Smart money’s looking beyond China stimulus debate – Asia Times

Businesses are resonating as a result of tension between President Xi Jinping’s long-term policy objectives and investor demand for short-term signal as Chinese securities recover.

The fight between the long and short viewpoints is not novel. For years, the” Washington Consensus” group has advised Beijing to adjust its unstable economy, which free market activists see as very reliant on giant, opaque state-owned companies and the vast incentives that sustain them.

However, restless investors who appear increasingly unwilling to give Beijing the room it needs to re-enter and overhaul its US$ 17 trillion market have frequently clashed with Xi’s work to do just that.

Until then, apparently. The conflict between Team Xi and anxious industry was clearly visible over the weekend.

Unplanned press conference by Xi’s Ministry of Finance ( MOF ) on Saturday ( 12 October ) sparked a frenzy with markets anticipating a potential significant new stimulus boost to help China reach its 20 % economic growth target for 2024 and new measures to combat the country’s increasingly ingrained deflation.

Futures markets sagged when MOF focused on larger transformation designs and declined to provide a certain amount label on the hung signal. But by Monday, companies rose.

Investors came to the conclusion that the MOF’s most recent statements reflect the pragmatism markets have long-craved from Xi’s inner circle, even if Beijing is n’t using its massive stimulus “bazooka.”

The trip news, according to economist Harry Murphy Cruise at Moody’s Analytics, “tied most of the appropriate boxes, but it lacked information on the size and range of new spending,” noting that” we anticipate more supports to be announced through the remainder of the year.”

Economist Zhiwei Zhang, president and chief economist at Pinpoint Asset Management, says,” these policies are in the right direction”.

There is still a strong argument that Chinese stock valuations are now fairly valued despite the recent rally, which was buoyant from the US$ 6.5 trillion rout dating back to 2021. In addition, Chinese shares are currently trading at significantly lower multiples than those in the US, where new market highs are being made daily.

The MOF press conference was still a surprise to us, according to economist Jing Liu from HSBC Holdings, despite the lack of significant fiscal stimulus. ” The policy pivot looks very much here to stay, with the rising risk appetite having a significant impact on both the stock and property markets.”

Odds are, though, that this is a trust-but-verify moment for markets. Bullish investors are partially reacting to Beijing’s hints of further support for the troubled housing market and highly indebted local governments with new, targeted fiscal-spending jolts.

More and more stimulus is becoming more popular. In September, Chinese exports and imports came in weaker than expected, raising new doubts about the economy’s main bright spot. Overseas shipments, for example, rose just 2.4 % year on year, a sharp fall from August’s 8.7 % increase.

According to Capital Economics ‘ economist Zichun Huang, “further ahead… growing trade barriers are likely to become an increasing constraint” on export and economic growth.

Although the move from Washington to Seoul may cause more demand to be made in some of China’s key trading partners, according to economists, political restrictions on products like electric cars and other green technologies are causing new headwinds.

However, punters are beginning to realize that Xi’s inner circle is almost blatantly focused on bringing China into the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution by accelerating the transition from the high-end to highly-value technology-driven industries.

Team Xi is more interested in the long-term benefits of tech-driven economic reinvention and future dominance of the industries. Although annual growth targets matter in the short run.

Investors are digging deeper into Chinese stock valuations in comparison to other top global markets and recognizing new value as a result of these caveats.

In the most recent Global Risk-Reward Monitor newsletter, Asia Times business editor David Goldman argues that with a price-earnings ( P/E ) ratio of 11, China’s stock market “is a bit too low”.

But at the same time, he notes,” there is no reason to expect Chinese valuations to approach the S&amp, P ( 500’s ) valuation of 22 times ( forward ) earnings”.

One reason, he argues, is that China’s government has gone out of its way to prevent and reverse the formation of market-skewing tech monopolies like Google, Microsoft or Amazon.

” No surprise, then, that Alibaba trades at a P/E of 27 after the run-up of the past month, versus Amazon’s 43″, Goldman writes. We have long argued that given subdued but consistent economic growth, China’s equity market valuation was too low. The Chinese market’s valuation seems more reasonable than that of the United States after the rally last month.

That’s not to say Beijing is n’t cognizant of the moment’s sensitivity. In a note to clients, economists at Morgan Stanley say this moment represents” Beijing’s second chance to convince the market” after a rough several days.

However, Xi may have found the balance between acting as a facilitator and a facilitator while also showing restraint.

According to Hui Shan, an economist at Goldman Sachs,” the most recent round of China stimulus clearly indicates that policymakers have turned to cyclical policy management and increased their focus on the economy.”

China will increase by 4.9 % this year, according to the US investment bank, up from an earlier forecast of 4.7 %. For 2025, Goldman Sachs sees growth of 4.7 %, up from an earlier 4.3 % forecast.

One source of Goldman Sachs ‘ optimism: MOF officials plan to deploy 2.3 trillion yuan ($ 325 billion ) of special local government bond funds in the fourth quarter of this year.

This, Hui says, suggests a more “back-loaded” public spending plan, paving the way for a bigger rebound than his bank had previously expected.

Last week, China ‘s&nbsp, National Development and Reform Commission announced pre-approval of&nbsp, 200 billion yuan&nbsp, ($ 28.2 billion ) worth of 2025 investment projects. It is seen by Huawei’s team as a clear government effort to help China meet its 5 % GDP goal this year.

Carlos&nbsp, Casanova, economist at Union Bancaire Privée, notes that investors are taking solace in Finance Minister Lan Fo’an highlighting that officials have a “fairly large” capacity to increase spending if needed.

That includes “implementing some of the most ambitious measures in years aimed at revitalizing the struggling property market, recapitalizing large banks,” according to Casanova, “everyone of which is crucial for addressing China’s ongoing structural challenges.”

However, Casanova adds,” the timeline for fiscal measures remains uncertain. The upcoming National People’s Congress Standing Committee meeting, scheduled for late October or early November, may require significant announcements to wait until.

The MOF “has given as strong a signal as possible while waiting for the NPC approval,” according to economist Shirley Ze Yu of the London School of Economics.

Larry Hu, Macquarie Capital’s chief China economist, doubts that Xi’s policymakers will be too specific about dollar amounts.

” First, they do n’t need to come up with such a number for the NPC to approve”, Hu says. ” Second, it’s hard to come up with such a number, as the line between fiscal, monetary and industrial policies is often blurred in China”.

Hu adds that, given the global financial crisis, it would go against Xi’s deleveraging goals of supplying the economy with stimulus the way Beijing did in 2008 and 2009.

Investors will be keenly focused on Beijing’s implementation of structural reforms, according to Hui of Goldman Sachs. &nbsp,

” The’ 3D ‘ challenges – deteriorating demographics, a multi-year debt deleveraging trend and the global supply chain de-risking push — are unlikely to be reversed by the latest round of policy easing”, Hui argues.

However, Oxford University’s China Center economist George Magnus is concerned that Beijing may continue to implement outdated policies.

” A solution would involve the sustainable expansion of the income and consumer demand shares of the economy, an end to deflation risk, more income redistribution, the promotion of private enterprise, and extensive tax and local government reforms”, Magnus writes in an op-ed for The Guardian.

Magnus adds that” Xi’s more Leninist agenda emphasizes supply and production, and what he calls’ high-quality development,’ which is essentially about state- and party-led industrial policies to allocate capital to lead and dominate modern science, technology and innovation in the global system”.

” China already has and wants to expand advanced industrial expertise and leadership in some key firms and sectors,” according to Magnus. These technologically dominant islands are found in a sea of macroeconomic imbalances and issues that can only be actually addressed by more liberal and open economic reforms.

Bottom line: According to Magnus,” the current focus on economic policy is important not for some decimal points on GDP but as a signal whether the government can, or wants to grasp the nettle.”

Magnus is not the only one who is concerned that policy tinkering wo n’t be sufficient. China will become a more dynamic and competitive economy over the long term if only the government sector is reforming, the capital markets are deepened, and households are encouraged to save less and spend more.

On the other hand, half measures will likely leave China vulnerable to boom/bust cycles brought on by the imbalanced allocation of resources, weak debt, and misalignments between household income and spending.

Investors will want to bereassured that big-picture reforms are on the horizon with the upcoming NPC. For now, though, an increasing number of investors are already getting the memo on China’s grand plan.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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Cyberview ignites creative innovation with CIRc8

  • evidence a letter of intent with TODAK Holdings and an MOU with Animonsta Studios &amp.
  • Aims to foster&nbsp, stronger engagement to benefit the online innovative business

L-R: Ahmad Faizul Ramli, chief operating officer, Cyberview Sdn Bhd; Mohd Hisyamuddin Awang Abu Bakar, head of Special Investment, Real Estate & Services Section, Government Investment Companies Division (GIC), Ministry of Finance; Kamarul Ariffin Abdul Samad, CEO, Cyberview Sdn Bhd; Teo Nie Ching, deputy minister of Communication; Khairul Azlan Zainal Ariffin, CEO, TODAK Holdings Sdn Bhd; Anas Abdul Aziz, chief content officer, showrunner & audio director, Animonsta Studios Sdn Bhd; Dr. Tan Awang Besar, rector, Akademi Seni Budaya Dan Warisan Kebangsaan

The Cyberjaya Digital Creative Circuit ( CIRc8 ) 2024, a synthesis of digital creativity and technological innovation, has been announced by Cyberview Sdn Bhd. More than just an occasion, CIRc8 serves as a platform where suggestions meet imagination, all within the fluid ecosystem of Cyberjaya.

As the technology hub designer, Cyberview emphasises that it is in a special place, very unlike other designers. A key goal of the business is to create a tech ecosystem that benefits all-size technology firms, enabling the Cyberjaya group to prosper as a whole.

Cyberjaya has recently seen an influx of data center investments, which has helped and established the very core of the modern business in the metropolis. As the desired technology investment location for Malaysia, Cyberjaya has seen an influx of data center investments. As the industry expands and makes use of cutting-edge technologies like conceptual AI, Cyberjaya’s online creative players gain advantage.

Kamarul Ariffin Abdul Samad, CEO of Cyberview, said,” Although we welcome high-value technology Investment, we are cognisant of the important role local technology firms play in building Malaysia’s modern economy in the long run. We are particularly pleased of our local software companies, particularly those in the creative market”.

He added,” We see the demand for digital innovative products and services is on the increase, both locally and internationally, therefore opening access to new markets and new parts for products and services”. Kamarul also emphasized that Cyberview’s assistance for this business is a long-term commitment, as demonstrated by the establishment of the modern innovative tech cluster within the Cyberjaya masterplan, which was launched in 2019.

Cyberjaya is home to some of Malaysia’s popular online artistic talents, with video studios like Monsta Studios, WAU Animation, and Durioo gaining international reputation. I’m convinced that there will soon be a domestic fairy called Cyberjaya. Therefore, he emphasized that Cyberview is doing everything we can to help businesses through numerous business help programs like the one we introduced today.

CIRc8 2024 was launched by Teo Nie Ching, assistant secretary of Communications, who likewise witnessed two report markets. The first was a Memorandum of Understanding between TODAK Holdings Sdn Bhd and Cyberview Sdn Bhd, and the next was a Letter of Intent between the two.

Both exchanges demonstrate the strengthening of the relationship between the parties involved, aiming to foster a more effective and important collaboration for the online creative sector.

With an estimated crowd of more than 1, 500 people, consisting of key players from the animation and e-sports industry, talent, and the community, visitors were entertained for two days with a mini game arcade, an immersive virtual art exhibition by Akademi Seni Budaya dan Warisan Kebangsaan ( ASWARA ), and meet-the-fans sessions with popular local animation characters.

Other hobbies included industry changes and a panel discussion titled” The Future of Digital Creativity – Navigating Innovation and Human Touch.” The board featured Shafinaz Salim, head of Technology Hub Development at Cyberview, Nicholas Sagau, chief operating officer of RevMedia Group and vice president of the Malaysia Digital Association, and Dr. Jazmi Jamal, chairman of Future Creative School at ASWARA.

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Growing talent should be Singapore’s top priority in building AI industry: Singtel

SINGAPORE: Singtel said a lack of talent trained in artificial intelligence ( AI ) could be one of Singapore’s most consequential bottlenecks in its digital journey.

This comes as the telco giant unveiled its new, end-to-end AI cloud venture RE: AI last Thursday ( October 10 ), which aims to make AI technologies and services more accessible and affordable for businesses.

According to the company, the service may be especially useful for local governments and sensitive industries like financial institutions that are looking to work with a local company to process data directly.

In collaboration with AI Singapore, the National University of Singapore ( NUS), and Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singtel is launching an AI Acceleration Academy ( AAA ) to expand the talent pool.

The telco hopes to impart knowledge about AI to its employees so they can become more adept at it, as well as create a curriculum that other businesses can use to improve adjust to an extremely AI-driven environment.

A number of significant corporations have even made announcements to start and expand operations in the country, away from Singtel. The most recent is ChatGPT’s family company OpenAI, which intends to open its Singapore company later this year as part of its international expansion plans.

Mr Bill Chang, CEO of Singtel’s Digital InfraCo system, said AI can be a great army multiple and efficiency driver, with opportunities ahead for some enterprises.

In a wide-ranging meeting, he told CNA how Singtel stands out against companies, why Singapore is an interesting place for AI owners, and how the country you sustain the momentum to keep ahead of the AI trend.

Q. Tell us about De: AI and how it stands out among the lengthy list of buyers in Singapore’s AI area. &nbsp,

Our Be: AI cloud service aims to address the data center stage level of complexity of the infrastructure. We make it a service … from integration of software … to delivery with various types of networks … ( including ) a quantum safe networking for highly sensitive data. By combining all these, making it open and flexible, making it successful and removing the difficulty, making it simpler to use for sectors and enterprises, is Be: AI’s goal.

We are a homegrown brand, offering sovereign GPUs ( graphics processing units ) from a homegrown operator. Some clients place value on that.

Q. What makes Singapore so interesting for AI purchase?

First, Singapore is a company hub. The global business community has a lot of great faith in us, and we have a strong communications system. We’ve got very good outreach ( in ) Southeast Asia … and an ability to export very quickly. Artificial inventors around the world are very interested in the successes we’ve achieved as a gateway and that we can replicate across our companions in the region.

Singapore has the potential to draw in many more ( investors ) by developing collaboration platforms and expanding upon our attractiveness as a hub. We’ve got a very progressive government that thinks about policies with private and public sector collaborations, ( including ) agencies in science and research.

Q. How significant are public-private alliances for firms considering establishing operations in a nation?

We need to make sure that these alliances between the public and private businesses have a clear goal-driven approach to achieving these goals. To address the needs of AI entrepreneurs who want to consider about Asia and Singapore beyond their home businesses, we ( must make sure that we are extremely targeted.

I think we’re at the start of this. We’ve had some rapid successes, which is really heartening to view. However, this is only the beginning of AI, with businesses expanding and establishing operations in this area. It’s essential to maintain that momentum and expand that achievement, so that we can produce a bigger ecosystem. The ability to produce these intersections and connections will add value as more players are present.

Q. What is Singapore do to increase its appeal to Artificial investors?

I would say: Build on the skills pool. AI companies are very strong in software, and as they expand, they will have top quality people in Artificial engineering, data scientists and people who are able to convert solutions.

Many businesses are trying to use artificial intelligence, but they are having a difficult time doing so.

( For Singtel ), we aim to train our over 10, 000 employees to be AI proficient, so that they are able to capture value in this AI revolution that is ahead of us.

( There is also ) the sustainability issue. With GPUs consuming so much energy and carbon footprint, how do we do it sustainably? We must have the infrastructure in place to enable the deployment of more GPUs to support the AI drive.

Q. How can data centres stay both high-performing and sustainable?

GPUs, the heart of processing for AI outcomes, consume a lot of energy and generate a lot of heat. We need specialised environments ( such as ) liquid-cooled designs to handle that. ( Singtel ) has been investing heavily in sustainable, AI-ready data centres.

Last June, there were only about 60 megawatts ( MW) operating in Singapore. More than 400MW of data centers are currently being built in four countries in Southeast Asia, and half of that capacity will be liquid cooling capabilities.

We are also looking into, for instance, using renewable energy to power our assets in our operations and working with our customers to address some of the renewable energy needs in the upcoming years.

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The Nippon Steel deal: taking another look – Asia Times

” States have no friends – only interests”, or so goes the copied version of Lord Palmerston’s speech. That was so cynical – so 19th Century British Empire. But 170 years later, try buying another nation ‘s&nbsp, steel&nbsp, company and you might think Lord Palmerston was right. &nbsp,

Japan’s largest steel company, &nbsp, Nippon Steel, wants to acquire&nbsp, US Steel. It was a veritable example of American industrial might and technological prowess many decades ago. Less so these days.

United States President&nbsp, Joe Biden&nbsp, pronounced himself opposed to the deal. That was only two months after his love-fest with Japanese Prime Minister&nbsp, Fumio Kishida touting the strength of the&nbsp, Japan-US alliance: rock solid and based on shared mutual values.

The decision to approve or reject the agreement has been postponed until after the November election.

Both Senator JD Vance, the Republicans ‘ vice presidential candidate, and former president Donald Trump are against the deal.

If foreigners obtain US Steel, one might get the impression that the end of the republic is near. &nbsp,

The main reason given is national security.

Is there a problem with national security?

It is prudent for a nation to closely monitor its main industries and the owners of them. But maybe the biggest issue with the&nbsp, US Steel&nbsp, deal is that it’s embarrassing. &nbsp,

For one thing, people are nothing if not tribal. And who does n’t want the home team to succeed, on its own? &nbsp,

This case serves as an embarrassing reminder that America’s business and political elites have abandoned the nation’s manufacturing dominance over the past five decades by moving much of it overseas.

However, a little embarrassment can sometimes be helpful if it helps you grow.

And this is a deal where it pays to swallow one’s pride.

Not unusual, to say the least.

For one thing, the Japanese are our friends. And Nippon Steel’s proposal is not unprecedented.

Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group&nbsp, ( MUFG ) wrote a$ 9 billion USD check to save&nbsp, Morgan Stanley, the American financial icon and a key player in global capital markets. That was in 2008 when it was within hours of collapse. &nbsp,

Morgan Stanley’s life had a fresh start. The Japanese got a good investment while becoming the bank’s largest shareholder. And it has worked out well for both sides. Nowadays nobody even knows Morgan Stanley is Japanese-owned.

The Japanese, in effect, did this as a favor to the Americans. They stepped in to profit instead of letting the Wall Street company collapse due to the irresponsibility of its own making. They did n’t.

Does allowing foreigners to own a US company, however, put us in danger? &nbsp,

That depends on which foreigners and the particular agreement. &nbsp,

In this case, Japan is a longtime ally – and an excellent partner. Also, the deal benefits both nations.

Landing page for the United States Steel ( US Steel ) website. Photo: screenshot, October 7, 2024

A deal that leads to employment in the US

Japan’s existence as an independent country depends on the United States and the&nbsp, US military. &nbsp,

Tokyo is well aware of that. &nbsp,

A weak America poses a threat to Japan.

Investing in US&nbsp, Steel&nbsp, and modernizing it will create great-paying jobs in the US. Importantly, it will give Japan a strategic asset that the United States has neglected and provides insurance for its survival. &nbsp,

Opponents have n’t produced a believable scenario in which Nippon Steel would ( or could ) shut down US steel production. Or in which it could create any political brouhaha that would endanger the essential&nbsp, US-Japan relationship&nbsp, and defense coverage.

As importantly, Japanese investment has been good for the nation. &nbsp,

jobs in Japan come from manufacturing

Toyota, &nbsp, Nissan and&nbsp, Honda&nbsp, are just the most well-known Japanese companies in America. Moreover, they support over 450, 000&nbsp, manufacturing&nbsp, jobs in the United States. &nbsp,

In addition to its significant research and development operations, Japan is the top overall foreign investor in the US.

The litmus test: Americans want to work for Japanese companies. And union organizers struggle to persuade them that they are unhappy.

Does anyone recall the 1980s, when Japan and its businesses were vilified on Capitol Hill and other locations? We were all going to turn into slaves as Japan seized control of our nation and economy. &nbsp,

Hardly.

However, it seems as though what is being said now will happen to American workers if Nippon Steel buys US Steel. Lose jobs, pensions, everything. &nbsp,

Actual US Steel employees support Nippon Steel’s efforts to modernize and strengthen its workforce, which is less well known.

China Ties?

Listen to deal opponents and one would think Nippon Steel were conspiring with the&nbsp, People’s Republic of China&nbsp, to destroy a US company.

Like many other companies, Nippon Steel has business dealings in the PRC. &nbsp,

These should be carefully and precisely weighed against actual security risks. And not shaded to keep the United Steelworkers&nbsp, union bosses happy.

If necessary, Nippon Steel should be required to modify or even end any China operations. &nbsp,

And so should &nbsp, Boeing, General Electric, Ford, GM, &nbsp, Tesla, Honeywell and the hundreds of other American companies in the China market. They have done far more than Nippon Steel to build up the&nbsp, Chinese economy&nbsp, and the People’s Liberation Army over the last four decades.

US sailors prepare to transport the wreckage of the Chinese ‘ spy balloon’ on February 10, 2023, in Virginia Beach, Virginia, USA. Photo: US Navy

Remember the Chinese&nbsp, spy balloon&nbsp, that flew over America in 2023? You might have noticed that the Biden administration refused to release a report on the findings. A likely reason is that the balloon’s innards had American components. &nbsp,

Is racism a cause of the deal’s opposition?

Probably.

If a British company were attempting to purchase US Steel, one doubts that we would be in this discussion. Does anyone care that the Italians and the French own Chrysler, you ask? &nbsp, Also, there is an air of “yellow peril” in some of the&nbsp, commentary.

However, the racism angle is a wash in this case. Take a look at the days when it appeared Renault would overtake Nissan. Company executives and Japanese government officials effectively took Nissan Chairman&nbsp, Carlos Ghosn&nbsp, hostage via charges of corporate misconduct. Furthermore, along with him, they arrested a senior executive, &nbsp, Greg Kelly, an American.

Avoid bringing up resentments between the US and Japan by remembering that they are friends. They need to stay focused on defending themselves.

Use Japan to rekindle US Steel’s greatness?

This would n’t be the first time.

In the 1970s and 1980s, American automakers were losing billions and producing subpar automobiles. Just look up “K-Car” on the internet. Detroit was in fact forced to get its act together by the Japanese.

Furthermore, Japan backed off and gave the American carmakers the breathing space to get their acts together.

Was that embarrassing? Sure. Infuriating? Sometimes. And there was occasionally excessive gloating from Japan.

But it worked out pretty well for everyone.

Damage Done?

Do n’t think Japan is n’t irked by Nippon Steel’s treatment. Japan has always felt uneasy about the commitment made by the United States.

Tokyo wo n’t be mollified by lines like” This is just business” or” This is just politics”.

Japan might start to wonder how trustworthy an ally the US is. &nbsp,

And maybe the US administration decides it ca n’t defend Japan when the Chinese start to be brutal with it. Nothing personal, and we still love you. However, an election is about to take place or ( fill in the blank ).

If the Nippon Steel deal is rejected, the alliance wo n’t collapse. But it will leave a scar, instead of deepening and strengthening the US-Japan relationship.

Early 20th century US Steel coal miners including the author’s grandfather, Mike Hlohinecz ( far left ). Photo: ©Grant Newsham family

The writer’s grandfather, Michal Hlohinecz, was a miner in one of the US Steel coal mines many years ago. What would he think of all of this? I have no idea. But he might have taken some offense at the idea that “foreigners” are the problem.

And the Japanese are not the cause of the Nippon Steel deal.

Former US diplomat and former US Marine officer Grant Newsham. He is the author of the book <a href="https://www.amazon.com/When-China-Attacks-Warning-America/dp/1684513650″ target=”_blank” rel=”noreferrer noopener”>When China Attacks: A Warning To America.

This article was first published by Japan Forward. It is republished with permission.

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Ways to break China’s legacy chip hold – Asia Times

Back in June, the Federation of American Scientists teamed up with Noahpinion, ChinaTalk, and Chris Miller to hold a crowdsourced policy competition.

We asked for ideas on how to deal with the problem of China potentially controlling the supply of foundational chips (also called “trailing-edge” semiconductors). Here was the post where we made the announcement:

The US has implemented export controls to try to stop China from getting a technological edge in advanced cutting-edge chips. But as I explained in a recent post, export controls have no hope of stopping China from building simpler types of chips — called “legacy chips”, “foundational chips”, or “trailing-edge chips.” These legacy chips are used for a huge number of things in our economy, from cars to smartphones to fighter jets.

And China is gearing up to build these legacy chips in absolutely staggering numbers. Check out this post by Jimmy Goodrich of the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and this post by the Rhodium Group for details. Basically, China is applying the same approach to legacy chips that it has successfully applied to batteries and EVs — massive scale and enormous subsidies. Already,

This basically presents at least three potential dangers to the US:

  1. First, China could deprive non-Chinese chipmakers of huge amounts of revenue by outcompeting them in the legacy chip market, making it harder for them to sustain their leading-edge chip businesses. Already investors are pressuring US companies to avoid competing with China by canceling their semiconductor fabs.
  • Second, if China controls the legacy chip market, it could cut off our supply of chips in a war.
  • Third, Chinese security services might be able to put back doors into Chinese-made chips, using them to spy or even to attack US infrastructure.

In other words, there are plenty of national security reasons for keeping Chinese-made legacy chips out of our supply chain. But how can we do it? It’s a tough problem.

First of all, as things stand, we don’t even know which products contain Chinese-made chips. If a Vietnamese-made phone or a Mexican-made PC includes Chinese-made legacy chips, the US currently has no way of knowing.

Second, even if we did know, it might be politically unpopular to ban those chips. A lot of US companies want to get chips as cheaply as possible, especially for new AI applications. We’d need some way to make chip restrictions politically palatable.

And finally, lots of Chinese legacy chips — and the products that contain them — aren’t going to be sold in the US or our allied countries. How do we make sure non-Chinese chipmakers stay competitive in markets like Vietnam, Brazil, Indonesia, etc?

We asked contestants to give us their ideas for addressing this problem. In the end, we decided that four of the submissions we received really stood out. These winners are listed in alphabetical order by first author.

Winner #1: Weaponizing EDA and using targeted industrial policy

By: Zenghao (Mike) Gao, Charles Yockey, and Felipe Chertouh

Gao et al point out an important weapon in the US’ arsenal of export controls that hasn’t been used yet: Electronic design automation software (EDA). We hear a lot about where the production of chips happens, and some about where the production of chipmaking tools happens, but not very much about where the software used to design chips comes from.

In fact, almost all of it comes from America, with a little bit coming from US-allied countries like Japan and Australia. And this software doesn’t just design chips in the first place; it’s also what chipmakers use to correct problems with the fabrication process as they arise.

Gao et al. suggest that EDA could be “weaponized” by mandating that it run on US-based cloud servers:

In hosting all EDA in a US-based cloud—for instance, a data center located in Las Vegas or another secure location—America can force China to purchase computing power needed for simulation and verification for each chip they design. This policy would mandate Chinese reliance on US cloud services to run electromagnetic simulations and validate chip design.

Under this proposal, China would only be able to use the latest EDA software if such software is hosted in the US, allowing American firms to a) cut off access at will, rendering their technology useless and b) gain insight into homegrown Chinese designs built on this platform.

Since such software would be hosted on a US-based cloud, Chinese users would not download the software which would greatly mitigate the risk of foreign hacking or intellectual property theft.

While the United States cannot control chips outright considering Chinese production, it can control where they are integrated. A machine without instructions is inoperable, and the United States can make China’s semiconductors obsolete.

This idea wouldn’t stop China from making foundational chips — Chinese companies could still use American EDA software. But it might give the US one more piece of leverage to hold over China in case hostilities broke out — and another way to try to slow down the Chinese chip industry in general, if that becomes necessary.

On the defensive side of things, Gao et al. also call for the US to form a trade bloc with Latin American nations to ensure safe supply of rare earths and NAND memory. They also have some additional ideas, such as forcing Chinese companies to release the source code for the firmware and other software for their chips.

You can read Gao et al’s full policy proposal here.

Winner #2: Working with other countries on industrial policies and tariffs

By: Andrew Lee

Lee sees the creation of a non-China foundational chip supply chain as the central problem to be solved. He envisions a program modeled after Lend-Lease — the system by which the US delivered arms to the UK in World War 2, and by which it’s currently delivering arms to Ukraine. The program would license US technology cheaply to friends and allies in exchange for cooperation in creating completely China-free chip supply chains:

The United States Federal Government could negotiate with the “Big Three” EDA firms to purchase transferable licenses to their EDA software. The US could then “lend-lease” licenses to major semiconductor producers in partner countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, or even Latin America.

The US could license this software on the condition that products produced by such companies will be made available at discounted prices to the American market, and that companies should disavow further investment from or cooperation with Chinese entities.

Partner companies in the Indo-Pacific could further agree to share any further research results produced using American IP, making further advancements available to American companies in the global market.

(Side note: It occurs to me that this might dovetail well with Gao et al.’s proposal for putting EDA on a US-based cloud.)

Lee also suggests coordinating with friendly countries in order to put tariffs on Chinese foundational chips. Recall that one of the big challenges here is that we don’t currently know which products contain Chinese-made chips, so we have no idea how many we’re importing.

Lee’s solutions to this problem are 1) an international database of which products contain Chinese chips, and 2) reporting requirements for importers, enforced by random audits:

How would tariffs on final goods containing Chinese chips be enforced? The policy issue of sanctioning and restricting an intermediate product is, unfortunately, not new. It is well known that Chinese precursor chemicals, often imported into Mexico, form much of the raw inputs for deadly fentanyl that is driving the United States opioid epidemic.

Taking a cue from this example, we further suggest the creation of an internationally-maintained database of products manufactured using Chinese semi- conductors. As inspiration, the National Institutes of Health/NCATS maintains the Global Substance Registration System, a database that categorizes chemical substances, along with their commonly used names, regulatory classification, and relationships with other related chemicals.

Such a database could be administered by the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security, allowing the personnel who enforce the tariffs to also collect all relevant information in one place.

Companies importing products into the US would be required to register the make and model of all Chinese chips used in each of their products, so that the United States and participating countries could to impose corresponding sanctions.

Products imported to the US would be subject to random checks involving disassembly in Commerce Department workshops, with failure to report a sanctioned semiconductor component making a company subject to additional tariffs and fines. Manual disassembly is painstaking and difficult, but regular, randomized inspections of imported products are the only way to truly verify their content.

Finally, he suggests efforts to protect US critical infrastructure by 1) identifying Chinese hardware within the infrastructure, and 2) improving cyber defense capabilities.

You can read Lee’s full policy proposal here.

Winner #3: An “Open Foundational” design standard and buyers’ group

By: Alex Newkirk

Newkirk also sees Chinese disruption of the chip supply chain — along with possible backdoors and other security issues — as the main problem to be solved. He proposes two ideas. First, Newkirk would create an “Open Foundational” design standard for legacy chips, in order to ensure that China doesn’t get proprietary control over any type of computer chip.

The chip companies who joined up to help create this standard would form a sort of cartel that could act to create a China-free manufacturing supply chain. Newkirk also suggests an international buyers’ group to create a strategic reserve of chips. This would serve the dual purpose of building up a chip stockpile and providing demand to encourage the adoption of the Open Foundational design standard. He writes:

To secure supply of foundational chips, I recommend development of an “Open Foundational” design standard and buyers’ group…[T]he US federal government…would establish a strategic microelectronics reserve to ensure access to critical chips. This reserve would be initially stocked through a multi-year advanced market commitment for Open Foundational devices. 

The foundational standard would be a voluntary consortium of microelectronics users in critical sectors, inspired by the Open Compute Project. It would ideally contain firms from critical sectors such as enterprise computation, automotive manufacturing, communications infrastructure, and others.

The group would initially convene to identify a set of foundational devices which are necessary to their sectors…and identify design features which…could be standardized.  From these, a design standard could be developed…

Steering committee firms will…be asked to commit some fraction of future designs to use Open Foundational microelectronics…[T]he buyers’ group would represent demand of sufficient scale to motivate investment, and that supply would be more robust to disruptions once mature. 

Government should adopt the standard where feasible, to build greater resilience in critical systems if nothing else. This should be accompanied by a diplomatic effort for key democratic allies to partner in adopting these design practices in their defense applications.

The foundational standard should seek geographic diversity in suppliers…The foundational standard also allows firms to de-risk their suppliers as well as themselves. They can stipulate in contracts that their tier one suppliers need to adopt Foundational Standards in their designs…

Having developed the open standard through the buyers’ group, congress should authorize the purchase through the Department of Commerce a strategic microelectronics reserve (SMR). Inspired by the strategic petroleum reserve, the microelectronics reserve is intended to provide the backstop foundational hardware for key government and societal operations during a crisis…

The foundational standard provides the product specification, and the advanced government commitment provides demand…This demand should be steady, with regular annual purchases at scale, ensuring producers consistent demand through the ebbs and flows of a volatile industry….The SMR could also serve as a backstop when supply fluctuations do occur, as with the strategic petroleum reserve…

This would ensure government access to core computational capabilities in a disaster or conflict scenario. But as all systems are built on a foundation, the SMR should begin with Foundational Standard devices. 

It’s notable how Newkirk’s ideas support each other. The international chip design standard he would create would make it easier to build up a stockpile of reliable chips. And building up the stockpile would create the guaranteed demand that would encourage adoption of the design standard.

That’s a very clever synergy. And as an added bonus, the consortium of companies that create and run the foundational chip standard would also be able to help carry out friend-shoring and de-risking, instead of leaving all the planning to the government.

You can read Newkirk’s full policy proposal here.

Winner #4: A legal plan for blocking Chinese chips

By: Ben Noon

Noon focuses on the difficult problem of identifying and restricting Chinese-made foundational chips contained within US imports from other countries. He vividly lays out the dangers of allowing China to control the foundational chip industry:

The list of examples of Chinese economic coercion is long…Washington faces less blatant coercion compared to its allies…This may be because Beijing does not believe it yet maintains necessary leverage over Washington…China’s growing position in the legacy semiconductor market could change that. How would Beijing’s behavior change if sales of the Ford F-150 relied on Beijing’s willingness to sell its semiconductors?

Noon argues that export controls have little or no hope of containing the Chinese foundational chip industry. And he argues that CHIPS Act-type subsidies alone are insufficient to maintain a US foothold in the market because Chinese subsidies will always be larger. Thus, he concludes, protectionism is necessary in order to keep China from dominating the global market for foundational chips.

The question, of course, is how to restrict imports of Chinese foundational chips contained in other products. Noon goes through and explains a list of various legal and administrative vehicles that the US government has at its disposal to accomplish that task:

  • Investigation of and restrictions on imported goods linked to unfair trade practices
  • Federal government purchasing restrictions
  • The Office of Information and Communications Technology and

Services (ICTS) at the Commerce Department, a recently created agency with broad authority to protect critical infrastructure from dangerous imported products

Noon believes that the most important legal justification for tariffs on Chinese chips is Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which both Trump and Biden have used extensively in order to put tariffs on Chinese products.

The really tough question, of course, is enforcement. Noon recommends “a major expansion of supply chain analytical capabilities across the US government,” but doesn’t say much more about that. He also suggests enlisting private companies as whistleblowers.

You can read Noon’s full policy proposal here.

Anyway, all of these proposals are quite interesting, and we’ve already contacted the authors to talk about following up on their development. I was very impressed by the diversity of ideas here — different contributors targeted different aspects of the problem, which helped them come at the issue from a variety of angles.

I continue to be impressed by the creativity and technical acumen of Noahpinion readers. Expect more policy contests at some point in the future!

This article was first published on Noah Smith’s Noahpinion Substack and is republished with kind permission. Read the original here and become a Noahopinion subscriber here.

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UK view of dangerous global strategic trends – Asia Times

This content was first published by Pacific Forum. It is republished with authority.

The UK recently published the seventh edition of&nbsp, Global Strategic Trends&nbsp, ( GST7 ), an early milestone in the new government ‘s&nbsp, Strategic Defense Review. GST, a program launched by the previous Labor government, provides geostrategic environment to tell corporate reviews that are conducted every four to five years.

Over the course of its 21 years, GST has expanded to include use in several different countries and gained significant international traction as a result.

Edition seven is the most comprehensive but, covering all international regions and shared spaces (oceans, Arctic, Antarctic, area and cybersecurity ), as well as emerging changes in societies, economy, the atmosphere, technology, conflict and security.

The new version is also far more geostrategic than its predecessors, reflecting a planet that has &nbsp, changed significantly&nbsp, since Labor next came to power in 1997. This more uncertain and risky prospect was the inspiration for the development of GST7.

The development of the world’s population has been a major contributor to that change, with the number expected to increase to 10 billion by 2055, tenfold since World War II. This has already led to the growth of new military and economic forces. Russia, some nations in East Asia, and a large portion of Europe are on the verge of a traditional turning point, when Africa, together with South and Southeast Asia, may begin to experience rapid population decline.

Therefore, as new countries leverage on youth bubbles to increase creative and service capacities, the balance of financial power may change even more. The competition for employees among developed nations perhaps even rise, but growing legal and illegal immigration may also add to already existing social, economic, and social pressures.

With international demand set to&nbsp, boost, the politics of energy could transform deeply. While hydrocarbons may be a major resource for the foreseeable future alongside nuclear power, the&nbsp, green transition&nbsp, could modify the landscape significantly. While positive in terms of carbon pollution, this change also brings new issues.

These include an expansion of equipment in previously congested and contested estates and&nbsp, lakes, opposition over clean technologies and markets, and exposure to the&nbsp, important minerals&nbsp, required to make these technologies, bringing innovative global regions into focus.

For example, 60 % of the country’s now identified&nbsp, sodium debris, an essential component for chargers, is under Latin America, while exposure to these sources is already impacting security&nbsp, in other areas.

Although estimates vary on how much will 3-D printing and automation innovations contribute to onshoring of manufacturing, the majority of economists anticipate that the majority of products will still be produced along extended value chains that span the globe.

New&nbsp, emerging nations&nbsp, poised to take on the mantle of the “world’s factory”, however, mean overall patterns of global trade could&nbsp, change significantly&nbsp, by mid-century as new routes and&nbsp, ports&nbsp, open in the coming decades. These configurations could be further altered by a shift in supply chains brought on by rising geopolitical tensions.

The availability of commodities may also increase competition in shared spaces. Significant deposits of critical minerals and&nbsp, hydrocarbons&nbsp, under the poles and across the&nbsp, ocean floors&nbsp, could see new races to mine these fragile ecosystems emerge, placing increasing strain on the international treaties that protect them.

Global food demand is also expected to increase by&nbsp, 50 % by 2055, creating increasing pressures for land farming and on the seas, including through&nbsp, illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.

Meanwhile, the race for high-tech leadership and control of digital standards and protocols is already growing, particularly given the dual-military potential of many of these technologies.

The development of digital services and communications also presents new potential risks. Artificial intelligence, for example, could prove both the&nbsp, great disruptor&nbsp, of traditional work while creating new forms of employment, with significant implications for economic and social stability.

Digital infrastructure is expanding all over the world. More satellites were&nbsp, launched in the first six months of 2022 than during the previous 60 years, for example, largely by commercial actors.

Subsea cable networks, already carrying&nbsp, 95 % &nbsp, of global internet traffic, continue to expand particularly&nbsp, in the southern hemisphere. These crucial networks will be both more crucial to how the world functions and ever more vulnerable to accidents as well as cyber and physical attacks.

The more frequent, violent, and permanent effects of climate change will cut across these drivers. This coincides with the population expanding and, possibly, shifting to coastal urban areas, the areas that are most susceptible to be impacted by rising sea levels and more destructive storms. In addition, impacts to&nbsp, critical national infrastructure&nbsp, could become more prevalent and damaging.

Meanwhile as ice melt opens up the&nbsp, possibility of new trading lanes&nbsp, across the Arctic, traditional routes such as the Panama Canal are already being&nbsp, impacted&nbsp, by changing temperatures.

Drought and storms could see&nbsp, millions becoming climate refugees&nbsp, in the coming decades, while the viability of some coastal regions and small island states may increasingly be challenged. More recently scientists have warned that some climate tipping points could be&nbsp, reached by mid-century, which could change weather patterns dramatically.

Near universal ownership of portable electronic devices combined with ubiquitous internet access will make the world&nbsp, increasingly connected&nbsp, but also more aware of rising inequality. Although some people will venture into space, the oceans, and the mysteries of life in the coming decades, it’s unlikely that everyone will benefit from these discoveries.

During the pandemic, for example, the world witnessed&nbsp, reversals&nbsp, in the indices of human betterment that had hitherto risen for decades. During that same period, however, &nbsp, 131 global billionaires doubled their wealth. In some areas, the state and the current systems of economic management and governance are now being increasingly questioned.

Combined, these pressures mean the future of geopolitics and security looks increasingly uncertain. The global balance of power is expected to become more congested and contested in the coming decades, even though the US, China, Russia, and other major powers in Europe and East Asia appear to continue to play a significant role. That could lead to larger-scale, emerging medium and small powers playing a more significant role in international affairs in the future.

Pressures on states, however, could also create gaps in governance for other actors to exploit. That includes transnational criminal gangs as well as violent extremism of all kinds. The corporations and the elites that own these assets could also become more powerful global actors as digital, space, and other technologies take a bigger part in how states operate.

The power’s future direction seems to be getting more uncertain at the same time. Earlier conceits that China will surpass all other countries in terms of importance. 1 economy, for example, now look less certain. Russia’s future depends on the outcome of its illegal conflict with Ukraine, as well as the price that China might demand for continued support. The US may face an increasing array of international demands, even if it avoids a turn back to isolationism. which all have more than a “rhyme” of history to them.

But if global order is less certain than at any time&nbsp, since the end of the Cold War, what are the alternatives? GST7 offers five scenarios. Instead of developing strategies based solely on a preferred future, which is frequently a common approach, they are prepared for less palatable world orders as well as the types of actions that might prevent them.

The world might turn to multilateral solutions in the event of a future existential crisis. It is the kind of world that the UN Secretary General requested at his Summit for the Futures.

Alternatively, the current rules-based international order endures, albeit increasingly competed.

However, growing conflict could also result in the creation of competing” spheres of influence” where major global powers impose rules on trade, diplomacy, and security for the nations in their orbits. Given the interdependence of trade and other issues, such a world might not quite be as oppressive as the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Of course, that arrangement could lead to even more bloody wars, and edition seven is the first GST to consider the possibility of a new global conflict. Alternatively, a succession of crises could place states under increasing pressure, with other actors then taking a more prominent role in global affairs.

All these potential futures will need to be taken into account as the new UK government prepares to release the results of its Strategic Defense Review next year. It may not take long to act in the wake of the potential new crises that are a result of ongoing wars in the Euro-Atlantic and Middle East.

Peter Olive&nbsp, ( [email protected]. former Royal Navy officer and senior defense leader, and former senior adjunct fellow at the Pacific Forum. Up until July 2024, Peterson oversaw the UK’s Global Strategic Trends program.

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EV tariffs end an era of EU-China engagement – Asia Times

The European Commission ’s plan to impose countervailing duties on electric vehicles ( EVs ) from China barely survived a Council of the European Union vote on October 4.

Five EU states voted against the tasks, including Germany, which had abstained in a past voting. Spain was even expected to vote against the taxes after Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez called for revision during a visit to Shanghai in September. But Spain eventually abstained, perhaps because Sanchez realized there was insufficient support to prevent the taxes.

China had pressurized important places to ballot against the taxes while initiating anti-subsidy and anti-dumping investigations into rum, meat and dairy. China has also threatened to curtail its foreign direct investment ( FDI) in EV manufacturing in the EU.

China ’s reaction to the EU tasks is more violent than its reaction to the United States and Canada’s 100 % taxes on Chinese Vehicles– though China has started an anti-dumping research into American rape.

China ’s reaction to the EU determine deserves attention. It’s clear that China has more leverage over the EU than other parts of the world, which contrasts with the EU’s large market size for Chinese EVs ( 55 % of Chinese EV exports go to the EU).

China ’s utilize arises from two major European shortcomings. Second, the EU is unable to communicate with one voice, yet on trade, its most consolidated competence after economic policy. Next, the EU depends on China much more than the US or Canada.

The EU’s main dependency comes from imports, especially important components for online and power transitions. In contrast, some big Western businesses depend on China ’s business.

The situation has not improved despite the EU plan to “de-risk ” from China – meaning to manage the risks related to economic and technological dependence. On the contrary, International dependence on China continues to rise, while the opposite is true for the US.

EU dependence on China also arises from years of European investment ( mostly German ) in China ’s auto industry. European manufacturers then export Vehicles from China into Europe, exposing them to the EU’s competing jobs.

While it seems reasonable that any company– including those from Europe– that receive international subsidies to provide the International market may be penalized to avoid harsh competition, the German government voted on October 4 to protect these automakers over the second market.

The fact that the largest EU land is ready to create such a move may sound the alarm about how much some major European companies operating in China are influencing EU business plan.

This also makes EU de-risking from China all the more urgent if the EU wants to preserve its independence over economic policy-making.

De-risking and economic security will, no doubt, come at a cost, but so will inaction. To reduce the cost, the EU must move from relying on defensive measures, such as the countervailing duties on EVs, to aggressive action to increase competitiveness.

The cost of producing an EV in China is still lower than elsewhere, even if subsidies are not factored in because of China ’s impressive technological upgrade and massive economies of scale.

Most analysts focus on the former as the main barrier for the EU in competing with China on green tech, but this might not be the case. In fact, part of the technology embedded in much of Chinese green tech originated in the EU or the US but received no government support while still unprofitable.

The US is clearly trying to change this situation with a massive industrial policy push, including through the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act. Whether these policies will succeed is still unclear.

The EU, by contrast, is still scrambling to build a credible industrial policy plan that will make its innovation commercially viable. This is particularly important for the EU because, compared to the US, it lacks the capital markets needed to scale up innovation.

China ’s huge economies of scale will be much harder to emulate in Europe unless a true single market is developed. Beyond strengthening the single market, the EU also needs to be much faster at building – and rebuilding – partnerships with other major economies, notably in the Global South.

Partnerships are needed beyond markets and sourcing. They will also help reduce the cost of potential retaliation from China against defensive actions such as the new duties on EVs. The main tool for this is coordination of economic security measures, mainly with the G7 and other like-minded economies.

Overall, the European Commission ’s duties on Chinese EVs signal that the era when China-EU relations were mainly governed by engagement is over. China and the EU now compete on the same types of products in third markets and it is more important than ever that the rules of the game are fair.

Alicia Garcia-Herrero is chief economist for Asia Pacific at Natixis and senior research fellow at Bruegel.

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The future is nickel in Indonesia – Asia Times

Indonesia’s metal economy is booming. The global adoption of electric vehicles ( EV ) is driving demand for the metal, which is a key element in many EV batteries.

In 2023, Indonesia produced a large 40. 2 % of the world’s source, sparking hopes the country can utilize its copper reserves as a foundation to build a regional Volt industry.

At the same time, the metal surge has courted controversy. In September, the US Department of Labor reported that forced labour was being used in the Indonesian nickel market. Nickel firms have also faced accusations of ecological damage and pollution.

Geopolitics is also at enjoy. Foreign technical skills, funding and businesses have been central to the development of the Indonesian economy.

National business plan in the form of the Inflation Reduction Act has aimed squarely at Chinese supremacy of supply stores for natural materials – limiting the access of Chinese-made products to US businesses.

Meanwhile, technological changes like the mass adoption of cheaper lithium iron phosphate ( LFP ) batteries for EVs– which use no nickel – pose further challenges.

In a wide-ranging interview with Asia Times contributor Joseph Rachman, Indonesia’s Deputy of Investment and Mining Coordination to the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investments Septian Hario  Seto, the government’s point person on nickel policy, made the case for optimism and the nation’s plan to become a battery-making powerhouse.

AT: Where next for Indonesia’s nickel industry?

SHS: The next step, I think it ’s to build an ecosystem for electric vehicles. So not only talking about nickel. We’re talking about cobalt and manganese. We’re talking about LFP ( lithium iron phosphate ). We’re developing an LFP factory in Indonesia. We develop copper, aluminum.

AT: How far along are you with this?

SHS: Our first pCAM [precusor material for battery cathodes ] factory was commissioned this September, last month. We’ve built now two lithium refineries in Indonesia. I think they will be completed end of this year or early next year.

Even though we don’t have the lithium mine, we import it from Australia and Africa. And, even some from Latin America. We’ve already built the copper foil factory for the battery – built and operated already next to the Freeport smelter in Gresik. So it ’s already done. I’m not just talking about a plan. This factory is already in commercial operation.

We already have anodes. If you look at the market landscape now the biggest players in the world – number one, two, and three – are Chinese companies. So, we have this anode factory now in Java. I think if you remember, in early August, President Jokowi inaugurated this factory.

So, there’s only a few remaining processes we need to attract. And with anodes this is very fundamental. If you ( have ) LFP- or nickel-based batteries the anode is the same. So, if you already have the anode this ecosystem will be easier to attract. So, if you ask me outside of China, we now have the biggest capacity for battery materials in the world.

China, America and geopolitical risk

AT: Why is China so central to Indonesia’s nickel industry? Does this pose a problem?

SHS: You need to understand on this, [in ] nickel processing no-one beats China. Can you name me one Western company that has been very successful in developing this nickel technology?

AT: Maybe Japan’s Sumitomo?

SHS: Yes, but the ( high-pressure acid leaching ) HPAL that they built was so many years ago. They tried to build HPAL with Vale but failed.

[Vale signed an agreement to open a nickel processing plant in Indonesia in partnership with China ’s Huayou Cobalt and America’s Ford in 2023. ]

So, I think this is the problem. So how do you deal with this situation? So, what you see now is now a lot of non-Chinese firms are getting a partner or a Chinese technology provider. I’m talking specifically about HPAL.

So, we have one project, which I think will start commercial operation this quarter, where the Chinese only control less than 25 %. It’s about 20 % if I’m not mistaken. The Indonesian shareholder controls 60 % the South Koreans will control about 20 %. So, you will see this type of investment is happening more and more.

[America’s IRA regulation bans subsidies for electric vehicles which use too many materials produced by companies which are more than 25 % owned by a “foreign entity of concern. ” Exact definitions can be vague, but this is widely seen as including any Chinese company. ]

I think this the issue of familiarity and comfort. Because when these projects start only the Chinese know, only the Chinese understand the risks. But as one, two, three, four projects have been successful the Indonesian companies – especially the Indonesian who own the mines – of course they want to take a bigger a role. You will see this is going to be the trend.

AT: There’s been talk of restructuring existing partnerships to get Chinese ownership below these thresholds?

SHS: I think it ’s going to be mostly new investments. The ones that are already in operation that ’s going to depend on a B2B ( business to business ) basis.

I think one thing that you need to remember is that in the market now – you can check all these nickel buyers all these MHP buyers – there’s no IRA premium. The nickel that you sell to the US, Europe, China, South Korea, Japan, it ’s the same price.

AT: You say there’s no IRA premium. But, America is still a big market with a lot of growth potential. Are you still working towards a Critical Mineral Agreement with the US, which could help make Indonesian nickel eligible for IRA subsidies?

SHS: It’s [a Critical Mineral Agreement ] very important. We’ll see what happens with the election. We just finished our election. And, now we’re still during the transition in the US with the election in November and maybe the new Cabinet will be set up in February. So we’ll see. We need to wait.

But, I think what’s important for us is the CMA is part of our diversification strategy. Now the US, we know Indonesia nickel is flowing into the US. Even without the IRA, still we can sell to the US.

AT: How does it still get in?

SHS: There’s a lot of requirements in the IRA like the car price can’t exceed$ 80,000. So, for premium cars, trucks, for commercial cars, they’re going to use this nickel.

So, let’s see what’s going to happen with this CMA. We still, of course, expect we can get this CMA, but this also really depends on the US election.

AT: Can Indonesia reduce dependence on foreign expertise?

SHS: The problem in Indonesia is that before we focused on mining engineers. Meanwhile, smelters and HPALs are about metallurgy and material sciences. Do you know how many graduates we have every year in this area? It’s only 350.

So, this is the area we need to encourage. We opened several new faculties specifically for metallurgy and material sciences to increase the number of graduates. So that ’s first.

The second thing is we send people with undergraduate degrees to get a master’s degree in China. Now we have four batches already sent to China. Once they are graduated, they can come back and operate all these HPAL factories.

The third step we already did. About a month ago, we inaugurated the first HPAL hydrometallurgy lab in ITB Bandung. This HPAL lab is donated by one of these Chinese companies. It’s worth about$ 30 to$ 35 million. I think this the biggest hydrometallurgy lab, the biggest HPAL lab, in the world. Even bigger than what China has.

So, in Indonesia we can study this technology. I’m very confident that in the next two-three years we can introduce patents for this nickel processing technology.

On alleged labor and environmental abuses

SHS: With forced labor, obviously, we are quite surprised with the announcement. I don’t think we got consultation from the US about this. You see how many people are working in IMIP right? Can you do forced labor with so many people?

AT: With Chinese workers on the site, we’ve had reports of confiscated passports, limited ability to leave the industrial sites, use of debt for control.

SHS: Yes, of course, for these Chinese workers we don’t know how is the arrangement. But, I guess if you see the Chinese working over there, I think it ’s good, has good conditions. I’ve checked the dormitory and everything.

But, for the Indonesians. Can you employ so many people doing forced labor? It’s impossible. There are more than six labor unions there. So I think there’s proof these claims are not correct.

And then you see the wealth impact as well. So, I think several months ago the ILO ( International Labor Organization ) sent a mission. And, we discussed with them what are their findings. And they said there is no issue on … getting lower wages and everything. They did not find this in Morowali. What they gave us input on is the urban planning. And we need that. That’s the issue we need to handle.

Because we did n’t think when we started this Morowali ( Industrial Park ) we would have lots of people working over there. You see Morowali, before this IMIP, maybe there were only a few motorcycles. If you go to Weda Bay, the conditions are much better. The company built more housing, dormitories, inside to absorb the workers. So this is the feedback we got from the ILO, nothing about this forced labor and everything.

Because so many people, it attracts thousands of people. You have labor unions. You have free speech and everything over there. So I think forced labor is not a big issue. So that ’s first.

The second is on the ESG ( environmental, social and governance ) you mentioned. So, two things that we are now implementing.

The first one is actually regarding traceability of nickel. So you remember on July 22, Pak Luhut, Ibu Sri Mulyani, several other ministers launched the Simbara System. This is the traceability system we developed.

We already implemented it in coal. So that you know for every ton of the commodity that you produce – so every ton of coal we produce we know who is the producer, who is the buyer, what is the name of the vessel that transports this coal, when is the shipment date, are they paying the royalty.

So if there is any regulation violation made by the company, we can block the company so their shipment cannot leave Indonesia. Practically we ban the mining company making the violation from selling the product. And this system cannot be manually overridden so you have to resolve this issue if you want to take off the blocking system.

So it will be implemented the same for nickel and tin. We are not only including the mining company but also the smelter. So we can see the material balance. How much nickel ore that you produce, how much nickel ore you consume, how many products, what kind of product … So it ’s the same thing. Before, if the nickel company made a violation, we can block the system so there is no buyer of the nickel ore.

Number two, is that 75 % of the nickel reserve in Indonesia is controlled by not more than 10 companies. Weda Bay Nickel, Vale Indonesia, Aneka Tambang, Harita, Cheria, and then you have Merdeka Battery Materials. So, all these companies now we encourage them to actually participate in independent international ESG certification.

The IRMA, the RCMM, RMI and everything. So they have to ensure that their ESG practice is meeting the standards accepted internationally. With all these smelters, the buyer is actually doing their own due diligence to make sure the nickel is actually acceptable.

AT: What about unsafe working conditions? In addition to the explosion that killed 21 workers last year, we’ve had other fatal accidents since.

SHS: Well, I think first we take very firm action. You see during the accident late last year when many people died because of the accident in this smelter. You know what happened, we take action not using labor law.

We used a criminal prosecution to bring three Chinese people, who are the managers and the head of the smelting operation to court. For them to face more severe punishment. Because if we are using the labor law the punishment is light. So I think this is very important to set the precedent.

Yes, we understand there is a problem with health and safety in this area. So one thing is we are already in discussions with the Chinese government for them to send their experts to ensure the practice is … Because this is basically a Chinese technology. If you send maybe a Western consultant they might not fully understand how this is going to work and fit together. So we asked the Chinese government to send their people to help us on reviewing these practices.

First of all, I think in terms of the casualties even in the US I think they have this many people die. But, what for us is important is this smelter – especially on RKEF – is purely developed by the Chinese. So that ’s why I think we need to hire and get the help from the people who actually understand this thing.

AT: Having talked to workers in the industry, I think they would be skeptical. In their opinion the company ’s only priority is production. And – rightly or wrongly – they often see this as working culture imported from China.

SHS: You know if that kind of thing… Why we decided to talk to the Chinese government? Because, you know, of course, the Chinese government does n’t want their reputation to have a problem internationally because of all of these incidents.

So yeah, let’s see. Of course, you can be skeptical. But, I think if the Chinese government steps in reviewing and helping us with this, I’m carefully optimistic. I think we can fix the problem.

What we found out in this last accident, which made several people die late last year. Because, they are bypassing several standard operating procedures. This is why we decide to take this to criminal prosecution because this is something we don’t take likely. So let’s see, lah.

AT: There’s been reporting that poverty levels have risen in provinces with major nickel processing sites.

SHS: If you see on the provincial level aggregate in terms of the poverty and everything, there might be a slight rise, especially after Covid. You have to be careful. If you take the data after Covid all Indonesia sees poverty increasing. So I have the data until 2023 showing the numbers [poverty statistics ] are starting to decline.

So, if you see in Morowali specifically, in Central Halmahera, you see clearly the poverty rate is declining. But, if you take the provincial level data, I don’t think that will be representative.

I’ve given these statistics to so many journalists because they tend to see aggregates from different statistics. But if you see clearly in IMIP, Morowali, Central Halmahera, and Konawe you see the poverty rate and Gini ratio, it ’s clearly showing a decline.

[Data from Indonesia’s Central Statistical Body shows poverty rates have declined since 2015 in the three regencies named. However, rates have risen somewhat in Konawe since 2022. ]

AT: A new president ( Prabowo Subianto ) will be sworn in on October 20. He has promised to continue the nickel policy. But are you confident the new government will have the expertise to pull it off?

SHS: I’m pretty confident because the industry involves a lot of stakeholders now. A lot of local companies have participated in the downstream industry. So obviously, they can also give input and feedback for the next administration.

I think the challenge is different in the next five years. In the previous five years, we focused still on the upstream part, smelting, refining, process the nickel ore into MHP and nickel pig iron.

But, the challenge in the next five years is how to attract more for the midstream and the downstream – the battery cell, the battery pack, etc. How you actually find new innovation in processing the nickel. This is a different challenge. But with the stakeholders and ecosystem we have today, I’m pretty optimistic.

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Singapore’s Ignition AI Accelerator partners Pfizer to advance biopharma sector with AI

  • Aims to improve AI capabilities, grow software across industries
  • Partnership aims to speed up medicine finding & industry solutions faster

Singapore’s Ignition AI Accelerator partners Pfizer to advance biopharma sector with AI

Fire AI Accelerator, a collaborative effort between NVIDIA, Tribe, and Digital Industry Singapore ( DISG) has announced a collaboration with international biotech head Pfizer in Emerging Markets Asia.

In a statement, the Singapore-backed Fire AI Accelerator explained that its goal is to advance AI skills and develop software across industries, driving global business development. The association with Pfizer aims to utilize its extensive community in Southeast Asia, including media, state, universities, accelerators, technical skill, and investors, to expand drug discovery and research processes, bringing innovative treatments to promote more quickly.

The Singapore government has been actively advancing border technologies like AI to support its medical technology and medical ecosystems and improve care quality. In addition to fostering private-public sector partnerships, it has invested over US$ 19 billion ( RM81 billion ) in science and technology research under its Research, Innovation and Enterprise 2025 plan. Through its engagement with DISG, Ignition AI Accelerator aims to attract major international AI companies to Singapore, building a thriving ecosystem for border systems. The throttle also empowers businesses to expand regionally, scaling their companies and accelerating their go-to-market techniques.

The partnership with Pfizer positions Fire AI Accelerator at the vanguard of AI creativity, providing local ecology partners and medical startups with the size and experience of industry giants. Through these collaborations, especially in the healthcare industry, Ignition AI Accelerator is better equipped to drive the development of pioneering therapies, patient treatment, and precision treatments worldwide.

” We are excited to collaborate with Pfizer, one of the leading players in the biopharmaceutical industry,” said Ng Yi Ming, CEO of Tribe. ” Our goal is to empower pharmaceutical giants with the latest advancements in AI to drive innovation in drug discovery and development. This partnership underscores our commitment to accelerating breakthroughs that can significantly impact lives globally. “

Pfizer is at the forefront of leveraging AI to transform drug discovery and development. By integrating into the Ignition AI network, Pfizer aims to create faster, more effective communication with stakeholders, enable a more efficient patient recruitment system, and improve manufacturing yields and cycle times.

” AI is reshaping pharmaceutical research, and our partnership with the Ignition AI Accelerator by Nvidia and Tribe is a significant step towards harnessing these technologies to enhance our communications with patients and healthcare professionals,” said Bei Goh, Regional Client Partner lead, Emerging Asia at Pfizer. ” With access to a thriving startup ecosystem, we are eager to catalyse groundbreaking biomedical startups and accelerate innovations in stakeholder engagement within the industry. “

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