India attempts to revive its dwindling rubber industry

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Latex from rubber trees in a forest on December 15, 2021 in Goalpara, Assam, India.Getty Images
By Priti Gupta
Mumbai

For more than 30 years Babu Joseph has been tending rubber trees on his small farm in the southern Indian state of Kerala.

Kerala used to be home to thousands of producers like him, who made a living extracting latex from small plantations of rubber trees, but over the last decade those numbers have dwindled.

“Rubber was once the state’s prime cash crop but over the past decade, prices have plunged,” he explains.

Tapping rubber trees is a labour-intensive activity. In the evening or early morning workers slice through the bark with cuts deep enough to allow the latex to run out and be collected in buckets – a process that is repeated on each tree every few days.

It requires some skill to make the incisions to the correct depth without damaging the tree.

Paying workers to do that amid falling prices has made plantations an unattractive business.

“Poor returns and high labour costs have forced many of the growers like me to give up their rubber plantations,” says Mr Joseph.

Babu Joseph on his plantation

Babu Joseph

India’s rubber production peaked in 2013 at 913,700 tonnes, according to figures from the country’s Rubber Board.

Production then fell dramatically to 562,000 tonnes in 2016. Since then it has seen a modest recovery but remains well below the 2013 peak.

The boom years were fuelled by favourable weather and the rising price of natural rubber, which peaked on the international markets at 540 cents/kg in 2011.

But as Mr Joseph noted, prices have plunged – trading this year at 130 cents/kg.

While domestic production has stuttered, demand for natural rubber in India has soared. Around 70% of India’s natural rubber is consumed by the tyre industry, which has grown rapidly in recent years and is forecast to grow further.

“Consumption growth is expected to race ahead of production growth,” says Rajiv Budhraja, director general of the Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Association (ATMA).

“The wide gap between natural rubber production and consumption… is a major concern for the Indian rubber goods sector,” he adds.

He says tyre manufacturers are not happy to rely on imports for such a crucial material and also want to support the government’s Make In India initiative.

An Indian employee walks past tyres at the JK Tyre and Industries

Getty Images

Importing rubber has hurt Indian producers, says Prasad Purushothama from the Rubber Board.

Usually, he says, international rubber prices are lower than those in the domestic market. So imports tend to drive down prices, further discouraging domestic producers.

The industry is trying to revive domestic production. Four members of the ATMA in partnership with the Rubber Board have a plan to create 200,000 hectares of new rubber plantations in Northeast India and West Bengal.

“The project is progressing as planned,” says Mr Budhraja. “In about four to five years from now, the Northeast will emerge as a large natural rubber production base in India.”

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There’s also hope that India’s rubber growers can become competitive again with the help of technology.

On the outskirts of Guwahati in the state of Assam, a Rubber Board research farm is growing the world’s first genetically modified (GM) rubber plants, tailored for the climatic conditions of Northeast India.

Rubber plants originate from the Amazon, so favour warm, humid climates.

But the genes of the experimental plants have been tweaked so that they can survive in hotter, colder or drier conditions.

“GM technology is the future of rubber plantations,” says Jessy MD, deputy director at the Rubber Research Institute of India.

“It will add on qualities to the existing cultivated clones, which is not possible through conventional methods,” he says.

That’s going to be particularly important as weather conditions in Kerala, the traditional area of rubber cultivation, are changing.

“Climate change is one of the major challenges that will affect rubber farming in the coming years,” says Mr Purushothama.

The hope is that the new trees will mean rubber production can expand to new areas.

The rubber trees of Assam are under evaluation and it will be some years before they make much of an impact on India’s domestic production.

In the meantime some rubber producers are turning to other technology.

Chinmayan MK uses tapping machine

Chinmayan MK

Chinmayan MK has an 18-acre rubber plantation in Kerala, where he uses machines to tap the rubber.

“The machines are costly but once used it’s much better than traditional techniques,” he says.

With the machine, workers with no experience can start tapping rubber. With a little practise they can tap as fast, or faster, than workers using knives.

The motorised tapping machine is the solution to the lack of tapping workers, says Mr MK.

According to him, the machines have resulted in a 60% rise in output on his plantation, while costs have fallen by 40%.

“In the beginning I was reluctant, but today my entire plantation works on machines,” he says, adding that innovation is needed to reverse the decline of Kerala’s rubber plantations.

“Many of the plantations have become old and need to be revived. But most of them are selling their land instead of finding a way to increase the production.”

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HK dollar de-peg argument gains new currency

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As China angles to increase the yuan’s role in trade and finance, economists are wondering what it means for Hong Kong’s long-time peg to the US dollar.

The will-the-peg-survive question has popped with regular popularity since the late 1990s amidst the Asian financial crisis. One such episode was in November last year when New York hedge fund manager Bill Ackman announced he was betting against the peg.

At the time, Ackman’s Pershing Square Capital Management cited Sino-US decoupling tensions as a rationale. That, he seemed to believe, raised the odds Hong Kong might be forced to end the peg.

And that the turmoil would make the trade profitable, unlike previous attempts by Hayman Capital’s Kyle Bass and George Soros decades before that.

Enter economist Andy Xie, who last week argued it’s time to ditch the US peg and link the Hong Kong dollar to the yuan. It’s hardly a new idea, but one Xie, a former top Morgan Stanley economist, argues has come of age in a recent South China Morning Post op-ed.

The gist of his argument is that “Hong Kong’s currency peg to the dollar is not sustainable. The city risks being increasingly led by US monetary policy as the utility of the fully convertible Hong Kong currency in meeting China’s demand for US dollars is fading. As global yuan demand grows, switching to that currency would boost Hong Kong’s financial fortunes.”

How likely is this? Not very, at least for the foreseeable future. Neither Chinese President Xi Jinping nor new Premier Li Qiang appears ready to make such a momentous change to a 40-year policy that’s served the greater China region quite well.

To be sure, the peg is now generating serious economic headwinds, warranting brainstorming in Beijing. US inflation at near 40-year highs and aggressive Federal Reserve tightening are forcing Hong Kong to tweak monetary policies in kind, undermining the business hub’s growth potential.

As Xie puts it: “With China’s interest rates expected to stay lower than US rates, due to lower Chinese inflation, embracing the yuan would stabilize Hong Kong’s asset markets. Sticking with a US-pegged currency, however, means exposure to volatility.”

Xie adds that “entrenched US inflation threatens to bring back dollar swings like in the 1970s and/or US interest rate surges like in the 1980s — the effect on Hong Kong could devastate its property market.”

Again, President Xi’s financial team hasn’t displayed much tolerance for risky policy shifts. But to economist Raymond Yeung at ANZ Bank, Xi’s ambitions for the yuan — including putting it at the center of oil purchases — are forcing the Hong Kong dollar’s peg back into the global spotlight.

“As geopolitics and economies change, so do pressures on the HK dollar peg,” Yeung says. “In recent months, more countries have expressed interest in using the yuan for transactions with China.”

What’s more, he notes, “the potential emergence of a ‘petro-yuan’ regime may seem to promote the reserve currency status of the Chinese yuan. Speculation about pegging HK dollars with the renminbi and ending the US dollar’s hegemony is also intensifying.”

China’s yuan is gaining ground as a currency of trade. Image: Twitter

That intensity can be found in surging interbank rates in Hong Kong. It reflects a drop in banking system cash amid speculation of tighter monetary conditions to come. In mid-May, the Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate rose to its highest level since December 2019.

The need for the Hong Kong Monetary Authority to keep the city’s currency in a tight range of 7.75 to 7.85 to the US dollar is complicating financial management. Over the last month, the HKMA’s aggregate balance – a key barometer of the amount of cash in the system – hit HK$44.5 billion (US$5.7 billion).

That’s the lowest since the 2008 global financial crisis. More recently, on May 30, Hong Kong’s de facto central bank loaned nearly US$500 million through its discount window.

The main cause for such liquidity squeezes is that “the Fed’s rate hike in June is on the table,” notes strategist Ken Cheung at Mizuho Bank.

Strategist Cheung Chun Him at Bank of America notes that HKMA might have to serve more and more as “lender-of-last resort” as the “scramble for funding will be particularly acute” through the end of the current quarter.

That’s becoming harder, though, as US Federal Reserve rates and those being set by the People’s Bank of China diverge.

Many economists make the argument that in order for the yuan to become a reserve currency rival to the US dollar, China’s financial system would benefit from more explicit ties to Hong Kong’s. This dynamic, though, works both ways.

“Since the city is highly integrated with China’s economy, the currency should be compatible with China’s business cycle instead of that of the US,” says ANZ Bank’s Yeung.

As peg speculation rises, Yeung thinks it’s useful to view things through the lens of Nobel laureate Robert Mundell’s 1960s theory of the “optimal currency area.” Mundell’s framework, Yeung notes, “seems to lend support because using the same currency for economies in a single market should promote economic efficiency.”

To be sure, Yeung hedges, “it’s not totally applicable to Hong Kong because the renminbi market has been extended to it. Trade, investments and financial flows can already be transacted in Chinese yuan.”

But “in our view, the yuan could eventually be a functioning currency in the stock market for transactions, including dividend payments, amid increased acceptance by global investors. Therefore, there is no need to impose unnecessary changes on the existing peg.”

Yeung speaks for many when he argues that “unnecessary change may do more harm than good.” He adds that “in short, stability is key. Although there have been rising concerns about the long-term outlook of the US dollar after the recent banking crisis, it remains a global standard.”

Looking forward, Yeung notes, China’s Belt and Road Initiative “may also attract new segments of investor interest. Countries worried about ‘weaponization’ of the US dollar could also see an alternative in the HK dollar as Hong Kong maintains free capital flows and its legal system is based on the common law.”

Still, speculators like Ackman think the Hong Kong peg’s days are numbered. The city’s precarious place is between a US that’s ratcheting rates higher and a China moving in the opposite direction. Some economists worry China is hurtling toward deflation, exacerbating Hong Kong’s troubles.

As Hong Kong struggles to straddle these two giants, it’s shackled with exactly the wrong monetary policy at a challenging moment. The straight jacket Hong Kong is forced to impose on itself could exacerbate the economic strains already damaging the government’s legitimacy, not least due to some of the worst income inequality in the developed world.

The tensions emanating from the currency peg have only grown over the last five years, in part because of Chinese money bidding up already elevated property prices. As economist Vincent Tsui at Gavekal Research points out, home prices have increased by double digits year after year.

“But if we look at the household income growth,” Tsui notes, “that has been stalled since 2018, before the social unrest, before the pandemic.”

“So basically, this dividend from the economic integration with China has been exhausted. Second, it’s the debt servicing costs, right. So there has been a period of extra low interest rate for a decade. And now actually the interbank rates are triple the level we have seen over the past decade,” says Tsui.

“So, two factors combined together on the demand side, have pretty much weakened as well. The whole supply-demand dynamic is switching in the Hong Kong housing market, making it a much shakier ground as we have seen before,” he adds.

Such risks might reduce the tolerance for fundamental changes to the mechanics of Hong Kong’s financial system. No piece is more central than the US dollar peg ­– or more destabilizing if a change were announced.

Ackman’s case against the Hong Kong peg has its merits, just as Bass’s did before Hayman Capital closed out its short position in 2021. This goes, too, for Soros in the late 1990s. And Xie’s take also makes some great new points.

Economist Andy Xie has raised fresh doubts about the Hong Kong dollar’s peg. Photo: Screengrab / BBC

“Riding on the yuan’s rise would be a big plus for Hong Kong,” Xie explains. “The yuan accounts for just over 2% of the global payments system, and about the same in global forex reserves. China accounts for about 18% of the world economy and around 30% of global manufacturing output.

“The yuan’s share in global payments and currency reserves is bound to rise. Before it becomes fully convertible, Hong Kong has a unique opportunity to ride its rise and consolidate its status as a global financial center,” he says.

The first step, Xie adds, could be Hong Kong “starting the transition” by shifting the government payroll to yuan and collecting taxes in yuan. “As the stock market gradually makes the shift, along with asset markets and the real economy, bank deposits and credit would follow naturally,” Xie argues. “The Hong Kong dollar would fade away.”

Yet for any of this to happen, Xi’s government would have to display a level of audacity and risk tolerance it hasn’t over the last decade, economists say. That’s why the odds still favor Hong Kong’s peg to the US dollar remaining for the foreseeable future.

Follow William Pesek on Twitter at @WilliamPesek

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Russian war highlights significance of Middle Corridor

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After the Cold War ended, the South Caucasus, Caspian Sea basin, and Central Asia became areas of practical policy focus for Western geopolitical strategists, who recognized their importance for international affairs going beyond the region’s rich energy resources. However, a hiatus of this strategic engagement set in at the end of the first decade of the new century.

Now, a decade and a half later, interest from the US State Department and policymakers and advisers in Washington has been rekindled, accompanied by a new European outreach that has so far been moderate.

Against the backdrop of intensifying diplomatic and economic exchanges between China and the five Central Asian countries, as exemplified by the recent high-profile summit in Xian, the significance of the Middle Corridor stretching across the Caspian Sea has in recent years steadily grown.

Less noticed was the second EU–Central Asia Economic Forum, which was held in Almaty at the same time as the meeting in Xian. The European Union has thus signaled its recognition of the Middle Corridor as a possible counterbalance to reliance on Russian-dominated infrastructure.

The Almaty meeting is an indicator of the EU’s strategic policy direction, adopted by the Council of the European Union in June 2019, seeking to cultivate closer ties with Central Asian nations.

This strategic policy focuses on resilience, including border security and the environment; on prosperity, especially “sustainable connectivity”; and on the promotion of regional cooperation.

Role of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan

This emerging focus from the West intersects with the strategic vision advocated by two key nations, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. That is because these states, pivotal to the implementation of the Middle Corridor, have endeavored to foster the autonomous development of the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

Azerbaijan in particular has been instrumental, given its geographical nexus bridging Europe and Asia, and its status as a critical transport and logistical fulcrum within the Middle Corridor structure.

The principal catalyst for the operational launch of the Middle Corridor has been the two countries’ active bilateral cooperation since 2017. This bilateral cooperation has since been reframed into a plurilateral platform to foster regional development, contributing to the transformation of the geo-economic landscape. The Middle Corridor has evolved from a geo-economic blueprint to a politically significant transit route.

Transformations of international trade patterns following Russia’s re-invigoration of its war against Ukraine have underscored the importance of the Middle Corridor. Evidence of its rising significance is visible in quantitative terms, with freight volume along the Middle Corridor experiencing a twofold increase in the past year alone, even this remains relatively low in absolute terms.

China’s aspirations

The prevailing narrative that depicts the Middle Corridor as a component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative misconceives Beijing’s view and neglects its own distinct strategic dimension. In reality, China’s commitment to the Middle Corridor pales in comparison to the resources it has directed to other transit routes (the northern route through Russia and the southern maritime route) integral to the BRI.

The continued advancement of the Middle Corridor, despite obstacles, is actually emblematic of the broader South Caucasus–Central Asia region’s aspiration to political and economic autonomy.

Despite laudable strides in developing critical infrastructure, such as Azerbaijan’s creation of the modern multimodal Port of Alat, the Western powers’ recognition of this route’s strategic significance has not yet translated into proportionate support for its extension. For that, deeper strategic commitment by the Western powers would be required, accompanied by increased multilateral investment.

If the Middle Corridor is developed in good time, it will hold the potential to serve as a conduit for Central Asia’s emancipation from Russia’s influence, as this continues to decline in the wake of its war in Ukraine.

Russia’s historical propensity to exert pressure on Central Asian countries through military threats and its control over energy markets could explain China’s reticence over the Middle Corridor. At the Xian summit, for example, Beijing touted a long-planned route through Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan, whence theoretically onward through northern Iran and Turkey to Europe.

Even though the Trans-Caspian International Trade Route (TITR) – a broader-scope project of which the Middle Corridor is the most important segment – was initially considered as an alternative route for Chinese and potentially Southeast Asian goods to reach Europe, Beijing seems never really to have considered it as part of the BRI in practice.

In particular, Chinese investment in the TITR, and especially in the Middle Corridor, has lagged. That is because China envisages the Middle Corridor mainly as a conduit for expanding its own influence in Central Asia.

It hesitates to extend support that might lead to any challenge to its own standing in the geopolitical equilibrium. It seeks to tilt in the region in its own direction by other means.

Changed circumstances driving new possibilities now give the TITR and the Middle Corridor the real potential to drive autonomous economic development and integration in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. This would be particularly true for the South Caucasus, if Armenia seizes the current opportunity for a comprehensive peace treaty with Azerbaijan.

Western interests

Strategic steps by the West can enhance trade flows through the Middle Corridor. These increased flows could guarantee a reliable supply of essential raw materials to the EU, meanwhile encouraging regional economic development and integration.

The ultimate result would be to drive the reconfiguration of the region’s economic geography in advance of the oncoming breakup and collapse of the current international system, which is foreseeable in the early/mid-2040s.

In this longer-term perspective, the Middle Corridor – arguably the backbone of the TITR – has the potential to establish the broader region, from the South Caucasus through Central Asia, as a relatively autonomous actor in world politics, that is, one that is not just the object of great-power whims but which can create its own circumstances.

Not only would such a development catalyze the fuller geo-economic transformation of the broader region – South Caucasus, Caspian Sea region, and Central Asia – but also it would, ultimately, influence the reconfiguration of the global balance of power already under way.

That reconfiguration would diminish the encroaching hegemony of the New Triple Alliance of China, Iran and Russia. It would therefore be in the interest of Europe, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Indo-Pacific countries.

It follows that the Indo-Pacific nations should make greater efforts in support of the TITR and, in the first instance, of the Middle Corridor.

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Portuguese language increasingly popular in Macao as city sharpens bilingual edge

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Local consultancy firm Perfeicao, which helps Chinese and Portuguese firms break into new markets, said the number of deals have gone up three times since Macao reopened its borders at the beginning of this year.

“Right now, China exports a lot of services and new technologies,” said Mr João Li, director of the firm’s Portugal office.

“We received a delegation comprising the top 500 companies from Brazil. They were looking for internet and technology companies such as Jingdong, Baidu, and Tencent (to find out) how to create a shared economy.”

EXPANDING STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS

These exchanges are also part of a bigger political shift as China eyes strategic partnerships in the West and beyond, amid soaring tensions with the United States.

In April, China and Brazil pledged to work together in international finance and fair development.

That same month, Macao’s Chief Executive Ho Iat Seng met with Portugal’s leaders to discuss bilateral trade.

“China is one of the biggest countries in the world in terms of demography, and one tiny place in China that has Portuguese as an official language, it has to make a difference,” said Prof Veloso.

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Sir Ivan Menezes: Boss of Guinness maker Diageo dies at 63

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Diageo chief executive Ivan Menezes speaks at a summit in London in 2022.Reuters
By Annabelle Liang
Business reporter

Sir Ivan Menezes, chief executive of the world’s biggest spirits company Diageo, has died aged 63.

On Wednesday, the Guinness and Johnnie Walker maker said he “passed away following a brief illness, with his family at his side.”

The British-American national was born in the Indian city of Pune. He was set to retire at the end of the month.

Earlier this week, the firm said Menezes was in hospital for conditions including a stomach ulcer.

“This is an incredibly sad day. Ivan was undoubtedly one of the finest leaders of his generation,” Diageo chairman Javier Ferrán said.

“Ivan was there at the creation of Diageo and over 25 years, shaped Diageo to become one of the best performing, most trusted and respected consumer companies,” Mr Ferrán added.

Prior to Diageo, he held marketing and strategy positions at major companies including food and beverage giant Nestlé.

Menezes joined Diageo in 1997 when the firm was formed through the merger of brewery giant Guinness and London-based conglomerate Grand Metropolitan.

Over the course of his career, he held several senior roles at Diageo.

As the firm’s global marketing director, he was behind the iconic Johnnie Walker “Keep Walking” campaign, which was launched in 1999.

The Scotch whisky brand has continued to run the campaign saying it “embodies our desire for progress, the fuel to tackle adversity, and the joy of unfiltered optimism.”

In 2012, Menezes was named as an executive director of Diageo and appointed to the company’s board. He was promoted to chief executive a year later.

Under his leadership, the company’s sales grew as it bought several brands, including Philippine rum brand Don Papa.

Diageo currently has more than 200 brands, which it markets in over 180 countries.

The firm’s latest annual earnings showed a jump in sales as more people made cocktails at home during the pandemic.

Earlier this year, the company announced that Menezes planned to retire on 30 June, after a decade as its chief executive.

He was set to be succeeded by chief operating officer Debra Crew.

On Monday, Ms Crew was appointed as Diageo’s interim chief executive as Menezes was undergoing medical treatment.

He was awarded a knighthood in King Charles’ first New Year Honours for services to business and equality.

Menezes is survived by his wife, Shibani and their two children, Nikhil and Rohini.

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The Positive Impact of Fintech in Serving the Underserved Community

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Ideal solutions that are more accessible, affordable, convenient
Boost’s cross-border payment ecosystem brings together the underserved

Access to financial services is a fundamental component of economic growth and social development. Unfortunately, a significant portion of the global population, particularly in emerging markets, remain underserved or excluded from formal financial services. This could…Continue Reading

Why Japanese equities are attracting foreign investors

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International investors are likely to increase their exposure to Japanese equities or, indeed, consider including them in their portfolios for the first time this year and beyond.

The reason is that the world’s third-largest economy is experiencing inflation that reached a four-decade high in February and continues to run hot.

Sharp price gains are rarely desirable, but Japan is an exception after bouts of deflation since the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Japan has been grappling with a persistent problem of low inflation and deflation for several decades for four main reasons. 

First, it has an aging population and a declining birth rate, which has led to a shrinking workforce and reduced consumer spending. With fewer people entering the workforce and spending less, there is lower demand for goods and services, resulting in stagnant prices.

Second, Japan has experienced prolonged periods of economic stagnation, characterized by sluggish growth and weak consumer and business spending. This has limited the potential for inflationary pressures to build up.

Third, the country has one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratios among developed countries. To manage this debt burden, the government has implemented accommodative monetary policies, including low interest rates and quantitative easing. While these policies aimed to stimulate economic growth, they have not translated into significant inflationary pressures.

And fourth, Japan has faced structural challenges in its economy, such as excess capacity in certain industries, weak productivity growth, and limited wage increases. These factors have contributed to a lack of upward pressure on prices.

Economic recovery

However, in more recent times, as the economic recovery continued amid supportive monetary and fiscal policies and a surge in tourism, inflation has surged.

For this reason, cash is no longer king as the rising prices are eroding Japanese investors’ purchasing power.  

As such, they’re increasingly looking for alternatives, and we expect Japanese equities are going to be the go-to as a way to preserve or even increase the real value of their investments.

Equities are often seen as a potential hedge against inflation. When prices rise, the value of a company’s revenue and earnings may increase, leading to higher stock prices. 

Should Japanese investors pile into the Tokyo and Osaka exchanges, equity values will naturally increase, and this will pique the interest of international investors looking to further diversify their portfolios to seize opportunities and mitigate risk.

Japan experienced a prolonged period of economic stagnation in the 1990s and 2000s, often referred to as the Lost Decades. This era was characterized by low economic growth, deflation, and a weak stock market. The negative perception of Japan’s economy during this time seriously deterred international investors from considering Japanese equities.

In addition, historically, Japan’s corporate governance practices and transparency standards were considered relatively weak compared with other developed economies. This lack of transparency and shareholder-friendly practices made some would-be overseas investors cautious about investing in Japanese companies.

Plus, of course, equities in Japan have not consistently outperformed other global equity markets in recent years.

But as values are likely to rise as investors shed cash and fixed-income investments because of rising inflation, this trend for overlooking Japanese stocks will be reversed.

Nigel Green is founder and CEO of deVere Group. Follow him on Twitter @nigeljgreen.

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Singapore committed to decarbonisation goals while uplifting workers in the transformation: Grace Fu

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During her keynote address, Ms Fu said that Singapore is committed to meeting its national climate target to achieve net zero emissions by 2050. 

Citing a report that mentioned finance, technology and international cooperation as three critical enablers for accelerated climate action, Ms Fu elaborated on how Singapore could contribute in these aspects. 

Singapore must accelerate the development of decarbonisation technologies to make them commercially viable in order to harness their potential for decarbonisation at scale, Ms Fu said. 

She raised the example of low-carbon hydrogen as a potential alternative to fossil fuels in the maritime and aviation sectors. Hydrogen can potentially supply up to half of Singapore’s power needs by 2050, she said. 

“More importantly, it has the potential to unlock global energy trade, through its carrier forms that can be stored and transported over long distances. This will connect regions with abundant low-cost renewable energy with those that have limited renewable energy potential. 

“However, the technology and supply chains are still nascent, and large-scale deployment has not yet been demonstrated.”

Another problem was the shortfall in funds to finance net zero goals. The solution to address this, Ms Fu said, is the scaling of blended finance, which is public, multilateral, or philanthropic funding “coming in as catalytic capital, to improve the bankability of green projects and encourage private investments”. 

The development of credible carbon markets is another breakthrough in finance, as carbon credits are key instruments that “channel financing to mitigation projects which would otherwise not be bankable nor implementable”, said Ms Fu. 

“(Singapore) will allow companies to use high-quality international carbon credits to offset up to five per cent of their taxable emissions from next year onwards. This could spur local demand in carbon markets, hence supporting the growth of a vibrant international carbon market and channel financing to mitigation projects internationally,” she added. 

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Thai stock exchange completes infrastructure upgrade | stock exchange of thailand, set, nasdaq, technology, upgrade, infrastructure | FinanceAsia

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On Wednesday (May 31) Nasdaq and the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) announced the launch of a new trading system that is set to provide improved function and efficiency across capital market dealflow and execution.

The upgraded infrastructure is built on Nasdaq-conceived technology that draws on state-of-the-art, in-built market data distribution and surveillance systems which support increasing transaction volumes and product varieties.

“Nasdaq has had a longstanding partnership with SET, having provided technology solutions to the exchange for over a decade. This announcement marks the successful completion of a technology upgrade programme that began in 2019,” Roland Chia, executive vice president and head of Marketplace Technology at Nasdaq, told FinanceAsia.

“It facilitates efficient system integration with widely adopted interfaces based on global standards for order entry and market data, including ITCH and OUCH.”

He shared that following the recent successful launch, SET has plans to integrate additional capabilities into its workflow, including Nasdaq’s Pre-Trade Risk Management, Index calculator, Data platform and other Market Surveillance solutions.

In the announcement, SET president Pakorn Peetathawatchai explained that the new system was inaugurated by the Thailand Futures Exchange last month and achieved a “smooth transition”. He reported particular success in terms of improved efficiency and faster order management. 

In a video discussing the infrastructure upgrade, Thirapun Sanpakit, head of SET’s Information Technology division, highlighted the development’s capacity to “boost the competitiveness of the Thai capital market.”

“We believe the solution will enable our customers to achieve the fastest time to market. While also minimising total cost of ownership,” he said.

Sanpakit explained that the upgrade reduces roundtrip order latency to under 40 microseconds and said that it would support the bourse’s pursuit of new product launches. He detailed callable bull-bear contracts (CBBC) in the equity market, and single stock options in the Thailand Future Exchange (TFEX) derivatives market, as likely to go live in the near future.

The Thai bourse boasts the highest liquidity among Asean-based exchanges – a position it has maintained for over a decade. In 2022, capital raised through IPO totalled $3.46 billion, the highest volume among Asean exchanges and fourth largest in Asia after China, South Korea and India. According to Sanpakit, the exchange handles a daily trading volume of $2.5 billion. 

SET was not able to comment beyond the press release prior to publication.

 

¬ Haymarket Media Limited. All rights reserved.

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SE Asia’s economies in a perilous US-China middle

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Assessments of Southeast Asia’s economic outlook published by the Asian Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund in 2023 find reasons for optimism. “Developing” Asia, they conclude, will lead the world in economic growth over the next two years.

Southeast Asian economies weathered the pandemic relatively well, notwithstanding hardship due to lockdowns. The geopolitical challenges brought by increasingly antagonistic competition between the United States and China are a looming threat to the region’s prosperity, but so too are the perverse growth effects of protectionist policies.

Southeast Asia has benefited from limited decoupling between the Chinese and US economies, as manufacturers move some production processes out of China to avoid tariffs and blacklists. Although some relocations have taken the form of “re-shoring”, more investment has moved to other Southeast Asian countries. 

Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia registered relatively strong inflows of FDI in the last two years. Competition among external powers has also provided Southeast Asian elites with bargaining leverage in infrastructure projects and access to finance.

But beneath these recent developments, there is a deeper structure that will shape the Southeast Asian experience of increased geopolitical tension.

First, there is the basic openness of economic development in Southeast Asia. The region’s growth and industrialization depends on external markets and foreign investment. High growth has mostly occurred when “internationalist” coalitions advanced their core interests and create access to international markets and investment.

Southeast Asian countries also showcase a tremendous variety of domestic institutions — the structures and embedded rules that guide action and make it more or less possible to carry out different development tasks. 

Specifically, state and private sector institutions shape the ability of individuals and companies to overcome problems of coordination, commitment and collective action. Countries that fail to overcome such problems typically fail to provide sustainable economic development.

People move past a clothing boutique selling locally made products in downtown Hanoi on October 29, 2014. A EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement promises to boost Vietnamese exports and growth. AFP / Hoang Dinh Nam
A clothing boutique selling locally made products in downtown Hanoi. Photo: AFP / Hoang Dinh Nam

Given Southeast Asia’s institutional variety, we can expect continued unevenness in how countries in the region will respond to current geopolitical challenges and opportunities.

Some are better equipped than others to benefit from supply chain restructuring and investment shifts motivated by the desire to secure supplies or protect against geopolitical risk. 

Mineral endowments coupled with nationalist policies have motivated recent investments in Indonesia, while Thailand’s established capabilities in the automotive sector make it an appealing investment site for Chinese and other investors seeking to diversify.

Southeast Asian responses to geopolitical change will also be mediated by political pressures within each country. In addition to the persistent risk of institutional corrosion due to rent-seeking elites, governments face the challenge of integrating broader political movements. 

Challenges “from below” include calls for greater redistribution of wealth, for the abandonment of export-driven political economies in favor of greater domestic consumption and for more attention to poverty alleviation. The environmental limits to extractive growth strategies — along with the effects of climate change — also create challenges.

Elite responses to these challenges vary enormously, from attempts at greater inclusivity to the mobilization of vertical allegiances that seek to displace material grievances through the politicization of race, religion or royalty.

Finally, it matters that the region is grappling with more than a transitory escalation in competition between great powers. Southeast Asia faces the challenge of weathering the power transition in East Asia. 

For the past 30 years, the region has prospered through increased integration into a Chinese-centric regional economy, while the United States’ security role limited concerns over asymmetric interdependence. 

But this strategy is not sustainable. The gravitational force of the Chinese economy – along with the political appeal of the Chinese development model – remains significant.

In contrast, the US security role is under pressure. Even prior to the rise in US-China tension from 2017, domestic political and economic constraints within the United States have made it less willing and able to prolong the status quo. Increases in Chinese military and technological capacity add to this structural shift.

A general conclusion is that the region’s development strategies and growth trajectories are subject to both internal and external pressures.

Currently, a degree of “friend-shoring” in supply chains and increased US-China competition have benefited some parts of Southeast Asia. But the positive spillovers stemming from geopolitical tension create increased points of potential entanglement and vulnerability.

In this file photo taken on August 26, 2020, a worker inspects disposable gloves at the Top Glove factory in Shah Alam on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur. Photo: AFP / Mohd Rasfan

While some firms may be forced to choose which side of any “economic iron curtain” they will stand on, others have invested in dual supply chains to serve decoupled technology spheres. In doing so, they take a bet on the continued willingness of both the United States and China to tolerate this duality.

Southeast Asian countries – enmeshed in cross-border investment and trade relationships that cut across geopolitical rifts – have effectively made the same bet. 

Samsung’s extensive investments in Vietnam, for example, are reinforced by a coalition of supporting interests that depend on Samsung’s status within the United States’ sphere of non-suspect entities. At the same time, the Vietnamese economy relies substantially on supply chain linkages to China.

This structure of connection will expose countries in the region if the security concerns of external powers escalate further. Beyond strictly business ties, potential reprisals, blacklists and sanctions could also threaten cross-border collaborations involving firms, research institutes, universities and government agencies. 

These connections mean that there is ample and increasing scope for US-China conflict to play out in Southeast Asian local economies.

Natasha Hamilton-Hart is Professor in the Department of Management and International Business at the University of Auckland and Director of the New Zealand Asia Institute.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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