Disruption (Page 12)

On July 29, 2024, a follow-up quadrilateral ministerial meeting was held in Tokyo. The Quad gathering of Japanese, American, Australian and Indian foreign ministers was overshadowed in media coverage by the more stimulating US-Japan 2+2 meeting and trilateral meeting of US, Japanese and South Korean defense ministers a day earlier.

Still, in diplomacy, even a meeting for the sake of a meeting can make good political sense. It can be an important tool for not only cultivating personal contacts but also for maintaining the visibility of institutionalized formats.

So what does the Quad do? The Quad is currently focusing its activities mainly in ten areas, namely:

1. Addressing health security challenges, including pandemic response and vaccine distribution.
2. Promoting initiatives to combat climate change and promote sustainable development.
3. Developing infrastructure projects to enhance connectivity and economic growth.
4. Enhancing the resilience of semiconductor supply chains.
5. Collaborating on critical and emerging technologies like 5G and AI.
6. Enhancing cyber resilience and cooperation to counter cyber threats.
7. Prioritizing Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) for providing aid and support during natural disasters and emergencies.
8. Ensuring the security of maritime routes and combating illegal activities at sea.
9. Tackling misinformation and promoting accurate information.

10. Strengthening efforts to combat terrorism and enhance regional security.

Ukraine war lessons

Notwithstanding friendly Russo-Indian ties, India and its fellow Quad members are learning valuable lessons from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In modern conflicts, hybrid warfare—which combines military attacks with cyberattacks on vital infrastructure like power plants—is becoming common.

February 2022 saw the start of Russia’s actual invasion of Ukraine, although it is thought that over a year before Russia had already gained access to the electricity and telecommunications infrastructure in Ukraine, as well as government agency networks, and was planning sabotage operations.

The cyberattacks started to pick up steam approximately a month prior to the invasion, and by the eve of the assault on February 23, over 300 Ukrainian systems had been attacked. The invasion started on February 24 and caused a disruption in the satellite communication network.

It is therefore no wonder that Quad places much importance on cybersecurity and hybrid warfare. The Quad intends to accelerate its capacity-building projects seen in the international conference on cyber capacity building in the Philippines and the forthcoming Quad Cyber Bootcamp in India.

Quad members clearly understand that China could replicate Russian tactics using hybrid warfare as a precursor to an invasion of Taiwan or a border conflict with India. 

Why does the Quad matter?

While the Quad is a far cry from the grandiose vision of former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe’s vision for Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond, it is still a meaningful part of the Indo-Pacific security environment.

Several commentators have noted that there is inflation in the number of minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific, ranging from AUKUS and the Quad to various trilateral formats, which dilutes their meaning and distracts the focus of the US, Japan and other regional players.

Some even argue that the minilateral formats, instead of adding to the stability of the Indo-Pacific security environment, are causing further instability.

Each chain is only as strong as its weakest link. In the case of the Quad, India is the least integrated member. Both Japan and Australia are US allies and already well integrated.

Japan and Australia recently signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement, which makes them quasi-allies. Japan also signed RAAs more recently with the Philippines and the UK.

From Washington’s point of view, greater interoperability between its allies in the First Island Chain is more than welcome. The rapprochement between Japan and South Korea, which face similar security challenges, is also an important part of the US network strategy.

Unlike in the North Atlantic, since the dissolution of SEATO, there has been no Asian regional pact focusing on collective security. The reason is that, until now, there was no political will to create such an alliance.

The US, which is defending its primacy in the region, is focusing mainly on fostering bilateral alliances. A good example of this strategy is the recent Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) announcing the intention of the US to reconstitute US forces in Japan into a joint force headquarters, strengthening its command function in Japan in parallel with the creation of Japan’s SDF Joint Operations Command.

While AUKUS and the trilateral US-led cooperation relationships (US, Japan and Australia; US, Japan and South Korea; and most recently, US, Japan and the Philippines) are better integrated and clearly focused on security with an emphasis on extended deterrence, the Quad has shifted its primary focus to providing public goods and economic security. 

Even though the Quad is not headlining the show, thanks to its flexibility and resilience, it retains relevance in the Indo-Pacific’s emerging new security architecture.

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Bangladesh is still shaking from violent student protests in recent weeks that resulted in over 170 deaths, a crackdown that has drawn unflattering global attention to the unprecedented brutality of police forces against civilians and an alleged government-enforced internet blackout that lasted for over five days.

As the situation starts to stabilize and internet access—at least for broadband—gradually resumes, grainy videos of students and ordinary citizens who protested for reforms in government job quotas are flooding social media. These videos show them being hit by bullets, pellets and relentless barrages of tear gas.

On the other hand, pro-government supporters are posting and sharing a counterstream of footage, including clips of vandalism during the protests punctuated by attacks on the country’s only metro rail system in Dhaka as well as on expressway and flyover toll booths on flyovers.

A video of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina crying upon seeing the damaged metro rail has gained significant traction and has been widely discussed and trolled online.

The general public’s perception of Hasina – who in January this year secured her fourth consecutive term through an opposition-less election – is a blend of fear, awe and apprehension.

Her administration’s heavy-handed suppression of protests and silencing of political opponents through intimidation, forced disappearances and extrajudicial killings are well-documented.

So, too, is her government’s legal harassment of the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), whose members face an overwhelming number of cases against them.

However, it isn’t only the use of brute force or a subdued judiciary that has made Hasina the longest-serving female head of government in modern Bangladeshi history.

Her administration is skilled at first crafting a narrative against its perceived opponents and enemies and then persistently disseminating this narrative through the country’s mainstream media and its extensive network of activists.

For instance, the Hasina administration is now vigorously working to shift the public focus from the “death tolls” to the “economic damage” caused by the recent student protests.

They claim that the main political opposition parties — BNP and Jamaat-E-Islami — “hijacked” the protests from the students and redirected them for their own political agenda of causing disruption and attempting to overthrow the government.

Why did the opposition jump in?

BNP and Jamaat—the usual suspects—clearly sought to exploit the chaos, echoing the sentiment of the devious character Littlefinger from the popular Game of Thrones series who said, “Chaos isn’t a pit, Chaos is a ladder.”

The political opposition had clear motives to capitalize on the unrest, as it presented an ideal opportunity for anti-government demonstrations.

Since early July, university students and recent graduates had staged peaceful yet persistent protests – a strategy that was successful in 2018 when similar demonstrations forced Hasina to replace the quota system with merit-based appointments.

The country’s courts, often seen as favoring Hasina, overturned the decision in June, fueling widespread suspicion that the prime minister sought to reinstate the quotas to appease her supporters, who were struggling due to the country’s economic difficulties.

However, Hasina made a faux pas in an unrelated press briefing that likely was responsible for unleashing the torrents of repressed anger. On the ninth day of the student protests, Hasina indirectly or unintentionally labeled the protesters as descendants of “razakars,” a term associated with wartime traitors.

Hasina and her Awami League party have frequently used such accusations against opponents and dissenters. Over the past 15 years, Hasina has positioned her supporters as the rightful heirs to the legacy of the country’s independence struggle and, by extension, its success.

At the same time, dissenters and opposition members have been portrayed as remnants of old treasonous and extremist forces. For a long time, Hasina succeeded in convincing a significant portion of the country’s apolitical population of this narrative.

This time, however, it backfired. Clearly frustrated and fed up with this “overused narrative,” students staged a dramatic response, organizing a large procession in the heart of Dhaka University – the largest public university – within hours of Hasina’s remarks. The situation quickly escalated after Hasina’s party’s student wing attempted to suppress the unrest with their trademark harsh tactics.

In her 15 years in power, Hasina had never encountered a situation where a student protest over job quotas escalated so swiftly into a widespread revolt, with people demanding her resignation and labeling her an “autocrat.” In a crisis that was largely of her own making, political opposition members merrily jumped in.

Overused narrative

The political opposition is now facing repercussions for their involvement – or alleged “hijacking” – of the student protests. As the dust settles on several tumultuous days, over 6,000 individuals with ties to the opposition have been swiftly arrested for their purported roles in vandalism and arson attacks.

Arson is a key element in the government’s narrative, reminiscent of the 2014 national election period when the main opposition BNP was accused of launching a series of arson attacks on public transport that resulted in several deaths.

Although the opposition denied any involvement and claimed that Hasina’s own Awami League orchestrated the attacks to tarnish them, Hasina’s regime has successfully persuaded much of the apolitical public that the BNP is indeed a party of “arsonists.”

This time, however, the strategy of using BNP-Jamaat as a scapegoat for every negative incident is not working so well for the Awami League. It’s not helped by the Awami League’s prioritizing “economic loss” over “human lives” in the post-protest environment.

Mainstream media and many Awami League ministers have been fervently portraying those killed in the protests as “arson attackers” linked to the opposition.

However, the reality is that most of the deceased were indeed “students” or ordinary citizens, as numerous unverified yet compelling social media posts have shown.

The Hasina administration is evidently struggling to grasp the sentiments of the general public, who are growing weary of the ruling party’s various overused and often contrived narratives. They have lost their effectiveness partly due to economic hardships and democratic erosion.

While Hasina may ultimately manage to quell the widespread anger and maintain her grip on power, the recent violent days in Bangladesh have made one thing clear: once-effective narratives can lose their resonance with overuse and abuse.

Faisal Mahmud is an award-winning journalist based in Dhaka. He is the recipient of the Jefferson fellowship and Konrad Adeneur Stiftung fellowship

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