25-year weak yen obsession is blowing up on Tokyo – Asia Times

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Forex traders who are betting on a yen bounce should talk to policy veterans who are more knowledgeable and not the current ones.

Officials from the Bank of Japan, Shunichi, Suzuki, Masato Kanda, and Kazuo Ueda, the yen’s government, argued that the renminbi is a victim of the Japan-US offer gap, while the yen was at its lowest point over the past year.

This is bedroom, as Hiroshi Watanabe, past vice minister of finance for foreign affairs, tells Nikkei Asia. Yet if Tokyo participates suddenly, there’s little opportunity for the yen to march from 159 then history, say, 150 to the US dollar, he says.

In the days to come, the chances are that the yen will continue to decline. The purpose: Tokyo’s 25- year- ancient poor- yen strategy is blowing up on Asia’s next- biggest economy in real time, leaving the currency on a upward path.

” The level of japanese loss in recent years is startling”, says Robin Brooks, scholar at the Brookings Institution. The Turkish lira, which has traditionally been the weakest money in the major markets, has lost more in real terms than the renminbi. However, since the end- 2019 – since only before Covid hit – only one money, the Egyptian pound, has fallen more than the yen in true terms”.

Brooks adds that,” no surprisingly, the level of this loss has sparked controversy on its drivers and how much further it can expand”. On some level, he explains, “yen weakness stems from Japan’s extremely high debt, which forces the bank to cover long- term government bond yields via available- ended bond buying”.

Finally, Brooks concludes,” Japan is a sobering stories about letting debt fall unchecked. Countries can impose limits on state bond yields with the help of their main businesses, but doing so only leads to weak currency depreciation.

Now that Watanabe is no longer employed directly by the government and is leading a Tokyo think tank, he can explain why the yen should n’t be viewed as a safe haven asset. And why does the market wager that the Ministry of Finance’s intervention wo n’t succeed?

A number of Asian governments have been using a weak yen-only strategy to encourage growth and combat inflation since the late 1990s. After Chinese officials claimed they were moving away from the old beggar-thy-neighbor policies, the ploy gained perhaps more significance.

The Liberal Democratic Party’s resumption of power in late 2012 is referenced below. With a strong plan to boost the business, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe came back into power.

Abe compared victory to the warrior analogy, which depicts how three projectiles fired at a target. Abe’s bolts, aimed at slaying depreciation, included intense monetary easing, more imaginative macroeconomic policies and a reform Big Bang.

However, structural changes to cut red tape, revive innovation and productivity, enable people and attract more major global skills were few and far between. Similar to how to create a new fiscal stance. Over the past 14 plus years, debt has remained high.

Instead, Abe prioritized lower interest rates and a weaker yen. To further the quantitative easing initiative that Tokyo had instituted in 2001, he appointed Haruhiko Kuroda as governor of the Bank of Japan in 2013. The BOJ had more stocks and bonds than it had in 2013 and 2018, so much so that its balance sheet surpassed Japan’s US$ 4.7 trillion gross domestic product.

Count the ways this strategy is backfiring. As the Fed tightened in 2022 and 2023, the yen’s weakness deepened. That made Japan vulnerable to rising oil, food, and other important imports.

According to economist Atsushi Takeda of the Itochu Research Institute,” the ideal scenario would be for wage gains to be passed on to prices and for prices to rise steadily.” Instead, “bad” inflation imported from abroad is undermining household and business confidence.

Goushi Kataoka, a former BOJ board member, notes that” cost- push pressure is heightening at a degree never seen before, prodding firms to raise prices”.

The yen’s decline is also gaining new life. It is possible that yen selling as a result of a certain threshold, as long as US-Japan rate differentials are above a certain threshold, even with some rate differential narrowing, says Barclays ‘ strategist Shinichiro Kadota.

However, the yen is falling because of investor confidence in the currency. So far this year, the yen is down more than 13 %. Its current course is raising questions about whether China will decide to accept a lower exchange rate as well. The yuan is on the verge of breaking point since 2008;

A weaker yuan is suggested as the best way to address the deflationary pressures on China. However, Japan’s experience serves as a warning about the advantages of putting aggressive monetary policy policies before policies to boost competition and disruption.

The BOJ basically inaugurated the biggest political and corporate welfare scheme in history. Since the late 1990s, it has made it more important for the 13 governments to rebalance growth engines and establish level playing fields.

Corporate executives felt less pressure to innovate, change, and take significant risks. For two- plus decades, it’s been easier to harness BOJ support than for CEOs to disrupt industry. In 2024, Ueda’s BOJ team is currently plagued by that BOJ-enabled complacency.

The yen is sagging again because it is Tokyo’s only real policy, as Watanabe and other Japanese policy veterans now acknowledge. This explains, in part, why Ueda has avoided any chance even just to start the process of normalizing rates. Ueda has jumped at every chance he has had to signal that change is on the way in his 14 plus months in charge.

The yen is still in secular-declining mode even if the MOF intervenes in the coming days. Too quickly is the BOJ able to feel at ease braking against the economy. Nor does Tokyo’s political environment encourage tighter policy.

The approval rating for the LDP’s current prime minister, Fumio Kishida, who is now 21 %, is the only factor that is falling faster than GDP. Ueda wants to blame the BOJ for causing Japan to go into recession, but that is last. The BOJ keeps its foot on the gas, but the yen drops as it goes.

According to Kelvin  Wong, senior analyst at currency broker Oanda,” softer prints of Japanese economic data may cause BOJ to delay its next interest rate increase to September in addition to the near-term increase in geopolitical risk premium coming out of the Eurozone as a result of the looming first round of French legislative elections scheduled this Sunday, June, supporting potential bids on the US dollar due to safe-haven demand.”

Japan contracted 1.8 % year on year in the January- March quarter. The one bright spot is exports, which are “having a positive impact”, says Yeap Jun Rong, market analyst at&nbsp, IG Asia Pte.

There’s an argument, though, that Japan’s economy is in worse shape than the official data suggest. &nbsp, Marcel Thieliant, economist at Capital Economics, points to hopes that exports alone will save the day.

He claims that the majority of the rise in trade values was caused by the yen’s sharp decline rather than by any discernible increase in volumes.

One wild card is the November 5 US election. If Beijing lets the yuan weaken, too, exchange rates could become a big controversy in Washington. No issue brings together Republicans led by President Joe Biden and Donald Trump like beggar-thy-neighbor scheming in Asia. That could add fresh fuel to trade- war politics in Washington, provoking retaliation in Beijing.

However, making up a claim that Japan is responsible for Washington’s policy is ineffective is not more credible. The preponderance of the data refutes both contentions.

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Putin’s high-risk North Korea gambit – Asia Times

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The Russian government’s excursion to North Korea affects international calculations, spreading volatility worldwide. China may now be interested in separating itself from him.

Shortly after establishing the People’s Republic of China ( PRC ) on October 1, 1949, China entered one of its most controversial historical periods. PRC leader Mao Zedong planned to attack Taiwan, where Chiang Kai- shek’s remnant nationalist forces ( Kuomintang or KMT ) had escaped. Stalin pressured Maoist to engage in the Korean War in the late 1950s, presumably because of his years of discussions with Americans. The conditions for a deadlock and peace that continue to this day were created by Chinese troops as they battled the Americans and fortified them.

Chinese treatment, but, prompted the US to build its ships in the Taiwan Strait, making the “liberation of Taiwan” difficult and turning it into the most unpleasant thorn in Beijing’s foreign legislation ever since.

There are many ideas and some ideas still floating around why Mao ordered his troops to Korea. But certainly, the Russians were acoustic in that choice. Stalin aided the Communists in their 1949 defeat of the KMT by providing Russian weapons and perhaps even Soviet forces. Stalin wanted to entice Mao and the US to ensure the success of North Korea. At a crucial time for China, Mao abandoned Taiwan in favor of the difficult North Korea.

The prominent Chinese journal Strategy and Management suggested that Chinese troops might encourage North Korea to engage in actual peace talks in the early 2000s, but many in Beijing were also looking for a way to advance. In returning, the US could offer better words to the PRC about Taiwan. The article’s author claims that North Korea reportedly demanded the publication’s closure. Beijing, fearing more escalations, complied.

Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia, appears to be trying to entice China farther away from the US using other means and implies. The days are very distinct, and Russia is significantly weaker than China, but the result may be related to 74 years ago – pushing Beijing furthest from Washington. China’s position on North Korea might once more be important.

Russia has tried to entice Beijing ever since the start of the conflict in Ukraine in February 2022. First, Beijing perhaps had believed in an easy Soviet win. When that did n’t materialize, Beijing attempted to maintain a certain distance. Even the most recent conflict with the US over Ukraine demonstrates that China’s place does not align with Russia completely. China emphasizes that it does not directly violate US requests ( for example, not giving weapons to Russia ). Yet, the US argues that China is aiding Russia’s military r- industrialization and that its bankers support Moscow’s money.

But Putin’s visit to Pyongyang shifts all indicators.

Russian and North Korean leaders claim to have signed a strong defense deal that resembles the one they did eight years ago. There is persuasive language it. Where does it keep China? Does it continue to erode relations with the West, or will it try to break free from the acknowledge and possibly join the alliance?

However, the new empire gave North Korea more flapping place from China’s widespread command, which existed before the Ukraine conflict. The empire tilted the Asian region’s energy balance against South Korea. Seoul will need to rebalance in order to cause the condition to worsen. This development is omitted from the PRC’s control.

Kim Jong-un, the president of North Korea, has his own ideas. During Putin’s attend to Pyongyang, he skipped the recently customary tribute to Kim’s father and grandfather. Moreover, Kim announced that his daughter would acquire his” throne”, breaking tradition. These details might reveal his desire to make some changes. The 74- yr- ancient truce may be in jeopardy.

It alters American and British perceptions of Putin, which is terrible news for China. Some American economists have argued that Russia should be protected in order to prevent Central Asia from bowing under the strain of China and to persuade Putin to rebel against Beijing.

But, perhaps the plan may be too convoluted. It is backfiring, giving Putin to several tools to perform.

If the Iraqi War Had Been Unique

The US was about to annex Iraq in 2003, claiming command of Afghanistan. Without resorting to excessive inner meddling, the United States would have established bases in both locations to maintain essential European communication routes if Saddam Hussein had been replaced by someone else and supported one Afghan tribe or group. By then, there could have been major changes in both places if its light-handed approach had also been combined with long-term support for improving education.

Incidentally, the American presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, by showing the area’s strategic importance, contributed to convincing China about the Belt and Road initiative ( BRI ) in the following decade.

In turn, it could have shown China, then on the gate about its coming, the USA’s strength and vision and helped shift Beijing towards transformation. The US would now be stronger with Iraq and Afghanistan and could have played a diverse game with China, gaining more global influence over time even if Beijing had continued without measures. In the years that followed, Putin may have behaved separately.

Today, the USA is in hard circumstances. The USA needs to combine hard opportunities. Putin is still a social brilliance who has spread his proper influence around the world, despite having socially lost the war in Ukraine and having been unable to militarily defeat Ukrainian opposition. He has repeatedly swayed China away from the US, reacted violently in Africa, supported Hamas and Iran, and stoked the support of politicians and businessmen in Europe. Then, he has secured North Korea’s copper- clad support, involving South Korea and Japan ( worried about an empowered Kim ) in the Russian war.

Because the US was stifled by the Ukrainian conflict, Beijing believed that China had rest for a while while it was still at war. That is no longer the case.

In this match, China is being portrayed as a slave with less breathing room. Unless China breaks Russia’s embrace, it will become an instrument in a Russian sport it ca n’t control. China is simply gaining fresh complications from its problems because it does not receive the support it needs from Russia despite its frictions and worries about the US and its relatives.

It’s like the 1950s all over again, Moscow is trapping Beijing. Mao could n’t break free. Did his successor, President Xi Jinping, handle it? Does he want to? Now more than ever, America is generally against China, making choosing a different way trying. Besides, thought processes, like physical movements, have inertia, and for China to realize it is being trapped by Russia and react accordingly would n’t be easy.

In this scenario, Putin is a wild cards, disrupting the world get to an extraordinary degree. He may get caught as soon as possible. The longer he roams freely, the more important the upheaval. More risk exists even now because of the possibility that he might make a diplomatic pact with China.

He is also dishonest, always keeps his word, and is impossible to trust. His political stance makes mid- to long-term techniques perplexed.

Cornering Putin does n’t come at no cost; it can have consequences and help pave the way for the future. It keeps China in the fray, opening up ability political and economic options. It secures Europe, wiping out Russia’s area of interest, which may mess things up in America, the Middle East, and Asia.

Francesco Sisci, an analyst and pundit on politicians with over 30 years of practice in Asia, is the director of&nbsp, Appia Institute, which actually published this article. &nbsp, It is republished with authority.

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Corner Putin, Agent of Chaos – Asia Times

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In: Asia

The Russian government’s excursion to North Korea affects international calculations, spreading volatility worldwide. China may now be interested in separating itself from him.

Shortly after establishing the People’s Republic of China ( PRC ) on October 1, 1949, China entered one of its most controversial historical periods. PRC leader Mao Zedong planned to attack Taiwan, where Chiang Kai- shek’s remnant nationalist forces ( Kuomintang or KMT ) had escaped. Stalin pressured Communist to engage in the Korean War in the late 1950s, presumably because of his years of discussions with Americans. The conditions for a standoff and peace that continue to this day were created by Chinese troops as they battled the Americans and fortified them.

Chinese treatment, but, prompted the US to build its ships in the Taiwan Strait, making the “liberation of Taiwan” difficult and turning it into the most unpleasant thorn in Beijing’s foreign legislation ever since.

There are many ideas and some ideas still floating around why Mao ordered his troops to Korea. But certainly, the Russians were acoustic in that choice. Stalin aided the Communists in their 1949 defeat of the KMT by providing Russian weapons and perhaps even Soviet forces. Stalin wanted to entice Mao and the US to ensure the success of North Korea. At a crucial time for China, Mao abandoned Taiwan in favor of the difficult North Korea.

The important Chinese journal Strategy and Management suggested that Chinese troops might encourage North Korea to engage in actual peace talks in the early 2000s, but many in Beijing were also looking for a way to advance. In returning, the US could offer better words to the PRC about Taiwan. The article’s author claims that North Korea reportedly demanded the publication’s closure. Beijing, fearing additional escalations, complied.

Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia, appears to be trying to entice China farther away from the US using other means and methods. The days are very distinct, and Russia is significantly weaker than China, but the result may be related to 74 years ago – pushing Beijing furthest from Washington. China’s position on North Korea might once more be critical.

Russia has tried to entice Beijing ever since the start of the conflict in Ukraine in February 2022. First, Beijing perhaps had believed in an easy Soviet win. When that did n’t materialize, Beijing attempted to maintain a certain distance. Even the most recent conflict with the US over Ukraine demonstrates that China’s place does not align with Russia completely. China emphasizes that it does not directly violate US requests ( for example, not giving weapons to Russia ). Yet, the US argues that China is aiding Russia’s military r- industrialization and that its bankers support Moscow’s money.

But Putin’s visit to Pyongyang shifts all indicators.

Russian and North Korean leaders claim to have signed a strong military deal that resembles the one they did eight years back. There is persuasive speech that. Where does it keep China? Does it continue to erode relations with the West, or will it try to break free from the acknowledge and possibly join the alliance?

However, the new empire gave North Korea more flapping place from China’s widespread command, which existed before the Ukraine conflict. The empire tilted the Asian region’s energy balance against South Korea. Seoul will need to rebalance in order to cause the condition to worsen. This creation is omitted from the PRC’s control.

Kim Jong-un, the president of North Korea, has his own ideas. During Putin’s attend to Pyongyang, he skipped the recently customary tribute to Kim’s father and grandfather. Moreover, Kim announced that his daughter would gain his” throne”, breaking tradition. These details might suggest his desire to make some changes. The 74- yr- ancient truce may be in jeopardy.

It alters European and American perceptions of Putin, which is terrible news for China. Some American economists have argued that Russia should be protected in order to prevent Central Asia from bowing under the strain of China and to persuade Putin to rebel against Beijing.

But, perhaps the plan may be too convoluted. It is backfiring, giving Putin to several tools to perform.

If the Iraqi War Had Been Various

The US was about to annex Iraq in 2003, claiming power of Afghanistan. Without resorting to excessive inside meddling, the United States would have established bases in both locations to maintain essential European communication routes if Saddam Hussein had been replaced by someone else and supported one Afghan tribe or group. By then, there could have been major changes in both areas if its light-handed approach had also been combined with long-term support for improving education.

Incidentally, the American presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, by showing the area’s strategic importance, contributed to convincing China about the Belt and Road initiative ( BRI ) in the following decade.

In turn, it could have shown China, then on the gate about its coming, the USA’s strength and vision and helped shift Beijing towards transformation. The US would now be stronger with Iraq and Afghanistan and could have played a diverse game with China, gaining more global influence over time even if Beijing had continued without changes. In the years that followed, Putin may have behaved separately.

Today, the USA is in hard circumstances. The USA needs to combine hard opportunities. Putin is still a social brilliance who has spread his proper influence around the world, despite having socially lost the war in Ukraine and having been unable to militarily defeat Ukrainian opposition. He has repeatedly swayed China away from the US, reacted violently in Africa, supported Hamas and Iran, and stoked the support of politicians and businessmen in Europe. Then, he has secured North Korea’s copper- clad support, involving South Korea and Japan ( worried about an empowered Kim ) in the Russian war.

Because the US was stifled by the Ukrainian conflict, Beijing believed that China was rest for a while while it was still at war. That is no longer the case.

In this match, China is being portrayed as a puppet with less breathing room. Unless China breaks Russia’s embrace, it will become an instrument in a Russian sport it ca n’t control. China is simply gaining fresh complications from its problems because it does not receive the support it needs from Russia despite its frictions and worries about the US and its relatives.

It’s like the 1950s all over again, Moscow is trapping Beijing. Mao could n’t break free. Does his successor, President Xi Jinping, handle it? Does he want to? Now more than ever, America is generally against China, making choosing a different way trying. Besides, thought processes, like physical movements, have inertia, and for China to realize it is being trapped by Russia and react accordingly would n’t be easy.

In this scenario, Putin is a wild cards, disrupting the world get to an extraordinary degree. He may get caught as soon as possible. The longer he roams easily, the more important the disturbance. More risk exists even now because of the possibility that he might make a diplomatic pact with China.

He is also dishonest, always keeps his word, and is impossible to trust. His political stance makes mid- to long-term techniques perplexed.

Cornering Putin does n’t come at no cost; it can have consequences and help pave the way for the future. It keeps China in the fray, opening up prospective political and economic solutions. It secures Europe, wiping out Russia’s area of interest, which may mess things up in America, the Middle East, and Asia.

Francesco Sisci, an analyst and pundit on politicians with over 30 years of practice in Asia, is the director of&nbsp, Appia Institute, which actually published this article. &nbsp, It is republished with authority.

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Bread & Kaya: Impact of the Cyber Security Bill 2024 on the Cybersecurity Industry in Malaysia

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In: Technology
  • The 14 commonly used Religion. 10’s of Chief Executive Powers may be abuseable.
  • Paramount any parliamentary determine implemented does not inadvertently inhibit creativity

Bread & Kaya: Impact of the Cyber Security Bill 2024 on the Cybersecurity Industry in Malaysia

The Cyber Security Bill 2024 ( hereinafter referred to as the Bill or Act ) was passed by Parliament on April 3, 2024. The Bill may become presented for Royal Assent and consequently gazetted into law.

( Unless otherwise stated, links to any parts herein shall be made to the Cyber Security Bill 2024.)

This innovative law aims to improve the national cyber security by providing for:

  • The National Cyber Security Committee’s formation
  • Duties and powers of the Chief Executive of the National Cyber Security Agency
  • What are the responsibilities and functions of the national critical information infrastructure (NCII ) sector leaders, respectively.
  • Control of cyber security risks and computer security incidents to regional critical information infrastructures
  • to regulate and provide for related issues for the providers of computer security services through licensing.

Digital security policy is hardly a new idea. Singapore passed the Cybersecurity Act 2018, Thailand passed the Cyber Security Act 2019, Vietnam passed the Law on Cyber Security in 2018, Australia passed the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018, and Ghana passed the Cybersecurity Act 2020.

Though bearing similarities to other foreign computer security legislations, the Bill brings back unique positions such as the Chief Executive and the federal critical information system market lead. These positions aim to give Malaysians a more industry-specific perspective on virtual safety management.

Amid the rising cyber intrusions in Malaysia, the Bill marks a vital step towards a secure online future. Through suggested steps, standards, and procedures, the country’s commitment to protecting NCII in both the public and private sectors is highlighted.

Applicability of the Bill

Regardless of nationality or citizen, the Bill will have an extra-territorial influence that will apply to anyone and apply to both domestic and foreign residents of Malaysia.

In practice, it may yet be difficult to capture international cybercriminals, especially if the criminals are usually based in states with weaker regulations and police. The potential impact of a wider extralegal approach on preventing or dissuading these criminals is limited.

While the Federal Government and State Governments are also content to the Bill, no trial action can be taken against them for any failure to comply with the rules of this regulation within this policy. The state will take all necessary steps to ensure that all government-related organizations, including those under the Federal Government, are compliant with the rules of this policy.

National Critical Information Network

The Bill introduces the NCII idea. It is defined as” computer or computer system which the disruption to or destruction of the computer or computer program would have a detrimental impact on the delivery of any company essential to the security, military, foreign relations, business, public health, public health or public attempt of Malaysia, or on the skill of the Federal Government or any of the State Governments to carry out its functions effectively”.

For instance, what laptop or computer systems are used to practice every banks or communications record? This includes

National Cyber Security Committee (NCSC )

The Bill establishes the NCSC, consisting of the Prime Minister, the Ministers accountable for certain government body and agencies, Chief Secretary to the Government, Chief of Defence Force, Inspector General of Police, Director General of National Security and two other persons who may be appointed by the Committee from among persons of position and knowledge in computer security.

The NCSC’s responsibilities include:

( a ) to plan, formulate and decide on policies relating to national cyber security,

( b ) to choose the best methods and tactics for addressing issues involving national cyber security.

( c ) to monitor the implementation of policies and strategies relating to national cyber security,

( d ) to consult and make recommendations to the Federal Government regarding policies and strategic measures to improve national cyber security.

( e ) to give directions to the Chief Executive and national critical information infrastructure sector leads on matters relating to national cyber security,

( f ) to oversee the Act’s effective application;

( g ) to do such other things arising out of or consequential to the functions of the Committee under the Act consistent with the purposes of the Act.

The NCSC shall have all the authority to carry out its duties in accordance with the Act, whether it be necessary, in connection with, or reasonably incidental to it.

The Chief Executive

The Act establishes the NCSC’s secretary, the Chief Executive ( Chief Executive ).

The Chief Executive is empowered under the Act to, among others, advise and make recommendations to the NCSC, implement policies relating to cyber security, appoint a cyber security expert, conduct a cyber security exercise for the purpose of assessing the readiness of any NCII entity in responding to any cyber security threat or cyber security incident, establish the National Cyber Coordination and Command Centre system for the purpose of dealing with cyber security threats and cyber security incidents and issue directives as necessary for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the Act.

Under Section 14, the Chief Executive has incredibly broad authority. Under section 14 ( 1 ), the Chief Executive has the power to direct for information. If he believes they have good reason to believe they have the information necessary to his duties and powers, he may require any person, public body, or organization to provide it. Failure of any person to comply with the request is liable to a fine not exceeding US$ 42, 440 ( RM200, 000 ) and/or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years.

The Chief Executive has a wide range of authority under this section because he or she may issue written notices to “any person” for the production of information, documents, or electronic media” as specified” or as the Chief Executive may choose. Though the duties and powers of the Chief Executive are set out in section 10, section 14 is still widely worded and this may be subject to abuse or exercised excessively or improperly.

The Chief Executive has complete discretion over the content and procedure of the direction for information. It is not subject to any external review processes. It is also noted that section 14 ( 1 ) uses the term “any person”. The Chief Executive may direct for such information from anyone, regardless of whether they own or run any NCII, with the deliberate choice of the term.

In any event, under section 14 ( 2 ), if the recipient of such a request does not possess the document, he shall state, to the best of his knowledge and belief, where the document may be found, and identify, to the best of their knowledge and belief, the last person who had custody of the document, and to state, to the best of their knowledge and belief, where that last- mentioned person may be found.

The recipient of such a request must make sure that the information, particulars, or copies of the document provided are accurate, and complete in accordance with section 14 ( 3 ), including a declaration that he is not aware of any additional information, particulars, or documents that might turn out to be false or misleading.

Failure of any person to comply with sections 14 ( 2 ) and/or 14 ( 3 ) will be liable to a fine not exceeding RM200, 000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to both.

NCII Sectors

The Bill sets out the following list of sectors regarded as NCII sectors that are crucial to Malaysia’s cyber security:

  1. the government
  2. banking and finance,
  3. transportation; 
  4. defense, national security,
  5. information, communication and digital,
  6. healthcare products and services
  7. water, sewerage and waste management,
  8. energy;
  9. plantations and agriculture,
  10. trade, industry, and economy, and
  11. science, technology, and innovation

NCII Sector Lead and NCII Entity

National Critical Information Infrastructure Sector Lead (NCII Sector Lead ) and National Critical Information Infrastructure Entity (NCII Entity ) are two different classifications introduced in the Bill.

The Bill defines NCII Sector Lead as “any Government Entity or person appointed as a national critical infrastructure sector lead for each of the NCII Sector. Any government entity or person may be appointed as the NCII Sector Lead for each of the NCII sectors, subject to the recommendation of the Minister in charge of cyber security ( Minister ). Each NCII Sector may have one or more NCII Sector Lead ( s ).

NCII Sector Leads will be, among other things, tasked with:

  1. designate any government entity or person as an entity which owns or operates NCII in respect of its appointed sector,
  2. create a code of practice that includes procedures, standards, and measures to safeguard an NCII within the NCII Sector for which it has been appointed ( Code of Practice ).
  3. implement the decisions of the NCSC and directives made under the Act, and
  4. monitor and make sure NCII entities fulfill their obligations.

NCII Entity is defined as” any Government Entity or person designated as an NCII Entity by a NCII Sector Lead, designated in such a manner as may be determined by the Chief Executive, if the NCII Sector Lead is satisfied that they own or operate an NCII”. If the Chief Executive is satisfied that the NCII Sector Lead owns or runs a NCII, he may also designate a NCII as an NCII Entity.

Government Entity means any ministry, department, office, agency, authority, commission, committee, board, council or other body, of the Federal Government, or of any of the State Governments, established under any written law or otherwise, and any local authority. Notably, an NCII Sector Lead, who is also a Government Entity, can only designate a government entity as an NCII entity.

NCII Entity may lose their designation if the NCII Sector Lead, or the Chief Executive ( in the case where the NCII Sector Lead itself is an NCII Entity ) is satisfied that the NCII Entity no longer owns or operates any NCII.

The NCII Entity’s responsibilities include, among others,:

  1. Introduce a code of practice: implement the measures, standards and processes as specified in the Code of Practice
  2. Audit: order an audit to be conducted to check whether the NCII entity is in compliance with the Act.
  3. Cyber risk assessments: conduct cyber risk assessments in accordance with the Code of Practice and directive.
  4. Notify the Chief Executive and the relevant NCII Sector Lead( s ) of any cyber security incident that has or may have occurred in connection with the NCII owned or operated.
  5. Provision of information: provide information relating to NCII owned or operated when there is a request by the NCII Sector Lead ( s ), when the NCII Entity procures or has come into possession or control of any additional computer or computer system which, in its opinion, is an NCII, or when a material change is made to the design, configuration, security or operation of the NCII.

We provide an explanation of what this entails because we think Cyber Security Incident will be of greatest interest to readers.

Cyber Security Incident

Any cyber security incident that may have occurred in relation to the NCII owned or operated shall be reported to the Chief Executive and the relevant NCII Sector Lead( s ) in accordance with section 23.

Upon receipt of the incident report, the Chief Executive will instruct an authorized officer to investigate the matter. The investigation’s goal is to determine whether an incident actually occurred and what can be done to correct it and take preventative measures to stop it from happening again.

Upon completion of the investigation by the authorized officer, if the authorized officer finds that-

No cyber security incident has occurred, and the authorized officer shall notify the Chief Executive of such findings and dismiss the matter accordingly.

( b ) &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, if the authorised officer finds that a cyber security incident has occurred, the authorised officer shall notify the Chief Executive about such findings and the Chief Executive shall notify the NCII Entity accordingly.

The Chief Executive may send a directive to the NCII entity concerned after being informed that a cyber security incident has occurred and how to stop such cyber security incidents from occurring in the future.

Failure of the NCII Entity to comply with the directive of the Chief Executive on the measures necessary to respond to or recover from the cyber security incident and to prevent such cyber security incident from occurring in the future is an offence and it will be liable to a fine not exceeding RM200, 000.00 and/or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years.

licensing of providers of cyber security services

Importantly, the Bill introduces a licensing framework for cyber security service providers. A cyber security service provider is defined as a person who offers a cyber security service, and any cyber security service that the Minister may designate and for which a permit is required. It was stated in the presentation slides provided at the public dialog session of the Cyber Security Bill dated 24 Nov 2023 that a cyber security service is a service provided by a person for reward that is intended primarily for or aimed at ensuring or safeguarding the cyber security of an information and communications technology device belonging to another person.

A person who follows section 27

( a ) &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, provide any cyber security service, or

( b ) promotes, promotes, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, &nbsp, in any way, or otherwise promotes his services as a provider of a cyber security service.

shall hold a licence to provide a cyber security service.
This does not apply where a business provides a service to a subsidiary company.

Any person or entity that provides cyber security services or holds themselves out as a provider of cyber security service without a licence shall be liable to a fine not exceeding RM500, 000 and/or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding10 years.

Foreign businesses that offer cyber security services in Malaysia must also register as such entities.

According to section 28, an applicant must not have any convictions for offences involving fraud, dishonesty, or moral turpitude. Additionally, the Chief Executive will set forth additional prerequisites for license applications.

Under section 29, when the Chief Executive receives the application for licence, the Chief Executive may approve the application and issue to the applicant upon payment of the prescribed fee a licence in such form as may be determined by the Chief Executive. The Chief Executive must explain the reasons why a licence application is turned down by him. The Chief Executive may issue a licence that is subject to such conditions as the Chief Executive thinks fit to impose, and the Chief Executive may at any time vary or revoke the conditions imposed on a licence.

Additionally, licensees are required to maintain and uphold records. They must record particulars such as the licence holder, or any person acting on his behalf’s name, details of the services provided, and any other particulars the Chief Executive requires. The records shall be kept and maintained in the manner that the Chief Executive may choose, kept for a period of at least six years after the provision of the cyber security service, and delivered to the Chief Executive at any time as the Chief Executive may request.

Based on the presentation slides provided at the public dialog session of the Cyber Security Bill dated 24 Nov 2023, the requirement of licensing will likely apply to service providers that provide services to safeguard information and communications technology devices of another person. Using the case of penetration testing, security operations centers, and providers.

In comparison, Singapore Cybersecurity Act 2018 also sets out the same types of service providers i. e. penetration testing and managed security operations centre monitoring.

Due to the sensitive client data they handle, these two services take precedence. They are also widely used in the Singapore market, making them influential in shaping overall security measures. Additionally, industry concerns that broader licensing requirements might prevent Singapore’s development of a vibrant cybersecurity ecosystem are taken into account when deciding to limit the licensing framework to these two services.

Positive step for Malaysia in the face of increasing and evolving cyber threats

In light of the growing and evolving cyber threats, Malaysia should take a positive and timely step with the Bill. The Bill has the potential to address existing legal gaps and enhance cyber defence mechanisms. In the context of a rapidly evolving cyber landscape, this is a significant milestone in protecting the NCII.

However, given the presence of certain uncertainties and shortcomings, it is hoped that such uncertainties and shortcomings can be resolved through implementations of regulations and guidelines. The Act must strike a balance between protecting the rights of the parties involved and promoting business.

Given the potential financial constraints that the NCII Entities may encounter while adhering to the provisions of the Act, it is imperative for the Government to extend support in various forms, such as tax benefits, incentives, grants or subsidies, guidance, to alleviate their burden, fostering an environment conducive to innovation and digital advancement.

In addition, it is crucial for the government to schedule an interim period of industry consultation and feedback, making necessary adjustments and responses, and ensuring its effectiveness in light of the Code of Practice’s implementation. It is paramount to ensure that any legislative or policy measures implemented within the cyber environment do not inadvertently impede innovation or hinder the growth of the digital economy.

Organizations can restrain their concerns by developing robust internal cybersecurity capabilities in spite of the difficulties caused by these changes. Due to the negative publicity and financial risks of cyberattacks, being prepared for cybersecurity is becoming essential for businesses. Organizations should be prepared, anticipate being designated as an NCII entity, and take proactive steps to ensure that once the Act is in effect, it will be in line with its requirements. This involves ensuring that they have the necessary processes, structures, and personnel to manage cybersecurity issues and comply with regulations.

These capabilities include the following:

1 ) strengthen their cybersecurity

2 ) review, update, and re-evaluate their current cyber security policies and procedures. If they lack such policies and procedures, they should consult with legal and professional experts to create them

3 ) take risk assessment measures

4 ) develop and implement effective risk management strategies

5 ) develop plans for responding to cyber security incidents.

6 ) obtain the necessary cyber insurance

7 ) threat intelligence analysis to anticipate potential threats

8 ) establish cyber security incident handling and digital forensics

9 ) carry out penetration testing and cyber-security network defense, and

10 ) foster cybersecurity awareness of the various types and sophistication of cyberattacks among employees and third- party contractors by organising regular and consistent cyber security training or tabletop simulations of cyberattacks.

While cost increases are inevitable, they are crucial when it comes to cyber insurance because it could lessen the effects of a cyber security breach or non-compliance with the Act. From an insurance standpoint, regulatory protection within a cyber policy covers expenses related to legal defence and investigation in the event of regulatory inquiries or claims arising from cyber incidents or mishandling of such events. Costs for breach response, data administrative investigation, and regulatory investigation costs are among the other insurable costs in a cyber policy. The requirement for mandatory reporting of cyber incidents can help insurers more accurately price risks and provide better protection.

Given the lack of standardized forms in the Asian cyber insurance market, organizations should be aware of their specific risk exposure when evaluating cyber insurance. Consequently, policies vary in their coverage. The breadth of coverage is largely determined by even tidbits of language. &nbsp,

Everyone at the company must be aware of cyber threats and attacks as a result of the widespread use of artificial intelligence and its growing use by threat actors for cyberattacks. This is particularly important because most cyber security incidents are often caused by human susceptibility, carelessness, or accidents.

Second year of Joanne Wong’s Help University’s Bachelor of Law program.

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Commentary: Malaysia is pushing the chips in on neutrality

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Investment IN SEMICONDUCTORS

Central to the Malaysian proposal is the recently introduced&nbsp, National Semiconductor Strategy, under which the Malaysian government will invest RM25 billion ( US$ 5.33 billion ) to transform the nation into a global semiconductor hub.

Selangor’s integrated circuit design area and Penang’s offshore” Silicon Island” are currently in development. These initiatives reflect Malaysia’s efforts to advance its place within the world’s semiconductor business and to provide alternative products to China and the US.

Malaysia’s bid to get investments beyond the US- China rivalry is no exclusive, but the country is nicely- positioned to achieve. Despite lacking a huge domestic market, Malaysia offers exceptional infrastructure and connectivity, a trusted and experienced workforce, an extensive network of free trade agreements, and pro- business policies. Local political challenges appear to be dissipating, further enhancing Malaysia’s attractiveness as a solid and beautiful purchase place.

Despite this, Malaysia’s state of neutrality may gain more popularity if Anwar embraced the Indo-Pacific concept with the same enthusiasm. The US- China rivals, mainly over Taiwan and the South China Sea, continues to pose major challenges.

US-China decoupling strategies are causing an exceedingly disjointed global trading system by causing the worldwide economic disruptions brought on by the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the COVID-19 pandemic. Malaysia, with its remarkably open market and proper location in the Indo- Pacific region, stands to lose substantially if tensions escalate.

Obviously, as with other small and mid power, Malaysia wants to ensure its business remains insulated, or at worse, adaptable to these problems. One of the main components that has negatively impacted the Malaysian economy in recent years is that it opens up the door for other supply stores to grow.

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Combined missile-drone hit sinks simulated US ship – Asia Times

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China sank a US cruiser in a new computer simulation while using ballistic missiles fired with grouping drones and regular warheads, underscoring the limitations of US marine defenses and the need for cost-effective missile defenses and kill-chain-disruption technologies.

A new study by the People’s Liberation Army that was published in the academic journal Command Control &amp, Simulation, revealed that China’s Fire Dragon 480 military ballistic missile may possibly drop a US Ticonderoga ship.

As for the Fire Dragon 480’s features, Janes reported in February 2023 that it has a variety of 360 km and a 480- gram weapon. The PHL- 16 Multiple Launch Rocket System ( MLRS ) can mount and launch two missiles from it.

Janes furthermore mentions that the program has been deployed with the Eastern Theater Command’s PLA 73rd Group Army, which deals with issues centered around the Taiwan Strait.

SCMP claims that the model involved 12 missiles slinging one of two Ticonderoga- school cruisers at once. According to the article, an average of six missiles may be needed to eliminate a large US warship.

In a different situation, SCMP points out that eight of the weapons had clustered helicopter weapons measuring six drones each. As the rockets approached the Ticonderoga ships, they released their helicopter payloads, reducing the ship’s firepower and giving more specific target coordinates for follow-up missile attacks. Any remaining drones that were redirected to attack other enemy ships were also mentioned in the post.

The simulation, in the opinion of SCMP, suggests that China’s PHL- 16 MLRS do need modern improvements to be entirely functional for the Fire Dragon 480 and drone swarming tactics. The US is eventually retiring its Ticonderoga-class ships, with the last one scheduled for decommissioning in 2027, according to the article.

US warship threats can be severely harmed by a mixed missile and drone attack because US warship defenses can only launch interceptor missiles with limited and expensive weapons and lack effective means of countering such an attack.

According to Asia Times, Foreign scientists developed a novel mono-rotor aircraft in March 2024 that could be divided into several smaller ones. Each smaller aircraft has the ability to perform various tasks. If weaponized, the uavs could be loaded in weapon grouping warheads to identify and eliminate targets separately.

This development in drone technology combines the capabilities of first-person view ( FPV ) drones with AI networking and autonomy, potentially making them formidable weapons.

Additionally, in January 2024, Asia Times reported on the US Navy’s light weapons programme losses, raising questions about how US ships did fare in a concentration helicopter and missile attack. Despite developments in solid-state laser technology, realistic problems like energy and space constraints prevent improvement on warships. The US Navy has deployed a dozen methods, but widespread deployment lacks a clear plan.

To successfully threaten US ship battlegroups and halt involvement in a Taiwan Strait conflict, China may require much more advanced weapons in addition to the Fire Dragon 480. The DF- 21 and DF- 26B intermediate-range nuclear missiles ( IRBM ) would be among those that are considered weapons.

The DF- 21D has a range of 500 to 2, 150 km and was tested against a ship destination in 2013, showcasing its increasing coastal hit features. China’s missile system remains a major focus for international security discussions, with estimates of around 80 atomic- tipped DF- 21 missiles and 50 to 200 nonnuclear variants in service.

The DF- 26B is an anti- ship version of China’s DF- 26 IRBM, capable of precise conventional and nuclear strikes up to 4, 000 kilometers away.

In terms of missile numbers, according to the US Department of Defense’s China Military Power Report 2023, China has 200 short- range ballistic missile ( SRBM ) launchers and 1, 000 missiles in that class, such as the Fire Dragon 480, 250 IRBM launchers, and 500 such missiles.

In May 2023, Asia Times reported that China simulated a hypersonic missile attack on the US supercarrier USS Gerald Ford and its escorts, sinking them. The simulation used 24 missiles in a three-wave attack, demonstrating how vulnerable US ships are to such weapons.

However, to effectively target US warships, China must collect target data, program and launch its missiles, and regularly practice and test the process. Moving warships must have effective homing sensors and guidance systems. If the US and its allies intervene in a Taiwan Strait conflict, defeating China’s missile kill chain is crucial.

Jim Mitre and Ylber Bajraktari make the point in an August 2023 Breaking Defense article that the main objective of China’s kill chain is to impede its ability to halt its attack. Mitre and Bajraktari suggest using low-cost, unmanned aerial and maritime vehicles to deceive China into identifying crucial targets. They claim that this tactic could cause Chinese forces to go to the wrong locations or force them to use advanced weapons on fictitious targets.

They add that a program that uses data from Chinese surveillance platforms could alert friendly units to potential surveillance and advise them to use decoys, camouflage, and other methods to conceal themselves. They point out that deception is essential for survival in contemporary warfare, as evidenced by the conflict in Ukraine.

Mitre and Bajraktari argue that the use of” smart” sea mines has the potential to be a strong defensive barrier. They claim that these mines can be repositioned to attack high-value targets or direct enemy ships to troubled areas. They point out that there are intelligent mines, but the tools to coordinate group movements and actions have not yet been developed.

Further, in a May 2024 Breaking Defense article, James Fairbanks emphasizes electronic warfare ( EW ) capabilities to defeat China’s missile kill chains.

Fairbanks insists that countermeasures must be adaptable enough to accommodate the enemy’s various methods and frequencies throughout the kill chain, from detecting a threat to intercepting it.

He claims that comprehensive countermeasures must break enemy kill chains across various attack stages and domains. This approach calls for encompassing the full range of threats, including their frequency, power, and waveforms, as well as continually improving electronic warfare systems and sensors with each new threat.

Fairbanks emphasizes that EW systems and sensors must be small, light, energy- efficient and cost- effective. They should also be compatible with open architecture for seamless integration with other systems and use advanced machine learning and AI algorithms to enhance performance and response time.

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Think China can take Taiwan easily? Think again – Asia Times

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” All forms of media is ]sic ] propaganda, we’re just more honest about it”. But declares the social media profile of&nbsp, Zhao DaShuai, a part of the&nbsp, Women’s Armed Police&nbsp, Propaganda Bureau.

Foreign technique is frequently characterized by its emphasis on deception, but like so many autocratic governments, the Chinese Communist Party frequently states precisely what it is doing and why it is doing it.

It is through this glass of&nbsp, propaganda&nbsp, and&nbsp, social warfare&nbsp, that China observers should examine the People’s Liberation Army’s “punishment tasks” around Taiwan, collectively referred to as Joint Sword 2024A. These activities, which were launched by Beijing as a response to Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te’s inaugural address on May 20, placed Chinese air and naval property in areas that would help Beijing to remove or establish a blockade on the island.

These activities were accompanied by a propaganda&nbsp, film, produced by China’s Eastern Theater Command, that showed an enormous salvo of missiles striking targets in Taiwan. The video‘s speakers declare that these strikes are intended to kill Taiwan’s wall of freedom. Hit the base camp of Chinese independence! Reduce off the blood stream of Chinese self-reliance”!

Seeing this in concert with China’s sustained&nbsp, force campaign&nbsp, against Taiwan, an motion of&nbsp, Chinese shipbuilding&nbsp, that extremely dwarfs American naval generation and a growing Chinese&nbsp, missile inventory&nbsp, with increasing threat ranges, one can easily see a grim picture of Taiwanese invincibility. A Chinese defense arrest of Taiwan would be fruitless, the message is clear.

US allies and partners who are considering defending Taiwan might question the viability and worth of intervening against quite a strong adversary as China. Additionally, the giant whose fist encircles their whole island nation may intimidate Japanese policymakers and voters. If weight is pointless, Taiwan and the rest of the world might make the wiser choice by reducing the pain of a future integration.

A mental fait accompli, this feeling is precisely what China seeks. China wants the world to think that no one can stop it and that it has already won.

China’s actual military might is less impressive and fragile than Beijing would have the earth think, despite the advertising. However, China’s control strategy may be successful if it reinforces what China watchers does now tend to believe.

For example, the Associated Press has &nbsp, accidentally used&nbsp, a doctored photo from Chinese state media of PLA military exercises. The narrative is removed from there. Many newspapers, television, social media, and academia now all tell the same tale of Chinese overmatch. In short: It has all the&nbsp, doctrinal hallmarks &nbsp, of effective deception.

Russia ran a&nbsp, similar playbook&nbsp, prior to its 2022 full- scale invasion of Ukraine, depicting its military as an overpowering force. The Russian façade of invincibility was quickly exposed by the fierce and persistent Ukrainian resistance against a foe with significant materiel and numerical advantages, even though Russia is and is an existential threat to Ukrainian sovereignty.

It’s another riff on the story of David versus Goliath. What China and Russia fail to remember is that, in that story, David wins.

It takes a multifaceted approach to expose this deception for what it is while exposing the Chinese vulnerabilities it aims to cover:

  • First, policymakers and the analysts who inform them must understand the nature and depth of Beijing’s influence operations.
  • Second, they must recognize Taiwan’s relative strengths and China’s relative weaknesses in a scenario of invasion.
  • Finally, they must thoroughly refute the claims of overwhelming Chinese influence and protect their populations from vile Chinese influence practices.

China’s influence campaign

China’s influence campaign in pursuit of this cognitive fait accompli is conducted across multiple lines of operation. The most obvious includes the overt demonstration of military strength in drills and exercises such as Joint Sword 2024A and accompanying propaganda videos.

China’s campaign is amplified on social media. The Chinese Communist Party provides funding for the , wumao, and tens of thousands of internet users paid by the Chinese government to repeat the regime’s propaganda and swarm those who appear to have views that are critical of it.

In addition, the Chinese government annually produces hundreds of millions of internet posts to&nbsp, distract users&nbsp, from any critical discussion of the party. Such influence operations occur not just&nbsp, on Weibo, the state- controlled Chinese social media platform, but also across X and other platforms to influence Western audiences. Many of these, despite their ham- fistedness, continue to generate significant followings and engagement.

The difficulty of a cross- strait attack

This aggressive squabbling across all information sources is intended to highlight Chinese strength as well as conceal its shortcomings in light of the realities of an attempt to militarily seize Taiwan. Such a mission would call for both an amphibious assault across the Taiwan Strait and the isolation and blockade of Taiwan.

China certainly has the air and maritime strength to&nbsp, establish a blockade&nbsp, around Taiwan, but maintaining one could become&nbsp, strategically&nbsp, tenuous&nbsp, for Beijing if it upended China’s economy, especially its international trade. It also would be operationally tenuous due to factors such as logistical sustainment, maintenance, and airspace control and coordination.

Blockade demonstrations like Joint Sword 2024A are extremely expensive and put a lot of strain on Chinese capabilities across the board, despite the temporary nature of the demonstations. A long, protracted blockade would eventually strain the Chinese military system, putting strain on the system to a greater degree, making sustainment improbable and vulnerable to disruption.

Should the United States and its allies intervene militarily, the “patrol boxes” vaunted on&nbsp, Chinese diagrams&nbsp, of their latest drill could just as easily become “kill boxes” for Taiwanese and US forces to target Chinese ships, especially those off of the island’s eastern coast.

China’s projection of power from Taiwan’s east coast to the mainland PRC coast is relatively straightforward, and it is likely that China will continue to be superior along these lines of operation. However, allies and partners who could intervene from the territories of Japan and the Philippines or via air and naval power from the Pacific are more likely to support Taiwan’s east coast. China would likely continue its military influence over the Taiwan Strait, but keeping it east of Taiwan is a bad idea.

Policymakers should also highlight the sheer&nbsp, difficulty&nbsp, of a cross- strait attack. A multi-layered amphibious assault from China into Taiwan would be larger and more complex than the Allied and Normandy invasion of World War II, which necessitated coordinated planning and coordination, which the bifurcated and politically divided services of the PLA lack.

A more apt analogy might be the failed Allied&nbsp, Gallipoli campaign&nbsp, of World War I, because China likely would lack the ability to achieve operational surprise and would be sailing into&nbsp, deadly waters&nbsp, filled with&nbsp, mines&nbsp, and&nbsp, munitions. And while Chinese troops may eventually make it to Taiwan’s shores, they likely would find themselves stranded and&nbsp, contained.

Establishing a lodgment is one thing, securing and expanding it is another. A 2023&nbsp, report&nbsp, by Mark F Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham identifies the many difficulties China would face in establishing a lodgment. The United States and Taiwan could take other steps to halt or stop the establishment of such a lodgment, according to the report.

The&nbsp, weaknesses&nbsp, inherent within an authoritarian, communist system only exacerbate these operational factors.

Countering China’s false narrative

Action must be taken both reactively and preemptively to counter China’s vile narrative. First, policymakers must highlight and make the most of China’s strengths and Taiwan’s weaknesses in an invasion scenario to the extent that classification and prudence allow.

They should reinforce, as often as possible, the&nbsp, will of many Taiwanese&nbsp, to fight for their autonomy and the strength and willingness of the United States, along with its allies and partners, to&nbsp, support Taiwan&nbsp, in such a fight. Put another way, they must demonstrate the net effect for the overall defense of Taiwan of the tightening alliances&nbsp, and&nbsp, partnerships that are being forged into a shield that&nbsp, continues&nbsp, to repel Chinese aggression.

Policymakers should draw attention to the comparisons between Moscow and Beijing and the example of Russia as an overt “emperor with no clothes.”

Finally, Taiwan and other countries should continue to pursue various other initiatives aimed at educating society against disinformation. Greater efforts to foster media literacy, from grade school to college, will help foster more critical consumers of information who wo n’t be so easily duped by disinformation in general and Chinese disinformation in particular.

Deliberately staffed offices tasked with identifying and combating Chinese disinformation could coordinate with and be amplified by public affairs and information offices across pro-Taiwan organizations.

Taiwan’s allies and partners can combat the potency of Chinese propaganda by exposing the truth about Taiwan’s vulnerabilities and Taiwan’s strengths across a variety of channels, helping to promote more informed and resilient strategies for supporting Taiwan’s security as well as stability throughout the Indo-Pacific.

Lieutenant Colonel Brian Kerg, USMC, is a nonresident fellow in the&nbsp, Indo- Pacific Security Initiative&nbsp, at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Follow him on X @BrianKerg.

This article was first published by the&nbsp, Atlantic Council. The opinions expressed here are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the US Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or any other US government figure.

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NEXT: AI Connect 2024 in Penang focuses on AI disruption

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  • Malaysia is learn from the upheaval created by AI and gain from it.
  • Bring AI people who work with colleges and universities?

NEXT: AI Connect 2024 in Penang focuses on AI disruption

” For the past few months, we saw significant investment from large companies like Microsoft and ByteDance into Malaysia,” said Penang-based serial entrepreneur Curry Khoo ( pic, below ), who is building his third startup right now, Noobs, an open-source playbook for the startup ecosystem in Southeast Asia, which was launched in 2022.” We saw heavy investment from Nvidia and other large companies like Microsoft and ByteDance into

A properly regarded society builder as well, Curry was not talking about Wordpress but instead, NEXT: AI Connect 2024, an occasion aimed at bringing together business leaders, companies, and AI fans on Jun 26 at The Ship Campus in Batu Kawan, Penang.

Curry believes that Malaysia you know and take advantage of the disturbance being created by AI due to the recent surge in demand for Nvidia’s specialised chips, which are essential for powering different forms of AI, including chatbots like Open AI’s ChatGPT and Google’s Gemini.

NEXT: AI Connect 2024 in Penang focuses on AI disruptionThe best way to know is to hold an event so that everyone can identify the participants and comprehend the surroundings of the AI scene, Curry said.

In the subsequent Q&amp, A, Curry goes into more detail about the occasion and explains why attending is worthwhile.
 

Q. Why did you decide to concentrate on AI for NEXT?

because everyone in the universe is discussing AI. Nvidia’s growth was but rapid as a result of AI, and it caught my attention. People will be a part of AI, in some way or another, after doing some checking and researching. However, over the past few decades, we have seen powerful opportunities by big companies like as Nvidia, Microsoft and ByteDance into Malaysia. So, the best way to learn from AI is to host an event but that we can learn from each other.. &nbsp,

Q. Why is it located on Batu Kawan rather than the beach?

There are already a few ordinary occasions on the island, but none in Batu Kawan. As industry experts will tell you, Batu Kawan is booming with semiconductor firms that even use a lot of AI, specifically for their production, but most people are unaware of it. Therefore I felt it was the best place for this occasion, and managed to get the help of the PKT Logistics Group via its business system, Entrepreneur&nbsp, Growth Hub, to host&nbsp, it at its The Ship Campus. &nbsp,

Q. You appear to be making an effort to draw students in addition. Why?

The most important factor for the industry to grow is skills. I anticipate a lot of desire for AI, and it should begin with young people, particularly those in universities and colleges. We want to motivate and motivate them to pursue careers in AI, particularly in the specialized field. You can read about the curiosity in AI from both the state and the traders who have invested. There is a&nbsp, need to expand our AI skills share. &nbsp,

Q. What kind of effect is this event going to own?

I want to see more personal business AI people, especially those with professional backgrounds, working with our colleges and universities to develop more expertise in the field. &nbsp,

I believe there is a huge opportunity for Malaysia because the semiconductor industry is increasingly reliant on AI to improve its production efficiency, especially if we can move the talent pool forward.

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