Trump has no monopoly on trying to restore vanished factory jobs – Asia Times

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The first ten days of April have seen the United States single-handedly rewrite the underlying paradigm for global trade – but while it is fair to say that the methods are extreme, the underlying goal of the policy is not unique to the US.

Indeed, the push to support, and expand, domestic manufacturing through policy intervention is experiencing a resurgence not seen since the 1970s.

Many people believe the COVID pandemic exposed weaknesses in global supply chains. In reality, the pandemic simply accelerated an existing trend of slowing of integration.

Growing concerns around trade wars and risks from climate shock existed prior to COVID with both policymakers and firms rethinking globalisation strategies.

Countries were also becoming concerned about the manufacturing dominance of China and the potential weaponisation of economic activity.

The risks of rising concentration

The expansion of international trade has led to massive efficiencies in production.

But it has also led to concentration of certain sectors in certain regions. Examples include software development in Silicon Valley, semiconductor manufacturing in Taiwan and critical minerals processing in China.

This geographic concentration started to raise concerns for many countries. Reasons include climate events disrupting supply chains, pandemics and increasingly, geopolitical concerns.

In response to the rise in economic concentration, countries as diverse as Japan, South Korea, the European Union, India, Brazil and the US introduced policy actions to promote or return certain critical sectors to domestic production.

Australia’s Future Made In Australia plan is a prime example of this.

Trade disruptions

Even before the Trump tariffs, the US and other countries were alarmed by China’s control over key manufacturing sectors and its associated ability to disrupt trade and commerce.

Australia experienced this first-hand when China imposed significant tariffs on wine and barley in response to Australia’s call for a Covid inquiry.

China’s willingness to use its economic position was demonstrated on Friday when it announced not just retaliatory tariffs, but export restrictions on seven categories of rare earth minerals. These are critical to strategic US sectors affecting companies like Apple and defense contractor Lockheed Martin.

Government support on the rise

This shift to increased economic resilience through self-reliance has led to a big surge in government intervention through industrial policies.

The objective of industrial policy is to target certain sectors in order to change the structure of economic activity within a country. It uses government policy to promote investment in sectors deemed under-served by markets.

While all countries have used some level of industrial policy, historically it was mainly confined to developing economies. It has been used sparingly since the 1970s. Between 2009 and 2017, the total number of industrial policies used by countries was less than 200.

Between 2017 and 2023 the use of industrial policy increased nine-fold. In 2023, there were roughly 2,500 industrial policy interventions put in place with two-thirds introduced by advanced economies. Almost 48% were concentrated in three: China, the EU and the US.

Intervening in markets

Generally, industrial policy has been out of favor with mainstream economists. It is very hard to get right as it relies on an in-depth knowledge of industries as well as an ability to predict the future.

Providing funding for one sector means less funding available for others. This could undermine new technologies or other as-yet unseen opportunities. It involves shifting resources from existing, efficient uses to less efficient uses.

It rarely works. A prime example: the many countries that have spent billions of dollars trying to recreate their own domestic Silicon Valleys with no success.

However, Trump is trying to do just that, on an economy-wide scale, mainly through tariffs. The tariffs announced also imply the US will go it alone. The approach takes fragmentation to a new level, where bilateral negotiations are the name of the game.

Shifting global alliances

Meanwhile the response from other nations such as Canada, Southeast Asian economies and even Europe is to diversify and form new alliances without the US.

Indeed, the Canadian Prime Minister’s first trip overseas was not, as tradition dictates, to the US, but to Europe and the UK, which he dubbed “reliable” partners.

Becoming more isolated and pushing other countries to China may not be what the US intends, but it is happening.

Last week, Japan and South Korea announced a joint strategy with China to promote regional trade. The EU’s trade representative went to Beijing shortly after the tariff announcement where the two nations announced plans to “deepen trade and investment” ties.

The risks of highly integrated supply chains in the face of security concerns, or changes in a trading partner’s domestic policy, have become glaringly clear.

How countries choose to address these concerns, especially through the widespread use of industrial policy, will create further disruption to markets. While it is considered politically expedient for security concerns, this will raise prices and limit choice in domestic markets. As the old adage reminds us, there is no free lunch.

Susan Stone is the Credit Union SA chair of economics at the University of South Australia.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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US-China trade war: economic fallout and strategic realignment – Asia Times

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The intensifying trade war between the United States and China has moved beyond a bilateral economic dispute, evolving into a global geopolitical confrontation with profound implications for East Asia. The economic fallout from escalating tariffs is expected to have wide-ranging consequences, including the restructuring of global supply chains and a realignment of strategic relationships in the region.

Although the US launched the trade war in an effort to curb China’s economic rise, the outcomes thus far indicate a reversal of those goals – strengthening China’s position in global trade, eroding US influence among key regional allies, and accelerating the shift toward a multipolar order in East Asia.

It is time for Washington to pause and fundamentally reconsider its strategy.

Disruption of the post-war global trading order

The US-China trade war now represents the most significant disruption to the global trading system since the formation of the post-World War II liberal economic order. Triggered by the imposition of steep tariffs – up to 125% by the US and 84% by China – the conflict now affects over $650 billion in bilateral trade, encompassing a wide range of consumer and industrial sectors.

And this may be just the opening salvo. No one can say with certainty where both countries will ultimately end up, as neither side appears willing to back down

Initially intended to rebalance trade flows and counter China’s perceived economic aggression, the trade war has instead generated widespread economic uncertainty and strategic dislocation – especially across East Asia.

The World Trade Organization projects an 80% reduction in US-China trade volumes, sending shockwaves through global markets. The OECD has revised its global GDP growth forecasts downward, predicting 3.1% growth in 2025 and 3.0% in 2026. US economic growth is expected to decline to 2.2% in 2025 and farther to 1.6% in 2026, reflecting not only trade-related headwinds but also rising inflation and waning investor confidence.

Tariffs have driven up import costs, particularly in sectors such as electronics, pharmaceuticals and retail. Financial markets have reacted negatively, with major stock indices experiencing notable declines.

Economic forecasts are becoming increasingly cautious, with growing concerns about the possibility of a recession. These trends point toward a heightened risk of stagflation – a troubling mix of economic stagnation and rising inflation.

Multinational corporations have begun reconfiguring their supply chains, shifting some production to other alternative countries. However, these alternatives lack China’s scale, efficiency, and integration, leaving global supply chains in flux and emerging markets vulnerable to further disruptions. The OECD warns that continued fragmentation could inflict lasting damage on global productivity.

China’s resilience and strategic position

Contrary to US expectations, China has not been economically crippled. As of 2024, it remains the world’s leading trading nation, accounting for 14.5% of global exports – far surpassing the United States’ 8.5%. Exports to the United States make up only 12.3% of China’s total exports, which amounted to almost $3.6 trillion.

This underscores Beijing’s strategic diversification and deep integration into global value chains. US leadership may be overestimating the significance of American imports in sustaining the economic strength demonstrated by the Chinese economy.

China supplies the US with critical goods, including semiconductors, rare earth minerals, and pharmaceuticals. Any further restrictions by Beijing in these sectors would have immediate and severe repercussions for US industry.

Strategic implications in East Asia

East Asia is witnessing a quiet but significant realignment. Major US allies such as South Korea and Japan are increasingly drawn toward China due to its economic size and geographic proximity. In 2023, China-South Korea trade reached $310 billion, and China-Japan trade exceeded $330 billion. In contrast, both countries traded only around $230 billion with the United States. This trend underscores a shift driven by economic pragmatism over ideology.

The ongoing trade war has started eroding the credibility of US-led alliances in the region. Participation by South Korea in China-led initiatives such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) signals a growing tilt toward Beijing.

Economic dependence is translating into diplomatic flexibility, with potential implications for long-standing security alignments. The region may never be the same again.

Should Washington continue with protectionist policies without offering viable economic alternatives, regional allies may begin to hedge their bets. This could result in reduced participation in US-led defense initiatives, joint military exercises, and diplomatic forums – marking a profound transformation in the region’s geopolitical landscape.

The US may be overestimating regional countries’ commitment to shared political values. That bond may not be strong enough to hold them together in the face of mounting economic hardships and rapidly shifting geopolitical dynamics.

US miscalculation and the rise of a multipolar Asia

Instead of curbing China’s rise, the trade war is catalyzing a broader realignment. China’s economic resilience, assertive diplomacy, and expanded global trade ties are accelerating its emergence as a rival superpower. Meanwhile, the US risks strategic overreach and diminishing relevance in a region it once dominated.

The Cold War-era architecture of US leadership is increasingly ill-suited for a world defined by economic interdependence. China sees this confrontation not merely as a trade dispute but as a strategic test of its national resolve. Far from backing down, Beijing is doubling down – confident that it can emerge from the conflict stronger and more globally engaged.

The way forward

The notion that the United States can bring China to its knees through a trade war is outdated. That window closed a long time ago. China is now the world’s largest trading nation – a status it has held for over a decade – and its share of global exports reflects a deeply embedded position within global supply chains.

It is crucial for American leadership to realistically assess the current role of US trade with China in driving China’s continued growth. Washington appears to be stuck in the past, when American investment and trade played a major role in China’s economic expansion. Today, China’s growth is increasingly sustained by diversified global partnerships and domestic innovation.

In 2024, China’s exports to the US accounted for a small portion of its total exports, underscoring its reduced dependence on the American market. On the other hand, the US remains heavily reliant on Chinese imports across critical sectors, from electronics and pharmaceuticals to rare earth minerals and consumer goods. A disruption in Chinese exports would paralyze major American companies and fuel inflationary pressures.

Moreover, China holds the ability to retaliate by targeting key US exports such as agricultural products, aircraft and luxury goods, which would hurt American farmers, exporters, and manufacturers. This could ripple across global markets, destabilize supply chains, and weaken US competitiveness.

In this multipolar landscape, China is no longer a subordinate player. It is a superpower with diversified markets, resilient trade networks, and growing geopolitical reach. The US strategy of using trade as a weapon – originally intended to constrain China – is now ironically enabling its rise.

Given these realities, the United States must fundamentally rethink its trade and strategic posture. Rather than continuing to rely on punitive tariffs, Washington should adopt a strategy of constructive engagement that reflects the complexities of a multipolar, interconnected global economy.

This requires a renewed commitment to work through multilateral trade institutions, ensure fair competition and promote transparency. Simultaneously, the US must lead the formation of inclusive regional trade agreements that offer its allies viable economic alternatives to dependence on China – thereby reinforcing trust and shared prosperity.

At the same time, Washington should deepen its partnerships in the  region by investing in joint ventures in digital infrastructure, green technology and next-generation innovation.

Domestically, the United States must enhance its economic strength by investing heavily in artificial intelligence, semiconductors, clean energy, and workforce development. These sectors will define global leadership in the 21st century, and the US must lead not merely through power, but by setting the pace of innovation.

Ultimately, preserving American competitiveness and credibility requires a comprehensive and forward-looking strategy. The challenge is no longer about winning a trade war with China – it is about whether the United States remains a central architect of the future global order or is gradually forced to cede that role to China

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Will iPhones cost more because of Trump’s tariffs on China?

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Liv McMahon

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Zoe Kleinman

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Reuters A woman's hands shown clasping two blue iPhone 16 handsets at a launch event in September.Reuters

The world’s most popular gadgets – phones, laptops, tablets, smartwatches – could be about to get a lot more expensive in the US.

Many of them are made in China, which now faces a 145% tariff on its goods imported to the US, under President Donald Trump’s controversial trade policy.

The effect this may have on the iPhone and its maker Apple is under the spotlight – with some analysts saying if costs are passed onto consumers, iPhone prices in the US could rise by hundreds of dollars.

And if the tariffs impact the value of the dollar, it could become more expensive to import iPhones and other devices around the world – potentially leading to higher prices in UK shops.

Ben Wood of CCS Insight told the BBC that if tariffs remain in place, Apple may raise iPhone prices globally when the next iteration is launched.

“It is unlikely the company would want to have differentiated pricing globally,” he said – as the tech giant would want to avoid people buying the device cheaply in the UK and selling it on for profit in the US.

Though others say they believe it could result in cheaper prices if firms which normally send their goods to the US instead send them to countries which don’t have such steep tariffs, like the UK.

And there may be a significant change if the cost of tariffs is passed onto consumers globally – longer contracts to spread out the cost of the device.

While a phone contract may typically last two years, Mr Wood said some firms already offer four year deals, and he believed “we might see five-year contracts” in 2025.

“One could argue it is almost like having a mortgage for your smartphone,” he said.

Where are iPhones made?

The US is a major market for iPhones and Apple accounted for more than half of its smartphones sales last year, according to Counterpoint Research.

It says as much as 80% of Apple’s iPhones intended for US sale are made in China, with the remaining 20% made in India.

Along with fellow smartphone giants such as Samsung, Apple has been trying to diversify its supply chains to avoid over-reliance on China in recent years.

India and Vietnam emerged as frontrunners for additional manufacturing hubs.

As tariffs took effect, Apple reportedly looked to speed up and increase its production of India-produced devices in recent days.

Reuters reported on Thursday that Apple chartered cargo flights to ship more than 600 tons of iPhones from India to the US.

Amid Trump’s 90-day pause on tariffs, including those levied on India, the country may be set to benefit from an iPhone manufacturing boost.

The BBC has approached Apple for comment on the impact of tariffs on their operations and prices, but has not had any response yet.

A chart showing how Apple could be impacted by tariffs. It includes information in this article, but presented with pictures of an iPhone, countries and a ship

How exposed is Apple to tariffs?

Trump and his advisors have said the aim of its tariffs are to encourage more US manufacturing.

However, the tech industry relies on a global network of suppliers for product components and assembly.

This, and finding skilled workers to match the fast pace and low cost of production in Asia, means relocating supply chains is no simple feat.

Apple committed a $500bn (£385bn) investment in the US in February – which the Trump administration believes will result in more homegrown manufacturing.

But Wedbush Securities analyst Dan Ives said shifting parts of its supply chain from cheaper manufacturing hubs in Asia to the US will take a lot of time, and money.

“The reality is it would take 3 years and $30 billion dollars in our estimation to move even 10% of its supply chain from Asia to the US with major disruption in the process,” he wrote on X on 3 April.

Will iPhone prices go up?

Apple have not revealed yet whether they plan to pass on the costs of the tariffs onto consumers in the US and increase prices.

Some analysts believe Apple is in a more fortunate position than others, having reaped more money from its products than it has spent on making them.

“As a company with lucrative margins on its devices, Apple can absorb some of the tariff-induced cost increases without significant financial impact, at least in the short term,” says Forrester principal analyst Dipanjan Chatterjee.

But he notes the company’s strong branding and popularity may allow it to pass some costs to consumers without too much backlash.

“The brand commands better loyalty than its competitors, and it is unlikely that a manageable price increase will send these customers fleeing into the arms of Android-based competitors.”

Some estimates suggest iPhone prices in the US could as much as triple if costs were passed to consumers.

Following Trump’s tariff increase on China to 125%, the cost for a China-made iPhone 16 Pro Max with 256GB storage would have surged from $1,199 to $1,999, according to estimates by investment banking firm UBS.

They estimate a less significant increase on the iPhone 16 Pro 128GB storage – which is made in India – by five percent from $999 to $1046.

While some analysts such as Dan Ives have suggested that the cost of a “Made in USA” iPhone could soar to as much as $3500.

What can consumers do about it?

There’s still plenty of uncertainty about what happens next, and how companies like Apple will respond to tariffs remains to be seen.

This hasn’t stopped some US customers reportedly rushing to Apple stores to buy its smartphones.

The BBC spoke to shoppers outside an Apple Store in New York who had bought products in fear of a potential price hike.

Anthony Cacioppo, a 53-year-old DJ and security technician, purchased the new iPhone.

“I really didn’t need a phone… but I’m not ready to pay double the price,” he said.

Bruce Conroy, a hair stylist, told the BBC that even if prices had risen considerably he “would have stuck with Apple products” – though potentially delayed his purchase of a new iPad.

“I bought it because the tariffs are coming, I want to buy before the prices go up and I expect they will,” said Julia Baumann, a personal finance editor, of her new MacBook.

Julia wearing a black puffer coat and yellow scarf outside the Apple Store on 5th Avenue in New York

We will likely have to wait until the autumn to see how much the next iPhone will cost.

But if it looks like costs incurred by tariffs will result in higher price tags, some may look to rival handsets or second-hand devices.

CCS Insight estimates that 5.5m second-hand smartphones will be sold in the UK in 2025, representing 29.7% of the total market.

The iPhone remains one of the most expensive smartphones on the market – and brands such as Google and Samsung offer phones with similar features at a lower cost.

The other option, and perhaps the most cost-effective, could be for people to skip upgrades to newer iPhone models and look to slightly older, cheaper versions.

“The path of least resistance would be to keep the smartphone they already have for longer,” said Mr Wood.

Additional reporting by Paul Sargeant, Tom Finn and Pratiksha Ghildial.

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Pakistan mercilessly removing its Afghan refugee crisis – Asia Times

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Since November 2023, Pakistan’s Illegal Foreigners Return Program ( IFRP ) has resulted in the deportation of over 800, 000 Afghans, making it one of the largest mass deportations in recent history.

Human rights organizations claim that some deportedees, including previous Afghan government workers, women activists, and journalists, are subject to persecution under the Taliban, despite the Pakistani government’s assertions about safety and links undocumented Afghans to rising violence.

Afghan Citizen Card (ACC ) holders and undocumented immigrants must leave the country on March 31, 2025, with arrests starting after that point. Afghan refugees who are armed with Proof of Registration ( PR ) cards, which are approved by the UNHCR, are not permitted to remain in Pakistan until June 30, 2025.

Worries persist regarding the treatment of vulnerable groups, including women and children, despite the government’s assurance that the evacuation procedure may be conducted with respect. Officials in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have issued official notices to Afghan citizens to end their activities and leave their properties.

In response, some universities, colleges, and companies have been shut down in places like Nasir Bagh Road, Board Bazaar, Urmar, Phandu Road, Afghan Colony, and Chamkani. Some Afghan individuals have now left for Afghanistan, while others are still unsure of their future.

The closing of educational facilities, health facilities, and other companies has hampered the livelihoods of many Afghan immigrants who are residing in Pakistan. In spite of global pleas for mercy, Islamabad has remained consistent that all foreign nationals who are undocumented must follow the legal guidelines or face removal.

The World Food Programme claims. Food scarcity affecting 14.8 million people in Afghanistan indicate a worsening humanitarian crises. Jailed families frequently experience extreme hardships as a result of poor shelter and limited work opportunities upon their return, according to reports.

Bangladeshi authorities have often cited Afghan citizens as a source of security concerns, blaming the deportation program on a rise in violence and criminal activity. The state has also cited the country’s citizens ‘ limited cover, healthcare, and employment opportunities, citing the economic burden posed by illegal immigrants.

Officials claim that removing illegal foreigners would help maintain the nation’s economy as inflation is spiking and economic pressures are mounting. Despite the imprisonment drive, constitutional protection for authorized Afghan refugees is still a contentious issue.

Political unrest and conflict in Afghanistan have frequently been the result of historical conflicts, such as the Durand Line established in 1893, which Afghanistan has not publicly acknowledged. Many Afghans view it as a colonial implementation that splintered the Pashtun and Baloch communities.

Afghanistan has challenged the validity of the border since Pakistan’s founding in 1947, contributing to frequent bilateral tensions.

A turning point came with Pakistan’s support of the Afghan jihadists in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which received significant support from the United States and Saudi Arabia. The second significant flood of Armenian migrants into Pakistan during this time was estimated at between three and five million.

Pakistan’s initial attitude was initially supportive of Afghan refugees, but with time geopolitical tensions, cross-border violence, and home security concerns changed. After Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan ( TTP), which Pakistan believed operated from Afghan soil, carried out the 2014 Army Public School attack in Peshawar, the situation got worse.

More than 365, 000 Armenian migrants were forced to return in 2016 as a result of this. Pakistan often accused of secretly supporting the Afghan Taliban, straining its partnership with US-backed Pashtun governments, and more complicating the migrant situation.

Pakistan later worked with the International Organization for Migration ( IOM) to track down and file illegal Afghan immigrants, but the refugee crisis is still deeply entangled with larger political and security relationships in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Thousands of Afghans emigrated the state after the Taliban took power in August 2021, with Iran and Pakistan serving as their main cross-border destinations. Over 1 million new visitors received protection in Iran, while Pakistan received about 600,000. Both nations have since taken limiting actions, including deporting illegal Afghans.

Tens of thousands of Afghan migrants were rescued by a number of European nations, including the US, Canada, the UK, and Germany, through urgent emergency and settlement plans. More than 85, 000 Afghans were relocated and through 122, 000 were resettled by the US. Greece became a refuge for Afghan people, mainly because Canada and the UK intended to relocate 40, 000 and 20 000 people, respectively.

Despite these attempts, many refugees also have access to services and legal issues. After the Taliban took control, the US Special Immigrant Visa ( SIV ) program, which was established in 2009 for Afghans who assisted US missions, became even more crucial.

But, President Donald Trump suspended refugee relocation applications, including the SIV operation, causing confusion and upheaval for some candidates who had been approved.

According to UNHCR data, the majority of Afghan refugees remain based in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP ) and Balochistan due to their close proximity to Afghanistan and close kinship ties. In Pakistan, over 80 % of Afghan migrants now reside in these two regions, where they have established a variety of companies.

Due to a rise in programs to Pakistan’s military in Kabul, the visa application process has significantly slowed. The surveillance concerns have made the interactions between Afghanistan and Pakistan even more difficult.

The Durand Line has seen an increase in conflicts since February 2022, leading to frequent conflicts between Afghan and Pakistani border security causes. The continued border conflicts between Pakistan and Afghanistan are more highlighted by the violent clashes that occurred at the Torkham passing in March 2025 between Pakistan’s Frontier Corps and Taliban border guards.

Pakistan has imposed more restrictions on Afghan refugees as Islamabad’s diplomatic relations with Kabul continue to suffer. 1.33 million Afghan refugees were still living in Pakistan as of June 2023, according to the UNHCR, with 52.6 % residing in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 24.1 % in Balochistan.

The fate of thousands of Afghan refugees is still uncertain as Islamabad continues to repress its assault on migrants. UN authorities have continuously criticized Pakistan’s September 2023 Illegal Immigrants Repatriation Plan, which has forced hundreds of thousands of Afghans to flee their homes and returning to Afghanistan.

The UN reported a disturbing increase in Afghan arrests as the March 31 date approached. The deportation method of Afghan refugees from Pakistan has been marked by extreme hardships, including large detentions, confiscation of property, loss of identity documents, and allegations of misconduct quite as harassment, abuse, and bribery.

These activities have drastically increased Afghan migrants ‘ and asylum seekers ‘ risk. These persons face significant difficulties in reintegrating into Afghan society after being deported, particularly in terms of getting into education and employment and maintaining socio-economic security.

These issues are made worse by the Taliban’s restrictive policies regarding the fundamental individual rights of women and girls, as outlined in Asylum information from 2023.

49 confinement facilities have been set up in Pakistan to house Afghan nationals until imprisonment. These facilities were never established under a particular legal framework, which raises questions about the validity and conditions of these facilities. This circumstance underscores the need for a more compassionate and legal-based method of handling the imprisonment approach.

Through the Regional Refugee Response Plan for 2024-2025, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has laid out a substantial commitment that will help 4.8 million Armenian migrants and 2.5 million people of their network areas.

In light of the difficulties they face, including arrests and socio-economic volatility, this plan is essential in meeting the urgent requirements of Afghan refugees. The future of Afghan migrants and Pakistan-Afghanistan relations is still very uncertain as a result of security concerns, financial burden, and philanthropic crises.

Pakistan is expected to uphold global legal requirements in its treatment of displaced people, despite not having signed the 1951 Refugee Convention and lacking a formal legal foundation for the safety of migrants.

Regardless of legal status, this includes ensuring that incarceration techniques respect human rights and uphold all other people’s respect. Pakistan continues to be a major player in the region and has a significant role to play in promoting security despite the fact that its internal volatility is generally caused by its local problems.

The wider global area is particularly concerned about the possibility of Afghanistan becoming a hub for criminal activity. In this context, resolving the frequent conflicts between Pakistan and Afghanistan is crucial for both local peace and global security.

Meena and Akanksha are both working on a PhD at the Centre for Inside Eastern Studies, and they are both employed by J. N. U.

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Durian exports to China face hurdle

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Growers and manufacturers demand action from the government to address qualification problems.

PUBLISHED: 8 Apr 2025 at 17: 33

Fresh durian sorted for export. (Photo: Commerce Ministry)
Durian freshly sorted for trade. ( Photo: Commerce Ministry )

On Tuesday, durian farmers and exporters from Chanthaburi and Trat regions ‘ eastern fruit regions pleaded with the government to address problems brought on by China’s rejection of the results of the Thai durian trade experiment.

After China’s General Administration of Customs ( GACC ) suspended the certification of two Thai labs that had previously confirmed that Thai durian had no trace of Basic Yellow 2 ( BY2 ) dye, about 1, 000 durian farmers and exporters gathered on Tuesday in Chanthaburi.

Exporters are now required to submit facility reports that just show labs that have been GACC-approved and have cadmium levels below 0. 0 micrograms and no visible BY2.

Nevertheless, Chinese customs officials conducting border inspections of the fruit discovered BY2 pollution, which sparked concerns and suspicions of unlawful use of the substance or possible use of contaminated products in the Thai durian supply chain.

Local exporters are concerned about a lack of certified labs, which may cause China to reject edible crops and cause further delays in exports.

They furthermore urged the government to address different pressing export issues, such as the importation of edible that is not ripe in the area and edible grown in neighboring nations that are smuggled in and falsely identified as Thailand-grown.

They claimed that these problems could undermine Thai durian’s notoriety and credibility on the market.

Sanchai Kosanwatana, a specialist in citrus farming, claimed the Chanthaburi collecting was the largest in recent memory because these issues have persisted in the citrus export chain and remained unsettled.

According to Ekaphap Phonsue, official for the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, reports that no laboratories in Thailand are left to check durian before exporting because of China’s punishments are inaccurate.

Four labs are still open, and five more are awaiting GACC’s acceptance. &nbsp,

He claimed that Thailand has also requested that China speed up the edible processing process in Thailand but has not yet heard back.

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Foreign teams start to withdraw from the collapse site

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Recovery energy still going powerful, says government

PUBLISHED: 6 Apr 2025 at 04: 33

Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra listens to a briefing by a team of Israeli rescuers who are part of an international contingent working at the collapsed building site in Bangkok on March 31. Ruamkatanyu Foundation
Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra listens to a presentation by a group of Jewish volunteers who are part of an international regiment operating at the collapsed building blog in Bangkok on March 31. Ruamkatanyu Foundation

The Israeli rescue team, part of the global Urban Search and Rescue ( USAR ) network, has now withdrawn from the site of the collapsed State Audit Office building in Bangkok.

This shift aligns with an earlier statement from Bangkok governor Chadchart Sittipunt that foreign rescue teams had started pulling out as some countries needed to attend to other serious international missions.

Mr Chadchart expressed his profound gratitude to the team for their work and bade them goodnight on Friday. ” The Jewish group, one of the first to reply within the USAR system, had been on-site for about a year, offering great expertise”, he said.

USAR groups are split into three categories: Heavy, Medium and Light. The Israeli staff falls under the Heavy type, meaning they can build worldwide to disaster sites within 78 hours and work non-stop, 24/7.

Specialising in search and rescue operations under fell buildings, the Jewish team soon set to work, identifying vital symptoms and signs of possible individuals, which they analysed using behaviour patterns, he said.

The team, which also includes legal experts and engineers, said the collapse in Thailand was particularly complex, noting” they had never before encountered the collapse of such a tall building”, said Mr Chadchart.

He assured the public that the departure of international teams would not impede the ongoing rescue and recovery efforts.

He said the Thai rescue teams, who have been in constant communication with international experts, are well-equipped and ready to continue the mission.

Meanwhile, the Japanese rescue team is en route to provide support, although their assistance will not be directed to the disaster site itself.

Instead, their focus will be on sharing knowledge, managing warning systems, and assessing the structural integrity of surrounding buildings, Mr Chadchart said.

Mr Chadchart said the ongoing search and rescue operations would continue without disruption, despite the international teams gradually returning to their home countries.

The key challenge now is locating survivors still trapped in the rubble. However, with the arrival of heavy machinery, the Thai rescue teams are able to carry on their work effectively, without exceeding operational limits.

As the international teams conclude their missions, Thai teams remain focused on critical search and rescue efforts. The use of heavy machinery has been carefully coordinated, with engineers ensuring the safety of operations to avoid further structural collapses.

” There is still hope of finding more survivors, and we remain committed to this mission with full determination”, the governor said.

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Tariffs on India: Can Trump’s sweeping global duties spark a manufacturing boom?

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last an afternoon
Soutik Biswas
Getty Images Employees at a garment manufacturing factory of Viraj Exports Pvt. in Noida, Uttar Pradesh, India, on Tuesday, Oct. 11, 2022Getty Images

Donald Trump’s broad tariffs have impacted global commerce, but disruption frequently leads to new opportunities.

Starting 9 April, Indian goods will face tariffs of up to 27% (Trump’s tariff chart lists India’s rate as 26%, but the official order says 27% – a discrepancy seen for other nations too). Before the tariff hike, US rates across trading partners averaged 3.3%, among the lowest globally, compared to India’s 17%, according to the White House.

India “presents an opportunity” in textiles, electronics, and machinery” with the US imposing even higher tariffs on China ( 54 % ), Vietnam ( 46 % ), Thailand ( 36 % ), and Bangladesh ( 37 % ), according to the Delhi-based think tank Global Trade Research Initiative ( GTRI ).

Great export tariffs for China and Bangladesh give Indian textile manufacturers more room to grow in the US market. If Taiwan’s system and plan help are strengthened, India can tap into package, testing, and lower-end chip production, despite Taiwan’s dominance in electronics. Even a 32 % tariff-driven limited supply chain transition from Taiwan might benefit India.

The industries that are dominated by China and Thailand are mature for tariff-driven transfer, especially in the fields of technology, cars, and products. According to a word from GTRI, India can make money by attracting purchase, expanding production, and increasing exports to the US.

May India be able to capitalize on the occasion?

Higher taxes have raised costs for businesses that are dependent on global value chains, putting strain on India’s ability to compete in foreign markets. India has a major trade deficit despite growing imports, largely driven by services. India accounts for only 1.5 % of global exports. Trump has consistently referred to India as a “tariff ruler” and a “big offender” of trade ties. With his fresh taxes, there is a concern that Indian imports will be less aggressive.

Reuters A man walks past a screen displaying U.S. President Donald Trump, at the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) ahead of Trump's tariff plans, in Mumbai, India, April 2, 2025Reuters

Nevertheless, Ajay Srivastava of GTRI believes that the US’s mercantilist price regime could spur India’s benefit from global supply chain adjustments.

India may improve its ease of doing business, invest in shipping and equipment, and uphold policy balance to fully exploit these options, according to the statement. If all of these requirements are met, India is well-positioned to become a major international hotspot for manufacturing and exporting in the upcoming years.

That’s much simpler to say than to do. Places like Malaysia and Indonesia may be better positioned than India, according to Biswajit Dhar, a business professional from the Delhi-based Council for Social Development think pond.

” We may have some lost ground in the garment industry then that Bangladesh is subject to higher tariffs, but the reality is that we have treated the industry as a twilight sector and made no investments.” How may we really benefit from these tax changes without expanding our ability? says Mr. Dhar.

Since February, India has ramped up efforts to win Trump’s favour – pledging $25bn in US energy imports, courting Washington as a top defence supplier and exploring F-35 fighter deals. To ease trade tensions, it scrapped the 6% digital ad tax, cut bourbon whiskey tariffs to 100% from 150% and slashed duties on luxury cars and solar cells. Meanwhile, Elon Musk’s Starlink nears final approval. The two countries have launched extensive trade talks to narrow the US’s $45bn trade deficit with India.

However, India was unable to leave the price war.

India may be concerned because there was a possibility that continuing trade negotiations would protect it from bilateral tariffs. According to Abhijit Das, former mind of the Centre for WTO Research at the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, imposing these taxes right now is a significant setback.

Getty Images Workers assemble mobile phones at a Dixon Technologies factory in Noida, Uttar Pradesh, India, on Thursday, Jan. 28, 2021.Getty Images

One upside: pharmaceuticals are exempt from reciprocal tariffs, a relief for India’s generic drug makers. India supplies nearly half of all generic medicines in the US, where these lower-cost alternatives account for 90% of prescriptions.

Exports in important industries like technology, executive products, automotive components, industrial machines, and marine products could suffer, yet. Given the significant investments made through India’s flagship “production-linked incentives” ( PLI ) schemes to boost local manufacturing, it would be especially troubling for electronics.

” I’m concerned about the capacity of our producers because many of them are small producers who will struggle to withstand a 27 % tax increase, making them unprofitable.” The problem only gets worse as the firm costs go up, and the trade infrastructure keeps getting worse. According to Mr. Dhar,” we’re at a big disadvantage.”

Some people believe that Trump’s bargaining chip in India’s trade negotiations is these taxes. The most recent statement from the US Trade Representative reveals Washington’s dissatisfaction with India’s business practices.

The report, which was made public on Monday, highlights India’s tight import regulations for dairy, pork, and fish, which require non-GMO certification without any supporting evidence from science. Additionally, it criticizes India’s slow acceptance of genetically modified products and stent and implant prices.

India has been placed on the” Priority Watch List” due to concerns over intellectual property rights, which the report cites insufficient patent privileges, and lack of business secret laws. The record also has concerns about limiting dish policies and mandates for data localization, which further strain trade ties. Washington is concerned that India’s regulatory strategy is extremely in line with that of China. US exports could increase by at least$ 5.3 billion annually if these obstacles were removed, according to the White House.

Being in the middle of business negotiations just makes our risk worse, according to the author. This isn’t just about business exposure; it’s the whole package, according to Mr. Dhar. Additionally, expanding your opportunities and gaining a competitive advantage over Vietnam or China takes period.

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