World isn’t ready for what Ueda’s trying to say

The fact that Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida believes he is in charge of Asia’s No. 2 market is what surprises me the most about his reshuffle of his case.

Basically, that would be Kazuo Ueda, who assumed leadership of the Bank of Japan in April. Governor Ueda hints at a scheme change that, if implemented, will undoubtedly roil global industry, making this crucial difference more important than ever.

It’s encouraging that Kishida announced fresh help actions to restrain economic development on Wednesday. Data that was made public 24 hours later revealed that secret machine orders decreased by a bigger-than-expected 1.1 % in July month over month. The fortnight saw a 5.3 % decline in production purchases.

Overall,” unsteady domestic demand, higher inflation, and policy uncertainty are hazards to the budget view ,” says economist Stefan Angrick of Moody’s Analytics.

This is hardly what Kishida and his dwindling approval ratings require as his administration approaches the two-year tag. This is especially true given that inflation is currently outpacing wage growth and that China’s decline is endangering trade industry.

With the next reshuffle of his 710-day-old era, Kishida aimed to change the depressing narrative. Strangely, he believed that simply renaming his underperforming economic staff may attract investors from around the world.

However, all that kept Shunichi Suzuki in his positions as finance minister, Yasutoshi Nishimura as secretary of business, and Sanae Takaiche as financial security minister did was spread misinformation in Tokyo as the world’s markets burned.

However, it doesn’t really matter when Ueda’s staff at BOJ office is in charge of the economy. Ueda has been using China’s problems and negative tendencies as recent wildcards for the future of Japan. & nbsp,

Ueda gave the first indication that a quantitative easing( QE ) policy change might be forthcoming over the weekend.

The BOJ’s target is on” a silent return” that doesn’t destroy industry, Ueda told the Yomiuri paper. He claimed that a slight change in July’s policy was merely an effort to” shift the balance between the results and side results” of QE.

The japanese is a trend that devalues. Photo: Facebook

Looking ahead, Ueda remarked,” It’s not improbable that we will have enough by the end of the year to anticipate wage increases going forward.” He continues,” There are some things we don’t see right now ,” such as potential fresh reverberations from China or the US.

It was Ueda’s first attempt at telegraphing a level change in the months ahead, despite appearing harmless. Economists at & nbsp and Deutsche Bank made the prediction that negative prices would disappear by January and the BOJ’s” yield curve control” would be eliminated by October as a result.

International businesses that have relied on completely Chinese currency since long before the Covid – 19 epidemic, the 2008 Lehman Brothers problems, and the terrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001, experienced something of an earthquake as a result of all of this.

Japan has risen to the top of the global rankings for bank and nbsp since 1999. Investors have a long history of taking out low-cost loans in hankering and using those funds to purchase higher-yielding goods from Argentina to South Africa to India to New Zealand. The leverage that these trades provide explains why panic may spread across asset classes due to unexpected yen movements.

Equity experts at IwaiCosmo Securities wrote in a word that, in response to Ueda’s remarks,” the strength of the yen seemed to have served as ominous for the business.” ” The increase in domestic bond yields boosted sales of sizable semiconductor securities, which ultimately drove the industry down.”

According to researcher Lee Hardman at MUFG Bank, the odds are that in the short term,” more aggressive speech from the BOJ and the increased risk of interference though should help to lessen the level of any further japanese selloff.”

However, in the long run, it is impossible to stress test with any real accuracy the specter of a significant funding source since the late 1990s & nbsp effectively vanishing.

What does it mean for commodity prices, yields, and financial stability if big central banks start tightening as well since the BOJ is the last of them to continue supplying liquid to global markets? At Rabobank, planner Benjamin Picton makes this claim.

Given that there is little chance of China coming to the rescue as it has in the past, Picton said,” It’s no surprise that other central banks are beginning to second guess themselves if the last surprise absorption is soon to go away.”

Ueda doesn’t want Japan to be held responsible for the next global financial crisis, according to many analysts who advise precaution. In other words, yield-curve control on the & nbsp may end this year, but negative rates will persist for a while.

According to strategist Naomi Muguruma at Mitsubishi UFJ Morgan Stanley Securities, the yen’s depreciation has been slower than last year and is not regarded as a” speculative move ,” making it difficult to carry out an intervention. ” Ueda’s pessimistic remarks might be meant to restrain yen loss.”

Wave growth continues to be poor and weakening, according to Commonwealth Bank of Australia planner Joseph Capurso. In the coming weeks, we anticipate that the dollar-yen’s upward momentum will begin.

The income issue is a problem in and of itself. The fact that inflation increases are outpacing progress in hourly income is a major factor in why Kuroda’s authorization ratings are at best in the lower 40s and why he reshuffled his Cabinet.

He may address the issue by implementing policies to counteract imported rate increases, boost national competitiveness, or encourage businesses to split profits with employees.

However, Kishida’s Liberal Democratic has chosen to allow a weaker renminbi take the lead and violent BOJ easing since the 1990s. This contemporary approach to trickle-down economics was intended to start a positive income cycle that may increase consumption and further strengthen Japan Inc. That isn’t how it has turned out.

Ueda now faces the challenge of turning back the hands of history and beginning the normalization of level plan without making things worse. & nbsp,

Although all major markets gave unaccountable central bankers the keys back in the middle of the 1990s, none did so more fully than Japan. However, during Governor Masaru Hayami’s 1998 – 2003 term, the BOJ expanded on its economic hegemony into a full-fledged mission creep.

Hayami pioneered QE when the BOJ became the first significant economic power to reduce interest costs to zero in 1999, as Japan’s bad mortgage problems grew worse due to recession. Hayami experimented with bad borrowing expenses in 2000 and 2001.

Masaru Hayami, a former chancellor of the BOJ, invented QE. Asia Times Files, AFP, and Toshifumi Kitamura are shown in the image.

Some may have predicted that the BOJ’s role in the economy would become so absolute or that it would result in a long-term dedication to preserving the living standards of 126 million people twenty-four years ago.

The final four BOJ rulers were unable to solve this puzzle’s mechanics. Governor Toshihiko Fukui attempted to end QE and raise prices thrice, to be exact, in 2006 and 2007. However, the ensuing recession happened immediately, and political retaliation followed even more quickly.

Masaaki Shirakawa restored QE when he took over as ruler in 2008. Haruhiko Kuroda arrived at BOJ Central in 2013 with the goal of supervising QE in order to end depreciation once and for all.

Yan and hoarded goods were poured into Kuroda’s global financial system. Kuroda’s decisions to corner bond and stock markets increased the BOJ ‘ balance sheet to$ 5 trillion in just five years, surpassing the size of the Japanese gross domestic product.

All eyes were on how Kuroda may start to wander down the BOJ’s balance strip in late 2022, as his decade in power was coming to an end. Rather, Kuroda punted, handing the unpleasant task to Ueda, who had received training from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and was regarded by many as adding new perspective to the riddle.

However, a bubble of confidence that has been inflated by both the public and private sectors is one of the negative effects of more than two years of zero costs. By serving as Japan’s ATM, 24 / 7 & nbsp, and largess, the BOJ dampened the spirit of the country.

Business CEOs lacked the motivation to invent, restructure, or take risks on their own. Government officials did nothing but watch as the BOJ’s sudden bursts of liquid fueled growth. In the meantime, the popularity of Chinese government bonds increased, exposing everyone.

Banks, businesses, local governments, pension and insurance funds, universities, endowments, the & nbsp, a massive postal system, and retirees will all suffer if Japanese government bond yields increase to 2 %.

Japanese women wearing kimonos ride a roller coaster during their Coming of Age Day celebration at a fun park in Tokyo in January 2017. Photo: Reuters/Kim Kyung-Hoon
For many in Japan, the good times had come to an end with QE. Asia Times Files / Agencies image

It has left a destructive dynamic that discourages almost everyone from selling debt:” mutually amply & nbsp, assured amplified.” Tokyo will have more trouble paying off the largest debt load in the developed world, which accounts for about 265 % of GDP, the higher provides go.

Some people may enjoy the process of unraveling 24 decades of zero rates in a country that is completely dependent on the BOJ’s financial well-being.

However, Ueda might be prepared to start yanking away the legendary creswell. Furthermore, it’s unclear whether any economy, business, or investor is really prepared for the impending market chaos brought on by Ueda.

William Pesek can be followed on X at @ WilliamPess

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China’s malaise rooted in Xi’s Big Tech crackdown

After more than two decades of” regulatory assault,” Chinese officials have begun opening an olive branch to China’s top software technology companies. The initial public offering( IPO ) of e-commerce behemoth Ant Group, an affiliate of Alibaba, was canceled in November 2020, marking the beginning of the crackdown.

The majority of China’s major software companies were impacted by the” rectification” in addition to Ant Group. However, a chill was sweeping over China’s market by June 2023. The healing following Covid-19 was sluggish. The rate of children employment increased by more than 21 %.

The government most probably came to the conclusion that they had succeeded in achieving the majority of the rectification’s goals. Premier Li Qiang & nbsp bent over backwards at the China Development Forum in March 2023 to reassure prominent Western CEOs that China was welcoming the private sector, both domestic and foreign.

Regarding the” true” goals of the crackdown, there is andnbsp, no consensus among academic and journalistic commentators. One theory contends that the” exuberance” of Jack Ma, the founder of Alibaba and China’s most well-known personal entrepreneur, and the ultimately Communist orientation of President Xi Jinping were at odds with one another.

However, concentrating on Jack Ma ignores the fact that almost all software firms underwent some sort of correction. Another viewpoint contends that, given Xi’s embrace of the state-owned market, it was merely a plan to cut off the wings of Chinas’ leading private companies. However, data indicating an increase in the penetration of big private companies into China’s economy refuted Xi claims that he was hostile to the private sector.

Others contend that in order to align the platform tech companies’ mission and objectives with Xi’s social policy goals, such as” common prosperity” and the fight against” disorderly expansion of capital ,” a” great” correction was required. However, the crackdown’s real goal had little to do with rules because the authorities’ actions went beyond what might be regarded as the imposition of a stricter regulation.

During a historical performance honoring the 100th anniversary of the Communist Party of China’s establishment on June 28, 2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping was depicted on television. Noel Celis, AFP, and Asia Times Files

Revision of regulations was merely a means to an end for different goals. A wave of & nbsp, or shareholder wealth destruction, characterized the crackdown. In November 2020, Ant Group was scheduled to launch its initial public offering ( IPO ) at an implied valuation of US$ 313 billion. & nbsp,

However, in July 2023, Ant Group announced a share buyback at an investment that was 70 % lower. Didi Chuxing, the largest ride-sharing company in the world, raised$ 70 billion during its IPO in New York in June 2021. It is now trading over the counter with a business valuation of roughly$ & nbsp,$ 16.7 billion after being forcibly delisted from the New York Stock Exchange.

The money transfer of platform companies to several state-owned entities was the other side of the coin. One method of extraction took the form of previously unheard-of charges. In April 2021, Alibaba received a$ 2.8 billion fine for alleged market dominance abuse.

Another method of extraction involved” deliberate” donations to causes that Xi supported. Tencent, the world’s largest game developer and investment in numerous start-ups,” earmarked”$ 7.7 billion in 2021 to a bank devoted to” common success.”

Another recovery method involved putting a stop to program companies’ ability to expand. Didi was prohibited from adding new customers for a period of 18 months. This fortunately allowed many of Didi’s state-backed rivals, including Huawei Technologies of T3 Chuxing, to enter the market.

The assault has had a significant impact on corporate establishment by fundamentally altering it. Platform software companies have been coerced into appointing state-nominated managers and issuing” golden shares” in subordinate companies to government-owned businesses through joint venture agreements. & nbsp,

Usually, these golden shares just make up roughly 1 % of a subsidiary’s capital. However, they grant majority shareholders overwhelming corporate governance right. In those businesses, the state now has the ability to reject tactical choices.

The defenestration of Jack Ma, the embodiment of China’s innovative success, was arguably the most significant change in business management. After the withdrawal of Ant Group’s IPO, Jack Ma was essentially exiled. Jack Ma’s voting rights were reduced from over 50 % to 6.2 % after the company underwent a share reshuffle.

Program businesses have escaped the regulatory crackdown. However, doing so comes at a cost to their business concepts, which cannot be changed. These businesses were extremely dissimilar from the majority of China’s large private companies prior to November 2020. & nbsp,

At the time, their business model could be characterized as” entrepreneurial” because it was entirely private, supported by top-tier venture capital, and led by entrepreneurs who were committed to maximizing shareholder value.

This business concept of entrepreneurship has then andnbsp been abandoned. Rather, these businesses must collaborate with another sizable private Chinese businesses that are frequently entwined with the government. Major state control over the personal business is ensured by this.

The change in the business model has even dealt a serious blow to persuasion in China’s personal business. If the government can deny a renowned personal businessman like Jack Ma control over the business he or she founded, it is difficult for the owners of Chinese private companies reason to be optimistic.

Sentiment & nbsp, may get better in the future. However, for the time being, the regulatory crackdown will continue to be a significant factor in China’s declining economic efficiency.

Martin Miszerak teaches as a visiting teacher at Beijing’s Renmin Business School.

East Asia Forum previously published this piece, which has been republished with a Creative Commons license.

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Exclusive interview with Paul Yang, BNP Paribas CEO for Asia Pacific | FinanceAsia

Paris-headquartered BNP Paribas boasts a history of over 160 years in Asia and today, it draws upon a 20,000-strong team that is active in thirteen markets across the continent.

The regional effort is led by Paul Yang, who ascended to role of CEO for Asia Pacific in December 2020, as the world succumbed to the full throes of the beginnings of a three-year pandemic. As society grappled with widespread affliction, Asia’s key economies responded to rapidly evolving government direction with fervour: leaving borders closed and markets shaken.

However, as you will discover through this exclusive interview, Yang was defiant in his refusal to be beset by external challenges. Proving himself an astute leader at the regional helm, he navigated the uncertain scenario deftly, and would go on to secure solid returns for both full-year 2021 and 2022; as well as robust revenue for the first quarter of 2023.

With a view to steering the bank’s business in support of the group’s Growth, Technology and Sustainability (GTS) strategy for 2025, FinanceAsia sought Yang’s take on Asia as a key international powerhouse, and learned about the milestones of his international career to date.

Entering Asia

BNP Paribas’ forerunner, the Comptoir National d’Escompte de Paris (CNEP), was set up by France’s finance minister following the hardships endured during the French Revolution; to curb mass bankruptcy in the financial markets; and to stimulate the economy. 

Following signature of a free trade agreement with the British, the Comptoir sought to develop an international strategy to source the raw materials required to support the flourishment of European industry. To do so, it extended beyond its French national borders for the first time; establishing offices in Calcutta and Shanghai in 1860, independent of foreign partnership.

Later, CNEP merged with the Banque Nationale pour le commerce et l’industrie (BNCI) to form the Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP). Capitalising on these regional capabilities, the bank made Hong Kong the centre of its Asian platform.

Q: Paul, you’ve been based in Asia Pacific for the majority of your career with BNP Paribas. Can you share what has defined BNP’s corporate journey in Asia so far?

A: Well, I wasn’t there in the 1860s, but it’s true that we have had a very long presence in the region. However, I consider “modern” BNP’s presence to be quite recent. It was really the bank’s merger in 2000 that created who we are today, elevating us as France – and then Europe’s – leading financial group and the most profitable bank in the eurozone.

But regarding Asia, we’re proud to be able to say that we’ve been here for a long time, which demonstrates our commitment to the region.

In Hong Kong, for instance, we often deal with multiple family generations of entrepreneurs and tycoons. The same is the case for some of our mid-cap clients – we have dealt with their fathers. We have built a sufficient network in the region to be able to play a key role in executing succession plans and building businesses for the future.  It really means something that we’ve been here for so long and to be profitable in all of the 13 markets where we operate.

These days, being relevant to your clients counts. You need a strong balance sheet, presence and scale to guide key them from their home markets into new areas. This is how we started, building our financial institutions group (FIG), then multinational and corporate (MNC) franchises,before further progressing to build scale, solutions, products and platforms.

We have developed a strong Asian presence and over the last three years, we’ve built on connectivity to improve the flows between the various corridors we participate in. We are relevant to key local participants and accompany international clients in reverse, also.

This goes for all facets of our business: whether in the corporate and institutional world, or in consumer finance. We are bigger than the sum of our parts and many things we do have relevant purpose for our clients.

Q: How does the bank’s business in Asia compare to that of the European markets (e.g. France, Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg)?

A: Understandably, our stronghold is Europe and we are significant as well in America. But overall, Asia represents a sizable portion of group business.

The bank’s longevity and strong heritage in Asia Pacific, coupled with our integrated business model places us in good stead to extend and reinforce our presence in this growth region.

In this regard, BNP Paribas’ Asia Pacific revenue contribution to the group’s corporate and institutional business is about 20%; and it will continue to grow.

Ultimately, the bank is emerging as a leading player in the region – and this brings us to a better position to aim for larger deals and more ambitious goals.

In this respect, we have grown our market share in our regions – for example, we hold dominance in markets such as Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong in the wealth management space, and we have recently launched an onshore wealth capability in Thailand. Asset management is developing; and our insurance business – Compagnie d’Assurance et d’Investissement de France (Cardif), has also been successful.

Where we do not have underlying domestic market strength, we choose to partner. We are humble enough to realise that sometimes it is better to do so. For example, in Asia, on the insurance side of the business we have partnered with local banking distributors. We started exploring this type of partnership around 25 years ago in markets such as Taiwan, Japan and Korea, and we are building up our strength in China, India and Southeast Asia.

The same goes for the retail side – personal finance. In 2005, we became a strategic shareholder of Bank of Nanjing in China and we are now their single largest shareholder with a 15.7% stake. 

We have built core business through partnerships, but where we think that we can control the entire business because it’s part of our DNA, is on the wealth management and corporate institutional banking (CIB) sides.

Q: What are the bank’s strategic priorities across Asia over the short and long term?

A: We are a bank that tries to deliver short-term results alongside long-term goals. Long-term relationships are part of our nature from a strategy perspective, and we are not in the business of pursuing rash opportunities when things look great and then making drastic cuts in a down cycle. We have a long-term vision and try to cultivate trust and relationships with this timeframe in mind.

From a short-term perspective, we have targets around our top line to maintain cost discipline and ensure that we invest for the future. We are intrinsically risk-aware and we insist on having a good mix of new blood and older experience, to move forward prudently.

Diversification is key. When you pursue disciplined growth, you avoid temptation, fashion and fad and consequentially, mistakes. Across all markets and products, we want to be positioned as the number one European bank for CIB, the preferred partner for wealth management, insurance and asset management – and we are not far from achieving this goal. 

Asia comprises a mix of developed and developing markets. Whether you look at the position we have in Japan, Australia, or Korea – or across more emerging business hubs such as Southeast Asia or China, we are well positioned there for our clients and we generate good returns.

Some of our peers will concentrate their presence at a particular local base, say in hubs. But we do not believe in guaranteeing strong, underlying growth simply by sitting in Hong Kong and Singapore and flying bankers all over the place.

The creation of local platforms is important. We have been building these in a considered manner across Southeast Asia, Taiwan, mainland China and elsewhere for the past decade and we are able to see the results. For example, we recently complemented our business mix with a securities licence in China. Once we have completed the takeover of several prime brokerage businesses from our competitors, we will see an increase in the equity cash portion of our business mix. Then there’s the joint venture (JV) we secured with the Agricultural Bank of China, which is the largest bank in the market by network and with whom we’ll be structuring investment products for retail clients.

Q: Diversification is a theme that has emerged from the pandemic to build business resilience. But are there any particular geographies or sectors that stand out as offering growth opportunity?

A: We’ve seen some volatility in the banking sector, but as a group, our corporate culture has focussed on development in a very diversified way. In terms of resilience, this sets us apart.

If you look at our group results, you will see that around 50% of our business is in the domestic retail and consumer finance market;

a third is in CIB; and over 15% is concentrated on activities such as asset gathering – from private banking to asset management and insurance. Within CIB, there’s also security services, which might not have a great cost income, but involves limited capital consumption and brings recurrent fees.

This percentage mix has been kept stable as we’ve grown across all areas and however you slice and dice our business, you will always see diversification. It’s the same for our client base – we not only serve financial institution clients but also corporates and high net worth individuals (HNWI). These three pillars are quite well balanced and offer us the means to build a sufficient product platform.

Capital market activities, including equity capital markets (ECM), debt capital markets (DCM), fundraising and advisory services can be volatile and event-driven; while another big portion of our business and effort is in transaction banking: following the flow of finance, supply chains, trade finance and cash management activities.

The interest rate surge of the last 12 -18 months has been very much beneficial to the cash management business, while monoliners who rely only on investment banking, have suffered. We have benefitted. Whatever way the world or region goes, we are naturally hedged.

Across the Asian region, our presence differentiates us from the rest. We are more than 2,500 in Hong Kong, have 2,200 in Singapore, plus a solid foothold in Japan where we’ve ranked consistently within the top five thanks to our leadership in the global macro environment, both in fixed income currencies and commodities (FICC) and across equity and credit.

In Australia, we have a dominant position in the custodian business that we started 20 years ago; we do well in China, and then we have strong ambition in India and Southeast Asia. I cannot see any market where there isn’t potential.

Q: How do you aim to grow the Asian business?

A: In the past, we have grown organically – even when we looked to secure Deutsche Bank’s prime brokerage business in 2019, it was not a typical acquisition. They were trying to expand in terms of platforms and wanted to lighten up their equity business. Meanwhile, in July 2021, we acquired another 51% of Exane, the top-rated equity research business, following a successful 17-year partnership where we had held 49%.

Both deals demonstrated ambition and keenness to complement the building blocks of our equity business.

So yes, our focus is organic over external growth. We feel it’s better to rely on organic opportunity.

Q: Which developments excite you across sustainability?

A: We’ve been involved in sustainability for over a decade, having started our sustainable finance forum (SFF) in Singapore seven years ago. I’m happy to see that what was a niche market is now very much mainstream.

I would say we have been dominating the ESG thematic, especially when it comes to corporate social responsibility (CSR). We’ve exited from carbon-heavy energy, have moved towards renewables, and we are working to lighten up our upstream exposure. It’s pleasing that every year we do more, whether green bonds, sustainable loans or other structures. We are among the top three banks in the space and even if we cannot manage to stay number one, our efforts make a positive impact across society.

Last year, we created a group of more than 150 bankers, the Low Carbon Transition Group (LCTG), to support our clients’ energy transitions. We’re experienced, so are not having to start from scratch and can support those corporates who might not know where to begin.

We recently held an electric vehicle (EV) conference where we gathered more than 300 clients, corporates and investors in Hong Kong. The topic sits well with what we want to do in the sector around mobility as an engine for growth and we think we can bring value-add to our clients.

EV adoption figures are impressive. In 2019, they accounted for 2.2% of the global total in cars sold, and rose to 13% last year. In China, the penetration figures are double. We’ve seen how this market can surprise everybody regarding adoption of new technologies. China did it with internet access, the smartphone, payments, and now EV. It’s exciting.

Q: You started in the IT department, held positions in Paris, Taipei and Hong Kong, before taking on Asia Pacific leadership at the height of the pandemic. What has shaped your career?

A: You’re right, I took the helm of the region in the middle of the pandemic. I was very fortunate to have been based in Asia for more than 20 years, so I knew the people, the teams, key clients and our platforms, which helped tremendously. During the pandemic, we adopted new technologies and forms of digital communication to stay close to our clients. We succeeded and the vast majority of our clients did also.

I think I’ve been lucky. I started in IT – I’m not sure I was good enough to stay in it, but my first business trip was to Hong Kong. I loved the place and dreamed of how amazing it would be to be based there. Thirty years later, here I am.

Like everybody, I’ve worked hard, but I was very fortunate, and at times, daring. When I wanted to switch from IT to credit, people said “No, Paul. We like you very much, but please don’t do something stupid. You already have a promising future.”

My response was to ask for a chance. I was curious to learn and probably would have gone elsewhere if I hadn’t been given opportunity. Fear around not succeeding makes you try harder and you don’t want to disappoint the people who see something in you.

A few years in, I moved from credit to corporate banking, where I was offered a great job in China – everybody wanted to be in China, but interestingly, it was a bit early – nobody was ready to do much there. So, I transferred to Taiwan to lead the corporate banking team and learned management on the ground. Doing quite well, I was later promoted to head of the territory and then after, moved to Hong Kong. That was 18 years ago!

For me, it’s been a combination of hard work, opportunity, luck and meeting the right senior people to support my development.

One memory that stands out was when the bank appointed a Hong Kong local to lead Greater China. It was a big move, as previously, the standard was someone French and male, but a Hong Kong woman took on the role and I worked for her for many years, learning from her insights. She believed in me and offered me the support to grow.

Q: What’s been the biggest highlight of your career to date?

A: This is difficult! But a key milestone was being given the opportunity to move from IT to banking. I’ve always liked a challenge – from coding, to implementing new tech systems and platforms, to what I do today.

I’ve seen many different things in my career and I have always been very curious. I’ve really cherished every opportunity I’ve had.

I’ve been very happy in the organisation and even today, it’s meaningful to partner with faces old and new. Back in 2004-2005, I had the opportunity to build a partnership in China. After much research, we invested in the Bank of Nanjing, which, two years later, was the first City Commercial Bank to list. There are many board members who I know well. It’s great for both them and me – it’s nice that our professional focus involves making core connections. It’s meaningful.

Q : If you weren’t in banking, what do you think you’d be doing?  

A : Very early on, I think we all wanted to be football players! For France or Argentina – the recent World Cup rivals!

Sometimes I reflect and think I would have been pretty good at teaching. But whatever alternate path I would have taken, it would have involved international opportunity.

I grew up first in Taiwan before moving to France and it was at that point that I knew that I wanted to see the world and find opportunity to do so.

Of course, these days, when I look at my daughter evolving, I can see that there is a lot of opportunity ahead for her, more so than when I was young.  

¬ Haymarket Media Limited. All rights reserved.

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Commentary: Why would foreigners want an Indonesian golden visa?

Washington doesn’t follow a meal, according to the Congressional Budget Office. Rather, it predicts that over the next ten years, the fiscal deficit will total at 6.1 percent of the gross domestic product. The government has already spent the highest amount since 1998 — 14 %— on net interest payments.

Treasury bonds may no longer be owned by long-term investors, according to Jefferies capital strategist Christopher Wood.

Financial Control IN INDONESIA

Purchasing US$ 350,000 value of local government bonds appears to be a safer bet in this world environment. Indonesia also upholds fiscal discipline, possibly in large part as a result of the cash outflows it experienced during the Global Financial Crisis.

These days, Jakarta maintains a 3 % self-imposed cap on its fiscal shortfall, even at the cost of slower growth. The most recent Income forecast for 2024 is 2.29 percent.

This conservative stance is a welcome story in an environment full of purchase. Buyers are concerned about how little debt is excessive and when a full-fledged economic collapse may occur in China, the European Union, and the US.

However, in Indonesia, household debt only makes up 9 % of GDP andnbsp; in fact, less than 60 % of the country’s 274 million young people have bank accounts.

For tech companies who want to be more than quiet investors and experiment with banking and financial participation, this balance-sheet environment offers a great option. People prefer to possess smartphones over televisions and washing machines because portable devices are so common.

Social media sites like TikTok, on the other hand, have a significant impact on Gen Z because they connect Indonesians while also protecting them from the turbulent, debt-fueled world.

And Bali, the sub-tropical riding and yoga haven, should not be overlooked. I observed young digital nomad typing frantically on their laptops in chic cafes last summer while participating in a yoga retreat it.

I felt jealous. I’d like to relocate it. The beautiful visa of Indonesia certainly merits a good look.

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G20 laments war in Ukraine but avoids blaming Russia

India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi (C) speaks during the first session of the G20 Leaders' Summit at the Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi on September 9, 2023. (Photo by Ludovic MARIN / POOL / AFP) (Photo by LUDOVIC MARIN/POOL/AFP via shabby graphics)shabby graphics

A joint resolution, which includes a statement on the conflict in Ukraine, has been agreed upon at the G20 summit in India.

The G20 leaders condemned the use of force for regional gain on the first day of their two-day meeting, but they refrained from criticizing Russia instantly.

The statement, according to the Polish government, is” nothing to be happy of.”

A number of international issues, such as climate change and the debt burden on developing nations, were also covered at the elevation in Delhi.

But at the G20 summit, it was a time of unexpectedly significant articles.

Given the strong divisions within the team over the conflict in Ukraine, some anticipated a joint resolution, not least on the first day of the mountain.

However, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared that the resolution had received widespread support.

An earlier review of the charter that was accessed by the BBC on Friday contained a clear indication that last-minute negotiations were ongoing: it stated the paragraph on Ukraine was left vacant.

The Ukraine conflict was the sticking point, as it was at the Bali summit the previous year.

The Delhi Declaration seems to be intended to make it possible for both Russia and the West to get advantages. However, in the process, it has used terminology that is less forceful in its criticism of Moscow than it was in Bali the previous year.

Although it noted that” there were other landscapes and different analyses of the condition and sanctions ,” the people in Bali condemned” in the strongest term” the brutality by the Russian Federation against Ukraine.

NEW DELHI, INDIA - SEPTEMBER 09: Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India holds a bilateral meeting with British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak during the G20 Leaders' Summit on September 9, 2023 in New Delhi, Delhi. This 18th G20 Summit between 19 countries and the European Union, and now the African Union, is the first to be held in India and South Asia. India's Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, is the current G20 President and chairs the summit. (Photo by Dan Kitwood/shabby graphics)

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Russia is not immediately criticized for the war in the Delhi resolution.

However, it does mention” the human suffering and additional negative effects of the Ukrainian war on the world’s food and energy security.” Additionally, it reiterated the acknowledgment of” different perspectives and evaluations.”

Importantly, rather than” the war against Ukraine ,” the declaration refers to the” war in Ukraine.” The probability that Russia would support the resolution may have increased as a result of this word choice.

Ukraine, which participated in the Bali conference, was never invited this time, and its reaction to the resolution has been negative.

The Russian foreign ministry tweeted,” G20 has nothing to be glad of in terms of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.”

The African Union( AU) was formally invited to join the G20 as a permanent member by Mr. Modi, which was the other major development.

As the cornerstone of its president, Delhi prioritized elevating the tones of these countries. In the near future, it is prepared to benefit from this strategic decision as it competes with China for influence in Asia and Africa.

African Union Chairman and Comoros President Azali Assoumani (R) and India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi hug each other during the first session of the G20 Leaders' Summit at the Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi on September 9, 2023. (Photo by Ludovic MARIN / POOL / AFP) (Photo by LUDOVIC MARIN/POOL/AFP via shabby graphics)

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The choice is also great news for Africa, which has 1.4 billion inhabitants and will now have a larger voice at international events like the G20.

Another fiercely debated subject was climate change.

There had been no consensus on the matter at the governmental level meetings in the weeks leading up to the mountain. However, officials now claim to have reached” 100 % consensus.”

Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman (L), India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi (C) and US President Joe Biden attend a session as part of the G20 Leaders' Summit at the Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi on September 9, 2023. (Photo by EVELYN HOCKSTEIN / POOL / AFP) (Photo by EVELYN HOCKSTEIN/POOL/AFP via shabby graphics)

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There has been a clear give-and-take on the environment in the resolution.

The G20 nations will” pursue and encourage efforts to triple renewable energy capacity globally through existing targets and plans ,” according to the statement. More than 75 % of greenhouse gas emissions come from G20.

In the past, developing countries had resisted raising their goals for renewable energy, cutting back on fossil fuel use, and lowering their emissions of greenhouse gases.

Developing countries have been able to buy day for greenhouse pollution to peak, at which point they will need to decrease.

According to the declaration,” timeframes for rising may be shaped by sustainable development, needs for poverty eradication, equity, and in accordance with various federal circumstances.”

The Green Development Pact, a plan to address the climate crisis through international cooperation over the next ten years, has also been emphasized by specialists.

In order to assist developing nations’ transitions to lower emissions, the G20 nations have also committed to working together to provide low-cost financing.

India had performed” fairly well” on natural finance, according to Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, head of the Eurasia Group’s South Asia practice.

” Green finance presently primarily originates in wealthy nations and travels between rich nations.” Private funding is essential to this funding. Yet emerging markets don’t grasp it. India has made efforts to alter that. Getting multilateral development banks to start de-risking private capital moves in the clean space is at the heart of it, he said.

Leaders of the G20 nations attend the second working session of the G20 Leaders' Summit at Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi on September 9, 2023. (Photo by Ludovic MARIN / POOL / AFP) (Photo by LUDOVIC MARIN/POOL/AFP via shabby graphics)

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Then there is the rising worry about debts. According to the World Bank, the world’s poorest countries have to pay bilateral creditors an annual debt service of more than$ 60 billion, which increases the likelihood of defaults. China is owed two-thirds of this bill.

The organization has stated that it wants to aid in the loan management of these nations. The Delhi Declaration has pledged to handle the country’s loan risks.

Navin Singh Khadka provided extra coverage.

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BlackRock closes China fund after lawmakers’ probe

After being investigated by the US House Select Committee for supposedly funneling American assets into stocks of blacklisted Chinese firms, BlackRock, the largest asset management company in the world, announced the closing of an offshore China equity portfolio. & nbsp,

According to Denise Voss, president of BGF, BlackRock Global Funds decided to discontinue the China Flexible Equity Fund due to a lack of new buyer interest.

Since August 24, when the fund’s net asset value ( NAV ) was roughly US$ 21. 4 million, no more subscriptions have been received. The fund’s NAV fell by 30.5 % the previous year. It was 25 % lower at the end of last year than it was in October 2017. & nbsp,

Managers” do not hope to raise significant additional membership in the near future ,” and” continuing to manage the account at this length will result in a higher price of investment that we believe is not in shareholders’ best interests ,” according to Voss.

The property in the fund’s underlying investment portfolio will be sold. On or before November 7, all outstanding shares may be redeemed. The fund’s shareholders have the option to change their opportunities to another account.

BlackRock assured the internet on Thursday that it is still firmly committed to the Chinese market. & nbsp,

It refuted reports that it was cutting off opportunities in China. BlackRock is not going to stop operating its onshore funds that have raised money in China, according to & nbsp, which stated that the China Flexible Equity Fund is for offshore investors.

scrutinized by politicians in the US

The US House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the US and the Chinese Communist Party informed BlackRock CEO Larry Fink and MSCI CEO Henry Fernandez on July 31 that their businesses were being investigated in relation to investments in specific Chinese firms.

The House select committee reportedly requested information from BlackRock and MSCI regarding their cooperation of US opportunities into around 50 Chinese companies that had been placed on a blacklist due to allegations of participation in alleged human rights violations or support for the Chinese army.

In a statement, BlackRock stated that it handles all assets in China in accordance with all relevant US regulations. & nbsp,

The research and the closing of BlackRock’s China Flexible Equity Fund are clearly related, according to observers.

According to social observer Chau Sze – tat on his YouTube channel,” The rising costs faced by BlackRock in China do not only suggest operating costs but also the dangers of growing political pressure from the US politicians.” In addition, & nbsp,

He claims that in the history, when US resources were profitable in China, they would not have given a damn if the US looked into it. BlackRock has since discovered that its customers no longer care about Chinese securities. To prevent problems, why not shut down its China Equity Fund?

Before US President Joe Biden signed an executive order restricting US money and businesses from investing in China’s silicon, quantum computing, and artificial knowledge fields on August 9, the investigation was launched. & nbsp,

As they exclude the ergonomics and clean energy industries, the investment restrictions are said to be softer than anticipated. Only businesses with at least 50 % consolidated earnings, net income, cash expenditures, or operating costs related to the protected business will be targeted. It implies that even though their products have invested in AI, US money can also trade stock of Tencent and Alibaba.

dumping A stocks

Net sales of A shares by offshore traders in August totaled 90 billion yuan( US$ 12.4 billion ), according to a report by The Financial Times on August 31. International investors, according to analysts, were disappointed that Beijing had not yet announced a more specific loan for developers of heavily indebted properties.

The Shanghai Composite Index dropped 1.13 % on Thursday, closing at 3,122. But so far this year, it has increased by 0.19 %. To reach 10, 321 on the Shenzhen Component Index, the decline was 1.84 percent. This time, it has lost 7.16 % of its value. In addition, & nbsp,

Given that many local individual owners have even lost money in recent years, some Taiwanese critics claim they do not hold BlackRock responsible for the closing of its China Flexible Equity Fund. & nbsp,

A Chinese blogger claims in a video posted on Thursday that it is difficult for individual traders to profit from the A-share businesses because some listed companies have fallen below their initial public offering costs. China’s property markets appear to have been created solely for business raising, not for financial gain by buyers.

He claims that although the amount of A-share firms has increased over the past ten years from 1,000 to 6, 000, not many of them are of high quality. He claims that listing regulations should be improved to boost investment trust. & nbsp,

In an article, a Guangdong-based financial blogger claims that BlackRock’s Foreign fund managers lack the knowledge necessary to avoid errors like investing in some very volatile stocks, like equipment supplier Suzhou Maxwell and solar panel manufacturer JinkoSolar.

Suzhou Maxwell has lost 59 % over the past year, while JinkoSolar has fallen 52 %. For the same time span, the Shanghai Composite Index has just dropped 3.5 %.

Tony Tang, China brain of BlackRock, resigned in June. All 12 of BlackRock’s China inland cash suffered losses as a result of this. Tang later became the China brain of Citadel LLC, an American wall bank. & nbsp,

BlackRock China New Horizon Mixed Securities Investment Fund A has experienced a 29.9 % decline over the past two years, compared to 30.55 % loss for the same fund. & nbsp,

Study: MSCI and BlackRock looked into opportunities in China

At & nbsp, @ jeffpao3 is Jeff Pao’s Twitter account.

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Stubbornly strong dollar looms large over G20 Summit

Fevered speculation of the dollar’s demise has gained intense currency throughout 2023. Yet the world’s reserve currency and the market bulls driving it ever higher haven’t gotten the memo.

This disconnect is sure to dominate discussions at this weekend’s Group of 20 summit in New Delhi, Indian.

Officially, the host, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, wants the September 9-10 confab to focus on cooperation and showcasing India’s rising clout in global trade and finance.

Yet the sideline of these events is where the real action happens. And a major source of discord is why the dollar is climbing for an eighth straight week, the longest such streak since 2005.

The plot thickens when you consider that the US Federal Reserve is wrapping up its tightening cycle, Washington’s dangerous fiscal trajectory continues apace and many G20 members are determined to sideline the dollar in global market circles.

“Many of the dollar-supportive factors of 2022 have abated,” says strategist Dwyfor Evans at State Street Global Markets.

He notes that other top central banks “are playing catch-up on rates.” And if China’s Covid re-opening trade reasserts itself, giving global demand a lift, “then cautious safe haven buying is on the back foot.”

Others argue that the surprising stability of the US service sector, despite still-high inflation and global headwinds, continues to offset trade weakness and support dollar buying.

“This resilience, whether looking at jobs growth, sticky inflation or consumer spending, is predominantly driven by services,” says strategist Adarsh Sinha at Bank of America. While the bank remains bullish, Sinha says, “In our view, a meaningful slowdown in the service sector is necessary if not sufficient for sustained US dollar depreciation.”

The more capital the dollar lures out of the developing world, the less there is to finance growth, keep bond yields stable and help private sector companies innovate, disrupt and create new wealth.

Past periods of extreme dollar strength – including the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis – posed existential financial risks to emerging markets. Yet the writing is seemingly on the proverbial wall, notes Natasha Kaneva, head of global commodities strategy at JPMorgan.

“The US dollar, one of the key drivers of global oil prices, appears to be losing its once powerful influence,” Kaneva says.

The bank’s research corroborates views that dollar strength and oil prices are steadily weakening. This, of course, is partly by design, with oil increasingly being transacted in non-dollar currencies.

Case in point: G20 member Saudi Arabia, which along with China has ambitious designs for a post-dollar financial system.

Between 2005 and 2013, JPMorgan says, a 1% increase in the trade-weighted dollar would lower the price of international benchmark Brent crude oil by roughly 3%.

Dollar dominance in oil trading may be coming to an end. Image: Twitter

Between 2014 and 2022, an equivalent dollar gain only resulted in a 0.2% change in Brent crude prices.

Kaneva’s JPMorgan colleague, Jahangir Aziz, head of emerging market research, notes that “overall, we find that the importance of the dollar has declined significantly from 2014 to 2022.” It’s “hard to ignore” this downshift, Aziz says.

China’s pivot to using the yuan in almost all of its Russian oil purchases is a major factor. Asia’s biggest economy is a huge energy buyer with great sway over smaller nations keen to tap its markets.

Despite international trade sanctions, Russian oil is finding ready demand from Asian trading partners using local currencies rather than the dollar.

It’s complicated, certainly. Both China and the US are keeping score of countries ignoring Washington’s sanctions and curbs imposed in punitive response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The trajectory is toward less dollar use. For now, the dollar is still at the center of the global financial system and US Treasury securities remain a safe haven of choice.

Within the SWIFT payments system, the dollar share of transactions is north of 40%, affording it the dominant position. The euro’s share is about 25%, while the yuan’s is roughly 3%.

But the dollar’s share in foreign reserves volume was a record low 58% at the start of 2023, down from 73% in 2001.

Old habits die hard, though. In a recent report, economists at JPMorgan conclude that while “marginal de-dollarization” is afoot, it won’t unfold rapidly. The dollar, for all its flaws, is simply too ingrained in global transactions to shift to another monetary unit in short order.

“Instead,” JPMorgan economists write, “partial de-dollarization – in which the renminbi assumes some of the current functions of the dollar among non-aligned countries and China’s trading partners – is more plausible, especially against a backdrop of strategic competition.”

Some are far less convinced that the dollar’s days are numbered. As economist Steve Hanke at Johns Hopkins University notes, “only 14 dominant international currencies have existed since the 7th century BC. This suggests that dethroning King Dollar will be easier said than done.”

Barry Eichengreen at the University of California, Berkeley, notes that the reasons why most economies favor the dollar “all reinforce each other.” He adds “there just isn’t a mechanism for getting banks and firms and governments all to change their behaviors at the same time.”

Yet US fiscal and political strains are colliding with global efforts to knock the dollar down a peg or two or more.

In August, Fitch Ratings yanked away Washington’s AAA credit rating. The rating agency said its downgrade “reflects the expected fiscal deterioration over the next three years, a high and growing general government debt burden, and the erosion of governance relative to AA and AAA rated peers over the last two decades that has manifested in repeated debt-limit standoffs and last-minute resolutions.”

Washington’s debt topping US$32 trillion was one problem. “Continued fiscal expansion/deficits could result in additional downgrades from rating agencies,” notes strategist Lawrence Gillum at LPL Financial. “So, until the US government gets its fiscal house in order, we’re likely going to see additional downgrades.”

Another big concern: Republican Party members toying around with the nation’s debt ceiling. “In Fitch’s view, there has been a steady deterioration in standards of governance over the last 20 years, including on fiscal and debt matters, notwithstanding the June bipartisan agreement to suspend the debt limit until January 2025,” the rating agency said.

A number of G20 members may find this weekend’s summit in New Delhi fertile ground to try and accelerate the dollar’s demise. It presents a timely opportunity for China, Russia, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and others to compare notes on devising a new reserve currency.

Earlier this year, Brazil began doing trade in other currencies like the Chinese yuan and Russian ruble. Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva threw his support behind creating a BRICS monetary unit to be used by members Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

BRICS nations are contemplating the creation of a new joint currency. Image: Shutterstock / Twitter / Bitcoin.com

Meanwhile, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim said China is open to resurrecting the formation of an Asian Monetary Fund, a move that would reduce the International Monetary Fund’s influence and revive a decades-old proposal to marginalize Washington’s power in Asia.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s efforts to internationalize the yuan are bearing some fruit. France, for example, is beginning to conduct some transactions in yuan. China and Brazil have agreed to settle their trade in yuan and reals.

Beijing and Moscow are ramping up trading in yuan and rubles. Pakistan is working to pay Russia for oil imports in yuan. Argentina recently doubled its currency swap line with China to $10 billion.

This month, Bank of China, one of China’s big four state-owned commercial institutions, opened its first branch in the Saudi Arabian capital of Riyadh with big plans to expand the use of the yuan in finance and trade there.

At the opening ceremony, BOC president Liu Jin said its new foothold in the Saudi capital will broaden trade and investment exchanges. Those include new “high-quality” construction projects via Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative.

It’s but one example of efforts amongst BRICS members to rely more on local currency settlements in cross-border trade while reducing dollar-denominated transactions.

At the same time, India and Malaysia are increasing use of the rupee in bilateral trade. The United Arab Emirates is also talking with India about doing more non-oil trade in rupees. 

The 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations is doing more regional trade and investment in local currencies. Indonesia, ASEAN’s biggest economy, is working with South Korea to ramp up transactions in rupiah and won.

Yet, despite all of these de-dollarization efforts, the greenback continues to defy gravity.

One explanation, says strategist Elsa Lignos at RBC Capital Markets, is that the dollar is currently the highest yielder in the Group of 10, offering even higher returns than many perceived as riskier emerging markets. RBC’s base case, Lignos says, is for the dollar to remain on an upswing until year-end.

The odds of additional Federal Reserve rate hikes are another wildcard.

“The recent upward trajectory in oil prices has laid the groundwork for potentially elevated consumer price index figures for August,” says Stephen Innes, managing partner at SPI Asset Management.

“These impending increases in oil prices present a fresh challenge for central banks as they continue their diligent efforts to bring inflation levels back in line with their desired targets.”

The dollar’s stubborn advance is ringing alarm bells in Asia as currencies hit multi-month lows. The worry is that capital outflows will accelerate, slamming equity markets and increasing risks of importing inflation.

Such concerns have done the near impossible: put China and Japan on the same side of an international debate.

China and Japan hold trillions of dollars worth of US Treasury debt. Image: Agencies

Officials in Tokyo are particularly worried that the yen’s drop to near 30-year lows will accelerate. “If these moves continue, the government will deal with them appropriately without ruling out any options,” says Masato Kanda, vice finance minister for international affairs.

In Beijing, People’s Bank of China officials are using daily yuan reference rates to warn against speculators pushing the exchange rate much lower. China’s waning growth prospects have economists at Morgan Stanley taking a bearish view on emerging market currencies in general.

Still, arguments for why the dollar’s best days are behind it will be the talk of the town in New Delhi, whether that’s actually the case or not.

Follow William Pesek on X, formerly known as Twitter, at @WilliamPesek

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China’s bazooka stimulus days are done and gone

A great deal is riding on Li Qiang’s visit to Jakarta this week, the new Chinese premier’s first official stop in Southeast Asia.

For all the disappointment that Chinese leader Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden won’t be at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit, Li is the one from which ASEAN leaders most want to hear.

In March, Xi entrusted Li to revive flagging mainland growth and restart big-picture reform efforts.

How Li characterizes Beijing’s plans for the world’s second-biggest economy means more for developing Asia than the West, given the ASEAN region’s extreme vulnerability to weakening Chinese growth. That’s especially true as China resists firing its stimulus “bazooka” during this latest downturn.

Since January, ASEAN has found itself grappling with two big misconceptions about China’s 2023. One, that the end of Covid-19 lockdowns would generate explosive growth and lift global demand. Two, that China would ramp up stimulus quickly and with overwhelming force amid signs the economy was struggling instead.

China’s slide toward deflation confounded the first assumption. Beijing’s surprisingly laid-back approach to cratering growth also caught developing Asia by surprise.

Li’s biggest challenge in Jakarta is reassuring ASEAN leaders that (a) rumors of a Chinese financial crisis are greatly exaggerated and (b) the region’s prospects have more to gain from allying with China than Biden’s America.

That’s become a bigger challenge as Beijing holds its fire on stimulus, dimming hopes the economy might hit its 5% economic growth target. Nor did the moves of recent days reassure ASEAN that China might fire its bazooka.

On September 1, for example, China moved to support its shaky property sector by cutting minimum down payments for mortgages to 20% for first-time buyers and 30% for second-time buyers nationwide.

The People’s Bank of China also cut the reserve requirement ratio on foreign exchange deposits, unleashing US$16 billion of liquidity to support a yuan that’s fallen 5% in four months.

The step came after regulators slashed margin requirements and stamp duties for equity transactions to “invigorate the capital market and boost investor confidence.”

All this sparked hopes Beijing was getting serious about rescuing its beleaguered property and financial sectors. Yet these are relatively modest tweaks that are unlikely to alter the downward trajectory of Asia’s biggest economy.

A worker at the construction site of Raffles City Chongqing in southwest China’s Chongqing Municipality. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP / Wang Zhao

A sustained rally in Chinese stocks and revival in economists’ perceptions is “unlikely without more aggressive action to stabilize the ailing property sector and lift aggregate demand,” says economist Charles Gave at Gavekal Dragonomics.

Of course, the urgency is rising. Last week, for example, saw Guangzhou become the first “tier one” city to cut down payments and loan rates for many home purchases. Other cities followed Guangzhou’s lead, including Beijing and Shanghai, which loosened local property market restrictions late.

“But there remains little prospect of big-bang stimulus at the national level,” Gave says. “As a result, aggregate demand will continue to be subdued and growth weak.”

China’s downshift, Gave adds, “will have differing effects on different economies around the world. In Asia, manufacturing exporters partially dependent on Chinese final demand, such as Taiwan, will take a hit, although the pain will be mitigated by a nascent upturn in the electronics cycle.”

The US, he adds, “with little macro exposure to Chinese demand, will be relatively insulated. But Europe will suffer the twin blows of reduced Chinese demand for its exports, together with heightened Chinese competition against its manufacturers because of the soft renminbi.”

To be sure, Li has solid arguments to make that China isn’t unraveling in the ways Western media and commentators suggest. Xi and Li have ample latitude and enough levers to prop up growth if and when they choose.

The recent successes by Huawei Technologies and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp (SMIC) demonstrate how China Inc is navigating around US sanctions in nimble and creative ways.

The chip breakthrough buttressed the argument that the Sino-US trade war isn’t slowing China’s ambitions to move upmarket.

It helps, too, that for all the asset bubbles afflicting the Chinese economy, no specific tract of land has ever been worth as much as California as Tokyo’s Imperial Palace was in Japan’s frothy 1980s.

Still, Xi and Li are determined to balance the short-term desire to boost growth with the longer-term imperative of recalibrating growth engines. However, this is causing consternation across Asian economies that were betting on a post-Covid Chinese growth surge.

In recent months, global markets have ricocheted between excitement over a Chinese stimulus boom and disappointment over Beijing taking its sweet time to jolt a slowing economy.

Xi and Li have settled on a strategy somewhere in between by breaking the economy’s fall without giving too much support that would incentivize bad corporate behavior.

Li Qiang and Xi Jinping have their economic policy work cut out for them. Image: Twitter / Screengrab

Under the surface, there are myriad hints that Li’s arrival in March put economic reforms on the front burner. In other words, Beijing now cares more about avoiding boom-bust cycles going forward than mindlessly generating new imbalances in 2023.

This anti-Mario Draghi moment has taken ASEAN by surprise. In 2012, the then-president of the European Central Bank made his infamous pledge that he’s “ready to do whatever it takes” to stabilize the financial system via powerful monetary easing.

On Draghi’s watch, the ECB unleashed stimulus on a level that would’ve been unfathomable to Bundesbank officials of old. His aggressiveness inspired other central bankers to follow suit, including then-Bank of Japan Governor Haruhiko Kuroda.

In Tokyo, between 2013 and 2018, the Kuroda-led BOJ’s balance sheet swelled to the point where it topped the size of Japan’s $5 trillion economy.

In both cases, a monetary boom did little, if anything, to make the broader European or Japanese economies more competitive, productive or, broadly speaking, more prosperous. Instead, rich monetary support generated a bubble in complacency.

Excessive monetary easing in Europe, Japan and elsewhere took the onus off government officials to loosen labor markets, reduce bureaucracy, incentivize innovation, tighten corporate governance or invest big in strengthening human capital.

China, it seems, is determined to go the other way. In the months since Xi started his third term — and Li arrived on the scene as his No 2 — Beijing has confounded the conventional wisdom on Chinese stimulus even as clear economic headwinds persist.

The closely-watched purchasing managers’ index (PMI) survey showed worse-than-expected non-manufacturing activity in August. A Caixin survey showed China’s service sector last month expanded at its slowest pace in eight months.

“As market competition was still tight, there was limited room for service companies to raise prices for customers, with the gauge for prices charged recording the lowest level in four months,” says economist Wang Zhe at Caixin Insight Group.

The services PMI suggests “activity in other services industries such as property may have deteriorated further in August,” Goldman Sachs wrote in a note.

One key market worry, says Goldman strategist Danny Suwanapruti, “is whether a weaker Chinese yuan will spur significant capital outflows. However, FX reserves are high, commercial banks’ external assets have been built up and the PBOC has tightened capital outflow channels.”

For now, says analyst Michael Hewson at CMC Markets, the outperformance of the dollar “is coming against a backdrop of rising optimism about the prospects for the US economy.” That, in turn, has markets wondering how a weaker yuan might affect global markets.

Former top International Monetary Fund official Josh Lipsky notes that the fallout from China’s slowdown “can’t just be wished away” and further weakness will “change some of the fundamentals of how the global economy has been wired over the past several decades.”

Jyotivardhan Jaipuria, founder of Valentis Advisors, believes that “China is perceptibly slowing down and that will have a secular slowdown in growth because they probably overbuilt the infrastructure.”

Now, he says, Beijing will “have to go through a phase where that whole overbuilt infrastructure which drove all the GDP growth for the last many years is going to start hurting them.”

The property sector also remains a considerable concern.

Troubles at Country Garden, China’s largest private property developer, are reminding markets that default risks abound. Recent days brought news that the company reported a record half-year loss of 48.9 billion yuan ($6.75 billion) for the first six months of 2023.

The resulting capital outflows have Li’s team unveiling fresh moves to boost personal income tax deductions for childcare, parental care and education. Additional steps to build a better social safety net that encourages consumption over savings are vitally needed.

“Policy momentum is clearly picking up,” says Citigroup analyst Yu Xiangrong. “This macro backdrop could be more supportive for China assets.”

China’s policy response aims to avoid more moral hazard risks. Image: Twitter Screengrab

Economist Hao Hong at Grow Investment Group adds that “economic fundamentals, as reflected in the cyclical asset prices, have so far failed to respond to policies as they used to. More needs to be done and will be.”

Yet things are only picking up so much as Beijing avoids another Draghi-like stimulus boom that will just add to China’s long-term troubles and squander recent progress made in deleveraging the economy.

It’s up to Li to explain to ASEAN officials – and global markets – why things are different this time in China. The more directly and transparently he does it, the better it will go over with China’s neighbors and the wider world economy.

Follow William Pesek on X, formerly known as Twitter, at @WilliamPesek

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pitchIN appoints Xelia Tong as COO

will be in charge of PitchIN’s businesses, including its IEO and ECF platforms.A well-known figure in the first investment and fundraising sectors in M’siaXelia Tong has been named Chief Operating Officer by pitchIN, successful as of 1 September 2023.Tong is a well-known figure in Malaysia’s early-stage funding and funding community. She…Continue Reading

Measuring Raimondo’s ‘big step forward’ with China

Commenting on her recent visit to China, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo said, “It was a big step forward. We can’t solve any problems without first communicating.”

US-China relations had apparently deteriorated to the point that just talking can be regarded as progress. But that also suggests recognition that there are limits to the US government’s ability to suppress the development of China’s economy.

In its readout of Raimondo’s Meeting with Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao, the US Commerce Department said that Raimondo and Wang agreed to: 

  • “Establish a new commercial issues working group, a consultation mechanism involving US and PRC government officials and private sector representatives to seek solutions on trade and investment issues and to advance US commercial interests in China. They agreed that the working group will meet twice annually at the vice minister level, with the US hosting the first meeting in early 2024.
  • “Launch the export control enforcement information exchange, which will serve as a platform to reduce misunderstanding of US national security policies. The first in-person meeting will occur at the assistant secretary level at the Ministry of Commerce in Beijing on Tuesday, August 29.
  • “Convene subject matter experts from both sides to hold technical discussions regarding strengthening the protection of trade secrets and confidential business information during administrative licensing proceedings. 
  • “Communicate regularly at the secretary and minister level about commercial and economic issues and to meet in-person at least once annually.” 
China’s Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao and US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo. Photos: Asia Times Files / AFP and SCIO.GOV.CN

The announcement was welcomed by the US business community. Michael Hart, president of the American Chamber of Commerce in China, was quoted by The Wall Street Journal as saying,“It feels like the machine has started again.” It “cools the tone, making it more constructive and less combative.”

Raimondo was careful not to overstate her success. On August 30, after “three days of productive meetings,” she said, “I have no expectation that on my first visit, after my first meetings with Chinese officials, we would suddenly resolve specific issues. I came to lay it on the line directly and precisely … challenges US companies and workers are facing.”

US business, she said, needs “a predictable regulatory environment,” including “transparency and the fair application of laws and regulations.” Without this, US firms increasingly regard China as “uninvestible.”

Raimondo was reported to have told Chinese Premier Li Qiang that “President Biden asked me to come here to convey the message that we do not seek to decouple. We seek to maintain our US$700 billion dollar commercial relationship with China.”

On the other hand, Raimondo also said, “There is no room to negotiate when it comes to protecting America’s national security, including detecting emerging technology.”

But where does concern about national security end and ordinary commerce begin? The conclusion of the Commerce Department’s readout indicates no change in US policy:

Finally, Secretary Raimondo reinforced the administration’s commitment to taking actions necessary to protect US national security and reiterated the administration’s “small yard, high fence” approach, underscoring that export controls are narrowly targeted at technologies that have clear national security or human rights impacts and are not about containing China’s economic growth. 

But less than a month before, on August 9, US President Joe Biden issued an executive order stating that the advance of semiconductor, microelectronics, quantum computing and artificial intelligence technologies in China constitutes a “an unusual and extraordinary threat” to the national security of the United States. Declaring it a “national emergency,” he ordered the establishment of procedures to restrict US outbound investments that could exacerbate this threat.

Aimed primarily at private equity, the executive order covers a broad range (not a “small yard”) of technologies. In addition, at US instigation, new and potentially damaging Dutch and Japanese sanctions on the Chinese semiconductor industry are coming into effect.

At the same time, however, the US has reportedly decided to allow Taiwanese and South Korean semiconductor makers including TSMC, Samsung Electronics and SK hynix to continue to ship equipment and other supplies to their factories in China.

As for US companies, Micron Technology plans to invest another $600 million in its integrated circuit packaging facility in Xian, while Intel has established a technology development facility in Shenzhen.

With the assistance of local government, the Intel Greater Bay Area Innovation Center will provide technical assistance and marketing support for Chinese companies in fields that are likely to include AI, edge computing, server and PC applications and energy efficiency.

Intel Greater Bay Area Innovation Center. Photo: Asia Times files

Obviously, the world’s leading semiconductor companies do not regard China as “uninvestible” – except in the sense that the US government has made it difficult for them to invest in China. Anyway, for the time being they have been granted a reprieve in what for them is a crucially important market.

Speaking at the Aspen Security Forum in July, Intel CEO Pat Gelsinger said, “Right now, China represents 25% to 30% of semiconductor exports. Right, if I have 25% to 30% less market, I need to build less factories, right? You know, we believe you want to maximize our exports to the world.… You can’t walk away from 25% to 30% and the fastest growing market in the world…. this is strategic to our future, we have to keep funding the R&D, right, the manufacturing, etc.”

This message appears to have gotten through to the Biden administration.

The Chinese must be pleased, but they are not dropping their guard. In the three months to June, 39% of Tokyo Electron’s equipment sales were to China. That was up from 23% the previous quarter, which was also the average for the previous fiscal year. And China has reportedly ordered $5 billion worth of AI processors from Nvidia for delivery over the next several months.

While hedging against sanctions and shortages, China continues with its national campaign to develop the advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, design skills, computing capability and software needed to overcome the bans. Regular consultation with the US will not make this more difficult but it could, by keeping tempers in check, make it easier.

It is hard to escape the conclusion that Raimondo’s visit was a success for US business, for China and for reducing economic risk in the run-up to the US elections in November 2024. It does not appear to have done anything to increase US national security, but has left the door open for additional sanctions and activities aimed at “detecting emerging technology” in China.

Follow this writer on Twitter: @ScottFo83517667

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