Bitcoin ETFs not approved for retail investors in Singapore: MAS

SINGAPORE: Spot Bitcoin exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are not approved for offer to retail investors in Singapore, said the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), a week after the US gave the green light for such products.

Those who choose to trade the products in overseas markets must exercise extreme caution, MAS said in response to CNA’s queries on Tuesday (Jan 16).

The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on Jan 10 approved the first US-listed ETFs to track Bitcoin, offering institutional and retail investors exposure to the world’s largest cryptocurrency without directly holding it.

On its first day of trading, US-listed Bitcoin ETFs saw US$4.6 billion worth of shares trade hands, according to LSEG data.

However, SEC chair Gary Gensler said the approvals were not an endorsement of Bitcoin, calling it a “speculative, volatile asset”.

ETFs, which are part of the collective investment schemes (CIS) accessible to retail investors in Singapore, are regulated under the Securities and Futures Act, said MAS.

Investors also face restrictions on the types of assets they may invest in. MAS has not approved Bitcoin and other digital payment tokens (DPTs) as eligible assets for retail CIS.

“Given this, spot Bitcoin ETFs are not approved by MAS for offer to retail investors,” said MAS.

The regulator defines CIS as an arrangement in respect of any property in which the participants have no day-to-day control over the management of the property; or participants’ contributions are pooled and profits or income from which payments are to be made are pooled.

The arrangement will allow participants to share in or receive profits or income generated.

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China’s population drops for 2nd year, raises long-term growth concerns

BEIJING: China’s population fell for a second consecutive year in 2023, as a plunging birth rate and a wave of COVID-19 deaths when strict lockdowns ended accelerated a downturn that will have profound long-term effects on the economy’s growth potential.

The National Bureau of Statistics said the total number of people in China dropped by 2.75 million to 1.409 billion in 2023, a faster decline than in 2022, which was the first since 1961 during the Great Famine of the Mao Zedong era.

China experienced a dramatic nationwide COVID-19 surge early last year after three years of tight screening and quarantine measures kept the virus largely contained until authorities abruptly lifted curbs in December 2022.

The country’s birth rate has been plummeting for decades as a result of the one-child policy implemented from 1980 to 2015 and its rapid urbanisation during that period. As with earlier economic booms in Japan and South Korea, large populations moved from China’s rural farms into cities, where having children is more expensive.

Further denting appetite for baby-making in 2023, youth unemployment hit record highs, wages for many white-collar workers fell, and a crisis in the property sector, where more than two-thirds of household wealth is stored, intensified.

The fresh data adds to concerns that the world’s No 2 economy’s growth prospects are diminishing due to fewer workers and consumers, while the rising costs of elderly care and retirement benefits put more strain on indebted local governments.

India surpassed China as the world’s most populous nation last year, according to estimates by the United Nations, fuelling more debate over the merits of relocating some China-based supply chains to other markets, especially as geopolitical tensions rise between Beijing and Washington.

Long-term, UN experts see China’s population shrinking by 109 million by 2050, more than triple the decline of their previous forecast in 2019.

China’s retirement-age population, aged 60 and over, is expected to increase to more than 400 million by 2035 – more than the entire population of the United States – from about 280 million people currently.

The state-run Chinese Academy of Sciences sees the pension system running out of money by 2035.

China’s birth rate last year was 6.39 births per 1,000 people, down from a rate of 6.77 births in 2022 and marking the lowest birth rate on record. Japan’s rate was 6.3 births per 1,000 people in 2022, while South Korea’s was 4.9.

China’s 2023 rate of 7.87 deaths per 1,000 people, was up from a rate of 7.37 deaths in 2022, making it the highest since 1974 during the Cultural Revolution.

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China blowing past Japan on autos may trigger change

If there’s any surprise over the fact that China dethroned Japan in 2023 to become the world’s top automaker it relates to how fast that happened.

Overall, auto exports jumped 58% last year from the prior one, topping 4.91 million units, says the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers. Along with deploying its increasing strength in electric vehicles, China Inc managed to tap Russia’s sanctions-hit market with unexpected aplomb. Detroit is not thrilled, of course.

But the truly tantalizing question is how all this goes over in Japan, where, 12 years on, officials are still struggling to get their heads around China’s surpassing Japan in gross domestic product terms. That GDP changing of the guard happened, depending on your preferred data set, sometime between 2010 and 2012.

Since then, Japanese governments in succession have convinced themselves that GDP isn’t the key metric: It’s per capita income, in which Japan leads what’s now Asia’s biggest economy by nearly three times. Yet the blow to Japan’s collective psyche from losing the GDP crown was a devastating one.

Arguably, shock over trailing China helped Shinzo Abe retake the premiership in late 2012. Abe’s economic revival scheme wasn’t pitched as a beat-China strategy – but that’s precisely what his strategy to loosen labor markets, cut red tape, rekindle innovation, catalyze a startup boom and revive Tokyo’s role as Asia’s indispensable financial hub amounted to.

Years of Tokyo complacency since then have been good to China, enabling Xi Jinping’s economy to fill the void created by deflation-racked Japan. The 12 years since Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party returned to power have been a lost period for major economic retooling.

Efforts to produce more tech “unicorns,” for example, went particularly awry. Today, Japan is trailing Indonesia in the race to generate $1 billion-plus valuation startups.

The same muddle can be seen in Japan’s almost linear obsession with hybrid vehicles as the EV market shifts into overdrive.

True, officials at Toyota Motor and Japanese peers are realizing their mistakes in having dismissed the EV future that’s fast coming into view. Toyota is playing catchup with new models. Japan’s top automaker is tripling EV output as it chases China’s BYD, which recently surpassed Elon Musk’s Tesla.

The question, of course, is whether it may already be too late as Tesla, Detroit, Germany and China beat Toyota to the market. “No one,” says Michael Dunne, CEO of auto industry advisory ZoZoGo, “can match BYD on price. Period. Boardrooms in America, Europe, Korea and Japan are in a state of shock.”

Toyota’s blunder is reminiscent of Japan Inc missteps of the past. It’s worth nothing that hybrid transport — including the Prius — was always a compromise, not a technological destination. But because Toyota pioneered it, the company refused to admit that something better had come along.

A similar lost opportunity played out in the 1980s during the Betamax versus VHS video competition. Sony argued that its Betamax technology was superior; the global market favored the more user-friendly VHS format. The years that it took Tokyo to accept defeat set Japan back.

Will China’s stunning success in an industry that Japan long dominated in the Asia region and beyond catalyze officials in Tokyo and the greater Nagoya region?

“For the first time, I came face to face with the competitiveness of Chinese components,” Toyota EV Chief Takero Kato said in September. “After seeing manufacturing processes not used in Japan,” Kato says he thought, “We’re in trouble!”

China Inc is, for example, making big inroads into once reliably Japanese markets such as Thailand. Already, EV models account for 10% of the Thai market. The so-called “Detroit of Asia” is now China’s number 2 destination for Chinese EVs. Ditto for plug-in hybrid vehicles.

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida met with Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin on December 17, 2023, in Tokyo. Photo: Wikipedia

Perhaps sensing the risks, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida last month met with Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin. In Tokyo, Kishida proposed a dialogue framework to ensure that Thailand’s auto industry will strengthen its competitive advantage in EVs and the range of next-generation automobiles. More importantly, that Thailand will remain in the Japan camp.

Also last month, Srettha, a businessman-turned-politician, announced that four Japanese automakers will invest 150 billion baht ($4.3 billion) in EVs in Thailand over the next five years. They include Toyota, Honda Motor, Isuzu Motors and Mitsubishi Motors.

At that time Srettha’s spokesman said, “The prime minister has stressed that Japanese carmakers can play an important role in promoting EV production in Thailand.”

In Japan, Kishida’s government is offering decade-long tax incentives to boost production in EVs and high-quality chips to lure more foreign direct investment. The tax breaks will be part of Tokyo’s fiscal 2024 tax reform framework. They will include 400,000 yen ($2,755) for battery-powered EVs and hydrogen fuel-cell cars.

Tesla, unlike many global peers, won’t be roadkill as China grabs more market share, ZoZoGo’s Dunne argues. Musk’s wares benefit from a first-mover advantage and also the goodwill that comes from Tesla’s choice of the Shanghai area as the site of its first production facility outside the US.

“What does this mean for global automakers not named Tesla?” Dunne asks. “BYD will continue to win large chunks of market share from legacy automakers worldwide.”

What’s more, Dunne says, “China’s market, the world’s largest, no longer needs or wants foreign makers. Jeep, Suzuki and Mitsubishi are already gone. VW, Ford, Hyundai, Nissan, and others will depart within five years. GM, once the poster child for successful US business in China, will likely be gone, too. GM sales in China are already down by more than 50% from their 2017 peak.”

Challenges abound, of course,and they include building greater trust among mainland consumers.

“China is the global leader in the transition to electric vehicles, but even its carmakers haven’t been able to resolve consumers’ ‘range anxiety,’” says analyst Ernan Cui at Gavekal Research. She argues that households are increasingly demanding hybrid vehicles that burn fossil fuels as backup, meaning the transition to a fully electric fleet will be slower than the most optimistic forecasts.

Nor is the Chinese market devoid of risks as 2024 opens. “Investors remain cautious as China’s auto market has had a volatile start to the year as competition and macro uncertainties persist,” says analyst Tim Hsiao at Morgan Stanley.

Chinese EV demand is seen cooling as the nation’s post-Covid rebound continues to disappoint. As consumer sentiment and demand stagnate, automakers may find it becoming harder and harder to hit this year’s sales targets. In the first week of January, mainland EVs came in short of expectations, falling 20% on the month, according to Citigroup analyst Jeff Chung.

That means that even BYD “will need to refresh its model lineup or have more competitive model launches given the challenging sector competition into 2024,” notes analyst Shelley Wang at Natixis Asia.

The Warren Buffett-backed company also risks a continued price war with Tesla as buyers “continue to expect ever cheaper cars.” When the price-cutting has to stop, that “may keep consumers from purchasing.”

Yet, some are far more optimistic about the performance of China’s “new economy” sectors, which drive 12% of gross domestic product, helping growth top 5%. “Together with strong performance across new economy sectors, such as EVs and high value-added manufacturing, this should help to support a broadening in China’s economic recovery,” says economist Carlos Casanova at Union Bancaire Privée.

Casanova notes that “more easing is still required to stabilize activity. Fiscal policy stimulus will take over from monetary policy stimulus in 2024, although both will have to be deployed in 2024.”

Last year, Casanova notes, the government delivered targeted support measures, including approximately 2% of GDP in additional fiscal spending for 2024. The People’s Bank of China also injected liquidity via open market operations. A rate cut is less likely, although there is ample room to reduce reserve requirement ratios this year.

Clearly, in any event, China is increasingly committed to developing its green economy. “This policy promotion has already crowded investment into green sectors such as solar, batteries, and EVs,” says Herbert Crowther, analyst at Eurasia Group. “Green loans expanded by 36.8% in 2023, with new market entrants ranging from traditional manufacturers and local governments to fossil energy companies and large state-owned enterprises.”

China’s EV industry growth fueled a 20% expansion in private auto manufacturer fixed asset investment in the first three quarters of the year, Crowther says.

The auto sector outperformed national export and industrial value-added growth in 2023. This surge, Crowther says, was largely powered by EVs –  which accounted for 42% of Chinese auto exports over the past year (up from 30% in 2021) and 27% of auto production volume (up from 12% in 2021). Private sector manufacturing investment increased overall by 9.1%, despite the 0.3% contraction in overall private spending.

As China raises its economic and innovative game, the interesting question is what alarm bells – and responses – are triggered in Japan. Competition is always a positive dynamic between Asia’s two biggest economies. In the EV space, Japan is about to get more than it ever bargained for.

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China gets banned Nvidia AI chips via gray markets

Evidence has accumulated that, despite the United States’ export controls, China’s military-related firms, research centers and universities can still acquire Nvidia’s high-end artificial intelligence (AI) chip. Technology experts say the Biden administration has failed so far to stop small distributors from reselling and smuggling the chips into the Chinese underground markets.

The US Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) banned the export of the A100 and H100 chips to China in October 2022 and the export of the A800 and H800 chips to the country last October, but results have not been satisfactory.

One early study, from the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), a Washington-based non-profit organization, said last October that thousands of controlled AI chips could have been smuggled into China in 2023. By 1925, it said, the figure might grow to as many as 12,500 – or even hundreds of thousands – per year.

Some Chinese firms have set up multiple shell companies in third countries, used them to place small orders with AI chip distributors and diverted those chips to China, it said – and some Chinese cloud providers placed bulk orders for AI chips for their overseas data centers and redirected some of these chips to China. 

The CNAS suggested that the BIS pilot an AI chip registry and inspection program, as well as end-user verification programs in Southeast Asia. It said AI chip exporters should be required to carry out rigorous customer screening targeted at key vectors for large-scale smuggling.

Now a document obtained by Reuters shows that Chinese state entities have procured Nvidia’s A100 chips in more than 100 tenders since October 2022 and A800 chips in dozens of tenders since last October. 

Among the buyers, a Wuxi-based People’s Liberation Army entity purchased three A100 chips last October and one H100 chip this month. The Harbin Institute of Technology, one of China’s top defense-research universities, purchased six A100 chips in May 2023. The University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, based in Chengdu, bought one A100 in December 2022.

Reuters reported that these Chinese entities’ chip suppliers are not retailers approved by Nvidia. In other words, some third parties may have resold Nvidia’s AI chips to China. Nvidia’s spokesperson told Reuters that the company will take immediate and appropriate action if it knows that a customer has made an unlawful resale to third parties.

AI chip registry system

Violations are hidden in plain sight, commentators say.

An IT writer using the pen name “Chenyi” says in an article published by Xinchao IC last November that it’s not difficult to see distributors, who claim to have A100 and H100 chips for sale, over social media and e-commerce platforms in China.

“These sellers mostly come from southern China and have their secret supply channels. They can send AI chips from overseas to mainland China but they don’t provide any post-sale services,” Chenyi says. 

He says the A100 was priced at about 40,000 yuan (US$5,600) in China in February 2023 but the price surged to 250,000 yuan in May. 

He says sellers then started speculating in the H100, which is several times faster than the A100 in AI training, in June. He says the H100 is now sold at about 320,000 yuan each, a 50% premium over the official price of US$30,000.

In the US, technology giants including Amazon Web Services, Meta, Microsoft and OpenAI are also facing insufficient supplies of the H100.  

Smuggling channels 

The US Commerce Department as early as 2021 had classified Hong Kong as one of its “foreign adversaries,” alongside mainland China, Iran, North Korea and Russia. It means that products that are subject to the US export controls cannot be shipped directly to Hong Kong, but must go through third countries to evade the controls.

A Hubei-based columnist published an article with the title “How to obtain A100 chips in China?” last July.

He says most of the A100 chips came from smuggling channels in Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong to mainland China. He says some sellers would require buyers to complete their deals in Hong Kong. 

“As Nvidia will not provide any warranty and post-sale services for the banned A100 display card in China, anyone who bought it will suffer from a huge loss if it has problems,” the writer says. “There is no way that a faulty A100 can be shipped overseas for repair or be protected by an official warranty scheme.”

Last April, Hong Kong Customs said it seized 70 pieces of unmanifested high-value computer display cards, plus about 280 kilograms of unmanifested live lobsters, in an anti-smuggling operation at the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge Hong Kong Port. It said the products had a total estimated market value of about HK$600,000 (US$76,669). Two men were arrested. 

Taiwanese media said the seized display cards look like Quadro K2200 cards, which were launched by Nvidia in 2014 and are not subject to US export controls.

US Authorities have vowed to close loopholes in the export restrictions and have tried to prevent overseas Chinese firms from having access to Nvidia’s high-end chips. But until now, they have not suggested any effective solutions that can stop the illegal resale and smuggling of high-end chips to China.  

Read: US-China chip war may extend to legacy chips

Follow Jeff Pao on Twitter at @jeffpao3

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Commentary: Will the ‘China factor’ become an election issue in Indonesia?

INDONESIA’S INDUSTRIAL AMBITIONS

On its part, Jokowi’s government maintains a positive view about future bilateral relations with Beijing.

In December 2023, Erick Thohir, as ad interim Coordinating Minister of Maritime Affairs and Investment (during minister Luhut Panjaitan’s spate of ill health), stated at the fourth Indonesia-China Business Partnership meeting in East Nusa Tenggara that the government appreciated the role of Chinese investors who had become industrial pioneers, laying the foundation of the downstream industry and helping to develop remote regions in Indonesia.

Thohir pointed out that under the bilateral strategic partnership that started in 2013, several important achievements, including the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Rail and work on Indonesia’s green energy transition, had been made. He added that Indonesia-China cooperation would be lasting, as it was built based on mutual trust and mutual benefit.

During the Jokowi administration, there is no doubt that China’s investment and economic role in Indonesia has grown, which matches Indonesia’s ambitions for a push in its industrialisation through infrastructure and downstreaming industry.

Nevertheless, China’s domination in the nickel industry in Indonesia is a cause for concern. One repercussion in the climate of decoupling has been on access to Western markets. In fact, Indonesia’s nickel products have no access to the US market, partly due to this “China factor”.

It is important to note that Indonesia has been trying to invite larger investments from Western countries but the latter are currently distracted by domestic concerns, the Ukraine war, and the Gaza crisis. Their appetite for open international trade and investment has been weakening.

Conversely and opportunistically, China has won partners and expanded its economic influence, particularly in Africa and Southeast Asia. According to official data, as of the third quarter of 2023, China and Hong Kong were the second and third largest investors in Indonesia after Singapore, with total investment reaching US$3.5 billion.

While the China factor will not likely be a controversial election issue in 2024, Indonesia still needs to carefully manage existing public apprehension concerning China’s growing economic role, especially when Indonesian lives are at stake.

The new administration taking over from Widodo will need to continue diversifying Indonesia’s economic cooperation, including with Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, the Middle East and Africa.

Leo Suryadinata is Visiting Senior Fellow, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Adjunct Professor at S Rajaratnam School of International Studies at NTU. Siwage Dharma Negara is Senior Fellow and Co-coordinator of the Indonesia Studies Programme, and the Coordinator of the APEC Study Centre, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. This commentary first appeared on ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute’s blog, Fulcrum.

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Why the world is turning away from the buck

The invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 prompted the US Treasury Department to impose unprecedented sanctions on Russia, to hold it “accountable for its premeditated and unprovoked invasion.”

The aim was to prevent Russia from “prop[ing] up its rapidly depreciating currency by restricting global supplies of the ruble and access to reserves that Russia may try to exchange to support the ruble.” In other words, Russia wouldn’t be able to sell enough US dollars in the foreign exchange market to buy up Russian currency and bolster its value.

Indeed, US Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen called this an “unprecedented action” that would “significantly limit Russia’s ability to use assets to finance its destabilizing activities.”

US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen. Alexandros Michailidis/Shutterstock

Freezing a sovereign country’s dollar holdings (Russia’s in this case) is a seismic event. It risks accelerating a move away from the use of the US dollar for trade or investment by countries that have different geopolitical interests than the US, such as China or the Gulf states.

In fact, several governments outside the West are exploring ways to reduce their exposure to the dollar. Russia is currently settling a quarter of its international trade using Chinese renminbi, and its bilateral trade with China is almost entirely settled in the two countries’ respective currencies.

In March 2023, China settled a payment for UAE gas in its own currency rather than US dollars for the first time. Then in November, China and Saudi Arabia signed a currency swap agreement, citing a desire to expand the use of their currencies.

There are more troubling signs for the US dollar. Even though central banks’ foreign exchange reserves have been growing steadily year-on-year for more than 20 years, the percentage held in US dollars reached its lowest point in the fourth quarter of 2022, as this chart shows:

US$ held by central banks

Line chart showing countries' USD holdings falling.
Currency composition of central banks’ foreign exchange reserves. Author provided using International Monetary Fund data., CC BY-NC-ND

This is not a blip. It is the culmination of a long negative trend that has seen the US currency’s share in foreign reserves held by central banks fall from over 70% in the early 2000s to under 60% today.

While the drop is not dramatic, it’s significant and indicative of a negative trend for the dollar that reflects several developments – economic but also geopolitical.

Leaving the US behind?

The US economy’s share in the world’s output is falling as emerging economies, especially China, continue to outgrow the US and its Western partners.

China, the US’s biggest economic competitor, is now the main trading partner to more than 120 countries, with exports amounting to more than US$3.6 trillion. This risks leaving the US behind in the race for global trade dominance.

Over the last 20 years, China’s share of the global economy has more than doubled from 8.9% to 18.5% while the US’s share declined from 20.1% to 15.5% in purchasing power parity terms (which compare prices of specific goods to determine currency purchasing power).

Last year, the BRICS economies (fast-growth developing countries Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) overtook those of the G7 (developed economies US, Canada, UK, Germany, France, Italy, Japan and Germany) based on their share of world GDP in purchasing power parity terms.

GDP: G7 v Brics

Line chart showing GDP shares of G7 v Bric economies converging before Brics surpasses G7.
Share of GDP, current USD, PPP. Author provided using World Development Indicator data (series: NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD), World Bank, CC BY-NC-ND

As more countries join the BRICS, it will give the group even more economic clout.

Meanwhile, the US economy’s global GDP share is falling and its debt is hitting new heights as it issues more Treasury bills, notes and bonds to fund current government spending. The US national debt stands in excess of $33 trillion, or 123% of the country’s annual output. Inflationary shocks followed by interest rate increases have made servicing this debt very expensive for US taxpayers, repeatedly raising the risk of a debt default in recent years.

There is no doubt the US dollar still dominates world markets right now, accounting for most of the transactions in international trade. Its share in the foreign exchange market is colossal at 88% of transactions, and it remains the most widely held “international reserve” by central banks who want to ensure they can cover their countries’ imports and support the value of their own currencies.

But the centrality of the US currency since the Second World War has not always been welcome – certainly not by US foes and sometimes not even by its friends. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the 20th president of France and a finance minister in the 1960s, called the dollar’s reserve status an “exorbitant privilege” for the US.

He probably meant that demand for US assets from abroad was so high that it could borrow easily at favorable terms to finance its current account deficit –– a privilege not available to other nations.

Current global geopolitical and economic shifts could now see this exorbitant privilege challenged. The refusal of Russia’s BRICS partners and many UN nations to undertake Western-style sanctions against Russia is evidence of the limitations the West faces in exerting geopolitical influence.

And from an economic perspective, China as the world’s top trader and Russia as one of the world’s richest countries by energy reserves have amassed large gold holdings that could replace some US dollar uses. Both are looking to work with other countries, including those in the Gulf region, to reduce reliance on the US dollar.

Challenger currencies

Convincing non-western investors to use a “challenger currency” – whether the Chinese renminbi or a BRICS currency – could become easier following the US Treasury’s freezing of Russian assets. And these switches could accelerate if the US decides to seize the frozen Russian assets.

It’s increasingly clear that, as non-Western countries assert themselves in the world’s economic arena, geopolitical divisions with the West will cause additional friction. As a result, the US dollar’s role is almost certain to become more limited than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War.

Alexandros Mandilaras is Associate professor, University of Surrey

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Houthi attacks expose China’s commercial stakes in Red Sea

BEIJING: China has called for an end to attacks on civilian vessels in the Red Sea that have dramatically widened the Hamas-Israel conflict and placed Beijing’s commercial interests along the Suez Canal at risk. The Iran-backed Houthi militia from Yemen that seeks “Death to Israel” is challenging the ability ofContinue Reading