing its Bulgarian brand with fresh meanings, images, and values, Meiji has not only reaped significant profits but also crafted in Japan a captivating portrayal of Bulgaria as the ‘holy land of yogurt.’ 

Back in Bulgaria, the media are captivated by the widespread acclaim of Bulgarian yogurt produced in Japan. In a 2015 article, Japanese consumers asserted that Meiji’s Bulgarian yogurt surpassed the popularity of Coca-Cola.

Whether it’s in travelogues describing experiences in Japan or in economic reports, virtually every narrative surrounding Japan includes the remarkable success of Bulgarian yogurt. This compelling tale has been embraced by businesses and politicians in post-socialist Bulgaria as a means to evoke a sense of national pride.

For many Bulgarians, the newfound Japanese identity of their native yogurt encapsulates the essence of Bulgarian collective traditions. Simultaneously, they perceive a deeper connection to the contemporary world as it becomes a symbol of health and happiness in one of the world’s prominent economic superpowers.

While globalization has reshaped cultural values around the world, the economic and cultural transformation of yogurt in Japan has been a remarkable journey, turning it into a source of health and nourishment for the Japanese people and a balm for the Bulgarian national spirit.

Bulgarian yogurt remains a popular choice in Japan, being offered by various brands. It is commonly available in supermarkets and convenience stores across the island nation and its appeal continues to grow.

Educational campaigns highlighting its probiotic content and its Bulgarian heritage have helped raise awareness and drive its popularity. Many restaurants and cafes in Japan have started incorporating Bulgarian yogurt into their menus, using it as a base for various dishes, including breakfast bowls, parfaits, and savory dishes. This has helped introduce it to a broader audience.

Japan continues to exhibit a distinct preference for Bulgarian yogurt as a healthy snack. The once-foreign product has trickled even into rural and remote areas of the island nation. The cultural ferment of Bulgarian yogurt continues to fortify it in the country’s markets.

The author declares that he has no contact, interaction, sponsorship, or commercial ties with any businesses or organizations mentioned in the article.

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Countering complaints about Biden’s China strategy

One of the most important criticisms of the Biden administration’s efforts to oppose serious challenges coming from Chinese government behavior is that the strategy is vague and dangerous because it does not sufficiently reassure China.

Such criticism is unrealistic and at odds with past US success in following similar policies against Chinese challenges.

US objectives and achievements

The Biden government’s efforts resemble the Asia-first strategies – explained below – that were used successfully by the Reagan and George W Bush administrations to curb Chinese challenges and assertiveness.

Biden’s main objectives focus on strengthening America at home and establishing power and influence abroad to change circumstances influencing Chinese interests, thereby prompting Beijing to curb its challenging behavior.

Calling for a clear end-state in these efforts is unrealistic as the process is subject to unpredictable changes over a prolonged period of acute competition.

The record this time around shows growing US achievements in strengthening against China with impressive momentum for six years. The policies have sustained backing from two very different US administrations and bipartisan majorities in Congress, along with broad approval in pubic opinion and US media.

The Biden administration has successfully completed a first stage of strengthening America at home and building power and influence abroad with a growing array of allies and partners.

The passage of the $1 trillion infrastructure bill in 2021 and two massive bills in 2022 were important in competing with China, especially in high technology.

With strong congressional backing, the administration in 2022 imposed a ban on the export of US advanced computer chip technology to China. In 2023 an Executive Order with broad congressional support proposed restricting high technology investments by US companies in China.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and China’s strong military reaction to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022 advanced US strengthening aboard.

Biden and his aides built on US-backed NATO resolve to counter Russia and its partner, China. They connected NATO with Japan and other Indo-Pacific powers like Australia, South Korea, and New Zealand.

Led by Biden, the G-7 countries and NATO showed unprecedented concern with China’s adverse impact on Asian security, including coercive behavior over South China Sea disputes and Taiwan.

The Biden administration’s success saw the Philippines, South Korea, and Vietnam advance ties with the United States despite risks of Chinese retaliation. The absence of traditional trade agreements giving greater access to US markets was offset as the US accommodated allies and partners using multi-billion-dollar high technology and climate change expenditures and other measures under the Indo-Pacific Economic Policy Framework.

Reagan background of US Asia-first policy toward China

What came to be called the US Asia-first policy emerged after two years during the first term of the Reagan administration. It countered Chinese efforts to leverage acute concern by US leaders in the late 1970s and early 1980s in sustaining strong Chinese backing as the United States faced powerful challenges from the Soviet Union.

Beijing repeatedly threatened to downgrade the US relationship over continued US arms sales to Taiwan and a host of other issues. Also making leading US leaders nervous, Beijing began talks with Moscow to ease tensions.

In response, US policy under the leadership of Secretary of State George Shultz (1982-1989) and backed by senior Asia policymakers Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Armitage and Gaston Sigur reversed the heretofore top US priority of advancing closer ties with China.

Thus Washington’s previous policy, which had been followed since the Nixon administration, was tagged with the newly derogatory term “China-first policy.”

Reagan, Shultz and George Bush Sr. Photo: The Telegraph

Shultz’s predecessor Alexander Haig and Haig’s subordinates had strongly advocated the old policy of accommodating Chinese demands to ensure Beijing’s alignment with the United States against the USSR.

The new US policy leaders took advantage of a massive buildup of US military strength and stronger alignment with allies, especially Japan and NATO powers, to deal effectively with Soviet expansionism.

The new leaders downgraded China’s importance as they rebuilt strong relations with Japan and other allies and partners including Taiwan. They remained unmoved by Chinese demands. Countering longstanding Chinese pressure against the sale of fighter aircraft, they went forward with the sale and assembly in Taiwan of 130 advanced fighter aircraft.

The result was a Chinese grudging adjustment, leading to much smoother US-China relations for the rest of Reagan’s term.

George W Bush administration picks it up again

A second episode of the Asia-first policy occurred at the outset of the George W Bush administration.

Incoming administration leaders included veterans from the Reagan years like Wolfowitz and Armitage. They viewed the Clinton government as passive and intimidated by Chinese pressures that might lead to a repeat of the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1995-96.

Taking advantage of Clinton administration preoccupations, Chinese leaders advanced military assertiveness in the Taiwan Strait and stridently exerted pressure against US missile defense, NATO expansion and security ties with Japan.

Bush policymakers enhanced US military strength along with strengthening alliances in the Asia-Pacific as they scrapped Clinton’s approach. China recalculated, resulting in Beijing’s new “peaceful rise” approach, which gave top priority to reassuring the United States.

Authoritative Chinese experts told this interviewer that there was a genuine concern that to do otherwise would have risked a repeat of the US response to Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany. Beijing stuck to the peaceful rise approach until the end of that decade, although the unsuccessful US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq tended more and more to confirm a Chinese assessment of declining US power and resolve.

Lessons for today

China is much more powerful today than it was in the 1980s and the 2000s. Nevertheless, China had profound leverage in those periods, which it employed to have its way at US expense. US strengthening and firm resolve effectively curbed Chinese assertiveness in those instances.

Against this background, the Biden administration’s impressive strengthening at home and building of power and influence abroad represents a proven approach that has strong momentum for sustained competition in the period ahead.

On the recent complaint that the United States is not sufficiently reassuring China, it is notable that US reassurance on Taiwan and other sensitive issues was infrequent in the first episode of Asia-first policy and was not much evident in the second.

Among other negative consequences, special reassurance of China risked weakening resolve in the United States and among allies and partners. The Biden government avoided such measures even when the crisis posed by China’s military actions after the Pelosi visit prompted a spike in commentators’ urging of greater accommodation of Chinese interests.

That crisis passed after a few weeks and US hardening to counter Chinese challenges intensified.

An added reason for the Biden administration to avoid special reassurance to China is the likelihood of strong criticism from Congress, threatening the bipartisan unity on China policy that has sustained a strong and unified America facing the Chinese challenges.

Past experience and current conditions argue against special reassurance of China at this time.

Robert Sutter ([email protected]), a former US national intelligence officer for East Asia and the Pacific, is a professor of practice of international affairs at George Washington University. This assessment draws from his new book: Congress and China Policy: Past Episodic, Recent Enduring Influence.

This article was originally published by Pacific Forum. It is republished with permission.

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Commentary: What we lose when night markets fade out in Singapore

ARE PASAR MALAM A RELIC OF THE PAST?

But since the turn of the millennium, the allure of pasar malam seems to be diminishing against the rise of air-conditioned malls. The markets were forced to close during the pandemic in 2020. When they finally returned in 2022, they opened to a post-pandemic world transformed by digitalisation.

Consumers have evolved. Many are going online for better bargains and have grown used to the comforts of food delivery.

But the pasar malam has not evolved alongside consumers. Friends tell me that its food offerings are homogenous today, while products are too pricey and not well curated. Although some bazaars offer rides and carnival games, they pale in comparison to those at theme parks and arcades.

Driven by a sense of nostalgia, I still take my children to the pasar malam occasionally, but it is hard not to see how they are fast losing their relevance in modern Singapore.

Yet perhaps this is not the only way forward for our beloved night markets of old. Indeed, even today, famous markets in other parts of Asia such as the Shilin Night Market in Taipei and the Chatuchak Market in Bangkok continue to draw crowds, despite the proliferation of malls and e-commerce.

Air conditioning is good, but consumers are always looking for new experiences. So perhaps our night markets simply need to offer more diversity beyond the standard Thai milk tea, Ramly burgers and cheap knockoffs. 

If rentals could be kept affordable, pasar malam would also make a great incubation ground to test out new food and lifestyle concepts, or support the existing e-commerce sites of home-bakers and small businesses.

Indeed, as a food and shopping haven, Singapore would benefit from preserving our street food and shopping. It would be a great pity if our future children would only be able to experience cultural events at theme parks, and street food at the basement of a mall.

Annie Tan is a freelance writer based in Singapore.

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US pension fund’s exit may shake Hong Kong markets

Hong Kong’s status as an international financial hub faces a new challenge as the United States’ federal pension fund has decided to exclude Hong Kong-listed shares from the benchmark indexes for its international funds.

The decision was announced by the US Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board (FRTIB) on Tuesday before Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden met in San Francisco on Wednesday. In a dinner on Wednesday evening, Xi called on the US business community to boost investment in China. 

The FRTIB said it had conducted a routine review of the four benchmark indexes followed by its Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) and decided to adjust its International Stock Index Investment Fund, or I Fund, which has an asset size of US$68 billion as of the end of last month. It said it had reviewed the recommendations of its staff and Aon, its investment consultant. 

“Overall, operational complexity has increased when investing in emerging markets in recent years given a range of events such as investment restrictions on sensitive Chinese technology sectors, delisting of Chinese companies and sanctions on Russian securities due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict,” Aon said

“These types of unforeseen events can incur transaction costs and may cause performance and volatility swings,” it said.

It said any announcement of investment restrictions can cause the value of a stock to decline at a time where the investor is forced to sell. It said, given the asset size of the I Fund, the forced selling or restricted investments could incur higher than average market impact costs due to liquidity challenges.

It said it will work with its fund managers to implement the transition from the current index (MSCI Europe, Australasia and Far East (EAFE) Index) to the next index (MSCI All Country World (ACWI) ex USA ex China ex Hong Kong Investable Market Index (IMI)) in 2024. It said the next index is expected to outperform the current one on a risk-adjusted basis over the long term.

Assets in Hong Kong

The MSCI ACWI IMI ex USA ex China ex Hong Kong, launched in June this year, provides exposure to 5,621 large-, mid-, and small-cap stocks in 21 developed markets and 23 emerging markets. 

The MSCI EAFE Index currently provides exposure to 798 large- and mid-cap stocks in 21 developed markets. Hong Kong stocks represent about 3.3% of the index’s assets, according to the geographical breakdown of a similar MSCI index. 

If the I fund is closely tracking the MSCI EAFE Index, it should have allocated US$2.2 billion of its assets into Hong Kong markets.

Simon Lee, a US-based Hong Kong commentator, noted that the asset size of the I Fund’s assets in Hong Kong is not enormous, comparatively speaking. But he predicted the fund’s departure will still hurt the city’s stock markets. 

“In general, the US now sees China as a risk, not an opportunity, and it does not treat Hong Kong as an independent economy from mainland China,” Lee said. “As the TSP is representative, its departure from Hong Kong may make some state-level pension funds follow suit.” 

He said the TSP’s departure will fuel capital outflows in Hong Kong and hurt the city’s status as an international financial hub. 

A Shanghai-based columnist says in an article that shares of 29 Hong Kong-listed firms, including AIA Group Ltd, Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd, CK Hutchison Holdings and Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd, will face downward pressure when the TSP’s fund managers dispose of them next year. 

The Hang Seng Index, a benchmark of the Hong Kong stock markets, has fallen 13.4% so far this year. The Shanghai Composite Index, which tracks the A-share markets, has dropped by only 2%.

Trump’s decision

In November 2017, the FRTIB decided to let its I Fund follow the MSCI ACWI IMI ex USA, instead of MSCI EAFE Index, as a way to enter the A-share markets. 

As of July 31, 2019, China received the third-most investment on a per-nation basis within the MSCI ACWI IMI ex USA at 7.56% of the index’s assets. 

In August 2019, US Senators Marco Rubio and Jeanne Shaheen told FRTIB Chairman Michael Kennedy in a letter that some of the US federal government employees’ money mightd have been invested in Chinese firms that pose national security, human rights and financial disclosure risks. 

The FRTIB was ordered to stop investing in A-shares by the Trump administration in May 2020.

As of the end of March in 2020, the TSP had US$557 billion of assets while its I Fund had US$41 billion.

The Economic Daily, a state-owned newspaper, said in a commentary in 2020 that the negative impact on the A-share markets of the TSP’s exit was negligible. 

Citing an estimation of the Bocom Schroders Asset Management Co Ltd, it said all US pension funds totaled US$30 trillion but the US federal government only controlled US$1.9 trillion of that while the remaining was owned by state governments and the private sector. 

It added that no more than US$15 billion of US pension funds had been allocated to the Greater China region and most of it was in Hong Kong.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry in May 2020 criticized the US government for blocking American investors from entering China’s markets and politicizing the matter in the name of national security. It said such a move would hurt US investors’ interest.

‘Butterfly effect’

In the first 10 months of this year, the average daily turnover of Hong Kong’s stock market was HK$106.6 billion (US$13.7 billion). Market capitalization amounted to HK$30.8 trillion (US$3.95 trillion) at the end of last month.

Some analysts said the I Fund’s US$2.2 billion investments in Hong Kong is negligible as it is only about 16% of the market’s daily turnover and 0.06% of its market capitalization. 

However, they are worried that if more institutional investors are leaving Hong Kong, it will create a “butterfly effect” that may lead to a market crash. 

In October 2022, the Teacher Retirement System of Texas, managing a US$184 billion public pension fund, cut its China target allocation to 1.5% from 3% of its assets. 

In April this year, Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP), Canada’s third largest pension fund, reportedly closed down its China equity investment team based in Hong Kong.

On Wednesday, lawmakers passed a bill to lower the stamp duty for stock trading to 0.1% from 0.13%, hoping to make the bourse more competitive.

Read: BlackRock, MSCI probed for investments in China

Follow Jeff Pao on Twitter at @jeffpao3

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New export markets to be tapped

Govt aims for ‘quick win’ to boost GDP

The government is stepping up efforts to boost exports as part of its “quick win” policy to revitalise the economy.

Government spokesman Chai Wacharonke said yesterday that Prime Minister and Finance Minister Srettha Thavisin has laid down a policy to turn the economy around by promoting exports in new overseas markets.

Thailand’s exports have been forecast to register positive growth in the final quarter, and growth is estimated at 1.99% next year with an estimated value of more than US$287 billion, the spokesman said.

The government has devised a plan to support and push for export growth, with Deputy Prime Minister and Commerce Minister Phumtham Wechayachai overseeing the plan’s implementation.

Measures will be taken to achieve “quick wins” by creating trade opportunities in new markets with high potential, such as China and the Middle East, while existing markets will be maintained through free trade agreement negotiations with trading partners, Mr Chai said.

The relevant agencies will work together proactively to promote products made by local communities globally via online and offline marketing, he said.

The government is also promoting the country’s soft power by using innovations and technology to increase the value of domestic goods and services such as Thai food, Thai boxing, and tourism, he noted.

Efforts have been made to integrate trade and tourism to increase retail outlets selling Thai goods on Thai Airways International flights, Mr Chai said.

He said plans are in place to push for a digital government and improve laws that pose hurdles to the export sector, as well as promote green industries and e-commerce.

Moreover, the government has drawn up a plan to upgrade cross-border checkpoints and set up one-stop service centres in seven provinces to facilitate cross-border trade and exports.

“The Commerce Ministry estimates the value of exports in the last quarter at about $25.7 billion a month while export growth is estimated to hit 1.99% next year with an estimated value of more than $287 billion,” the spokesman said.

“If things go according to plan, the trade volume will increase, which will help boost the economy and create jobs and generate income for Thais.”

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The grand strategy shaping Australia’s new worldview

The term “grand strategy” may perplex, but many employ the technique even if not naming it such. Most governments seek to build and then apply national power in their attempts to establish sought-after relationships with other states.

Grand strategies are whole-of-government, involving diplomaticinformational, military and economic power. They are of most use to states with limited power that need to focus scarce resources on their most important concerns.

The grand strategy methodology is a useful framework with which to consider Australia and its contemporary international policies and activities as a middle power

Like other small and middle powers, grand strategy informs Australia’s statecraftthe application of diverse forms of national power. Grand strategy also involves building particular forms of national power in a manner appropriate to achieving the desired objectives.

Australia has developed a balance of power grand strategy that will be of a scale “sufficient…to deter aggression and coercion” and generate “a strategic equilibrium.” Such a grand strategy assumes that others can be stopped from achieving their ambitions by being as, or more, powerful than them.

Power is gained by building up military and economic might, by forming collective defense alliances with others, or by doing both. This grand strategy is clearly focused at the great power level and implicitly at China.

The balance of power grand strategy is steadily being implemented. 

Diplomatically, AUKUS is strengthening the US alliance and UK partnership. Internally, Canberra is hardening societal resilience by criminalizing foreign interference, blocking specific foreign telecom firms, toughening foreign investment laws, strengthening critical infrastructure regulations and countering misinformation and disinformation actions.

In addition to the AUKUS submarines, Australia is buying new long-range strike missiles, getting anti-ship missiles for the army, upgrading northern defense bases and developing offensive cyber capabilities.

Building economic power actions include the National Reconstruction Fund which provides targeted investments in defense capability, advanced manufacturing and critical technologies.

The AUKUS nuclear submarine deal is making ripples across the Indo-Pacific. Image: US Embassy in China

Looking beyond the great powers, Australia has also devised an engagement strategy focused on middle and smaller powers. This grand strategy involves working with others to achieve common goals.

Australia will work with Southeast Asia and the Pacific “to enhance our collective security and prosperity.” Supporting regional states to be more resilient to outside pressures aligns with a balance-of-power grand strategy.

In recent years Australia reached numerous bilateral and multilateral economic agreements with Indonesia, the Pacific IslandsIndia, Japan and South Korea.

Australia also aims for greater trade and investment with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the two sides have deepened ties with the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and its associated Aus4ASEAN Futures Initiative.

The initiative includes financing smart cities, digitization, technology innovation, digital skills training and a scholarship program in the areas of maritime, connectivity, economic development and sustainable development goals.

The two grand strategies are “mutually reinforcing.” Having different strategies to achieve different outcomes is necessary as a single grand strategy cannot achieve all a state seeks and combining them has proven problematic.

The balance of power grand strategy will not solve the problem of a possible great power war. Instead, the strategic equilibrium must be maintained indefinitely until the risk of major war fades. 

Australia has little control over what the great powers do, meaning its grand strategy must maintain a high level of defense expenditure and industry as well as a focus on major high-technology wars.

Australia is effectively trapping itself within a narrow range of possible domestic and foreign policy options. On the other hand, a great power war in the region is critically important to avoid. Reduced autonomy in the international system may be a price worth paying.

The engagement grand strategy brings its own complications. Australia’s new trade and investment strategy with Southeast Asia needs a whole-of-nation effort. 

It calls for better Southeast Asia literacy across Australia’s business, government, education and community sectors, proposing sectoral business missions to the region, more capable business chambers, deeper SME links with the region and more professional exchanges and internships. 

It also calls for Australia to be a substantial regional investor using monies from its corporations, capital markets, national savings and superannuation funds.

Ultimately, grand strategies must generally gain domestic approval to be successfully implemented. It’s not simply a national government endeavor. Instead, Canberra needs to persuade Australians of the merits of the two grand strategies by building legitimacy and crafting a strategic narrative that encourages buy-in.

strategic narrative can provide an interpretive structure to make sense of these challenges and emerging issues. Such narratives should appeal to both people’s rational and emotional cognition.

The two grand strategies set out a path, even if their success is uncertain. More definite, is that over time they will impact all Australians.

Peter Layton is a visiting fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute and the author of Grand Strategy.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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An avenue for ‘recoupling’ US and China

The establishment of the US-China economic and financial working groups in September 2023 marked a noteworthy pivot in the often volatile relations between Washington and Beijing. 

Amid the escalating tensions of what is widely recognized as “great power rivalry,” these working groups have the potential to foster greater stability between the world’s two largest economic superpowers.

In recent years, “decoupling” has become a buzzword that symbolizes the United States and China’s intent to disentangle their economies. The establishment of the working groups challenges this notion to an extent. 

While certain dynamics of the ongoing trade war and the pandemic may have hinted at a move towards reduced interdependence, complete economic decoupling is likely to harm both the United States and China. 

Astute policymakers on both sides are wary of the risks associated with decoupling. The reality remains that bilateral economic ties are characterized by intrinsic interdependence.

Trade between the United States and China has remained substantial. As of August 2023, the total value of the US trade in goods with China exceeded US$369 billion. China has also been one of the largest foreign creditors to the US government, holding $821 billion worth of US Treasury bonds in July 2023.

The working groups will serve as a forum for bilateral policy exchange. Under the guidance of high-ranking officials from both countries, they offer a structured channel for sustained dialogue, promising several benefits.

Supported by US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and China’s Vice Premier He Lifeng, along with regular meetings at the vice-ministerial level, these working groups are well-prepared for consistent and high-level interactions. Such continuity ensures that discussions can move beyond superficial exchanges and delve into more substantive policy matters.

In the intricate realm of international relations, transparency – or a lack thereof – can be a significant destabilizing factor. The US-China working groups, by promoting frank dialogue on macroeconomic and fiscal trajectories, can mitigate uncertainties that might otherwise inflame tensions.

Direct communication is one of the most effective tools in preventing misunderstandings. These working groups offer an opportunity for both nations to clarify their positions, objectives and concerns directly without the distortion of third-party interpretations.

The US-China working groups have the potential to act as a fulcrum for stabilizing economic ties. Regular interactions at the bureaucratic level can build a foundation of trust, which is often missing in high-stakes diplomatic negotiations.

Balancing optimism with realism is crucial. While the inception of the working groups is a laudable stride towards de-escalating tensions, it is not a silver bullet for all bilateral challenges.

During the initial meeting of the financial working group, differences emerged, notably in the discussion of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s quota-based lending resources. The United States advocated for an increase in IMF quota-based lending resources without changing its shareholding structure, while China showed reluctance to support this proposal without an increase in its IMF shares.

Secretary Yellen expressed optimism for an “equi-proportional” quota increase, where each member country’s contribution to an increase in quotas is proportional to their current IMF shareholdings. This divergence reflects broader disagreements between the United States and China on financial and economic ​cooperation.

The working groups may face challenges in addressing structural trade imbalances, as the capital account can drive the current account and low-cost Chinese goods continue to retain their global competitiveness. In the domain of high-tech competition, security imperatives will continue to drive intense rivalry. 

The US government may sustain pressure on the Chinese government, as indicated by Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo during her Beijing visit when she said the United States will not compromise or negotiate in matters of national security.

At the same time, Beijing’s increased industrial policies and domestic content requirements might impede US businesses from penetrating the Chinese market, potentially exacerbating technological contestations.

Given the overarching significance of the US-China relationship on the global stage, their choices can recalibrate global markets, influence worldwide innovation and redraw the geopolitical cartography for generations. 

As global stakeholders keenly monitor the evolving US-China interplay, the working groups, while not a panacea to address fundamental problems between these two great powers illuminate the potential for rivalry and collaboration to coexist. The working groups also demonstrate that astute diplomacy can foster mutual respect and understanding.

Such platforms for dialogue are not only beneficial but crucial for US-China relations, especially in the context of their great power rivalry.

Yuhan Zhang is a scholar based at UC Berkeley specializing in China’s political economy. He is also an adjunct assistant professor at the G20 Center of Beijing Foreign Studies University’s International Business School.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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